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Summary.	  
The	  Second	  World	  War	  was	  a	  time	  of	  increased	  contacts	  for	  ordinary	  Britons	  with	  
peoples	  of	  different	  race,	  ethnicity	  and	  nationality.	  This	  thesis	  explores	  these	  novel	  
interactions	  primarily	  through	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  other	  ranks	  of	  the	  18th	  Division,	  who	  set	  
sail	  from	  Britain	  in	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  1941	  and	  arrived	  in	  Singapore	  shortly	  before	  it	  was	  
overwhelmed	  by	  the	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Army,	  in	  February	  1942.	  They	  subsequently	  
endured	  three	  and	  a	  half	  years	  in	  captivity,	  the	  severity	  of	  which	  was	  such	  that	  a	  
quarter	  of	  them	  never	  returned.	  The	  harsh	  nature	  of	  their	  captivity	  meant	  that	  an	  
unusually	  large	  number	  of	  them	  were	  inspired	  to	  make	  a	  record	  of	  their	  experiences,	  
and	  it	  is	  the	  holdings	  of	  these	  accounts	  at	  the	  Imperial	  War	  Museum	  which	  provide	  the	  
pivotal	  source	  for	  this	  project.	  
Previous	  British	  studies	  of	  the	  prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese	  have	  tended	  to	  describe	  
aspects	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  officer	  corps.	  In	  this	  thesis	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  other	  
ranks,	  and	  specifically	  those	  recently	  recruited	  to	  the	  services,	  whose	  previous	  
overseas	  travels	  were	  at	  best,	  limited.	  It	  examines	  their	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  variety	  
of	  peoples	  with	  whom	  they	  came	  into	  contact,	  in	  the	  categories	  of	  civilians,	  allied	  and	  
enemy	  personnel.	  	  These	  contacts	  occurred	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  emotional	  settings,	  ranging	  
from	  the	  relatively	  care	  free	  journey	  east,	  to	  the	  more	  fraught	  conditions	  of	  combat	  
and	  captivity.	  It	  examines	  how	  these	  perspectives	  were	  formed	  and	  could	  change	  over	  
time,	  and	  in	  what	  way	  they	  informed	  relations	  with	  these	  various	  groups.	  	  
In	  the	  process	  new	  light	  is	  shone	  upon	  the	  experiences	  of	  these	  unfortunate	  men	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The	  Second	  World	  War	  was	  a	  pivotal	  point	  in	  the	  history	  of	  white	  global	  hegemony,	  signalling	  a	  
change	  in	  the	  colonial	  order	  that	  had	  developed	  over	  the	  previous	  500	  years.	  The	  British	  
Empire	  had	  reached	  its	  greatest	  territorial	  extent	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  with	  the	  addition	  
of	  the	  mandated	  territories,	  both	  to	  Britain	  itself	  and	  by	  proxy	  to	  its	  white	  dominions,	  at	  a	  time	  
when	  its	  relative	  economic	  power	  had	  been	  on	  the	  wane	  for	  some	  decades.	  Defending	  this	  
empire	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  France	  in	  1940,	  when	  Britain	  stood	  alone	  in	  Europe	  against	  the	  all-­‐
conquering	  German	  forces,	  would	  prove	  problematic.	  This	  was	  particularly	  so	  in	  Asia,	  where	  
the	  imperial	  ambitions	  of	  the	  increasingly	  militaristic	  government	  of	  Japan	  had	  already	  taken	  
that	  nation	  to	  war	  with	  China,	  and	  seen	  it	  occupy	  the	  French	  Vichy	  colonies	  in	  South	  East	  Asia.	  
Churchill’s	  attempts	  to	  appease	  the	  Japanese,	  by	  withdrawing	  troops	  from	  Shanghai	  and	  
closing	  the	  supply	  road	  from	  Rangoon	  to	  China,	  were	  successful	  for	  only	  a	  limited	  time.	  In	  early	  
December	  1941	  Japanese	  forces	  simultaneously	  attacked	  British,	  American	  and	  Dutch	  
territories,	  in	  a	  rapid	  advance	  that	  saw	  them	  sweep	  through	  the	  mainland	  and	  archipelagos	  of	  
South	  East	  Asia	  and	  the	  Pacific.	  The	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor	  and	  the	  capture	  in	  rapid	  succession	  
of	  Hong	  Kong,	  Malaya,	  the	  Netherlands	  East	  Indies,	  the	  Philippines	  and	  most	  of	  Burma	  
shattered	  the	  myth	  of	  white	  invincibility	  in	  the	  region.	  	  
The	  most	  stunning	  defeat	  of	  all,	  the	  fall	  of	  Singapore	  on	  the	  15th	  of	  February	  1942,	  after	  a	  
week	  of	  fighting	  on	  the	  island,	  was	  a	  crushing	  blow	  to	  Britain’s	  imperial	  prestige,	  both	  at	  home	  
and	  abroad.	  Winston	  Churchill	  referred	  to	  it	  as	  ‘the	  worst	  disaster	  and	  largest	  capitulation	  in	  
British	  history’,1	  a	  description	  no	  doubt	  informed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  had	  been	  inflicted	  by	  a	  
non-­‐European	  power.	  There	  had	  been	  a	  number	  of	  resounding	  defeats	  inflicted	  on	  British	  arms	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Churchill,	  W.S.	  (1951)	  The	  Second	  World	  War:	  Volume	  IV:	  The	  Hinge	  of	  Fate.	  Cassell,	  London.	  p	  81	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in	  the	  19th	  century	  in	  colonial	  settings	  by	  the	  resistance	  of	  non-­‐European	  local	  populations,	  
including	  the	  disastrous	  retreat	  from	  Kabul	  in	  1842,	  a	  near	  thirty	  year	  war	  with	  the	  Maoris	  in	  
New	  Zealand,	  and	  at	  Isandlwana	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Zulus	  in	  South	  Africa	  in	  1879.	  Even	  in	  
Churchill’s	  agile	  mind,	  the	  last	  of	  these	  events	  when	  he	  was	  just	  four	  years	  old,	  would	  be	  a	  
faint	  and	  distant	  memory.	  
For	  most	  of	  the	  population,	  including	  the	  younger	  men	  who	  went	  into	  captivity	  and	  who	  had	  
known	  nothing	  but	  British	  imperial	  superiority,	  such	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  established	  order	  must	  
have	  seemed	  unimaginable.	  Furthermore	  there	  had	  been	  a	  series	  of	  resounding	  defeats	  in	  the	  
current	  conflict	  in	  Europe,	  from	  Norway	  and	  the	  BEF	  in	  France	  to	  Greece	  and	  Crete,	  with	  large	  
scale	  surrenders,	  at	  St	  Valery	  in	  France	  and	  shortly	  to	  follow	  at	  Tobruk.	  But	  these	  had	  been	  at	  
the	  hands	  of	  European	  neighbours,	  and	  none	  had	  the	  impact	  of	  that	  at	  Singapore,	  inflicted	  by	  
an	  Asian	  nation.	  	  Paul	  Rich	  has	  suggested	  that:	  
The	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  in	  1939	  ushered	  in	  the	  beginnings	  of	  a	  new	  era	  
in	  British	  race	  relations	  which	  was	  to	  culminate	  in	  the	  relinquishing	  of	  the	  colonial	  
empire	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  early	  60s.2	  
	  
The	  beginning	  of	  the	  end	  for	  empire	  would	  come	  several	  years	  later	  with	  the	  fall	  of	  Singapore,	  
a	  defeat	  that	  accelerated	  the	  desire	  for	  independence	  across	  Asia.	  	  One	  consequence	  of	  the	  
Japanese	  campaign	  would	  be	  to	  expose	  a	  much	  larger	  proportion	  of	  the	  British	  public	  to	  
people	  of	  a	  different	  race,3	  either	  as	  servicemen	  in	  Asia,	  or	  back	  home	  in	  Britain,	  where	  by	  
June	  1944	  there	  would	  be	  130,000	  black	  GIs	  widely	  dispersed	  around	  the	  country.4	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Rich,	  Paul	  B.	  (1986;	  2nd	  edn	  1990)	  Race	  and	  Empire	  in	  British	  Politics.	  CUP.	  p145.	  
3	  Race	  was	  used	  with	  several	  contemporary	  meanings,	  including	  national	  and	  religious	  contexts,	  as	  well	  
as	  in	  relation	  to	  physiological	  difference.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  unless	  otherwise	  specified,	  it	  is	  the	  latter	  
interpretation	  that	  is	  intended.	  




0.2.	  Race,	  Class	  and	  National	  Identity.	  
In	  Britain,	  despite	  (or	  because	  of)	  its	  control	  of	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  globe’s	  population,	  
there	  was	  little	  visible	  indication	  of	  those	  peoples	  in	  the	  metropole	  prior	  to	  the	  1940s.	  Small	  
communities	  were	  clustered	  around	  the	  seaports	  of	  Liverpool,	  Cardiff	  and	  the	  East	  End	  of	  
London,	  and	  there	  were	  a	  fewer	  number	  of	  students,	  largely	  from	  colonial	  elites,	  at	  
educational	  establishments,	  a	  population	  estimated	  to	  be	  around	  eight	  thousand.5	  Contacts	  
with	  ordinary	  Britons	  were	  few	  and	  far	  between,	  unless	  the	  Briton	  concerned	  had	  been	  
overseas	  as	  part	  of	  the	  imperial	  diaspora	  that	  regulated	  the	  empire,	  often	  in	  the	  armed	  
services.	  This	  isolation	  would	  change	  significantly	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  war,	  initially	  as	  workers	  
were	  recruited	  from	  the	  Caribbean	  colonies	  to	  work	  in	  an	  assortment	  of	  industries	  and	  
services,	  and	  then	  with	  America’s	  formal	  entry	  into	  the	  conflict,	  due	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  large	  
numbers	  of	  black	  GIs	  who	  carried	  out	  support	  roles	  in	  the	  segregated	  US	  Army.	  Their	  arrival	  to	  
support	  the	  war	  effort	  was	  widely	  welcomed	  and	  there	  was	  much	  sympathy	  from	  the	  public	  at	  
large	  for	  the	  difficulties	  they	  experienced	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  segregation	  of	  the	  US	  Army,	  and	  
their	  treatment	  at	  the	  prejudiced	  hands	  of	  many	  of	  their	  white	  colleagues.	  This	  isolation	  would	  
also	  end	  for	  many	  servicemen	  sent	  to	  fight	  in	  Africa	  and	  Asia	  in	  what	  was	  a	  significantly	  more	  
global	  war	  than	  its	  predecessor.	  
There	  was	  however	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  oft	  claimed	  tolerance	  and	  belief	  in	  equality	  in	  white	  
Britain,	  and	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  white	  racial	  hegemony	  in	  the	  colonial	  setting.	  	  
This	  had	  already	  burst	  into	  conflict	  at	  home	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War	  in	  the	  port	  riots	  of	  1919,	  
and	  simmered	  through	  the	  inter-­‐war	  years,	  finding	  legislative	  expression	  in	  the	  Special	  
Restriction	  (Coloured	  Alien	  Seamen)	  Order	  of	  1925,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  a	  wide	  application	  of	  the	  
‘Colour	  Bar’.6	  This	  tension	  became	  more	  clearly	  drawn	  when	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  settlers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Reynolds,	  Rich	  Relations,	  p303.	  
6	  The	  1925	  Order	  was	  an	  instrument	  that	  changed	  the	  documentary	  proof	  required	  from	  black	  seamen	  
as	  proof	  of	  their	  British	  identity,	  potentially	  resulting	  in	  denial	  of	  entry	  or	  deportation.	  At	  a	  local	  level	  
the	  authorities	  would	  apply	  it	  zealously	  against	  the	  black	  population,	  regardless	  of	  British	  status	  or	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started	  arriving	  from	  Asia,	  the	  Caribbean	  and	  Africa	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  the	  post	  1945	  period,	  
challenging	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  British	  as	  a	  fair	  and	  tolerant	  people.	  Whilst	  much	  has	  been	  
assumed	  and	  asserted	  regarding	  the	  attitudes	  of	  ordinary	  Britons	  to	  race	  and	  difference	  in	  the	  
period	  before	  and	  during	  the	  war,	  there	  has	  been	  little	  concrete	  study.	  Tony	  Kushner’s	  
attempt	  to	  recover	  such	  details	  from	  the	  Mass-­‐Observation	  archive	  represents	  the	  most	  
comprehensive	  attempt	  at	  such	  an	  analysis,	  and	  reflects	  upon	  changes	  in	  outlooks	  as	  the	  war	  
progressed.7	  	  
One	  of	  the	  two	  aims	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  view	  the	  accounts	  of	  the	  prisoners	  of	  war	  (POWs)	  in	  
Asia	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  social	  history,	  by	  examining	  their	  attitudes	  to	  the	  issues	  of	  race,	  class	  
and	  identity,	  and	  thus	  add	  to	  the	  existing	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  such	  wider	  British	  perspectives	  
in	  this	  field.	  
The	  men	  of	  the	  18th	  Division,	  and	  the	  RAF	  ground-­‐crew	  who	  left	  Britain	  with	  them	  in	  convoy,	  
initially	  heading	  for	  Egypt,	  and	  then	  in	  response	  to	  events	  further	  east	  redirecting	  to	  Asia,	  offer	  
a	  near	  unique	  cohort	  in	  this	  respect.	  Most	  had	  been	  no	  further	  overseas	  than	  the	  hinterland	  of	  
Dunkirk	  in	  1940,	  if	  at	  all,	  and	  they	  left	  Britain	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  USA	  joining	  the	  war,	  before	  the	  
arrival	  of	  the	  GIs.	  After	  journeying	  half	  way	  round	  the	  world	  they	  had	  a	  few	  weeks	  of	  freedom,	  
such	  as	  it	  could	  be	  in	  a	  chaotic	  war-­‐zone,	  and	  then	  went	  into	  captivity,	  with	  little	  time	  to	  be	  
influenced	  by	  the	  prejudicial	  colonial	  tropes	  and	  mores	  of	  service	  in	  the	  empire.	  Thus	  by	  
elucidating	  their	  outlooks	  to	  the	  novel	  situations	  that	  they	  found	  themselves	  in,	  a	  greater	  
understanding	  can	  be	  gained	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  the	  prevalence	  of	  racialized	  thinking	  and	  the	  
validity	  of	  assumptions	  regarding	  the	  sources	  of	  such	  thinking,	  be	  that	  in	  a	  domestic	  context	  or	  
in	  a	  colonial	  setting,	  can	  be	  examined.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
occupation.	  See:	  	  Tabili,	  Laura.	  (1994)	  “We	  ask	  for	  British	  Justice”:	  Workers	  and	  Racial	  Difference	  in	  Late	  
Imperial	  Britain.	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  London,	  pp113-­‐134.	  	  See	  also:	  Hiro,	  Dilip.	  (1971)	  Black	  British	  
White	  British.	  Eyre	  and	  Spottiswoode,	  London.	  
7	  Kushner,	  Tony.	  (2004)	  We	  Europeans:	  Mass-­‐Observation,	  ‘Race’	  and	  British	  Identity	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  
Century.	  Ashgate,	  Aldershot.	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The	  British	  other	  ranks	  (BORs)	  were	  also	  members	  of	  a	  profoundly	  hierarchical	  structure,	  
particularly	  those	  in	  the	  army.	  Writing	  before	  the	  start	  of	  the	  war	  Lewis	  Clive	  had	  highlighted	  
the	  financial	  and	  institutional	  barriers	  to	  entry	  to	  the	  commissioned	  ranks,	  and	  the	  resultant	  
exclusion	  of	  those	  from	  the	  working	  class.	  He	  cites	  a	  statement	  in	  Parliament	  that	  only	  4%	  of	  
officers	  had	  come	  through	  the	  ranks,	  and	  that	  most	  of	  these	  were	  ‘gentleman	  rankers.’	  Duff	  
Cooper,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  War	  reported	  to	  the	  House	  that	  ‘even	  in	  the	  ranks	  the	  most	  
valuable	  asset	  if	  you	  are	  hoping	  for	  a	  commission	  is	  a	  public	  school	  accent.’	  8	  What	  Jeremy	  
Crang	  has	  described	  as	  a	  ‘distant	  and	  in	  many	  senses	  a	  feudal’	  relationship	  between	  the	  
officers	  and	  men	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  war	  did	  improve	  slowly,	  as	  a	  more	  meritocratic	  system	  of	  
selection	  was	  developed	  and	  implemented.9	  Geoffrey	  Field	  has	  similarly	  noted	  how	  the	  
pressures	  of	  the	  war	  and	  the	  need	  to	  commission	  an	  extra	  200,000	  officers	  led	  to	  a	  dramatic	  
change	  in	  the	  social	  make-­‐up	  of	  the	  officer	  corps.10	  Such	  developments	  however	  came	  about	  
after	  the	  men	  of	  the	  18th	  Division	  shipped	  out,	  and	  they	  remained	  locked	  into	  a	  military	  system	  
in	  captivity	  that	  was	  largely	  still	  grounded	  in	  the	  old	  ways.	  Of	  course	  not	  all	  of	  the	  other	  ranks	  
should	  be	  seen	  as	  working	  class,	  and	  although	  there	  were	  few	  in	  their	  number	  that	  had	  the	  
public	  school	  accent	  required	  for	  officer	  training,	  there	  would	  have	  been	  a	  larger	  number	  from	  
what	  was	  termed	  the	  commercial	  class,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  considerably	  higher	  level	  of	  education	  than	  
one	  might	  find	  in	  a	  regular	  peacetime	  unit.	  
Interwoven	  into	  the	  themes	  of	  race	  and	  class	  is	  that	  of	  national	  identity.	  Linda	  Colley	  has	  
proposed	  that	  British	  identity	  was	  initially	  constructed	  in	  the	  late	  early	  modern	  period	  in	  
opposition	  to	  a	  French	  and	  Catholic	  other.11	  With	  the	  French	  suitably	  subdued	  during	  the	  long	  
19th	  century	  conceptions	  of	  Britishness	  took	  on	  a	  more	  imperial	  hue,	  and	  this,	  along	  with	  a	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  Clive,	  Lewis.	  (1938)	  The	  People’s	  Army.	  Victor	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  Ltd,	  London.	  pp118-­‐124.	  
9	  Crang,	  Jeremy	  A.	  (2000)	  The	  British	  army	  and	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  War:	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  MUP,	  Manchester.	  p58.	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  Field,	  Geoffrey.G.	  (2011)	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resurgent	  patriotism	  and	  virtuous	  manhood,	  became	  core	  elements	  of	  the	  soldier	  hero	  as	  a	  
role	  model	  for	  the	  male	  half	  of	  the	  population.	  In	  this	  construction	  Graham	  Dawson	  suggests	  
that	  war	  was	  ‘its	  ultimate	  test	  and	  opportunity.’12	  Failing	  this	  test	  in	  the	  imperially	  laden	  
context	  of	  the	  fall	  of	  Singapore	  would	  have	  varying	  psychological	  repercussions	  on	  how	  the	  
BORs	  saw	  themselves,	  and	  how	  they	  were	  affected	  on	  a	  more	  physical	  plane	  by	  the	  attempts	  
of	  officers	  to	  redeem	  their	  dented	  pride.	  
Sonya	  Rose,	  in	  her	  study	  of	  identity	  in	  Britain	  during	  the	  war	  has	  pointed	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  forces	  
being	  at	  work,	  with	  issues	  of	  race,	  class	  and	  gender	  forestalling	  attempts	  to	  generate	  a	  
homogenous	  state	  of	  citizenship.	  She	  does	  however	  allow	  herself	  to	  define	  a	  British	  ‘national	  
character’,	  based	  on	  the	  hegemonic	  masculinity	  that	  melded	  elements	  of	  the	  soldier-­‐hero	  with	  
a	  more	  temperate	  and	  tolerant	  disposition	  that	  had	  developed	  in	  the	  inter-­‐war	  years.13	  Even	  in	  
1940	  such	  templates	  had	  their	  critics,	  as	  Hamilton	  Fyfe	  demonstrated	  in	  a	  passage	  following	  a	  
deconstruction	  of	  previous	  historical	  givens.	  
Yet,	  seeing	  that	  most	  	  ancient	  ideas	  now	  seem	  to	  us	  to	  be	  foolish,	  what	  reason	  is	  there	  
to	  suppose	  that	  our	  ideas	  will	  appear	  to	  future	  ages	  to	  have	  been	  any	  truer?	  One	  of	  
them,	  at	  any	  rate,	  which	  will	  be	  laughed	  at,	  I	  am	  sure,	  is	  the	  illusion	  of	  national	  
character.	  Or	  more	  probably,	  it	  will	  be	  looked	  back	  on,	  not	  with	  amusement,	  but	  
scorn.14	  
	  
Paul	  Addison	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  main	  conflict	  over	  identity	  during	  wartime	  was	  a	  contest	  
between	  an	  ‘Anglican	  Deep	  England	  of	  deference	  and	  hierarchy’	  and	  a	  ‘radical-­‐populist	  Britain	  
fuelled	  by	  dissent.’15	  Men	  from	  both	  of	  these	  groups	  would	  find	  themselves	  side	  by	  side	  in	  
captivity.	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  Dawson,	  Graham.	  (1994)	  Soldier	  Heroes:	  British	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  the	  imagining	  of	  masculinites.	  
Routledge,	  London.	  p1.	  
13	  Rose,	  Sonya	  O.	  (2003)	  Which	  People’s	  War:	  National	  Identity	  and	  Citizenship	  in	  Britain	  1939-­‐1945.	  
OUP.	  p287.	  
14	  Fyfe,	  Hamilton.	  (1940)	  The	  Illusion	  of	  National	  Character.	  Watts	  and	  Co,	  London.	  pp4-­‐5.	  Fyfe	  had	  
previously	  edited	  the	  Daily	  Mirror,	  the	  Morning	  Advertiser	  and	  the	  Daily	  Herald.	  
15	  Addison,	  Paul.	  (2004)	  “Book	  Review:	  Which	  People’s	  War:	  National	  Identity	  and	  Citizenship	  in	  Britain	  
1939-­‐1945,	  by	  Sonya	  O.	  Rose.”	  The	  English	  Historical	  Review,	  Vol	  119,	  p1367.	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In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Asian	  location	  of	  the	  camps,	  and	  the	  European	  origins	  of	  most	  of	  their	  
fellow	  prisoners,	  issues	  of	  wider	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  and	  western	  identities	  also	  have	  a	  role	  in	  how	  
the	  POWs	  could	  define	  themselves.	  As	  Edward	  Said	  has	  asserted;	  ‘the	  orient	  has	  helped	  to	  
define	  Europe	  (or	  the	  west)	  as	  its	  contrasting	  image,	  idea,	  personality,	  experience.’16	  	  
Elements	  from	  each	  of	  these	  aspects	  of	  identity,	  together	  with	  their	  associated	  perspectives	  
on	  race	  and	  class,	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  relation	  to	  how	  the	  Far	  Eastern	  Prisoners	  of	  War	  
(FEPOWs)	  interpreted	  their	  experiences,	  and	  attempted	  to	  reconstruct	  their	  sense	  of	  self,	  both	  
during	  captivity	  and	  as	  they	  tried	  to	  rebuild	  their	  lives	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  
	  
	  
0.3.	  British	  Other	  Ranks	  (BORs)	  and	  the	  FEPOW	  Narrative.	  
The	  second	  major	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  recover	  and	  reassess	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  Far	  
Eastern	  Prisoner	  of	  War	  (FEPOW)	  experience,	  particularly	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  BORs.	  Penny	  
Summerfield	  has	  written	  that	  the	  popular	  memory	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  ‘is	  the	  outcome	  
of	  a	  competitive	  and	  sometimes	  conflictual	  process	  by	  which	  some	  representations	  of	  the	  past	  
achieve	  social	  and	  cultural	  centrality	  while	  others	  are	  eclipsed	  and	  marginalised.’17	  In	  respect	  
of	  the	  prisoners	  in	  Asia	  there	  has	  been	  little	  evidence	  of	  this	  process	  at	  work	  in	  the	  popular	  
narrative,	  and	  where	  there	  has	  been	  some	  limited	  discussion	  in	  the	  historical	  literature	  it	  has	  
focussed	  on	  the	  relative	  role	  of	  different	  categories	  of	  officers	  in	  the	  camps.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  first	  
books	  on	  this	  captivity	  to	  be	  published	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period,	  Lt	  Coast	  noted	  in	  his	  
introduction:	  
I	  apologise	  to	  the	  Other	  Ranks.	  They	  had	  a	  worse	  time	  than	  the	  Officers	  and	  I	  very	  
much	  hope	  that	  some	  of	  them	  will	  write	  a	  history	  from	  their	  viewpoint.	  Though	  always	  
sympathetic	  to,	  and	  aware	  of	  the	  O.R.s’	  more	  wretched	  position,	  this	  book	  can	  but	  
remain	  the	  work	  of	  a	  Subaltern	  and	  an	  individualist.18	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Said,	  Edward	  (1978;	  2003	  edn)	  Orientalism.	  Penguin	  Classics,	  London.	  pp1-­‐2.	  
17	  Summerfield,	  Penny.	  (2010)	  “Dunkirk	  and	  the	  Popular	  Memory	  of	  Britain	  at	  War,	  1940-­‐58.”	  Journal	  of	  
Contemporary	  History,	  Vol	  45.	  p790.	  
18	  Coast,	  John.	  (1946;	  2014	  edn)	  Railroad	  of	  Death.	  	  Myrmidon,	  Newcastle	  upon	  Tyne.	  p.xlvii.	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Whilst	  there	  have	  been	  numerous	  accounts,	  published	  and	  unpublished,	  by	  the	  other	  ranks	  in	  
the	  intervening	  70	  years,	  there	  has	  been	  no	  academic	  attempt	  at	  a	  synthesis	  that	  focusses	  
specifically	  on	  captivity	  from	  their	  viewpoint.	  This	  thesis	  aims	  to	  start	  to	  redress	  this	  lacuna	  
and	  recover	  their	  history.	  
The	  dominant	  FEPOW	  narrative	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  has	  been	  one	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  
suffering	  and	  hardships	  endured,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  the	  time	  spent	  on	  the	  Burma-­‐
Thailand	  Railway	  (the	  Railway).	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  around	  a	  quarter	  of	  the	  
men	  would	  die	  in	  captivity	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  from	  the	  mutually	  reinforcing	  trinity	  of	  
malnutrition,	  illness	  and	  overwork,	  many	  of	  them	  during	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Railway,	  and	  
that	  more	  than	  half	  of	  all	  British	  POWs	  were	  involved	  at	  this	  particularly	  harsh	  location	  of	  
captivity.	  The	  Railway	  ran	  for	  a	  length	  of	  415kms	  from	  Ban	  Pong	  in	  Thailand	  to	  Thanbyuzyat	  in	  
Burma,	  connecting	  the	  Singapore	  to	  Bangkok	  line	  with	  that	  from	  Ye	  on	  the	  Burmese	  coast	  to	  
Rangoon.19	  	  
Whilst	  the	  Railway	  was	  atypical	  of	  overall	  captivity	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  severe	  circumstances	  that	  
could	  be	  endured	  and	  the	  consequent	  high	  mortality	  rates,	  it	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  representative	  
of	  the	  overall	  nature	  of	  prison	  life.	  It	  was	  not	  the	  singular	  experience	  that	  it	  has	  often	  been	  
portrayed	  as.	  Conditions	  could	  vary	  considerably	  depending	  on	  issues	  of	  location,	  time	  and	  
both	  allied	  and	  Japanese	  agency.	  Those	  men	  in	  the	  camps	  in	  the	  remote	  middle	  stretches	  of	  
the	  line	  suffered	  far	  more	  than	  their	  colleagues	  who	  had	  the	  better	  fortune	  to	  be	  based	  closer	  
to	  the	  respective	  termini,	  particularly	  in	  Thailand,	  where	  facilities	  were	  more	  developed	  and	  
supplies	  easier	  to	  deliver.	  The	  most	  exacting	  times	  on	  the	  Railway	  were	  the	  speedo	  periods,	  
when	  the	  Japanese	  demanded	  extra	  effort	  to	  meet	  local	  construction	  deadlines,	  the	  worst	  of	  
which	  coincided	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  monsoon	  and	  a	  cholera	  epidemic	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  1943.	  
As	  will	  be	  seen	  the	  outlooks	  and	  approaches	  of	  the	  camp	  command	  structures,	  both	  Japanese	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Kinvig,	  Clifford.	  (1973)	  Death	  Railway.	  Pan/Ballantine,	  London.	  p24.	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and	  POW,	  could	  also	  vary	  considerably	  between	  locations	  and	  over	  time,	  again	  lending	  
considerable	  heterogeneity	  to	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  
Such	  factors	  were	  at	  work	  all	  across	  the	  Asian	  POW	  diaspora,	  and	  there	  were	  many	  other	  
locations	  and	  times	  when	  conditions	  could	  be	  just	  as	  severe,	  or,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Changi,	  far	  
easier.	  A	  few	  were	  even	  worse.	  Whilst	  it	  would	  be	  facile	  to	  deny	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  
factors	  in	  the	  POW	  experience,	  and	  this	  thesis	  makes	  no	  attempt	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  process	  of	  
analysing	  their	  outlooks	  does	  however	  offer	  a	  fresh	  perspective	  on	  other	  less	  familiar	  aspects	  
of	  their	  situation,	  in	  the	  brief	  period	  before	  captivity,	  in	  the	  camps,	  and	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  years.	  
	  
0.4.	  Structure	  and	  Chapter	  Layout.	  
The	  variety	  of	  contacts	  made	  by	  the	  FEPOWs	  were	  organised	  into	  a	  tripartite	  categorisation	  
based	  upon	  combatant	  status;	  allied,	  enemy	  and	  civilian.	  A	  potential	  benefit	  of	  this	  
classification	  is	  that	  it	  allows	  for	  a	  consideration	  as	  to	  whether	  such	  status	  had	  any	  effect	  of	  
how	  the	  different	  populations	  were	  viewed.	  	  
	  
As	  with	  any	  such	  socially	  constructed	  taxonomy	  there	  are	  potential	  complications	  as	  to	  where	  
people	  belong.	  The	  Japanese	  were	  encountered	  both	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  enemy	  combatants,	  on	  
the	  battlefield	  or	  as	  captors,	  and	  as	  civilians.	  Encounters	  with	  Japanese	  civilians	  were	  varied	  
and	  not	  unusual	  in	  Japan	  during	  transit	  and	  at	  work,	  on	  route	  to	  Japan	  where	  they	  met	  
seamen,	  and	  in	  the	  form	  of	  railway	  engineers	  in	  Burma	  and	  Thailand.	  Even	  more	  complex	  was	  
the	  situation	  in	  regard	  to	  Indians,	  who	  could	  fall	  into	  all	  three	  categories.	  They	  could	  be	  allies	  
from	  the	  Indian	  Army,	  as	  well	  as	  enemy	  combatants,	  either	  as	  guards	  in	  the	  camps	  and/or	  as	  
members	  of	  the	  Indian	  National	  Army	  (INA),	  and	  they	  could	  be	  civilians,	  both	  at	  home	  or	  as	  
that	  part	  of	  the	  diaspora	  in	  Malaya,	  many	  of	  whom	  ended	  up	  labouring	  on	  the	  Railway	  in	  close	  
proximity	  to	  the	  POWs.	  Indians	  do	  appear	  briefly	  in	  the	  sections	  on	  allied	  personnel,	  largely	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before	  captivity,	  at	  which	  point	  they	  were	  separated	  by	  the	  Japanese	  with	  a	  view	  to	  their	  
recruitment	  into	  the	  INA,	  and	  occasionally	  as	  camp	  guards	  working	  for	  the	  Japanese	  in	  
Singapore	  and	  elsewhere.	  The	  main	  focus	  is	  however	  on	  civilian	  Indians,	  both	  before	  and	  
during	  captivity.	  Such	  examples	  of	  multiple	  category	  occupation	  allow	  for	  further	  testing	  of	  the	  
importance	  (if	  any)	  of	  combatant	  status	  upon	  outlooks.	  	  
The	  selection	  of	  the	  various	  nationalities	  and	  ethnicities,	  which	  are	  the	  focus	  in	  the	  respective	  
categories	  and	  chapters,	  has	  been	  informed	  primarily	  by	  the	  weight	  of	  evidence	  available	  in	  
the	  POW	  accounts,	  	  and	  only	  rarely	  in	  association	  with	  a	  view	  to	  intrinsically	  elaborating	  upon	  
a	  specific	  aspect	  of	  the	  men’s	  worldview.	  Issues	  of	  allocation,	  selection	  and	  focus	  are	  discussed	  
more	  fully,	  where	  appropriate,	  within	  each	  chapter.	  	  
The	  first	  chapter	  considers	  the	  period	  between	  departing	  from	  Britain	  in	  late	  1941	  and	  
entering	  captivity	  in	  early	  1942.	  It	  offers	  a	  snapshot	  of	  the	  attitudes	  of	  the	  men	  towards	  the	  
local	  civilian	  populations	  that	  they	  encountered	  on	  their	  journey	  to	  Asia,	  which	  stopped	  off	  in	  
the	  contrasting	  imperial	  locations	  of	  South	  Africa	  and	  India.	  This	  theme	  is	  developed	  upon	  
arrival	  in	  Singapore,	  where	  responses	  to	  the	  city’s	  multi-­‐ethnic	  population	  are	  considered,	  at	  a	  
time	  of	  increasing	  tension	  and	  concerns	  over	  a	  local	  fifth	  column	  movement.	  The	  desperate	  
attempts	  by	  some	  to	  escape	  the	  fall	  of	  Singapore,	  in	  both	  official	  and	  unofficial	  evacuations,	  
offer	  a	  further	  opportunity	  to	  trace	  their	  outlooks	  to	  the	  local	  communities	  at	  a	  time	  of	  
considerable	  stress.	  Finally,	  the	  ritualised	  marches	  of	  shame	  to	  the	  prison	  camps,	  designed	  by	  
the	  Japanese	  to	  humiliate	  their	  prisoners	  and	  demonstrate	  the	  new	  order	  to	  the	  local	  
populaces,	  offer	  a	  further	  lens	  onto	  the	  perceptions	  of	  the	  now	  defeated	  British	  POWs,	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  civilian	  crowds	  through	  which	  they	  had	  to	  proceed.	  
In	  Chapter	  Two	  the	  pre	  December	  1941	  and	  war-­‐time	  attitudes	  to	  their	  enemy	  captors	  are	  
assessed,	  primarily	  focussing	  on	  the	  Japanese.	  The	  press	  has	  been	  suggested	  as	  a	  prime	  source	  
of	  pre-­‐war	  Japanese	  characterisations,	  but	  a	  detailed	  examination	  finds	  little	  evidence	  to	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support	  such	  a	  claim,	  indeed	  the	  press	  were	  largely	  neutral	  in	  their	  frequently	  parochial	  
coverage	  of	  events	  in	  China	  in	  the	  late	  1930s.	  An	  examination	  of	  existing	  BOR	  outlooks	  prior	  to	  
combat	  finds	  little	  evidence	  of	  any	  specific	  antagonism	  towards	  the	  Japanese,	  the	  POW	  
accounts	  pointing	  to	  the	  development	  of	  an	  antipathy	  towards	  the	  Japanese	  which	  was	  largely	  
based	  upon	  their	  experience	  of	  captivity.	  	  
Chapter	  Three	  looks	  at	  associations	  with	  their	  allied	  colleagues	  in	  captivity,	  with	  particular	  
focus	  on	  the	  oft	  cited	  less	  than	  harmonious	  relations	  with	  the	  “Dutch”,	  whose	  numbers	  
included	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Eurasian	  troops.	  	  Whilst	  this	  antagonism	  had	  a	  number	  of	  sources,	  
including	  issues	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  co-­‐operation	  and	  fighting	  spirit	  prior	  to	  the	  surrender	  and	  assorted	  
jealousies	  over	  resources	  in	  camps,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  a	  major	  cause	  of	  such	  antipathy,	  among	  
the	  minority	  of	  men	  who	  stated	  it,	  was	  the	  racial	  difference	  of	  their	  Dutch	  colleagues.	  
The	  frequently	  antipathetic	  views	  of	  the	  BORs	  as	  to	  their	  officers	  form	  the	  focus	  of	  Chapter	  
Four.	  The	  vicissitudes	  of	  the	  military	  caste	  system	  are	  considered	  from	  the	  convoys	  east	  to	  the	  
POW	  camps,	  with	  specific	  reference	  to	  the	  prime	  cause	  of	  antagonism,	  the	  differing	  conditions	  
enjoyed	  by	  most	  of	  the	  officers	  in	  captivity.	  Whilst	  this	  factor	  and	  the	  consequent	  wide	  
variation	  in	  the	  mortality	  rates	  suffered	  by	  the	  officers	  and	  the	  men	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  
study	  in	  other	  national	  histories	  of	  captivity,	  it	  has	  been	  largely	  absent	  in	  the	  British	  literature.	  
A	  first	  attempt	  to	  quantify	  such	  effects	  in	  the	  British	  context	  is	  presented,	  along	  with	  a	  more	  
qualitative	  evaluation	  of	  mutual	  relations,	  which	  also	  investigates	  the	  effects	  of	  military	  
hierarchy	  within	  the	  other	  ranks.	  	  
In	  Chapter	  Five	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  othering	  of	  local	  populations	  and	  the	  landscape,	  reputedly	  
held	  by	  the	  men	  during	  captivity	  but	  informed	  by	  previous	  conditioning,	  are	  considered	  in	  two	  
contexts.	  The	  first	  is	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  popularly	  perceived	  impossibility	  of	  escape.	  Examples	  of	  
successful	  attempts	  are	  presented	  that	  challenge	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  such	  assumptions,	  and	  the	  
situation	  in	  Asia	  is	  compared	  to	  the	  European	  theatre,	  where	  a	  much	  more	  positive,	  though	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equally	  inaccurate	  escape	  discourse	  has	  developed.	  In	  a	  parallel	  section	  the	  BOR	  perceptions	  
of	  the	  Tamil	  workforce	  on	  the	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway	  are	  considered,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  
the	  racially	  and	  colonially	  informed	  perspectives	  that	  dominated	  the	  British	  narrative.	  
Particular	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  period	  of	  the	  cholera	  epidemic	  which	  raged	  down	  the	  line	  in	  1943,	  
and	  how	  the	  BORs	  responded	  to	  the	  terrible	  situation	  that	  the	  Tamils	  found	  themselves	  in.	  
The	  final	  chapter	  looks	  at	  the	  evolution	  of	  post-­‐war	  attitudes	  of	  the	  former	  POWs	  to	  the	  
Japanese,	  where	  a	  surprising	  amount	  of	  reconciliation	  is	  to	  be	  found.	  	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  
established	  popular	  narrative,	  as	  presented	  by	  the	  mass	  media	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  popular	  
and	  published	  press	  and	  the	  cinema,	  which	  has	  persisted	  in	  perpetuating	  a	  largely	  unchanging	  
and	  unforgiving	  outlook.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  the	  popular	  memory	  of	  captivity	  and	  the	  
reality	  of	  the	  POWs’	  perspectives	  are	  at	  their	  greatest	  divergence,	  somewhat	  ironically	  given	  
the	  continued	  prevalence	  of	  notions	  of	  tolerance	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  British	  identity.	  	  
	  
0.5.	  Methodology	  and	  Sources.	  
The	  analytical	  focus	  of	  this	  study	  is	  on	  the	  attitudes	  of	  “ordinary”	  Britons,	  which	  in	  the	  military	  
context	  is	  taken	  to	  mean	  the	  other	  ranks	  as	  opposed	  to	  their	  officers.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  
novelty	  which	  their	  new	  surroundings	  and	  contacts	  provided,	  and	  avoid	  the	  influence	  of	  
previous	  colonial-­‐military	  encounters,	  the	  majority	  of	  cases	  scrutinised	  were	  members	  of	  the	  
18th	  Division	  of	  the	  British	  Army.	  This	  unit	  was	  raised	  in	  September	  1939,	  as	  a	  second	  line	  
Territorial	  Army	  Division,	  recruiting	  its	  infantry	  contingents	  primarily	  among	  the	  East	  Anglian	  
county	  regiments,	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  battalion	  of	  Sherwood	  Foresters,	  one	  from	  the	  
Northumberland	  Fusiliers	  and	  with	  the	  Lancashire	  based	  Loyal	  Regiment,	  also	  territorials,	  
providing	  the	  reconnaissance	  battalion.	  The	  considerable	  number	  of	  support	  troops,	  including	  
the	  complements	  of	  artillery,	  engineers,	  signallers	  and	  service	  corps	  personnel	  were	  of	  a	  wider	  
geographical	  provenance,	  although	  some	  of	  these	  units	  had	  a	  strong	  regional	  affiliation,	  such	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as	  the	  125th	  Anti-­‐Tank	  Regiment,	  which	  was	  mainly	  recruited	  from	  the	  Sunderland	  area.	  	  
Whilst	  most	  of	  the	  men	  in	  this	  study	  come	  from	  the	  18th	  Division,	  some	  other	  servicemen,	  
mostly	  new	  to	  the	  flag,	  particularly	  from	  the	  other	  ranks	  of	  the	  RAF,	  have	  also	  been	  included	  
where	  they	  inform	  and	  add	  to	  the	  discussion.	  
The	  majority	  of	  sources	  for	  this	  study	  have	  come	  from	  the	  holdings	  at	  the	  Imperial	  War	  
Museum	  (IWM)	  which	  feature	  an	  unusually	  large	  proportion	  of	  accounts	  by	  members	  of	  the	  
other	  ranks,	  reflecting	  the	  extraordinary	  nature	  of	  their	  wartime	  experience.	  	  The	  IWM	  was	  
founded	  in	  1917	  to	  record	  the	  experiences	  of	  all	  sections	  of	  society,	  civilian	  and	  military,	  
during	  the	  then	  ongoing	  First	  World	  War.	  Moving	  to	  its	  current	  location	  at	  the	  former	  Bethlem	  
Royal	  Hospital	  in	  1936,	  it	  has	  continued	  to	  document	  the	  story	  of	  Britain	  at	  war	  into	  the	  21st	  
century	  and	  commemorate	  and	  record	  the	  sacrifices	  of	  previous	  generations.	  	  	  
As	  well	  as	  a	  substantial	  collection	  of	  documentary	  holdings,	  the	  museum	  has	  a	  large	  and	  
growing	  oral	  history	  archive.	  Initially	  started	  in	  1972	  to	  record	  the	  reminiscences	  of	  the	  by	  
then	  ageing	  veterans	  of	  the	  First	  War,	  it	  has	  continued	  to	  capture	  the	  testimony	  of	  those	  
involved	  in	  subsequent	  conflicts	  and	  peacetime	  service.	  By	  the	  early	  1980s	  the	  former	  POWs	  of	  
the	  Second	  World	  War	  were	  being	  interviewed,	  a	  process	  that	  has	  continued	  into	  the	  present	  
century.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  holdings	  at	  the	  IWM	  in	  the	  research	  for	  this	  thesis	  cannot	  be	  
overstated;	  without	  them	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  reconstructions	  that	  follow	  would	  at	  best	  be	  
severely	  diminished,	  if	  not	  impossible	  to	  develop.	  
	  In	  pursuing	  this	  investigation	  the	  full	  range	  of	  individual	  life	  history	  accounts	  has	  been	  utilised,	  
ranging	  from	  contemporary	  diaries	  to	  post-­‐war	  memoirs	  and	  interviews.	  This	  holistic	  approach	  
has	  been	  partially	  conditioned	  by	  the	  longitudinal	  nature	  of	  the	  project,	  extending	  as	  it	  does	  
into	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  relative	  merits	  of	  the	  types	  of	  source	  to	  




Some	  scholars	  prefer	  to	  utilise	  only	  contemporary	  sources	  in	  the	  search	  for	  the	  raw	  
unmediated	  reality	  of	  the	  period	  under	  study,	  precluding	  the	  clouding	  of	  this	  authenticity	  by	  
the	  effects	  of	  failing	  and,	  perhaps	  more	  dangerously,	  discursively	  influenced	  memory.	  Sonya	  
Rose	  adopts	  such	  an	  approach	  in	  her	  study	  of	  citizenship	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  identity	  in	  
Britain	  during	  the	  war,	  infusing	  herself	  	  almost	  entirely	  into	  contemporary	  material	  to	  better	  
understand	  her	  subjects,	  free	  from	  the	  post-­‐hoc	  distractions	  of	  subsequent	  reconstructions.20	  
Whilst	  there	  are	  sound	  methodological	  reasons	  for	  adopting	  such	  a	  constrained	  approach	  to	  
mining	  the	  ore	  of	  research,	  in	  this	  particular	  situation	  there	  are	  stronger	  reasons	  to	  seek	  a	  
wider	  base.	  	  
The	  logistics	  of	  diary	  writing,	  including	  the	  sourcing	  of	  the	  materials	  required	  within	  the	  often	  
limited	  camp	  economy,	  prioritising	  their	  purchase	  over	  that	  of	  more	  essential	  items,	  and	  the	  
need	  for	  safe	  storage	  spaces,	  all	  combined	  to	  reduce	  the	  material	  available	  to	  the	  historian.	  	  
Whilst	  there	  were	  ten	  manuscript	  diarists	  in	  the	  group	  under	  consideration,	  their	  illicit	  writings	  
were	  undoubtedly	  constrained	  by	  the	  risk	  of	  them	  being	  discovered	  by	  their	  captors,	  a	  
scenario	  that	  could	  involve	  severe	  punishment	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  death.	  Thus	  while	  they	  may	  
(and	  indeed	  do)	  offer	  some	  useful	  insights	  into	  relations	  with	  other	  prisoners	  and	  civilians,	  
references	  to	  the	  Japanese	  are	  few	  and	  far	  between,	  and	  the	  distance	  of	  these	  rare	  jottings	  
from	  the	  reality	  of	  their	  feelings	  is	  probably	  greater	  still.	  Another	  constraint	  on	  the	  utility	  of	  
the	  diaries	  is	  that	  the	  content	  often	  reflected	  the	  immediate	  thoughts	  of	  the	  authors,	  which	  in	  
the	  poor	  nutritional	  environment	  of	  the	  camps	  meant	  that	  deliberations	  about	  food	  frequently	  
overshadowed	  everything	  else.	  Remco	  Raben,	  a	  Dutch	  historian	  of	  captivity	  in	  Asia,	  has	  
observed	  this	  factor.	  ‘The	  camp	  diaries	  deal	  with	  an	  extremely	  limited	  number	  of	  themes.	  
Food,	  particularly	  the	  lack	  thereof,	  is	  the	  main	  issue.’21	  Despite	  such	  shortcomings	  diaries	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Rose,	  Which	  People’s	  War,	  pp25-­‐26.	  
21	  Raben,	  Remco.	  (ed)	  	  (1999)	  Representing	  the	  Japanese	  Occupation	  of	  Indonesia:	  Personal	  Testimonies	  
and	  Public	  Images	  in	  Indonesia,	  Japan	  and	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  Netherlands	  Instutute	  for	  War	  
Documentation,	  Amsterdam.	  Waanders	  Publishers,	  Zwolle.	  p165.	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some	  utility,	  particularly	  when	  seeking	  outlooks	  that	  are	  unmediated	  by	  subsequent	  changes	  
in	  racial	  and	  cultural	  norms,	  as	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  in	  a	  later	  chapter.	  
There	  are	  several	  accounts	  that	  might	  be	  termed	  near	  contemporary,	  composed	  in	  the	  
immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  events	  they	  describe.	  Such	  sources	  include	  the	  report	  scripted	  by	  
several	  members	  of	  the	  Intelligence	  Corps	  on	  arrival	  in	  India	  after	  successfully	  evacuating	  from	  
Singapore	  in	  1942,	  and	  two	  accounts	  by	  liberated	  POWs	  written	  in	  1945	  and	  1946,	  shortly	  
after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.	  
Most	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  memoirs	  started	  appearing	  in	  the	  late	  1970s,	  as	  the	  veterans	  reached	  the	  
reflective	  years	  of	  their	  retirement.	  These	  vary	  in	  length	  from	  a	  few	  pages	  to	  one	  detailed	  
account	  that	  spans	  three	  volumes	  and	  around	  600	  pages.22	  While	  some	  of	  these	  accounts	  
provide	  a	  cradle	  to	  retirement	  chronology,	  most	  at	  least	  cover	  the	  period	  under	  scrutiny,	  that	  
is	  from	  their	  departure	  from	  the	  UK	  in	  1941,	  through	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  and	  up	  to	  the	  time	  of	  
writing	  some	  thirty	  or	  more	  years	  later.	  	  Attached	  to	  such	  sources	  are	  the	  implicit	  dangers	  of	  
such	  long	  term	  recall,	  including	  accuracy,	  collective	  accretion,	  and	  the	  reinforcement,	  
rehearsal	  and	  selection	  of	  memory.	  	  Whilst	  such	  pitfalls	  also	  attach	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  archive	  of	  
interviews,	  a	  drawback	  specific	  to	  written	  memoirs	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  writing	  process	  itself,	  
the	  process	  of	  consideration,	  re-­‐scripting	  and	  editing	  potentially	  magnifying	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  
aforementioned	  provisos.	  However,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  information	  being	  sought	  in	  this	  study,	  
usually	  at	  something	  of	  a	  tangent	  to	  the	  considered	  focus	  of	  the	  authors,	  mitigates	  some	  of	  
the	  issues	  of	  memory	  outlined.	  	  
The	  interviews	  were	  primarily	  examined	  for	  specific	  post-­‐war	  attitudes	  to	  the	  Japanese,	  this	  
being	  a	  regular	  question	  near	  the	  end	  of	  each	  collection.	  However,	  on	  occasions	  during	  this	  
process	  detail	  would	  come	  to	  light	  that	  informed	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  project.	  In	  contrast	  to	  
the	  measured	  ruminations	  that	  usually	  accompany	  the	  writing	  process,	  interviews	  give	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  In	  one	  case	  it	  was	  quite	  literally	  the	  back	  of	  a	  cigarette	  packet.	  IWM:	  Crawley.	  N.	  (Docs	  1132)	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subject	  less	  time	  to	  formulate	  an	  “acceptable”	  answer,	  and	  can	  sometimes	  be	  heard	  as	  
providing	  a	  more	  spontaneous	  response.	  	  Such	  answers	  may	  not	  be	  as	  unrehearsed	  as	  they	  
first	  appear	  however,	  particularly	  if	  the	  respondent	  is	  retelling	  a	  frequently	  recounted	  
narrative,	  one	  that	  has	  undergone	  the	  process	  of	  what	  Graham	  Dawson	  has	  described	  as	  
subjective	  composure.23	  Again,	  the	  oblique	  nature	  of	  the	  material	  being	  sought	  acts	  to	  mitigate	  
some	  of	  the	  danger	  inherent	  in	  this	  factor.	  Of	  more	  specific	  concern	  to	  both	  written	  and	  verbal	  
post-­‐hoc	  sources	  	  are	  changes	  in	  individual	  and	  societal	  outlooks	  since	  the	  war,	  that	  may	  
impact	  upon	  what	  the	  individual	  feels	  is	  appropriate	  and	  acceptable	  to	  mention	  in	  their	  later	  
years.	  The	  changing	  use	  of	  linguistic	  idioms	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  in	  this	  context,	  in	  both	  
public	  and	  private	  settings,	  and	  examples	  of	  such	  variations	  provide	  evidence	  of	  evolution	  in	  
societal	  norms	  and	  the	  mutability	  of	  individual	  perspectives,	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  as	  they	  
appear	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  text.	  
A	  total	  of	  thirteen	  contemporary	  accounts	  (mainly	  diaries,	  but	  including	  a	  report	  made	  in	  1943	  
by	  a	  successful	  evacuee	  from	  Singapore,	  and	  two	  accounts	  written	  in	  1946	  by	  former	  POWs)	  
and	  seven	  memoirs	  submitted	  to	  the	  IWM	  between	  1975	  and	  1997	  form	  the	  core	  group	  of	  
written	  records	  studied,	  and	  a	  further	  40	  interviews	  with	  BORs	  were	  reviewed.	  	  All	  were	  
selected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  relevant	  prompts	  from	  the	  catalogue	  descriptions,	  in	  the	  written	  
sources	  relating	  to	  relations	  with	  other	  groups	  of	  people,	  and	  in	  the	  interviews	  by	  the	  search	  
term	  ‘attitudes	  to	  the	  Japanese.’	  The	  60	  cases	  scrutinised	  are	  only	  a	  tiny	  proportion	  of	  the	  
50,000	  men	  who	  were	  prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese,	  and	  thus	  this	  study	  can	  only	  provide	  
indicative	  as	  opposed	  to	  conclusive	  outcomes.	  	  The	  full	  list	  of	  all	  the	  men	  considered,	  including	  
name,	  rank,	  unit,	  source	  type	  and	  archive	  number	  appears	  in	  the	  bibliography.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Dawson,	  Soldier	  Heroes,	  p22-­‐23.	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  use	  of	  oral	  testimony	  and	  the	  ‘production	  of	  
memory’	  see:	  Summerfield,	  Penny.	  (1998)	  Reconstructing	  women’s	  wartime	  lives:	  Discourse	  and	  
subjectivity	  in	  oral	  histories	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Manchester	  University	  Press.	  pp9-­‐22.	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A	  further	  source	  of	  material	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  many	  published	  accounts	  of	  the	  POWs.	  To	  the	  
caveats	  already	  noted	  above	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  post-­‐hoc	  archival	  materials	  should	  be	  added	  
the	  pressures	  applied	  directly	  and	  indirectly	  to	  the	  authors	  by	  the	  publishers.	  Indicative	  of	  such	  
publishing	  demands	  is	  Terence	  Kelly’s	  nuanced	  account	  of	  his	  captivity,	  most	  of	  it	  spent	  in	  
what	  he	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  reasonable	  camp	  in	  Japan,	  working	  alongside	  similarly	  equitable	  
Japanese	  civilians,	  originally	  published	  as	  Living	  With	  Japanese.	  The	  back	  matter	  noted	  that	  
this	  was	  ‘no	  hackneyed	  story	  of	  the	  enemy’s	  brutality	  and	  inhumanity.	  It	  shows	  the	  Japanese	  in	  
a	  broader	  light	  than	  most	  books	  by	  prisoners	  of	  war.’24	  It	  was	  reprinted	  some	  years	  later	  by	  
Pen	  and	  Sword	  Military	  under	  the	  title	  By	  Hellship	  to	  Hiroshima,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  cover	  matter	  
now	  on	  the	  ‘squalid	  native	  prison’	  that	  he	  was	  initially	  held	  in,	  and	  the	  conditions	  on	  board	  the	  
ship	  that	  transported	  him	  to	  Japan	  which	  were	  ‘so	  appalling	  that	  many	  men	  died’.25	  The	  text	  of	  
the	  book	  was	  completely	  unaltered.	  Given	  these	  caveats	  only	  occasional	  use	  is	  made	  of	  such	  
publications	  where	  they	  serve	  as	  an	  aid	  to	  illustrating	  the	  subject	  under	  discussion,	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  published	  diaries	  of	  several	  of	  the	  medical	  officers	  (MOs).	  
Whilst	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  on	  the	  attitudes	  of	  the	  BORs,	  the	  sources	  were	  also	  scanned	  
for	  further	  accounts	  to	  give	  a	  comparative	  view,	  in	  particular	  from	  the	  British	  officers.	  Eight	  
diaries,	  two	  accounts	  written	  after	  release	  in	  1945,	  and	  five	  memoirs	  written	  between	  1982	  
and	  1995	  were	  scrutinised	  at	  the	  IWM	  in	  this	  respect.	  Published	  literature	  was	  also	  used	  to	  
elucidate	  Australian,	  Dutch,	  American,	  local	  civilian	  and	  Japanese	  perspectives.	  
Linda	  Colley,	  in	  her	  study	  of	  British	  prisoners	  in	  foreign	  lands	  during	  earlier	  times,	  neatly	  
summarises	  the	  pitfalls	  and	  the	  benefits	  of	  captivity	  narratives:	  
They	  are	  imperfect,	  idiosyncratic,	  and	  sometimes	  violently	  slanted	  texts.	  They	  are	  also	  
astonishingly	  rich	  and	  revealing,	  both	  about	  the	  British	  themselves,	  and	  about	  the	  
mixed	  fortunes	  and	  complexities	  of	  their	  dealings	  with	  other	  peoples.26	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Kelly,	  Terence.	  (1997;	  1998	  edn)	  Living	  With	  Japanese.	  Chivers	  Press,	  Bath.	  
25	  Kelly,	  Terence.	  (2006)	  By	  Hellship	  to	  Hiroshima.	  Pen	  and	  Sword	  Military,	  Barnsley.	  
26	  Colley,	  Linda.	  (2002)	  Captives:	  Britain,	  Empire	  and	  the	  World,	  1600-­‐1850.	  Jonathan	  Cape,	  London.	  p15.	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The	  range	  of	  accounts	  utilised	  in	  this	  study	  share	  the	  same	  characteristics,	  and	  with	  careful	  
reading	  (and	  in	  this	  more	  technologically	  advanced	  era,	  listening)	  they	  can	  be	  as	  informative	  
now	  as	  they	  were	  then.	  
Additional	  holdings	  were	  scrutinised	  at	  The	  National	  Archive,	  where	  the	  Japanese	  card	  index	  
system,	  an	  almost	  complete	  record	  of	  individual	  POWs,	  is	  held.27	  The	  cards	  give	  some	  basic	  
biographical	  information	  about	  the	  prisoners	  in	  English,	  next	  of	  kin,	  date	  of	  birth	  and	  home	  
address,	  as	  well	  as	  some	  details	  regarding	  their	  captivity	  in	  Japanese.	  Around	  a	  quarter	  of	  
them	  have	  a	  thick	  red	  line	  or	  saltire	  drawn	  across	  them,	  indicating	  death	  in	  captivity.	  In	  parallel	  
to	  this	  are	  a	  near	  complete	  set	  of	  exit	  questionnaires	  filled	  in	  by	  the	  survivors	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
war.	  The	  other	  ranks	  usually	  had	  little	  to	  say	  in	  these	  although	  they	  do	  provide	  a	  useful	  record	  
of	  their	  location	  as	  they	  moved	  from	  camp	  to	  camp,	  and	  thus	  a	  means	  of	  verification	  for	  
veracity	  of	  the	  source	  accounts.	  Post-­‐war	  holdings	  of	  documents	  relating	  to	  War	  Crimes	  
Investigation	  Teams	  (WCIT)	  and	  other	  similar	  reports	  provided	  additional	  information,	  
particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  use	  of	  Asian	  labourers	  on	  the	  Railway.	  
A	  range	  of	  national	  and	  regional	  newspapers	  and	  publications	  were	  also	  surveyed	  in	  sections	  
that	  examined	  their	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  outlooks;	  titles	  scrutinised	  were	  the	  Daily	  Mirror,	  
Manchester	  Guardian,	  The	  Times,	  the	  Daily	  Express,	  the	  Evening	  Standard,	  the	  Daily	  Mail,	  The	  
Independent,	  the	  Yorkshire	  Post	  and	  the	  Picture	  Post.	  
	  
0.6.	  Historiography.	  
In	  a	  general	  review	  of	  publications	  on	  prisoners	  of	  war,	  historian	  Neville	  Wylie	  writes	  that	  
there	  is	  ‘a	  raft	  of	  memoir	  literature	  and	  academic	  studies	  already	  published	  on	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  This	  was	  a	  rare	  item	  to	  survive	  the	  widespread	  destruction	  of	  records	  relating	  to	  captivity	  by	  the	  
Japanese	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.	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far	  east	  [sic]	  POWs’.28	  Whilst	  there	  is	  a	  plethora	  of	  memoirs	  published	  by	  the	  former	  prisoners	  
of	  the	  Japanese,	  there	  has	  been	  considerably	  less	  scholarship	  regarding	  their	  time	  in	  captivity.	  
This	  was	  a	  trend	  that	  was	  first	  signalled	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Official	  History	  in	  1969,	  
which	  relegated	  the	  experiences	  of	  three	  full	  army	  divisions’	  worth	  of	  British	  servicemen,	  over	  
three	  and	  a	  half	  years,	  to	  the	  ten	  pages	  of	  appendix	  30	  in	  the	  final	  volume	  of	  five.29	  This	  
particular	  historiographical	  field	  would	  lie	  fallow	  for	  a	  long	  period	  after	  the	  war,	  until	  
professional	  interest	  started	  to	  germinate	  in	  the	  1990s,	  both	  among	  scholars	  and	  authors	  with	  
a	  family	  or	  vocational	  interest.	  
Clifford	  Kinvig’s	  interest	  had	  been	  stimulated	  during	  his	  post-­‐war	  military	  service	  that	  took	  him	  
to	  the	  region,	  and	  his	  River	  Kwai	  Railway	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  synthesise	  individual	  accounts	  into	  
a	  comprehensive	  history	  of	  that	  location	  of	  captivity.	  His	  predominant	  use	  of	  officers’	  
accounts,	  particularly	  as	  a	  source	  of	  unpublished	  material,	  together	  with	  his	  army	  background,	  
frequently	  give	  the	  text	  the	  feel	  of	  a	  campaign	  history,	  with	  little	  sense	  of	  the	  other	  ranks’	  
experience,	  although	  his	  use	  of	  Japanese	  sources,	  and	  in	  particular	  his	  coverage	  of	  the	  local	  
labour	  forces	  working	  in	  parallel	  to	  the	  POWs,	  does	  lend	  a	  sense	  of	  wider	  perspective	  to	  his	  
analysis.30	  
The	  officer	  based	  focus	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  chapters	  for	  various	  anthologies	  written	  by	  Sybilla	  
Jane	  Flower,	  who,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  dedicated	  academics,	  has	  become	  the	  default	  
contributor	  to	  such	  edited	  collections	  on	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  British	  POWs.	  	  In	  her	  first	  
published	  contribution	  she	  argued	  that	  the	  ‘prevailing	  interpretation	  has	  been	  to	  disparage	  
officers	  as	  a	  caste’,	  and	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  her	  chapter	  was	  ‘to	  correct	  the	  obvious	  distortions	  that	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pervade	  both	  the	  popular	  and	  scholarly	  literature	  on	  the	  subject.’31	  By	  the	  time	  of	  her	  latest	  
outing	  in	  print	  her	  thesis	  continued	  to	  include	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  closeness	  of	  the	  officers	  
to	  their	  men,	  particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Territorial	  Army	  units	  such	  as	  the	  9th	  Northumberland	  
Fusiliers,	  commanded	  by	  Lt.	  Col.	  H.S.	  Flower.32	  Whilst	  well	  researched	  and	  presented,	  Flower’s	  
deliberate	  and	  selective	  focus	  on	  restoring	  the	  reputation	  of	  (part	  of)	  the	  officer	  corps	  leaves	  
little	  room	  for	  the	  story	  of	  the	  BORs.	  
So	  pervasive	  in	  the	  literature	  were	  Flower’s	  articles	  that	  it	  was	  perhaps	  not	  surprising	  that,	  in	  
the	  review	  of	  her	  existing	  work	  for	  the	  latter	  collection,	  she	  was	  incorrectly	  attributed	  as	  
having	  contributed	  a	  chapter	  in	  the	  first	  major	  edited	  collection	  focussing	  purely	  on	  POWs	  in	  
Asia.33	  Some	  of	  the	  essays	  in	  Japanese	  Prisoners	  of	  War	  were	  a	  rare	  attempt	  to	  specifically	  
examine	  the	  issue	  of	  race	  and	  cultural	  difference	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Asian	  camps,	  from	  a	  
historical	  standpoint,	  particularly	  from	  the	  Japanese	  perspective.34	  Given	  the	  small	  and	  tight	  
knit	  community	  of	  researchers	  in	  the	  field,	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  Kinvig	  reprised	  his	  earlier	  work	  
in	  this	  book,	  and	  Kent	  Fedorowich,	  the	  joint	  editor	  of	  the	  first	  anthology,	  also	  contributed	  a	  
chapter.	  	  
Robert	  Havers	  previewed	  his	  research	  on	  the	  camp	  at	  Changi	  in	  the	  same	  volume,	  and	  the	  full	  
monograph	  was	  published	  in	  2003.35	  This	  was	  an	  important	  work	  as	  it	  belayed	  the	  myth	  of	  a	  
universally	  ruthless	  captivity,	  and	  the	  specific	  picture	  of	  Changi	  that	  had	  come	  to	  be	  associated	  
in	  popular	  thought	  with	  the	  worst	  locations	  on	  the	  Railway.	  In	  so	  doing	  it	  demonstrated	  that	  
the	  Japanese	  response	  to	  the	  prisoners	  was	  by	  no	  means	  consistently	  harsh,	  and	  that	  under	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the	  right	  circumstances	  life	  could	  be	  organised	  to	  a	  level	  of	  relative	  comfort.	  Havers	  also	  
liberally	  uses	  the	  unpublished	  accounts	  of	  the	  other	  ranks,	  including	  some	  of	  those	  used	  in	  this	  
thesis,	  alongside	  those	  of	  the	  officers,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  early	  days.	  That	  they	  disappeared	  from	  his	  
account	  after	  the	  first	  few	  chapters	  is	  no	  surprise,	  as	  most	  of	  them	  were	  transported	  off	  in	  
work	  parties.	  Notwithstanding	  such	  inclusions	  however,	  this	  is	  very	  much	  again	  a	  story	  
focussed	  on	  the	  commissioned	  levels	  of	  the	  military	  system,	  including	  some	  of	  their	  own	  
internecine	  tensions,	  and	  one	  that	  does	  not	  delve	  too	  deeply	  into	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  selective	  
Japanese	  application	  of	  some	  of	  those	  parts	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Convention	  that	  applied	  to	  the	  
officer	  corps.	  The	  issue	  of	  race	  is	  also	  quickly	  touched	  upon,	  but	  not	  developed	  with	  any	  
substance,	  and	  equally	  briskly	  moved	  on	  from.	  
Parallel	  to	  the	  scholarship	  on	  the	  POWs	  there	  has	  been	  increased	  interest	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  
the	  civilians	  interned	  by	  the	  Japanese.	  Bernice	  Archer	  adopted	  a	  trans-­‐national	  approach	  to	  
the	  study	  of	  internees,	  weaving	  issues	  of	  race,	  class	  and	  gender	  into	  her	  ‘Patchwork	  of	  
Internment’,	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  her	  research.36	  She	  concluded	  that	  intra-­‐cohort	  conceptions	  
of	  national	  identity,	  race	  and	  class	  were	  frequently	  subsumed	  and	  re-­‐directed	  at	  the	  external	  
suppressor,	  the	  Japanese.	  More	  recently,	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years,	  Felicia	  Yap	  has	  published	  a	  
number	  of	  articles	  that	  reflect	  upon	  similar	  issues.	  Her	  article	  on	  the	  marginal	  position	  of	  
Eurasians	  during	  the	  occupation	  demonstrates	  the	  precarious	  existence	  that	  had	  to	  be	  
negotiated	  in	  the	  space	  between	  the	  new	  Japanese	  rulers	  and	  the	  interned	  British	  
establishment,	  frequently	  suffering	  the	  distrust	  of,	  and	  denigration	  by,	  both	  parties.37	  In	  a	  
subsequent	  article	  she	  makes	  a	  comparative	  study	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  officers,	  other	  ranks	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and	  civilian	  internees,	  primarily	  at	  Kuching	  Camp	  in	  Borneo,	  where	  all	  three	  cohorts	  were	  in	  
separate	  parts	  of	  the	  same	  camp.38	  	  
International	  contributions	  to	  the	  literature,	  particularly	  from	  Australia,	  had	  made	  an	  earlier	  
appearance	  in	  the	  1980s.	  The	  POWs	  constituted	  a	  much	  larger	  part	  of	  Australia’s	  war,	  both	  in	  
numbers	  and	  mortality,	  than	  did	  the	  British	  captives.	  Despite	  this	  fact,	  a	  similar	  inertia	  had	  
hold	  of	  scholarship	  and	  public	  interest.	  This	  was	  broken	  by	  the	  broadcasting	  of	  a	  series	  of	  
documentaries	  about	  the	  POWs	  and	  the	  parallel	  publication	  of	  the	  accompanying	  book	  by	  
Hank	  Nelson.39	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  an	  exposure	  of	  the	  relative	  mortality	  rates	  of	  officers	  and	  
other	  ranks	  amongst	  the	  Australian	  prisoners	  in	  Ambon	  and	  Hainan,	  researched	  by	  Joan	  
Beaumont.40	  Nelson	  went	  on	  to	  edit	  a	  collection	  of	  essays	  about	  the	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway	  
with	  Gavan	  McCormack,	  which	  added	  to	  the	  Australian	  voices	  perspectives	  from	  Japanese	  and	  
Korean	  participants	  in	  the	  episode.	  It	  also	  included	  a	  chapter	  on	  the	  civilian	  labourers	  on	  the	  
line,	  by	  one	  of	  the	  Japanese	  scholars	  who	  had	  taken	  an	  interest	  in	  recovering	  the	  memory	  of	  
that	  group.41	  
	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  British	  literature,	  that	  from	  Australia	  adopted	  a	  much	  more	  egalitarian	  
approach,	  frequently	  considering	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  other	  ranks.	  The	  only	  book	  focussing	  
on	  the	  commissioned	  ranks	  in	  the	  Australian	  canon	  is	  the	  recent	  publication	  by	  Rosalind	  
Hearder	  which,	  being	  an	  account	  of	  the	  role	  of	  Australian	  doctors	  in	  captivity,	  would	  naturally	  
focus	  on	  officers.42	  The	  historiography	  of	  the	  Australians	  and	  the	  internees	  offers	  a	  more	  all-­‐
inclusive	  and	  trans-­‐national	  approach	  than	  much	  of	  the	  British	  work	  on	  POWs,	  where	  a	  similar	  
direction	  is	  sometimes	  suggested	  but	  only	  rarely	  delivered.	  On	  this	  latter	  point	  Hearder	  has	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written	  of	  the	  ‘lack	  of	  broad	  scholarship	  in	  cross-­‐cultural	  aspects	  of	  captivity	  between	  the	  
various	  allied	  forces’43,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  intention	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  expand	  and	  widen	  this	  theme,	  
utilising	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  other	  ranks.	  
In	  so	  doing	  a	  variety	  of	  strands	  of	  historiography	  will	  be	  introduced	  where	  appropriate	  to	  assist	  
in	  the	  development	  of	  each	  chapter.	  	  Two	  particular	  areas	  with	  regard	  to	  race	  are	  worth	  
introducing	  at	  this	  point,	  both	  geographically	  defined.	  The	  issue	  of	  race	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
Asia-­‐Pacific	  War	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  scrutiny	  at	  a	  number	  of	  levels.	  	  At	  the	  meta-­‐political	  
level	  Christopher	  Thorne	  has	  noted	  how	  it	  pervaded	  the	  ongoing	  relationships	  between	  Britain	  
and	  America	  during	  the	  war	  years.44	  At	  a	  more	  parochial	  political	  level,	  Louis	  Allen,	  a	  former	  
intelligence	  officer	  with	  the	  14th	  Army	  in	  Burma,	  dedicated	  a	  chapter	  in	  his	  history	  of	  the	  fall	  of	  
Singapore	  to	  The	  Factor	  of	  Race,	  highlighting	  the	  reluctance	  of	  the	  British	  authorities	  to	  utilise	  
the	  local	  population.45	  Gerald	  Horne	  has	  examined	  the	  impact	  of	  British	  imperial	  and	  colonial	  
racism	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  war,	  with	  specific	  focus	  on	  such	  effects	  in	  Hong	  Kong.46	  Adopting	  a	  
wider	  lens	  on	  western	  hegemony,	  John	  Dower	  has	  written	  about	  the	  influence	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  
racial	  antipathy	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  brutalised	  nature	  of	  the	  war.47	  In	  contrast	  to	  this	  thesis,	  
Tarak	  Barkawi	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  brutality	  in	  the	  Burma	  theatre	  was	  not	  pre-­‐ordained,	  but	  
was	  the	  result	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  fighting	  itself,	  and	  developed	  in	  situ.48	  
With	  regard	  to	  Britain	  itself,	  there	  is	  a	  limited	  literature	  that	  reflects	  upon	  British	  outlooks,	  
both	  before	  and	  during	  the	  war,	  and	  particularly	  around	  the	  reception	  that	  the	  Black	  GIs	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received,	  and	  these	  works	  provide	  useful	  home	  comparators	  for	  the	  cohort	  that	  went	  to	  Asia.	  
Two	  key	  works	  in	  this	  respect	  are	  the	  studies	  of	  the	  American	  “occupation”	  that	  started	  in	  
1942,	  by	  Graham	  Smith49	  and	  David	  Reynolds50.	  Both	  authors	  relate	  how	  the	  British	  public	  
were	  largely	  receptive	  to	  the	  black	  visitors,	  although	  Reynolds	  indicates	  that	  the	  relationship	  
grew	  less	  cordial	  as	  the	  war	  progressed.	  In	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  survey	  to	  date	  of	  
contemporary	  British	  attitudes	  to	  race	  and	  difference,	  Tony	  Kuschner’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  Mass	  
Observation	  archives	  reveals	  a	  more	  nuanced	  position,	  and	  he	  argues	  that	  there	  was	  a	  greater	  
complexity	  and	  mutability	  in	  outlooks.51	  	  
	  
In	  the	  article	  referred	  to	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  section,	  Wylie	  suggested	  that	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
POW	  literature,	  ‘we	  have	  probably	  reached	  the	  stage	  where	  claims	  for	  originality,	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  historiographical	  lacunae,	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  sustained.’52	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  just	  
such	  a	  lacuna	  regarding	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  BORs	  in	  captivity	  in	  Asia	  during	  the	  Second	  
World	  War,	  and	  that	  in	  starting	  to	  address	  it	  a	  further	  contribution	  can	  be	  made	  to	  the	  







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Smith,	  Graham.	  (1987)	  When	  Jim	  Crow	  Met	  John	  Bull:	  Black	  American	  Soldiers	  in	  World	  War	  II	  Britain.	  
I.B.Taurus	  and	  Co,	  London.	  
50	  Reynolds,	  Rich	  Relations.	  	  
51	  Kushner,	  We	  Europeans.	  
52	  Wylie,	  “Prisoners	  of	  War.”	  p229.	  
25	  
	  
Chapter	  1.	  	  The	  Journey	  East	  and	  into	  Captivity	  .	  
	  
1.1.	  Introduction.	  
On	  their	  journey	  east	  via	  South	  Africa	  and	  India,	  and	  upon	  arrival	  in	  Singapore,	  the	  BORs	  would	  
find	  themselves	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  local	  populations,	  including	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Indian	  
diasporas,	  Malays,	  Thais,	  Burmese,	  Indonesians	  and	  Eurasians.	  Notwithstanding	  their	  
proximity,	  contacts	  could	  be	  surprisingly	  limited,	  as	  first	  colonial	  and	  then	  Japanese	  imposed	  
segregation	  worked	  to	  keep	  them	  separate.	  Despite	  their	  often	  limited	  nature,	  such	  contacts	  
as	  there	  were	  offer	  the	  opportunity	  to	  elucidate	  the	  outlooks	  of	  the	  servicemen	  to	  the	  peoples	  
whom	  they	  encountered.	  Some	  initial	  perspectives	  would	  be	  signalled	  during	  the	  journey	  east,	  
and	  amplified	  once	  in	  theatre,	  and	  this	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  examine	  those	  nascent	  views	  and	  
provide	  a	  wider	  insight	  into	  such	  sentiments.	  
One	  approach	  to	  structuring	  this	  chapter	  would	  be	  to	  adopt	  a	  classification	  based	  along	  
national	  and	  ethnic	  lines.	  Such	  an	  approach	  would	  however	  be	  simplistic	  and	  remove	  the	  focus	  
from	  the	  BORs	  who	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  study.	  By	  examining	  their	  responses	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  
civilians,	  in	  a	  range	  of	  settings	  through	  time,	  a	  much	  richer	  picture	  of	  their	  outlooks,	  their	  
complexity	  and	  mutability,	  and	  the	  factors	  that	  informed	  and	  developed	  them,	  can	  be	  
elucidated.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  ignore	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  were	  important	  factors	  that	  applied	  to	  
specific	  nationalities	  and	  the	  BOR’s	  impressions	  of	  them,	  and	  these	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  
text	  as	  they	  occur.	  
The	  civilians	  were	  theoretically	  neutral,	  and	  thus	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  offer	  truer	  insights	  into	  
the	  ethno-­‐racial	  mind-­‐sets	  of	  the	  ordinary	  Briton,	  largely	  untainted	  by	  the	  potential	  for	  bias	  
that	  could	  be	  introduced	  in	  the	  consideration	  of	  allied	  or	  enemy	  combatant	  status.	  In	  reality	  
however	  the	  situation	  was	  somewhat	  more	  complex	  and	  local	  populations	  would	  nearly	  
always	  be	  seen	  through	  a	  prism	  of	  partiality,	  be	  it	  supportive	  or	  unhelpful,	  positive	  or	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derogatory,	  sometimes	  dependent	  upon	  the	  situation	  that	  the	  serviceman	  found	  himself	  in	  
and	  the	  response	  of	  the	  civilian	  to	  that	  situation.	  Frequently	  the	  soldier’s	  view	  of	  a	  civilian	  
would	  be	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  the	  view	  which	  he	  thought	  that	  the	  civilian	  held	  of	  him;	  thus	  
while	  suspicion	  of	  civilians	  was	  usually	  accompanied	  by	  an	  assumed	  antipathy	  in	  return,	  a	  
grateful	  POW	  was	  likely	  to	  see	  the	  civilian	  as	  being	  sympathetic.	  Such	  a	  binary	  feedback	  
relationship	  is	  not	  unexpected,	  indeed	  it	  would	  be	  a	  surprise	  were	  it	  otherwise,	  and	  forms	  the	  
basis	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  outlooks	  in	  this	  chapter,	  where	  antipathy	  and	  sympathy	  follow	  a	  
consistent	  and	  traceable	  path	  through	  the	  first-­‐hand	  accounts.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  contacts	  with	  and	  outlooks	  upon	  the	  civilian	  populations	  will	  be	  assessed	  in	  four	  
largely	  consecutive	  contexts.	  An	  initial	  section	  examines	  the	  journey	  east,	  as	  the	  men	  were	  
sent	  overseas	  by	  convoy,	  disembarking	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Bombay	  on	  the	  way.	  This	  provides	  
an	  initial	  snapshot	  as	  to	  the	  men’s	  outlooks,	  as	  they	  witness	  the	  segregation	  of	  South	  Africa,	  
and	  the	  deprivation	  of	  India.	  The	  next	  section,	  upon	  arrival	  in	  what	  was	  by	  now	  the	  war-­‐zone	  
of	  	  Singapore,	  examines	  the	  naiveté	  of	  the	  men	  to	  their	  new	  surroundings,	  considering	  first	  
impressions	  upon	  landing	  in	  Singapore,	  the	  apparent	  ubiquity	  of	  the	  enemy	  lurking	  within	  the	  
local	  population	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  5th	  column,	  and	  difficulties	  in	  differentiating	  ethnicity.	  	  This	  
is	  followed	  by	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  often	  desperate	  attempts	  made	  by	  some	  of	  the	  men	  to	  
avoid	  capture	  during	  the	  flight	  from	  Singapore,	  and	  their	  responses	  to	  the	  local	  communities	  
through	  which	  they	  passed.	  The	  final	  section	  examines	  the	  reactions	  of	  the	  men	  during	  the	  
post	  surrender	  marches	  into	  captivity,	  intended	  by	  the	  victorious	  Japanese	  to	  humiliate	  the	  








1.2.	  The	  Journey	  East.	  
For	  most	  of	  the	  other	  ranks	  the	  journey	  to	  South	  East	  Asia	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1941	  was,	  with	  the	  
exception	  for	  some	  of	  a	  brief	  sojourn	  in	  France	  the	  previous	  year,	  their	  first	  experience	  of	  
going	  overseas.	  This	  journey	  would	  bring	  them	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  range	  of	  contrasting	  cultural	  
landscapes	  en	  route,	  including	  that	  of	  their	  American	  hosts	  on	  the	  first	  convoy,	  and	  particularly	  
at	  the	  points	  of	  disembarkation,	  at	  Cape	  Town	  and	  Durban	  in	  South	  Africa,	  and	  Bombay.	  	  
Most	  of	  the	  subjects	  of	  this	  study	  went	  overseas	  on	  two	  main	  convoys.	  The	  first,	  containing	  
most	  of	  the	  18th	  Division,	  departed	  from	  Liverpool	  (27-­‐30/10/41)	  and	  from	  Gourock	  on	  the	  
Clyde	  (31/10/41).	  After	  three	  days	  sailing	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  Royal	  Navy,	  it	  was	  met	  in	  
mid-­‐Atlantic	  by	  a	  U.S.	  Navy	  flotilla	  and	  proceeded	  under	  American	  escort	  to	  Halifax	  (Nova	  
Scotia).	  There	  the	  men	  were	  transferred	  to	  six	  converted	  American	  liners,	  the	  United	  States	  
Ships	  West	  Point,	  Wakefield,	  Mount	  Vernon,	  Orizabe,	  Dickson	  and	  Leonard	  Wood,	  the	  main	  
body	  embarking	  on	  8/11/41.	  
Their	  route	  took	  them	  down	  to	  Trinidad	  for	  resupplying,	  before	  crossing	  the	  Atlantic	  again,	  and	  
docking	  at	  Cape	  Town	  on	  the	  9th	  and	  10th	  of	  December,	  just	  after	  the	  outbreak	  of	  hostilities	  in	  
the	  Far	  East.	  	  After	  several	  days	  in	  port	  the	  convoy	  departed	  for	  Bombay	  on	  the	  14th,	  where	  
most	  of	  the	  ships	  arrived	  at	  the	  end	  of	  December,	  and	  the	  men	  disembarked	  for	  several	  weeks	  
of	  land	  based	  training	  at	  Ahmednagar	  in	  central	  India.	  They	  departed	  on	  the	  20th	  and	  21st	  of	  
January	  for	  Singapore,	  reaching	  their	  final	  destination	  at	  the	  end	  of	  January,	  just	  two	  weeks	  
before	  the	  capitulation.	  The	  Bombay	  landfall	  was	  not	  made	  by	  the	  USS	  Mount	  Vernon,	  which	  
was	  diverted	  to	  Mombasa	  in	  time	  for	  Christmas	  Day,	  and	  thence	  went	  straight	  to	  Singapore	  
arriving	  in	  mid-­‐January,	  giving	  its	  unfortunate	  passengers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  




A	  further	  convoy,	  with	  a	  large	  RAF	  presence,	  left	  Gourock	  on	  7/12/41,	  this	  time	  taking	  a	  more	  
direct	  route	  to	  the	  Far	  East,	  via	  Freetown	  (21/12/41	  –	  25/12/41),	  Cape	  Town	  (5/1/42)	  and	  
Durban	  (10/1/42-­‐14/1/42),	  where	  the	  men	  were	  allowed	  to	  disembark.	  Their	  journey	  then	  
took	  some	  of	  them	  straight	  to	  Singapore,	  arriving	  about	  a	  week	  before	  the	  fall,	  whilst	  others	  
were	  diverted	  to	  Batavia	  on	  Java.	  
The	  other	  ranks	  exhibited	  a	  range	  of	  responses	  to	  their	  first	  opportunity	  for	  shore	  leave,	  after	  
nearly	  six	  weeks	  at	  sea.	  Having	  left	  Britain	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  winter,	  in	  the	  throes	  of	  rationing	  and	  
bombing,	  disembarking	  at	  Cape	  Town	  during	  the	  southern	  hemispheric	  summer,	  with	  its	  
abundance	  of	  familiar	  and	  exotic	  foodstuffs	  and	  a	  relatively	  large	  and	  welcoming	  English	  
speaking	  white	  population,	  must	  have	  been	  a	  revelation	  and	  cause	  for	  celebration	  amongst	  
many	  of	  the	  ship	  bound	  soldiers.	  A	  typical	  example	  of	  such	  a	  reaction	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  diary	  
of	  Private	  Caldwell:	  ‘9/12/41	  Granted	  shore	  leave.	  Reception	  from	  S.	  African	  population	  was	  
outstanding.	  13/12/41	  Departed	  with	  heavy	  hearts	  from	  Cape	  Town.’53	  
Private	  Carpenter	  had	  similar	  memories,	  when	  he	  recalled	  that	  ‘…	  those	  four	  days	  were,	  well,	  
no	  words	  of	  mine	  can	  express	  them	  …	  four	  wonderful	  days.’54	  Bombardier	  Parry	  noted	  on	  the	  
30/10/41	  that	  in	  Cape	  Town	  ‘…	  the	  people	  are	  falling	  over	  themselves	  to	  look	  after	  us’,	  and	  
four	  days	  later	  he	  wrote:	  ‘Left	  Cape	  Town	  and	  some	  of	  the	  kindest	  people	  you	  could	  ever	  wish	  
to	  meet.’55	  
Intelligence	  Corps	  member	  L.Cpl.	  Taylor	  offered	  a	  more	  nuanced	  view,	  as	  he	  noted	  that	  ‘The	  
chief	  impressions	  of	  Cape	  Town	  were	  the	  overflowing	  hospitality	  of	  the	  inhabitants,	  and	  the	  
atmosphere	  of	  wealth	  and	  abundance	  which	  was	  apparent…’,	  whilst	  however	  observing	  that	  
on	  the	  way	  to	  zoo	  that	  ‘we	  noticed	  the	  reverse	  side	  of	  Cape	  Town	  in	  the	  hovels	  occupied	  by	  
the	  African	  population.’	  At	  the	  zoo	  he	  drew	  a	  parallel	  with	  the	  wider	  political	  developments	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  IWM:	  Caldwell,	  E..J.	  (Docs	  11092)	  p3.	  
54	  IWM:	  Carpenter,	  C.W.	  (Docs	  1484)	  p6.	  
55	  IWM:	  Parry,	  E.W.	  (Docs	  2729)	  30/10/41;	  4/11/41.	  
29	  
	  
South	  Africa:	  ‘The	  lions	  anyhow	  were	  on	  their	  own	  territory,	  and	  had	  only	  exchanged	  a	  wider	  
liberty	  for	  permanent	  economic	  security.’56	  	  	  
Some	  of	  the	  other	  ranks	  similarly	  noted	  and	  recalled	  what	  they	  saw	  beyond	  the	  luxurious	  
white	  lifestyle,	  the	  concomitant	  conditions	  for	  the	  less	  fortunate	  residents.	  One	  area	  that	  was	  
repeatedly	  mentioned	  by	  the	  ORs	  in	  this	  respect	  was	  District	  Six,	  situated	  near	  to	  the	  docks,	  
where:	  
…	  coloured	  and	  white	  Afrikaner	  rural	  migrants	  rubbed	  shoulders	  with	  Jewish	  and	  
Indian	  shopkeepers;	  West	  Indians	  introduced	  the	  language	  and	  ideas	  of	  African	  
America;	  and	  St	  Helenans	  lived	  cheek	  by	  jowl	  with	  Cape	  Muslims	  and	  the	  descendants	  
of	  Filipino	  fishermen.57	  
	  
Prior	  to	  letting	  the	  men	  ashore,	  an	  on-­‐board	  briefing	  was	  routinely	  given	  by	  the	  officers.	  This	  
was	  a	  standard	  mechanism	  by	  which	  the	  military	  communicated	  what	  they	  assumed	  the	  
troops	  needed	  to	  know	  about	  the	  location	  they	  were	  about	  to	  visit,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Cape	  
Town	  this	  largely	  meant	  advising	  them	  to	  steer	  clear	  of	  District	  Six,	  which	  it	  was	  claimed,	  
contrary	  to	  the	  reality	  outlined	  above,	  was	  a	  no	  whites	  zone.	  Despite	  the	  admonitions	  of	  his	  
officers,	  Private	  Houghton	  found	  himself	  in	  District	  Six:	  
I	  saw	  the	  other	  side	  of	  town,	  where	  the	  natives	  live,	  their	  quarters	  are	  	  
squalid	  –	  dirt	  roads,	  tin	  houses.	  Somehow	  we	  had	  got	  into	  District	  6,	  a	  forbidden	  zone	  
for	  whites.	  This	  is	  my	  first	  sight	  of	  poverty,	  downright	  poverty,	  up	  to	  now	  thought	  this	  
could	  never	  happen	  –	  told	  later	  we	  were	  lucky	  to	  come	  away	  without	  some	  injury	  or	  
other.58	  
	  
Gunner	  Pitfield’s	  diary	  entry	  suggests	  that	  he	  had	  attended	  such	  a	  briefing	  and	  had	  fully	  
absorbed	  such	  warnings;	  ‘…	  stopped	  for	  4	  days	  terrific	  welcome,	  District	  Six	  very	  deadly	  for	  
troops	  many	  stabbed	  and	  killed	  by	  natives	  Cape	  Town	  a	  very	  beautiful	  spot	  …’59	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  IWM:	  Taylor	  (Taylor)	  (Docs	  841)	  Ch	  14.	  
57	  Bickford-­‐Smith,	  Vivian;	  van	  Heyningen,	  Elizabeth,	  and	  Worden,	  Nigel	  (1999)	  Cape	  Town	  in	  the	  
Twentieth	  Century:	  An	  illustrated	  social	  history.	  David	  Philip	  Publishers,	  Claremont,	  South	  Africa.	  p71.	  
58	  IWM:	  Houghton,	  J.R.	  (Docs	  2258)	  10/12/41.	  
59	  IWM:	  Pitfield,	  T.W.	  (Docs	  6398)	  p1.	  
30	  
	  
Other	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  District	  Six	  was	  more	  welcoming	  than	  the	  official	  line	  would	  have	  
it,	  including	  that	  of	  Private	  Dixon	  who	  recalled	  marching	  through	  Cape	  Town:	  
In	  our	  platoon	  we	  had	  one	  black	  person	  named	  Al	  Binney	  who	  used	  to	  be	  a	  fairground	  
boxer	  and	  came	  from	  Sheffield.	  He	  joined	  us	  as	  we	  left	  England.	  As	  the	  band	  
approached	  the	  coloured	  quarters,	  named	  District	  Six,	  it	  always	  struck	  up	  ‘Way	  down	  
the	  Swanee	  River’.	  You	  can	  imagine	  the	  rapturous	  applause	  we	  got	  when	  they	  spotted	  
our	  black	  Al	  Binney	  amongst	  us.	  As	  far	  as	  I	  know	  he	  was	  the	  only	  coloured	  in	  the	  whole	  
division.60	  
	  
The	  same	  Al	  Binney	  would	  later,	  in	  captivity,	  drag	  an	  unconscious	  Dixon	  back	  to	  his	  hut	  after	  a	  
severe	  beating	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Japanese.	  Presumably	  Al	  Binney	  was	  not	  living	  in	  Brixton	  in	  
1969,	  when	  Dixon	  wrote	  that	  ‘our	  coloured	  neighbours	  were	  making	  our	  lives	  unbearable	  so	  
we	  thought	  it	  best	  to	  move	  and	  we	  did.’61	  
	  
Private	  Henderson,	  an	  active	  Communist	  Party	  member,	  sought	  a	  more	  political	  (and	  perhaps	  
less	  patronising)	  means	  of	  mediating	  the	  BOR/District	  Six	  interface	  as	  he	  recalled	  the	  subject	  of	  
‘Section	  Six’	  [sic]	  coming	  up	  in	  a	  meeting	  with	  the	  local	  Cape	  Town	  party	  secretary.	  On	  board	  
ship	  they	  had	  been	  told	  that	  an	  Australian	  had	  been	  killed,	  and	  that	  men	  in	  British	  uniforms	  
were	  decidedly	  unpopular	  there.	  His	  local	  comrade	  said	  that	  there	  had	  been	  an	  incident	  
involving	  a	  group	  of	  drunken	  Australians,	  who	  had	  run	  away	  from	  the	  police	  after	  attempting	  
to	  rob	  a	  brewer’s	  dray,	  and	  ended	  up	  in	  District	  Six.	  	  
The	  drunks	  had	  pestered	  a	  couple	  of	  women,	  evidently	  labouring	  under	  the	  false	  
concept	  that	  as	  they	  were	  coloured	  women	  they	  were	  sexually	  available.	  A	  number	  of	  
male	  residents	  of	  the	  section,	  becoming	  aware	  of	  the	  situation,	  had	  gone	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	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  13003)	  p33.	  There	  was	  at	  least	  one	  other	  black	  man	  serving	  in	  the	  18th	  Division.	  
Sgt	  Manley	  de	  Roux,	  in	  his	  mid	  30s,	  	  had	  worked	  his	  passage	  from	  Jamaica	  to	  volunteer	  in	  1940,	  and	  
enlisted	  in	  the	  Northumberland	  Fusiliers,	  where	  he	  was	  rapidly	  promoted.	  Held	  in	  high	  regard	  by	  his	  
comrades	  both	  before	  and	  during	  captivity,	  he	  volunteered	  to	  stay	  behind	  to	  help	  with	  the	  wounded	  
POWs	  after	  the	  war,	  and	  died	  in	  a	  plane	  crash	  near	  Saigon	  in	  1945	  whilst	  on	  these	  duties.	  IWM:	  Eva,	  
O.V.	  (Docs	  2381)	  pp	  35-­‐37.	  His	  deployment	  to	  the	  Northumberland	  Fusiliers,	  a	  battalion	  of	  which	  had	  
rioted	  in	  Kingston,	  and	  marched	  through	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  Jamaican	  capital	  singing	  ‘We’ve	  got	  the	  wind	  
up	  the	  wogs’	  a	  few	  years	  before,	  was	  an	  interesting	  choice.	  See	  Bousquet,	  Ben,	  and	  Douglas,	  Colin.	  
(1991)	  West	  Indian	  Women	  at	  war:	  British	  Racism	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  Lawrence	  and	  Wishart,	  London.	  pp	  
31-­‐34.	  
61	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  p153.	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assistance	  of	  the	  women,	  and	  a	  fight	  had	  broken	  out.	  One	  Australian	  had	  ended	  up	  in	  
hospital	  but	  our	  informant	  said	  “I’ve	  heard	  nothing	  about	  any	  one	  being	  killed.	  Had	  
there	  been	  a	  death	  I	  would	  have	  heard	  about	  it.	  We	  have	  members	  in	  Section	  Six.”	  
	  
Henderson	  was	  taken	  by	  his	  host	  to	  see	  District	  Six	  for	  himself.	  
The	  scene	  was	  one	  of	  Victorian	  gentility	  with	  soberly	  dressed	  men	  strolling	  along	  the	  
pavements	  with	  their	  wives	  on	  their	  arms,	  often	  accompanied	  by	  their	  children	  who	  all	  
seemed	  to	  be	  dressed	  as	  if	  for	  a	  Whit-­‐Sunday	  parade.	  As	  we	  passed	  with	  our	  guide	  
hats	  were	  raised	  in	  courteous	  greeting	  and	  no	  exception	  at	  all	  was	  taken	  to	  our	  
uniforms.	  
Our	  guide	  told	  us	  that	  these	  people	  were	  …	  strongly	  anti-­‐fascist	  although	  some	  
regarded	  the	  war	  as	  a	  white	  man’s	  affair	  and	  wanted	  none	  of	  it.62	  
	  
Henderson’s	  description	  appears	  to	  be	  somewhat	  at	  odds	  with	  that	  given	  by	  Houghton,	  as,	  not	  
for	  the	  last	  time	  in	  this	  survey,	  very	  different	  perspectives	  influenced	  perceptions	  of	  the	  same	  
location.	  Their	  situations	  were	  however	  different.	  Houghton	  had	  got	  lost	  in	  the	  company	  of	  
some	  of	  his	  similarly	  culturally	  inexperienced	  fellow	  soldiers,	  in	  completely	  unfamiliar	  territory.	  
Henderson,	  however,	  informed	  by	  a	  more	  rounded	  worldview	  and	  more	  numerous	  positive	  
contacts	  with	  people	  of	  other	  races,	  questioned	  the	  official	  guidance	  and	  had	  deliberately	  set	  
out	  to	  investigate.	  In	  this	  matter	  he	  was	  being	  guided	  by	  a	  trusted	  local	  comrade,	  who	  was	  also	  
respected	  in	  the	  community.	  Henderson’s	  account	  sees	  through	  the	  poverty	  and	  into	  the	  
humanity	  of	  District	  Six,	  and	  is	  so	  glowing	  that	  it	  might	  seem	  at	  odds	  with	  even	  local	  accounts	  
of	  the	  area,	  until	  one	  considers	  that	  it	  appears	  he	  visited	  on	  a	  Sunday.	  
Given	  the	  numerous	  references	  to	  District	  Six	  in	  the	  BOR	  accounts	  of	  Cape	  Town,	  it	  is	  
something	  of	  a	  surprise	  that	  none	  appear	  from	  any	  of	  the	  officers.	  The	  nearest	  to	  such	  to	  be	  
found	  is	  an	  official	  sounding	  statement	  from	  Captain	  Merrett,	  referring	  to	  the	  Cape	  Flats,	  some	  
distance	  away	  from	  the	  main	  port	  and	  from	  District	  Six:	  ‘The	  native	  district	  in	  Cape	  Town	  on	  
the	  edge	  of	  Cape	  Flats	  is	  forbidden	  to	  troops	  &	  only	  poor	  whites	  live	  there	  the	  police	  patrol	  in	  
pairs.’	  It	  would	  perhaps	  have	  been	  surprising	  had	  Merrett	  not	  found	  space	  in	  his	  journal	  for	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  IWM:	  Henderson,	  E.S.	  (Docs	  8225)	  p121-­‐122.	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such	  an	  entry,	  given	  his	  wide	  ranging	  review	  of	  the	  racial	  politics	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  Cape,	  
including	  the	  ‘Indian	  problem’	  of	  the	  1920s,	  the	  growing	  Boer	  population,	  and	  a	  visit	  to	  
Muizenberg,	  ‘called	  Jewsenberg	  for	  quite	  obvious	  reasons.’63	  	  	  
Conversely,	  given	  that	  some,	  at	  least,	  of	  the	  BORs	  had	  described	  with	  sympathy	  their	  
encounter	  with	  District	  Six,	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  only	  one	  of	  them	  had	  commented	  about	  the	  
segregated	  nature	  of	  the	  US	  Navy.	  Cape	  Town	  had	  not	  been	  so	  welcoming	  to	  the	  black	  crew	  
members	  of	  the	  American	  ships,	  as	  they	  disembarked	  from	  Jim	  Crow	  ships	  on	  to	  a	  land	  that	  
embraced	  a	  system	  of	  embryonic	  apartheid.	  These	  men,	  and	  some	  Filipinos,	  were	  recruited	  
solely	  into	  ancillary	  roles	  in	  the	  US	  Navy,	  and	  served	  as	  waiters	  and	  servants	  to	  the	  officers	  on	  
board.	  	  Lance	  Corporal	  Boyd	  noted	  that	  the	  ‘position	  of	  the	  U.S.	  negroes	  must	  have	  been	  
delicate,	  as	  the	  colour	  bar	  is	  rigid	  in	  C.T.	  and	  signs	  saying	  EUROPEANS	  ONLY/BLANKES	  ALLEEN	  
were	  everywhere.’64	  	  The	  impact	  of	  segregation	  onshore	  for	  the	  American	  crew	  was	  one	  that	  
was	  also	  noted	  by	  one	  officer,	  Captain	  de	  Cayley	  of	  the	  5th	  Suffolks,	  who	  recalled	  that:	  
Our	  negro	  waiters	  were	  horrified	  by	  the	  colour	  bar,	  and	  we	  were	  warned	  that	  some	  
white	  girls	  hanging	  around	  the	  dock	  entrance	  were	  classified	  as	  coloured	  and	  were	  
tabu	  [sic].	  We	  asked	  how	  you	  could	  tell	  and	  were	  told	  that	  they	  had	  no	  half-­‐moons	  on	  
their	  nails.65	  	  	  	  
	  
Whilst	  it	  is	  questionable	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  sailors	  would	  have	  been	  much	  surprised	  at	  facing	  
more	  segregation	  when	  they	  landed,	  these	  statements	  suggest	  a	  certain	  empathy	  on	  the	  part	  
of	  those	  that	  made	  them,	  and	  de	  Cayley’s	  statement	  goes	  on	  to	  harpoon	  one	  of	  the	  issues	  of	  
racial	  categorisation	  that	  plagues	  any	  such	  social	  system.	  Private	  Henderson,	  who	  had	  been	  
characteristically	  open	  to	  new	  horizons	  on	  the	  West	  Point,	  struck	  up	  a	  friendship	  with	  a	  radio	  
operator	  who	  was	  of	  Italian	  origin,	  as	  were,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  most	  of	  the	  crew.66	  	  Given	  that	  the	  
black	  stewards	  on	  board	  were	  reserved	  for	  serving	  the	  officers,	  their	  paths	  probably	  never	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  IWM:	  Merrett,	  F.M.	  (Docs	  1293)	  p10.	  
64	  IWM:	  Taylor,	  J.D.	  (Boyd)	  Chapter	  13.	  
65	  IWM:	  de	  Cayley,	  F.E.	  (Docs	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  p12.	  
66	  IWM:	  Henderson;	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crossed.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  officers	  and	  District	  Six	  a	  similar	  explanation	  seems	  plausible,	  in	  
that	  to	  venture	  anywhere	  near	  such	  an	  area	  (especially	  given	  the	  picture	  painted	  by	  their	  
colleagues	  for	  the	  men)	  was	  an	  anathema	  to	  them.	  	  
	  
Further	  evidence	  of	  broader	  outlooks	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  accounts	  of	  servicemen	  whose	  
journey	  took	  them	  via	  Durban,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  second	  convoy.	  Private	  Strong’s	  diary	  entry	  
displays	  his	  enjoyment	  of,	  and	  receptiveness	  to,	  a	  new	  environment;	  ‘Many	  things	  combined	  
to	  make	  this	  first	  walk	  in	  a	  new	  country	  strange	  and	  delightful,	  the	  large	  numbers	  of	  natives	  in	  
the	  streets,	  the	  rickshaw	  men	  who	  were	  doing	  a	  roaring	  trade…’.67	  Aircraftman	  2nd	  Class	  
Gregory	  remembered	  discussing	  his	  appreciation	  for	  the	  role	  of	  General	  Smuts	  in	  world	  affairs	  
with	  his	  hosts:	  
They	  stopped	  me	  in	  mid	  stream	  and,	  while	  sharing	  my	  enthusiasm	  for	  their	  leader,	  
expressed	  their	  utmost	  certainty	  that,	  whatever	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  war,	  there	  would	  
be	  grave	  changes	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  South	  African	  affairs.	  They	  explicitly	  forecast	  the	  
coming	  of	  apartheid	  and	  accurately	  named	  three	  or	  four	  politicians	  who	  would,	  they	  
feared,	  bring	  about	  this	  evil	  change	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  their	  lives.	  68	  
	  
A	  small	  cohort	  of	  188	  mixed	  army	  and	  RAF	  other	  ranks	  would	  extend	  their	  stay	  in	  Durban,	  as	  
military	  prisoners,	  following	  a	  revolt	  over	  the	  insanitary	  conditions	  on	  the	  ship	  they	  were	  due	  
to	  board,	  the	  City	  of	  Canterbury,	  for	  the	  final	  leg	  of	  their	  journey	  to	  Singapore.	  The	  senior	  
officer	  in	  the	  local	  Natal	  Command	  had	  visited	  the	  ship	  and	  agreed	  that	  the	  situation	  was	  
unsatisfactory,	  noting	  the	  poor	  ventilation,	  unusable	  lifebelts,	  infestations,	  and,	  ‘horror	  of	  
horrors	  –	  the	  Other	  Ranks	  latrines	  were	  also	  being	  used	  by	  the	  coloured	  crew	  members.	  He	  
immediately	  ordered	  that	  the	  latrines	  be	  reserved	  for	  white	  troops.’69	  Despite	  his	  report,	  the	  
situation	  in	  Singapore	  was	  desperate,	  and	  the	  ship	  set	  sail	  without	  some	  of	  its	  passengers.70	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70	  There	  had	  also	  been	  a	  mutiny	  of	  sorts	  on	  the	  first	  convoy	  at	  Halifax.	  Conditions	  on	  board	  the	  Sobiesky	  
were	  such	  that	  the	  men	  were	  refusing	  to	  re-­‐board	  her.	  The	  Kings	  Regulations	  Mutiny	  Act	  was	  read	  out	  
to	  the	  recalcitrant	  men,	  accompanied	  by	  loud	  jeering	  and	  communal	  renditions	  of	  The	  Red	  Flag.	  The	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The	  next	  stop	  for	  most	  of	  those	  on	  the	  first	  convoy	  would	  be	  Bombay,	  something	  of	  a	  contrast	  
to	  Cape	  Town,	  as	  recorded	  in	  the	  verses	  of	  the	  poem,	  Wasted	  Journey,	  attributed	  to	  an	  
anonymous	  [Sherwood]‘Forrester’,	  in	  the	  diary	  of	  Sapper	  Coates:	  
Verse	  11.	  
We	  all	  know	  the	  tales	  of	  the	  marvellous	  days,	  
We	  were	  all	  entertained	  in	  a	  hundred	  ways,	  
By	  inhabitants	  of	  our	  Empire	  Pearl,	  
Hospitality	  set	  our	  heads	  awhirl,	  
	  
12.	  
Mountain	  drives	  in	  someone’s	  car,	  
Pleasures,	  where	  money	  was	  no	  bar,	  
To	  these	  Empire	  people	  I’m	  justly	  proud,	  
And	  shall	  always	  ring	  their	  praises	  loud.	  
	  
13.	  
But	  like	  all	  good	  things	  it	  came	  to	  end,	  
Back	  on	  our	  boat,	  we	  our	  journey	  wend,	  
This	  time	  India	  our	  destination,	  





Star	  of	  the	  east	  recall	  the	  day,	  
Our	  boat	  was	  harboured	  at	  Bombay,	  
Pestered	  by	  merchants	  in	  little	  boats,	  
On	  muddy	  waters	  where	  all	  filth	  floats.	  
	  
16.	  
Contrast	  with	  the	  last	  port	  of	  call,	  
There’s	  nothing	  to	  compare	  at	  all,	  
Beggars,	  insanitation	  and	  rot,	  
A	  few	  days	  shore	  leave,	  best	  forgot.71	  
This	  somewhat	  unfavourable	  comparison	  was	  echoed	  by	  Caldwell:	  ‘Arrived	  at	  Bombay	  (India).	  
Granted	  one	  day’s	  leave.	  What	  a	  filthy	  place!!’72	  	  Disembarking	  on	  the	  same	  day	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
appearance	  of	  the	  converted	  American	  liners	  in	  harbour	  ended	  the	  disturbances	  and	  the	  men	  
embarked.	  (IWM:	  Dixon;	  p	  31.)	  
71	  IWM:	  Coates,	  N.H.	  (Docs	  6651)	  
72	  IWM:	  Caldwell;	  30/12/41.	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Houghton,	  who	  noted	  that:	  ‘Though	  we	  are	  weathered	  veterans,	  the	  sights	  and	  stenches	  of	  
Bombay	  streets,	  betel	  nut	  spit	  on	  walls/pavements,	  everywhere	  caused	  us	  to	  toy	  with	  our	  food	  
for	  days.’73	  	  	  
Some	  of	  the	  men,	  however,	  took	  a	  more	  analytical	  view,	  again	  noting	  the	  inequalities	  of	  what	  
they	  saw	  as	  typified	  by	  Corporal	  Flello’s	  entry	  for	  29/12/41:	  
	  …	  Extreme	  poverty	  of	  great	  numbers	  of	  community.	  Fires	  for	  cooking	  on	  pavement,	  
people	  changing	  clothes	  in	  street.	  Whole	  families	  sleeping	  on	  pavements.	  On	  other	  
hand	  –	  wealth	  of	  certain	  classes.	  …	  Native	  parts	  of	  the	  city	  –	  the	  buildings	  here	  
contrast	  strongly	  to	  magnificent	  buildings	  in	  European	  quarters.	  …	  Hard	  working	  
people	  in	  canteens.	  …	  Compare	  with	  Cape	  Town.74	  
	  
He	  provides	  a	  more	  sympathetic	  outlook	  on	  those	  suffering	  from	  the	  poverty	  of	  Bombay,	  
whilst	  still	  drawing	  the	  comparison	  with	  Cape	  Town.	  The	  penury	  in	  Bombay	  was	  made	  all	  the	  
more	  visible,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  sizeable	  and	  distracting	  European	  population	  to	  entertain	  
them.	  	  
Henderson	  provides	  another	  rich	  seam	  of	  material	  in	  this	  location,	  drawing	  comparisons	  with	  
more	  familiar	  sites	  back	  home.	  ‘We	  picked	  our	  way	  through	  the	  waterside	  debris	  typical	  of	  all	  
dock	  areas	  …’	  and	  then,	  while	  walking	  through	  the	  more	  commercial	  parts	  of	  the	  city,	  
remembering	  how	  ‘The	  shops	  were	  brilliantly	  lit	  and	  were	  just	  such	  as	  one	  would	  see	  in	  Oxford	  
Street	  or	  Tottenham	  Court	  Road.’75	  Again	  Henderson	  had	  questioned	  the	  official	  briefing	  
before	  leaving	  the	  ship,	  given	  by	  Colonel	  Thomas:	  
At	  one	  point,	  Thomas	  addressed	  us	  very	  seriously,	  almost	  wagging	  an	  admonitory	  
finger	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  audience.	  “Never,”	  said	  the	  Colonel,	  “Never	  let	  an	  Indian	  
address	  you	  without	  giving	  you	  the	  proper	  title	  of	  ‘Sahib’.	  This	  word	  means	  ‘White	  
Lord’.	  It	  doesn’t	  matter	  who	  the	  native	  is,	  he	  must	  address	  you	  as	  ‘Sahib’”.76	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  IWM:	  Houghton;	  p40;	  30/12/41.	  	  
74	  IWM:	  Flello,	  F.E.L.	  (Docs	  3662)	  29/12/41.	  
75	  IWM:	  Henderson;	  p147;	  p152.	  
76	  IWM:	  Henderson;	  p140.	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As	  a	  member	  of	  The	  League	  Against	  Imperialism	  and	  The	  India	  League	  Henderson	  felt	  aptly	  
qualified	  to	  take	  the	  Colonel	  to	  task	  over	  the	  utility	  of	  his	  briefing.	  His	  views	  were	  made	  even	  
more	  explicit	  during	  an	  incident	  on	  the	  train	  to	  Ahmednagger,	  a	  training	  depot	  inland.	  He	  
recalls	  an	  
incident	  of	  coin	  throwing	  to	  kids	  following	  train	  and	  “calling	  out	  such	  things	  as	  “Fight	  
for	  that	  one	  you	  black	  bastards.”	  Some	  of	  the	  epithets	  called	  out	  were	  worse	  than	  that	  
and	  I	  lost	  my	  temper.	  I	  seized	  the	  man	  who	  appeared	  to	  be	  the	  ring-­‐leader	  and	  pulled	  
him	  bodily	  into	  the	  carriage;	  he	  was	  one	  of	  the	  old	  sweats	  who	  on	  more	  occasions	  
than	  one	  I	  had	  heard	  talking	  to	  the	  younger	  men	  in	  the	  company	  about	  the	  Indian	  boy	  
prostitutes	  he	  had	  bought	  for	  the	  price	  of	  a	  cheap	  packet	  of	  cigarettes.	  I	  flung	  him	  
away	  from	  me	  and	  returned	  to	  the	  disgraceful	  scene	  outside.	  The	  lads	  in	  my	  section	  
shut	  up	  when	  they	  saw	  me.	  I	  quietened	  them	  all	  down	  and	  cleared	  the	  platform.	  
Back	  in	  the	  carriage	  I	  told	  them	  what	  I	  thought	  of	  their	  behaviour.	  These	  men	  I	  knew	  to	  
be	  decent	  fellows.	  Some	  were	  married	  men	  with	  children.	  I	  was	  dismayed	  that	  they	  
could	  so	  easily	  be	  brought	  down	  to	  this	  despicable	  level.	  “You	  can	  see	  for	  yourselves	  
the	  terrible	  plight	  these	  people	  are	  in.”	  I	  said.	  “If	  members	  of	  your	  own	  family	  were	  
only	  half	  as	  thin	  as	  most	  of	  these	  villagers	  you	  were	  making	  fun	  of	  you	  would	  be	  
worried	  sick.	  How	  can	  you	  make	  fun	  of	  such	  suffering?	  We	  are	  at	  war	  with	  a	  political	  
system	  that	  behaves	  in	  the	  way	  you	  were	  behaving	  just	  now.	  Haven’t	  you	  got	  
standards	  of	  your	  own	  about	  how	  to	  treat	  your	  fellow	  men?	  Do	  you	  follow	  the	  lead	  of	  
that	  miserable	  heap	  of	  shit	  over	  there	  in	  the	  corner?	  …	  How	  would	  you	  feel	  if	  the	  
fascists	  win	  this	  war	  and	  you	  are	  brought	  down	  to	  the	  level	  of	  these	  poor	  devils	  in	  
India.	  It	  could	  happen?.”	  
I	  returned	  to	  my	  seat	  and	  sat	  there	  in	  the	  silence	  that	  prevailed	  in	  the	  carriage.	  I	  felt	  
utterly	  miserable	  at	  what	  I	  had	  just	  witnessed.	  Then	  Auger	  sat	  down	  beside	  me.	  “Sorry	  
Stan.”	  he	  said.	  “You’re	  right	  in	  what	  you	  said.”77	  	  
	  
This	  passage	  not	  only	  makes	  explicit	  Henderson’s	  position,	  but	  also	  offers	  further	  insights	  into	  
the	  minds	  of	  those	  around	  him.	  The	  throwing	  of	  money	  has	  echoes	  of	  similar	  incidents	  off	  
Freetown,	  where	  coins	  were	  thrown	  for	  local	  boys	  to	  dive	  into	  the	  water	  for,	  and	  although	  
unrecorded	  there	  may	  well	  have	  been	  accompanying	  racial	  remarks.	  This	  was	  however	  a	  much	  
more	  direct	  encounter,	  far	  less	  innocent	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  soldiers,	  and	  apparently	  more	  
desperately	  needed	  by	  the	  recipients.	  That	  the	  old	  regular	  should	  have	  been	  acting	  in	  such	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  IWM:	  Henderson;	  p161-­‐162.	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way	  came	  as	  no	  surprise	  to	  Henderson,	  what	  disappointed	  him	  profoundly	  was	  the	  ease	  with	  
which	  he	  managed	  to	  lead	  his	  section	  astray.	  
However,	  Henderson	  was	  himself	  aware	  of	  his	  own	  imperfections,	  as	  when	  he	  writes	  of	  the	  
time	  at	  Ahmednagger	  that	  he	  awoke	  to	  find	  himself	  being	  shaved:	  
I	  have	  to	  plead	  guilty	  to	  having	  awakened	  in	  some	  alarm.	  …	  but	  to	  awaken	  suddenly	  
and	  find	  oneself	  staring	  into	  the	  face	  of	  a	  man	  who	  has	  an	  open	  razor	  in	  one	  hand	  and	  
features	  made	  familiar	  to	  us	  by	  such	  films	  as	  ‘The	  Bengal	  Lancers’	  is	  another.	  The	  
man’s	  smile	  and	  greetings	  of	  “Good	  morning	  Sahib”	  helped	  to	  allay	  my	  fears.78	  
	  
This	  passage	  is	  interesting	  in	  that	  it	  demonstrates	  that	  there	  are	  other	  factors	  than	  his	  religious	  
belief	  in	  equality,	  in	  this	  case	  films,	  which	  influence	  his	  thinking,	  even	  if	  only	  at	  the	  sub-­‐
conscious,	  half	  asleep	  level.	  Furthermore,	  the	  irony	  of	  the	  barber’s	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘Sahib’	  
helping	  to	  allay	  his	  fears	  was	  surely	  not	  lost	  upon	  him,	  although	  this	  anecdote	  was	  probably	  
not	  repeated	  to	  Colonel	  Thomas.	  
The	  BORs	  exhibited	  a	  range	  of	  responses	  to	  the	  various	  legs	  of	  the	  journey	  to	  Singapore.	  The	  
brief	  time	  in	  South	  Africa	  was	  something	  akin	  to	  a	  holiday.	  There	  were	  a	  few	  who	  saw	  beyond	  
the	  veneer	  of	  white	  prosperity	  to	  the	  poverty	  that	  sustained	  it,	  and	  they	  were	  the	  same	  people	  
who	  looked	  upon	  India	  in	  a	  more	  positive	  and	  understanding	  light.	  For	  those	  who	  had	  
unquestioningly	  enjoyed	  white	  hospitality	  in	  Cape	  Town,	  Bombay	  was	  contrasted	  
unfavourably.	  Some	  of	  the	  men	  demonstrated	  a	  certain	  insularity	  at	  best	  when	  confronted	  by	  
difference,	  at	  worst	  they	  displayed	  derogatory	  prejudice.	  Others	  were	  receptive	  to	  the	  new	  
situations	  they	  found	  themselves	  in,	  and	  exhibited	  an	  empathy	  or	  sympathy	  for	  those	  that	  
they	  met	  and	  saw.	  As	  they	  neared	  their	  destination	  they	  came	  under	  attack	  from	  Japanese	  
planes,	  and	  the	  relatively	  relaxed	  days	  of	  their	  voyage	  were	  soon	  behind	  them.	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1.3.	  First	  Impressions	  and	  Fifth	  Columnists.	  
On	  arrival	  in	  Singapore	  the	  men	  would	  find	  some	  of	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  conceptions	  of	  race	  
found	  wanting	  in	  the	  light	  of	  experience,	  whilst	  for	  others	  they	  would	  be	  confirmed.	  They	  were	  
largely	  newcomers	  to	  Asia,	  its	  peoples	  and	  its	  cultures,	  although	  a	  couple	  had	  some	  service	  
with	  Indian	  Army	  divisions.	  This	  section	  will	  examine	  their	  responses	  to	  this	  novel	  situation,	  
and	  assess	  to	  what	  extent	  and	  how	  their	  naiveté	  conditioned	  those	  responses.	  
First	  impressions	  of	  Singapore	  itself	  were	  largely	  subsumed	  in	  the	  accounts	  by	  the	  threat,	  or	  
the	  reality	  for	  the	  later	  arrivals,	  of	  Japanese	  attacks,	  but	  a	  few	  make	  reference	  to	  their	  new	  
surroundings.	  For	  Private	  Parry	  Singapore	  must	  have	  seemed	  like	  a	  colonially	  informed	  hybrid	  
of	  his	  impressions	  of	  Cape	  Town	  and	  Bombay.	  He	  described	  it	  as	  ‘a	  large	  town	  with	  quite	  
modern	  buildings	  and	  parks	  near	  the	  centre,	  then	  you	  step	  off	  the	  main	  street	  into	  all	  the	  filth	  
of	  the	  East,	  Chinese,	  Malays	  and	  Indians	  are	  mucked	  in	  together	  –	  “smell	  em	  boyo”.’79	  To	  him	  a	  
modern	  and	  westernised	  core	  was	  surrounded	  by	  Asia’s	  teeming	  and	  olfactarily	  unpleasant	  
masses,	  ethnically	  specified	  although	  in	  his	  contemporary	  thinking	  they	  seemed	  an	  amorphous	  
group.	  Despite	  being	  nominally	  in	  the	  9th	  Indian	  Division,	  his	  recent	  arrival	  mitigates	  any	  
suggestion	  that	  he	  had	  absorbed	  his	  cultural	  prejudices	  through	  prior	  service.	  
L.Cpl	  Taylor	  of	  the	  Intelligence	  Corps	  drew	  different	  conclusions	  from	  what	  he	  saw	  of	  civic	  
conditions.	  In	  his	  eyes	  ‘the	  standard	  of	  cleanliness	  was	  high,	  especially	  when	  compared	  with	  
other	  eastern	  cities.	  For	  once	  European	  administration	  had	  provided	  the	  oriental	  with	  good	  
results.’80	  At	  a	  more	  local	  level,	  whilst	  searching	  Chinese	  houses	  on	  the	  waterfront	  for	  snipers,	  	  
L.Bdr	  Grafton	  echoed	  such	  sentiments,	  as	  he	  noted:	  	  ‘We	  were	  surprised	  at	  the	  general	  
standard	  of	  cleanliness	  and	  comfort	  in	  evidence,	  as	  this	  was	  the	  first	  time	  any	  of	  us	  had	  seen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  IWM:	  Parry;	  5/12/41.	  
80	  IWM:	  Taylor;	  Chapter	  21.	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the	  inside	  of	  a	  home	  in	  Singapore.	  Although	  by	  our	  standards	  poor,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  these	  
people	  were	  clean	  and	  industrious.’81	  	  	  
Standards	  of	  cleanliness	  are	  identified	  in	  all	  three	  of	  these	  statements	  as	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  
defining	  how	  the	  BORs	  looked	  upon	  the	  local	  populations,	  and	  will	  recur	  as	  a	  topic,	  particularly	  
in	  relation	  to	  conditions	  on	  the	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway.	  Both	  Taylor	  and	  Grafton	  exhibited	  
some	  surprise	  at	  what	  they	  saw,	  suggesting	  that	  they	  had	  carried	  some	  misconceptions	  ashore	  
with	  them,	  and,	  although	  their	  observations	  were	  qualified	  by	  comparisons,	  implicitly	  and	  
explicitly,	  with	  conditions	  at	  home,	  these	  serve	  to	  strengthen	  the	  impression	  of	  the	  
modification	  of	  their	  views.	  Furthermore,	  whilst	  Taylor	  displays	  a	  certain	  cynicism	  about	  the	  
received	  benefits	  of	  colonialism,	  and	  thus	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  a	  more	  open-­‐minded	  
attitude,	  Grafton’s	  sense	  of	  revision	  is	  enhanced	  by	  the	  novelty	  of	  his	  contact,	  the	  first	  time	  he	  
(and	  his	  colleagues)	  had	  come	  into	  such	  close	  proximity	  with	  the	  citizens	  of	  Singapore	  in	  their	  
domestic	  environment.	  	  
Given	  the	  disjunction	  of	  the	  military	  and	  civilian	  communities	  at	  this	  level,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  
that	  such	  a	  contact	  would	  occur	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  search	  for	  fifth	  columnists.	  That	  this	  
search	  was	  being	  conducted	  in	  the	  Chinese	  community,	  which	  had	  been	  very	  largely	  
supportive	  of	  the	  now	  ten	  year	  long	  struggle	  in	  their	  homeland	  against	  Japanese	  aggression,	  
and	  which	  because	  of	  this	  would	  suffer	  terribly	  under	  the	  post	  surrender	  occupation,	  gives	  
some	  indication	  of	  the	  chaos	  and	  confusion	  that	  informed	  military	  thinking	  at	  all	  levels	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  fifth	  column.82	  Indeed,	  after	  the	  surrender	  it	  would	  be	  the	  Chinese	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  A.W.F.	  (Docs	  6466)	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82	  The	  British	  largely	  ignored	  Chinese	  requests	  to	  fight	  against	  the	  Japanese,	  preferring	  to	  recruit	  them	  
into	  civil	  defence	  roles	  such	  as	  the	  ARP	  and	  first	  aid.	  See	  Allen,	  Singapore,	  pp	  248-­‐252.	  Despite	  this,	  
because	  of	  their	  independent	  support	  for	  China	  as	  many	  as	  50,000	  civilians	  died	  in	  Singapore	  in	  what	  
has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  Sook	  Ching	  massacre,	  during	  the	  first	  few	  weeks	  after	  Percival’s	  surrender.	  
Smith,	  Colin.	  (2005)	  Singapore	  Burning:	  Heroism	  and	  Surrender	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  Viking,	  London,	  pp556-­‐
559.	  	  
Western	  historiography	  has	  also	  largely	  ignored	  this	  episode,	  for	  a	  rare	  contribution	  see;	  Blackburn,	  
Kevin.	  (2000)	  “The	  Collective	  Memory	  of	  the	  Sook	  Ching	  Massacre	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  the	  Civilian	  War	  
Memorial	  of	  Singapore.”	  Journal	  of	  the	  Malaysian	  Branch	  of	  the	  Royal	  Asiatic	  Society,	  Vol.	  73,	  p71-­‐90.	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community	  that	  would	  suffer	  the	  worst	  consequences	  of	  such	  treacherous	  activities,	  as	  tens	  of	  
thousands	  died	  during	  the	  occupation,	  a	  number	  that	  was	  probably	  only	  slightly	  mitigated	  by	  
the	  payment	  of	  $40	  million	  of	  what	  was	  essentially	  protection	  money	  to	  the	  Japanese	  
administration.83	  
The	  term	  “fifth	  column”	  had	  been	  coined	  during	  the	  Spanish	  Civil	  War,	  to	  describe	  a	  military	  
practice	  that	  dated	  back	  to	  the	  Trojan	  Wars	  and	  no	  doubt	  beyond,	  whereby	  advancing	  armies	  
were	  assisted	  by	  supporters	  behind	  the	  front	  line.	  In	  the	  Malayan	  campaign	  it	  was	  a	  pejorative	  
term,	  used	  to	  describe	  those	  thought	  to	  be	  assisting	  the	  Japanese,	  whilst	  the	  hastily	  organised	  
British	  forces	  left	  behind	  the	  lines	  were	  termed	  “stay-­‐behind	  parties”,	  or,	  to	  adopt	  a	  term	  from	  
an	  earlier	  conflict	  in	  Spain,	  guerrillas,	  if	  organised	  by	  the	  Malayan	  Communist	  Party.	  For	  those	  
recently	  arrived	  in	  the	  theatre	  this	  would	  not	  have	  been	  the	  first	  encounter	  with	  the	  concept	  
of	  the	  fifth	  column.	  As	  Hitler’s	  blitzkrieg	  attack	  on	  Western	  Europe	  was	  unleashed	  in	  1940,	  a	  
campaign	  in	  the	  popular	  press	  for	  the	  internment	  of	  enemy	  aliens	  was	  taken	  up	  at	  the	  official	  
level.	  This	  was	  a	  shameful	  episode	  that	  saw	  Jewish	  refugees	  from	  Germany	  and	  Austria,	  
incarcerated	  in	  squalid	  camps	  with	  middle	  aged	  Italian	  restaurateurs,	  and	  then	  herded	  on	  to	  
ships	  at	  bayonet	  point	  by	  British	  soldiers	  who	  had	  already	  robbed	  them.84	  Hundreds	  died	  
before	  some	  semblance	  of	  humanity	  and	  common	  sense	  took	  hold.	  Unaware	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  
treatment	  meted	  out	  to	  these	  mostly	  innocent	  internees,	  and	  conditioned	  by	  the	  wave	  of	  
publicity	  that	  had	  preceded	  this	  dark	  chapter,	  it	  was	  perhaps	  no	  surprise	  that	  some	  of	  the	  men	  
in	  Singapore	  and	  Malaya	  saw	  a	  fifth	  columnist	  round	  every	  corner	  and	  behind	  every	  rubber	  
tree.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See	  also	  Modder,	  Ralph.	  (2004)	  “Sook	  Ching”:	  The	  Singapore	  Chinese	  Massacre;	  18	  February	  to	  4	  March	  
1942.	  Horizon	  Books,	  Singapore.	  
83	  Modder;	  “Sook	  Ching”;	  p40.	  
84Lafitte,	  F.	  (1940)	  The	  Internment	  of	  Aliens.	  Penguin	  Books,	  Harmondsworth.p168.	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The	  fifth	  column	  had	  a	  diverse	  membership,	  ranging	  from	  the	  Japanese	  military	  through	  the	  
local	  civilian	  population	  and	  even	  into	  the	  British	  forces.	  Whilst	  most	  of	  the	  Japanese	  
population	  had	  either	  been	  withdrawn	  or	  were	  rounded	  up	  at	  the	  start	  of	  hostilities,	  to	  endure	  
an	  uncertain	  future	  in	  internment	  in	  India,	  some	  had	  eluded	  the	  net.85	  Private	  Houghton	  was	  
one	  of	  many	  to	  report	  that	  the	  former	  head	  waiter	  at	  Raffles	  had	  appeared	  after	  the	  surrender	  
in	  the	  uniform	  of	  a	  Japanese	  Major.86	  Whilst	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  this	  oft	  quoted	  appearance	  acts	  as	  
much	  as	  a	  caveat	  to,	  as	  it	  does	  in	  support	  of,	  its	  validity,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  there	  were	  
Japanese	  soldiers	  who	  would	  get	  in	  front	  of	  the	  main	  forces,	  sometimes	  in	  civilian	  clothing,	  
taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  European	  troops	  to	  differentiate	  between	  the	  Japanese	  
and	  the	  local	  communities.	  	  
Such	  was	  the	  confusion	  in	  this	  respect	  that	  one	  unit	  actually	  shot	  several	  members	  of	  a	  Gurkha	  
platoon	  that	  had	  the	  misfortune	  to	  cross	  its	  path.87	  Similarly,	  Gunner	  Pitfield,	  who	  claimed	  to	  
have	  shot	  a	  Japanese	  infiltrator	  dressed	  in	  civilian	  clothes,	  also	  recalled	  his	  unit	  killing	  Chinese	  
civilians	  who	  had	  been	  mistaken	  for	  Japanese.88	  	  Such	  cases	  of	  mistaken	  identity	  were	  not	  the	  
sole	  province	  of	  the	  British	  troops.	  During	  the	  battle	  for	  Singapore	  the	  recently	  formed	  44th	  
Indian	  Brigade	  had	  a	  skirmish	  with	  the	  neighbouring	  members	  of	  a	  Dalforce	  company,	  
composed	  of	  Chinese	  volunteers	  who	  took	  to	  the	  frontline	  wearing	  little	  but	  a	  white	  headband	  
to	  distinguish	  their	  civilian	  clothes.	  Both	  sides	  thought	  the	  other	  was	  the	  Japanese,	  and	  whilst	  
such	  episodes	  are	  not	  uncommon	  in	  the	  confusion	  of	  combat,	  the	  inexperience	  of	  each	  unit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  The	  treatment	  that	  these	  internees	  received	  was	  frequently	  harsh.	  One	  locked	  railway	  wagon	  full	  of	  
detainees	  was	  left	  unattended	  on	  a	  siding	  in	  Kuala	  Lumpur,	  where	  it	  remained	  unopened	  until	  its	  now	  
dead	  occupants	  were	  discovered	  by	  Japanese	  soldiers	  who	  subsequently	  went	  on	  a	  rampage.	  Elphick,	  
Peter.	  (1997)	  Far	  Eastern	  File:	  The	  Intelligence	  War	  in	  the	  Far	  East,	  1930-­‐1945.	  Hodder	  &	  Stoughton,	  
London.	  p	  328.	  	  	  
86	  IWM:	  Houghton;	  17/2/42.	  
87	  IWM:	  Carpenter;	  p15.	  
88	  IWM:	  Pitfield;	  p2.	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and	  the	  lack	  of	  identifying	  uniform,	  compounded	  by	  the	  Indian	  unit’s	  inability	  to	  distinguish	  
between	  Chinese	  and	  Japanese,	  contributed	  to	  the	  misunderstanding.89	  
At	  the	  other	  extreme	  of	  the	  fifth	  column	  diaspora	  was	  Captain	  Patrick	  Heenan,	  an	  Indian	  Army	  
officer	  seconded	  to	  a	  unit	  liaising	  with	  the	  RAF,	  who	  was	  blamed	  for	  a	  number	  of	  successful	  
Japanese	  air	  raids	  that	  destroyed	  many	  planes	  on	  the	  ground.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  appeared	  
to	  be	  a	  radio	  transmitter	  that	  was	  found	  in	  a	  communion	  set	  in	  his	  kit,	  he	  was	  tried	  at	  a	  secret	  
court	  martial	  and	  executed	  by	  a	  military	  policeman	  with	  a	  shot	  to	  the	  back	  of	  the	  head.	  Colin	  
Smith	  suggests	  that	  ‘Heenan	  may	  have	  been	  as	  innocent	  as	  many	  of	  them	  [Asian	  civilians	  who	  
were	  shot]	  were’,	  and	  intimates	  that	  other	  factors	  may	  have	  been	  working	  against	  him,	  
including	  his	  preference	  for	  the	  company	  of	  Indian	  officers,	  Asian	  civilians	  and	  White	  Russian	  
women.	  Perhaps	  his	  ‘markedly	  olive’	  complexion	  (his	  Irish	  father	  had	  been	  born	  in	  India	  and	  
was	  possibly	  of	  Eurasian	  heritage)	  had	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  story.90	   	  	  	  	  
Most	  of	  the	  allegations	  of	  fifth	  column	  activities	  would	  however	  fall	  upon	  the	  local	  
communities	  in	  Malaya	  and	  Singapore.	  As	  the	  Japanese	  Army	  advanced	  rapidly	  down	  the	  
Malayan	  peninsula,	  preceded	  by	  frequently	  effective	  air	  strikes	  on	  RAF	  bases	  and	  other	  
military	  infrastructure,	  such	  allegations	  of	  treacherous	  behaviour	  multiplied.	  The	  reality	  that	  
much	  of	  the	  intelligence	  groundwork	  for	  the	  attacks	  had	  been	  carried	  out	  before	  the	  war	  was	  
largely	  ignored	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  largely	  eluded	  much	  of	  the	  British	  command,	  which	  was	  
seeking	  to	  absolve	  its	  own	  inability	  to	  match	  the	  opposing	  forces.	  On	  arrival	  in	  Singapore	  in	  
January	  1942,	  L.Cpl	  Taylor	  of	  the	  Intelligence	  Corps	  had	  been	  briefed	  by	  his	  CO	  that	  ‘Malaya	  
was	  honeycombed	  with	  enemy	  agents.’91	  	  Fear	  and	  distrust	  of	  the	  unknown	  rapidly	  fed	  down	  
the	  ranks	  to	  some	  of	  the	  men	  on	  the	  ground,	  nourished	  by	  a	  mixture	  of	  naiveté	  and	  some	  pre-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Bhargava,	  K.	  D.,	  Sastri,	  K.	  N.	  V.	  and	  Prasad,B.	  (1960)	  Official	  History	  of	  the	  Indian	  Armed	  Forces	  in	  the	  
Second	  World	  War	  1939–45:	  Campaigns	  in	  South-­‐East	  Asia.	  Combined	  Inter-­‐Services	  Historical	  Section,	  
New	  Delhi.	  pp322-­‐323.	  
90	  Smith,	  Singapore	  Burning.	  pp	  161-­‐163.	  
91	  IWM:	  Taylor;	  Chapter	  23.	  
43	  
	  
existing	  xenophobia.	  One	  regular,	  his	  sentiments	  perhaps	  informed	  by	  several	  years	  of	  pre-­‐war	  
service	  in	  India,	  described	  the	  fifth	  column	  as	  being	  ‘made	  up	  mostly	  of	  natives	  of	  the	  places	  
occupied	  by	  the	  Japs.	  These	  b-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐s	  were	  selling	  us	  down	  the	  river	  for	  a	  handful	  of	  dollars.	  Who,	  
before	  the	  Japs	  came	  were	  calling	  the	  white	  man	  master.’92	  	  
It	  would	  seem	  that	  not	  all	  of	  the	  men	  were	  so	  convinced	  of	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  this	  enemy	  
within	  however.	  Private	  Dixon	  recalled	  an	  occasion	  in	  the	  last	  week	  before	  the	  surrender,	  
when	  a	  Royal	  Navy	  lorry	  had	  disgorged	  ‘about	  20	  Malay	  alleged	  5th	  columnists’	  into	  his	  care,	  
just	  as	  another	  air	  raid	  occurred.	  ‘You	  can	  imagine	  the	  scramble	  as	  they	  made	  their	  escape,	  me	  
being	  in	  charge	  of	  them	  with	  one	  rifle	  which	  I	  fired	  aimlessly	  at	  them	  wounding	  a	  couple	  but	  
with	  so	  much	  panic	  all	  escaped.’93	  Although	  40	  years	  in	  the	  telling,	  the	  candour	  of	  Dixon’s	  
account,	  frequently	  to	  the	  point	  of	  self-­‐incrimination,	  suggests	  that	  he	  was	  unconvinced	  as	  to	  
the	  veracity	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  detainees,	  a	  surmisal	  supported	  by	  his	  half-­‐hearted	  attempts	  
at	  preventing	  their	  escape.	  Given	  his	  own	  service	  and	  life	  experiences	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  he	  
was	  not	  unsympathetic	  to	  their	  circumstances.	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  reliable	  account	  of	  fifth	  column	  activities	  within	  the	  subject	  group	  comes	  
from	  L.Cpl.	  Taylor	  and	  his	  colleagues,	  L.Cpl.	  O’Shea	  and	  L.Cpl.	  Boyd,	  in	  the	  Intelligence	  Corps,	  
whose	  specific	  task	  was	  to	  deal	  with	  such	  matters	  of	  field	  security.	  Written	  in	  India	  in	  the	  
second	  half	  of	  1942,	  after	  they	  had	  successfully	  escaped	  on	  the	  official	  evacuation,	  it	  paints	  a	  
mixed	  picture	  of	  false	  alarms	  leavened	  with	  occasional	  evidence	  of	  genuinely	  suspicious	  
activity.	  Outside	  of	  his	  small	  cohort	  he	  found	  most	  of	  his	  section	  to	  be	  ill-­‐equipped	  for	  their	  
task.	  ‘An	  air	  of	  Gestapo	  mystery	  overhung	  their	  doings,	  of	  local	  language	  knowledge	  they	  were	  
happily	  ignorant.’	  After	  discovering	  that	  an	  alleged	  heliograph	  on	  a	  roof	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  
workmen’s	  tools,	  and	  ‘that	  a	  tremendous	  white	  patch	  on	  the	  ground	  turned	  out	  later	  to	  be	  the	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  IWM:	  Carpenter;	  p15.	  
93	  IWM:	  Dixon;	  p41.	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result	  of	  several	  dhobis	  united	  effort!’,	  it	  was	  perhaps	  not	  surprising	  that	  L.Cpl.	  O’Shea	  made	  
more	  mention	  of	  ‘red	  herrings’	  in	  his	  chapter	  than	  he	  does	  of	  ‘5th	  columnists’.	  
L.Cpl.	  Boyd	  recalled	  a	  similar	  red	  herring	  the	  night	  when	  a	  blinking	  light	  was	  seen	  signalling	  to	  
enemy	  aircraft	  during	  an	  air-­‐raid:	  ‘For	  hours	  they	  lay	  on	  their	  bellies,	  hardly	  daring	  to	  breathe,	  
while	  this	  light	  went	  on	  and	  off.	  On	  closing	  in	  they	  found	  it	  to	  be	  the	  brilliantly	  lit	  house	  of	  the	  
Australian	  Officer	  Commanding.’	  Not	  all	  the	  incidents	  were	  so	  benign	  however,	  and	  Boyd	  
recalled	  removing	  large	  amounts	  of	  suspicious	  materials	  from	  a	  railway	  track	  near	  a	  Divisional	  
HQ,	  shortly	  before	  a	  group	  of	  Japanese	  planes	  arrived,	  who	  circled	  at	  low	  altitude	  for	  30	  
minutes	  before	  departing,	  unable	  to	  locate	  their	  target.94	  
This	  section	  has	  served	  to	  illustrate	  some	  of	  the	  difficulties	  that	  resulted	  from	  the	  inability	  to	  
differentiate	  not	  only	  who	  was	  friend	  or	  foe,	  but	  also	  between	  the	  different	  communities.	  
Private	  Henderson	  recalled	  that	  on	  arriving	  in	  Singapore	  at	  the	  end	  of	  January	  that	  while	  most	  
of	  the	  people	  on	  the	  quayside	  were	  Europeans,	  (evidence	  suggestive	  of	  another	  racialized	  
evacuation,	  similar	  to	  that	  from	  Penang	  some	  six	  weeks	  previously)	  there	  were	  also	  ‘skins	  of	  
every	  shade	  of	  brown.	  It	  was	  to	  take	  us	  quite	  a	  long	  time	  to	  be	  able	  to	  accurately	  distinguish	  
between	  Chinese	  and	  Malays	  and	  later	  between	  Chinese	  and	  Japanese.’	  He	  was	  however	  able	  
to	  identify	  the	  Tamils,	  and	  not	  surprisingly	  there	  was	  a	  class	  dimension	  –	  they	  were	  used	  ‘as	  
general	  dog’s	  bodies.’95	  Henderson’s	  unusually	  international	  outlook	  and	  his	  contacts	  with	  
non-­‐Europeans	  in	  the	  pre-­‐war	  period,	  lends	  significance	  to	  his	  initial	  inability	  to	  distinguish	  
between	  some	  of	  the	  ethnic	  and	  national	  groups.	  If	  he	  was	  having	  difficulties,	  it	  seems	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  IWM:	  Taylor;	  Chapters	  23-­‐28.	  
95	  IWM:	  Henderson;	  p179.	  	  The	  British	  command	  had	  ordered	  an	  evacuation	  of	  Europeans	  only	  from	  
Penang	  on	  the	  16th/17th	  of	  December,	  in	  an	  operation	  described	  as	  ‘surreptitious	  and	  ignominious’	  by	  
Bayley	  and	  Harper:	  Bayly,	  Christopher	  and	  Harper,	  Tim.	  (2005)	  Forgotten	  Armies:	  Britain’s	  Asian	  Empire	  
and	  the	  war	  with	  Japan.	  Penguin,	  London.	  p120.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  this	  selective	  flight	  on	  Asian	  
morale	  across	  all	  communities,	  the	  Governor	  of	  The	  Straits	  Settlements,	  Sir	  Shenton	  Thomas	  had	  
promised	  the	  Legislative	  Council	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  racially	  defined	  evacuation	  from	  Singapore.	  
Smith,	  Singapore	  Burning,	  p432.	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reasonable	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  less	  worldly	  wise	  colleagues	  would	  have	  been	  in	  
a	  similar	  position.	  	  
Support	  for	  this	  assumption	  can	  be	  found	  in	  a	  1980	  interview	  with	  2nd	  Lt	  Harold	  Payne.	  Whilst	  
discussing	  the	  retreat	  down	  Malaya	  he	  was	  asked	  “Did	  you	  actually	  see	  any	  Japanese	  during	  
this	  action?”	  His	  response	  demonstrated	  that	  officers	  could	  be	  just	  as	  naive	  as	  the	  ranks	  when	  
it	  came	  to	  their	  new	  surroundings.	  	  
You’ll	  never	  believe	  this,	  but	  it	  was	  very	  difficult	  to	  know	  what	  a	  Jap	  looked	  like	  quite	  
frankly,	  because	  you	  had	  Malays,	  Chinese,	  Japanese…	  we	  had	  only	  just	  come	  out	  of	  
England	  and	  we	  weren’t	  be	  able	  to	  be	  filmed	  [sic]	  and	  told	  what	  the	  characteristics	  of	  
these	  people	  were.	  
	  
He	  goes	  on	  to	  discuss	  his	  active	  role	  in	  suppressing	  fifth	  column	  activity,	  but	  becomes	  
concerned	  that	  he	  has	  been	  referring	  to	  the	  Chinese	  too	  much	  in	  this	  respect.	  
I	  should	  make	  it	  very	  clear,	  and	  I	  apologise	  if	  I	  have	  over	  emphasised	  the	  Chinese,	  I	  
would	  say	  natives,	  or	  erm	  locals,	  whether	  they’re	  Chinese,	  Malays,	  Tamils,	  anything	  
under	  the	  sun,	  	  as	  I	  say,	  it	  was	  very	  difficult	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  war	  to	  know	  chalk	  from	  
cheese,	  I	  could	  tell	  somebody	  who	  was	  er,	  er,	  er,	  white	  colour,	  but	  there	  were	  a	  lot	  of	  
them	  were	  these	  yellow,	  um,	  tinted,	  and	  also	  we	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  Indian	  regiments	  out	  
there	  as	  well,	  which	  um,	  one	  can	  always	  tell	  the	  Indian	  regiments,	  and	  the	  Ghurkas	  we	  
had	  out	  there	  as	  well,	  so	  there	  were	  many	  many	  different	  er	  nationalities	  .	  .	  .	  no	  doubt	  
a	  lot	  of	  them	  were	  wayward	  Thais	  or	  Siamese	  that	  had	  come	  over	  the	  border.96	  
	  
This	  passage	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  man	  consciously	  struggling	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  traversing	  the	  
changing	  semantics	  and	  nomenclature	  of	  race,	  a	  battle	  he	  gives	  up	  on	  by	  the	  end	  with	  his	  
referral	  to	  both	  Thais	  and	  Siamese.	  The	  frequent	  ers	  and	  ums	  that	  punctuate	  the	  passage	  are	  
indicative	  of	  such	  attempts	  as	  he	  seeks,	  largely	  unsuccessfully,	  to	  find	  words	  that	  will	  carry	  a	  
less	  pejorative	  meaning.	  Locals	  and	  natives,	  be	  they	  yellow	  or	  tinted,	  may	  have	  been	  difficult	  
for	  him	  to	  differentiate	  between,	  but	  they	  were	  easily	  distinguishable	  from	  the	  British	  and	  
Australian	  troops,	  and	  the	  Indian	  soldiers	  in	  uniform.	  	  His	  problem	  was	  not	  it	  seems	  one	  of	  
telling	  chalk	  from	  cheese,	  it	  was	  more	  an	  issue	  of	  distinguishing	  what	  type	  of	  cheese.	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  IWM:	  Payne,	  H.L.	  (Sound	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An	  exception	  to	  this	  pattern	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Taylor	  account	  that	  offers	  an	  exposition	  of	  the	  
diversity	  of	  Singapore,	  which,	  despite	  his	  sense	  of	  imperial	  cynicism,	  is	  strongly	  informed	  by	  
essentialised	  colonial	  tropes.	   	   	   	  
	  The	  people	  were	  as	  varied	  as	  could	  be	  imagined.	  Chinese	  were	  everywhere,	  and	  very	  
attractive	  because	  of	  their	  cleanliness,	  smartness,	  intelligence	  and	  courtesy.	  There	  
were	  young	  Europeanised	  Chinamen	  (these	  in	  many	  respects	  seemed	  to	  us	  the	  best	  
element	  in	  the	  population;	  it	  was	  they	  who	  filled	  the	  ARP,	  first	  aid	  jobs	  etc.)	  	  .	  .	  .	  	  	  In	  
addition	  there	  were	  meek	  Tamils,	  in	  closely	  wound	  sheets	  and	  their	  older	  offspring	  in	  
European	  clothes	  and	  heavily	  oiled	  hair;	  as	  well	  as	  noble	  Sikhs,	  and	  attractive	  Malays,	  
with	  here	  and	  there	  a	  fat,	  rather	  gone	  to	  seed	  looking	  Tuan.	  	  .	  .	  .	  all	  smiling,	  helpful,	  
pleasant,	  merely	  because	  we	  were	  a	  yellowish	  –	  browny	  –	  white	  in	  tincture.97	  
	  
On	  the	  surface	  Taylor’s	  ethnic	  demography	  of	  Singapore’s	  residents	  relies	  very	  much	  on	  
colonial	  stereotypes;	  the	  well-­‐mannered	  and	  intelligent	  Chinese,	  the	  ‘meek	  Tamils’	  and	  ‘noble	  
Sikhs’,	  ‘attractive	  Malays’	  and	  overweight	  and	  no	  doubt	  red-­‐nosed	  Tuans	  all	  conform	  to	  
established	  imperial	  characterisations.	  There	  is	  also	  an	  evolutionary	  element	  to	  his	  
descriptions,	  with	  the	  generational	  change	  in	  the	  clothing	  of	  the	  young	  Chinese	  and	  Tamils	  
demonstrating	  their	  acculturation	  to	  western	  standards.	  By	  the	  same	  token	  he	  suggests	  that	  
the	  “whiteness”	  of	  his	  fellow	  Europeans	  is	  not	  as	  clearly	  defined	  as	  they	  may	  have	  thought,	  
reflecting	  the	  effects	  of	  even	  their	  short	  time	  in	  the	  tropics.	  In	  this	  racial	  melting	  pot	  the	  Asians	  
were	  becoming	  more	  European,	  and	  the	  Europeans	  more	  Asian,	  as	  the	  effects	  of	  cultural	  
contacts	  and	  climate	  combined	  in	  his	  own	  reiteration	  of	  Darwinian	  development.	  His	  
differentiation	  of	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Tamil	  youth	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  subconsciously	  	  reflecting	  
contemporary	  European	  racial	  models,	  the	  lighter	  skinned,	  more	  intelligent	  Chinese	  
conforming	  to	  northern	  Europeans,	  the	  darker	  complexion	  and	  the	  oiled	  hair	  of	  the	  Tamils	  
fitting	  a	  more	  Mediterranean	  typography.	  	  
The	  responses	  of	  the	  BORs	  to	  first	  contacts	  in	  Singapore	  display	  a	  range	  of	  outlooks,	  pre-­‐
existing	  negative	  expectations	  were	  commonplace,	  but	  not	  immutable.	  Some	  of	  the	  men	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reassessed	  their	  perspectives,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Chinese	  population,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
their	  experience.	  The	  differentiation	  of	  the	  local	  populations,	  both	  internally	  and	  in	  
comparison	  to	  the	  enemy	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  problematic	  for	  most	  of	  the	  new	  arrivals.	  In	  the	  
absence	  of	  a	  uniform	  making	  a	  distinction	  between	  friend	  and	  foe	  would	  be	  difficult,	  not	  only	  
for	  the	  British	  troops,	  but	  also	  as	  seen	  for	  other	  cohorts	  of	  the	  allied	  forces.	  This	  became	  an	  
even	  bigger	  problem	  when	  some	  of	  the	  BORs,	  fed	  by	  the	  “aliens”	  scare	  of	  1940	  back	  home	  and	  
a	  pre-­‐existing	  sense	  of	  racial	  mistrust,	  started	  looking	  upon	  the	  civilian	  population	  as	  a	  whole	  
as	  a	  source	  of	  fifth	  columnists.	  Whilst	  in	  this	  context	  contacts	  with	  civilians	  could	  be	  a	  matter	  
of	  life	  and	  death	  for	  the	  local	  populations,	  the	  irrepressible	  Japanese	  advance	  would	  again	  
change	  the	  dynamic	  of	  such	  relations,	  placing	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  British	  servicemen	  very	  much	  in	  
the	  hands	  of	  the	  locals	  for	  their	  salvation.	  
	  
1.4.	  The	  Flight	  from	  Singapore.	  
The	  retreat	  down	  Malaya	  and	  the	  fall	  of	  Singapore	  was	  only	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  humiliating	  in	  
a	  series	  of	  chaotic	  and	  ignominious	  withdrawals	  and	  defeats	  that	  the	  men	  of	  the	  British	  Army	  
endured	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  war.	  Similar	  episodes	  in	  France,	  Norway,	  Greece,	  Crete	  and	  
the	  western	  desert	  all	  preceded	  it.	  It	  would	  be	  followed	  by	  similar	  scenarios	  in	  Burma	  and	  
again	  in	  the	  western	  desert,	  all	  of	  which,	  even	  the	  morale	  sapping	  capitulations	  of	  Hong	  Kong,	  
Singapore	  and	  subsequently	  at	  Tobruk,	  have	  tended	  to	  be	  overshadowed	  by	  the	  memory	  of	  
the	  “miracle	  of	  deliverance”	  that	  was	  Dunkirk.	  The	  other	  attempts	  to	  evacuate	  and	  avoid	  
surrender	  were	  sometimes	  decidedly	  less	  heroic,	  and	  have	  largely	  been	  forgotten,	  particularly	  
the	  disasters	  that	  befell	  the	  British	  forces	  in	  Asia.	  	  
The	  withdrawal	  from	  Burma,	  by	  land,	  sea	  and	  air,	  which	  followed	  the	  Malayan	  campaign	  was	  
characterised	  by	  racially	  constructed	  pathways	  that	  favoured	  the	  Europeans.	  	  Whilst	  most	  of	  
the	  army	  and	  the	  European	  civilians	  managed	  to	  struggle	  back	  to	  India	  in	  the	  official	  retreat,	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tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  Indians	  were	  less	  fortunate	  and	  died	  trying	  to	  escape,	  many	  of	  them	  not	  
allowed	  to	  cross	  the	  border	  into	  India.	  ‘It	  seemed	  scarcely	  possible	  for	  the	  British	  reputation	  in	  
Asia	  to	  fall	  lower,	  but	  it	  did.’98	  This	  retreat	  was	  preceded	  by	  an	  attempted	  flight	  from	  
Singapore,	  which	  although	  smaller	  in	  scale	  was	  perhaps	  even	  more	  damaging	  to	  British	  
standing	  among	  the	  communities	  who	  had	  the	  misfortune	  to	  be	  in	  its	  path.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
Japanese	  attack	  on	  Singapore,	  its	  unfortunate	  defenders	  had	  ‘run	  out	  of	  land.’99	  This	  did	  not	  
entirely	  preclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  evading	  capture	  however,	  primarily	  utilising	  a	  sea	  route	  that	  
island	  hopped	  to	  Sumatra,	  from	  which	  it	  was	  hoped	  to	  obtain	  a	  passage	  from	  Padang	  on	  the	  
west	  coast	  to	  allied	  territory	  in	  Ceylon,	  some	  	  1500	  miles	  distant	  across	  the	  Indian	  Ocean.	  	  
There	  were	  two	  distinct	  military	  cohorts	  in	  this	  flight;	  the	  first	  was	  an	  official	  evacuation	  of	  the	  
lucky	  few	  men	  supposedly	  considered	  to	  be	  essential	  to	  the	  further	  conduct	  of	  the	  war,	  who	  
left	  prior	  to	  the	  surrender.	  	  The	  second	  group	  was	  a	  less	  organised	  free	  for	  all,	  generally	  
utilising	  smaller	  vessels,	  that	  ensued	  in	  the	  days	  leading	  up	  to	  and	  after	  the	  capitulation,	  the	  
frequently	  ignoble	  progress	  of	  which	  has	  received	  little	  attention	  once	  it	  had	  moved	  away	  from	  
the	  wider	  visibility	  of	  the	  wharves	  and	  godowns	  (warehouses)	  of	  Keppel	  Harbour,	  and	  moved	  
out	  of	  British	  colonial	  territory	  into	  that	  of	  the	  Dutch.100	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  these	  service	  personnel	  
were	  a	  large	  number	  of	  civilians	  who	  had	  left	  it,	  or	  been	  left,	  to	  the	  last	  moment	  to	  try	  and	  
evacuate.	  Many	  of	  them	  would	  die	  as	  the	  last	  official	  convoy	  out	  of	  Singapore,	  just	  before	  the	  
fall,	  provided	  an	  easy	  target	  for	  Japanese	  aircraft	  and	  naval	  vessels.	  Over	  forty	  of	  its	  forty-­‐four	  
ships	  went	  down,	  and	  only	  a	  quarter	  of	  the	  5,000	  passengers	  ever	  made	  it	  to	  India	  or	  
Australia.101	  In	  the	  chaos	  that	  ensued	  members	  of	  all	  three	  cohorts	  could	  find	  themselves	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  Bayly	  and	  Harper,	  Forgotten	  Armies,	  pp186-­‐187.	  The	  British	  evacuation	  of	  Penang	  in	  mid-­‐December	  
1941	  was	  criticised	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  even	  more	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  Europeans	  only	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99	  IWM:	  Parry;	  16/2/42.	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  Geoffrey	  Brooke,	  a	  survivor	  of	  the	  sinking	  of	  the	  Prince	  of	  Wales,	  who	  eventually	  made	  it	  to	  Ceylon	  
after	  an	  epic	  journey	  that	  started	  on	  the	  official	  evacuation,	  suggests	  that	  there	  were	  1,800	  on	  the	  
official	  list,	  and	  some	  3,000	  ‘who	  needed	  no	  official	  spur’.	  In:	  Singapore’s	  Dunkirk:	  The	  Aftermath	  of	  the	  
Fall.	  (1989:	  2003	  edn)	  Leo	  Cooper,	  Barnsley.	  p106.	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  Smith,	  Singapore	  Burning,	  p	  529.	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amalgamated	  in	  fluid	  groups	  of	  varying	  size	  as	  circumstances	  changed.	  A	  few	  officers	  on	  the	  
official	  list	  courageously	  attempted	  to	  maintain	  order	  at	  key	  points	  along	  the	  route,	  
jeopardising	  their	  own	  chances	  of	  escape	  in	  the	  process.	  
One	  of	  the	  lucky	  recipients	  of	  the	  official	  order	  to	  leave	  was	  L.Cpl.	  Taylor	  of	  the	  Intelligence	  
Corps,	  who	  along	  with	  three	  of	  his	  colleagues	  embarked	  on	  a	  small	  steamship	  for	  the	  east	  
coast	  of	  Sumatra,	  from	  where	  they	  made	  their	  way	  to	  Padang	  and	  boarded	  a	  destroyer	  to	  
Colombo.	  	  At	  all	  stages	  of	  their	  journey	  they	  found	  the	  many	  Malays	  that	  they	  met	  to	  be	  
helpful	  and	  friendly,	  selling	  them	  supplies	  and	  caring	  for	  the	  wounded.	  Even	  when	  their	  boat	  
crashed	  into	  the	  customs	  pier	  and	  demolished	  it,	  on	  reaching	  Sumatra	  at	  the	  mouth	  of	  the	  
Prigi	  Raja	  River,	  the	  local	  customs	  officials	  were	  still	  obliging	  and	  offered	  useful	  advice.	  There	  is	  
no	  doubt	  that	  this	  voyage	  benefitted,	  as	  did	  the	  relations	  with	  the	  civilians	  along	  the	  way,	  from	  
being	  relatively	  well	  resourced,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  finance	  and	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  a	  reliable	  boat.	  
Thus	  were	  two	  major	  potential	  sources	  of	  friction	  with	  the	  local	  population	  removed,	  and	  the	  
journey	  became	  something	  akin	  to	  a	  tourist	  adventure,	  where	  ‘manning	  the	  lifeboat	  and	  
pulling	  away	  to	  some	  green	  and	  wooded	  islet	  to	  buy	  food	  and	  fuel	  were	  comparable	  with	  
buccaneering	  exploits	  and	  treated	  as	  such.’102	  
Within	  a	  few	  days	  Taylor’s	  description	  of	  ‘buccaneering	  exploits’	  would	  take	  on	  a	  less	  innocent	  
meaning,	  as	  the	  initially	  unsanctioned	  exodus	  of	  allied	  troops	  washed	  through	  the	  region,	  
bringing	  with	  it	  a	  tide	  of	  piracy,	  murder	  and	  pillage	  that	  whilst	  brief	  in	  longevity	  could	  be	  
violent	  in	  its	  intensity.	  The	  opening	  phase	  of	  this	  flight,	  from	  the	  dockside	  of	  Singapore	  is	  
relatively	  well	  recorded,	  particularly	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  Australian	  soldiers	  who	  had	  forced	  their	  
way	  onto	  waiting	  civilian	  evacuation	  ships.	  Indeed,	  a	  large	  party	  of	  Australians	  had	  already	  
preceded	  Taylor’s	  group,	  ‘looting	  and	  causing	  great	  disorder’,	  prior	  to	  their	  arrest	  by	  the	  Dutch	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  Taylor;	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authorities.103	  Some	  were	  later	  captured	  by	  the	  Japanese	  and	  sent	  to	  work	  on	  the	  Burma	  
Railway,	  where	  they	  were	  known	  amongst	  their	  fellow	  Australian	  POWs	  as	  the	  Empire	  Star	  
Group,	  a	  reference	  to	  their	  boarding	  of	  one	  of	  the	  last	  ships	  	  out	  of	  Singapore,	  allegedly	  forcing	  
women	  and	  children	  off	  in	  the	  process.104	  Despite	  popular	  memory	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  this	  
was	  not	  an	  exclusively	  antipodean	  episode,	  and	  several	  records	  provide	  insights	  into	  the	  
brutality	  of	  the	  responses	  of	  British	  servicemen	  to	  the	  desperate	  circumstances	  they	  found	  
themselves	  in	  during	  the	  flight	  from	  Singapore,	  and	  how	  such	  acts	  were	  interpreted	  by	  their	  
comrades.	  
The	  accounts	  of	  Wireless	  Operator	  Oakley	  and	  L.Bdr	  Grafton	  are	  at	  first	  glance	  remarkably	  
similar,	  having	  fled	  Singapore	  within	  days	  of	  each	  other	  (13th	  February	  and	  15th	  February	  
respectively),	  and	  then,	  having	  followed	  very	  similar	  routes,	  arriving	  at	  Padang	  around	  the	  10th	  
of	  March,	  a	  few	  days	  after	  Taylor	  had	  departed	  	  for	  Ceylon.	  Oakley	  had	  left	  Singapore	  on	  an	  
official	  vessel	  that	  was	  promptly	  sunk	  by	  the	  Japanese,	  and	  it	  was	  a	  week	  before	  his	  party	  were	  
able	  to	  commandeer	  two	  passing	  junks,	  the	  Chinese	  crew	  of	  which	  ‘became	  very	  distraught	  as	  
they	  realised	  that	  their	  ships	  were	  not	  only	  being	  pirated	  but	  their	  spoils	  of	  war	  were	  being	  
thrown	  over	  the	  side.’	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  Chinese	  captain,	  who	  had	  been	  knocked	  half	  
conscious	  and	  dumped	  overboard	  whilst	  attempting	  to	  regain	  control,	  the	  junks	  beached	  and	  
eventually	  sank	  on	  the	  coast	  of	  Sumatra.	  From	  here	  they	  made	  their	  way	  inland	  and	  upriver	  in	  
a	  couple	  of	  stolen	  rowing	  boats,	  to	  a	  village	  where	  the	  local	  shopkeeper	  was	  reluctant	  to	  
donate	  supplies	  to	  the	  hungry	  men.	  	  His	  reticence	  would	  cost	  him	  dearly.	  
Incoherently	  mouthing	  Scottish	  epithets,	  Jock	  pulled	  his	  bayonet	  and	  with	  
unbelievable	  ferocity	  ran	  him	  through	  impaling	  him	  to	  his	  own	  front	  door.	  We	  were	  all	  
astounded	  at	  the	  swiftness	  and	  single-­‐mindness	  [sic]	  of	  Jock’s	  action	  yet	  
simultaneously	  horrified	  by	  the	  man	  writhing	  in	  agony	  at	  our	  feet.	  Calmly	  Jock	  pulled	  
him	  away	  from	  the	  door	  and	  stuffed	  a	  rag	  into	  the	  dying	  man’s	  mouth,	  effectively	  
stifling	  his	  screams.	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  IWM:	  Taylor;	  Summary	  of	  Rest	  of	  Journey.	  
104	  Uren,	  Tom.	  “Journeys	  in	  Captivity.”	  in:	  McCormack,	  G,	  and	  Nelson,	  H.	  (eds)	  (1993)	  The	  Burma-­‐
Thailand	  Railway:	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  and	  history.	  Allen	  and	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The	  shopkeeper	  died	  overnight,	  and	  the	  group	  departed	  the	  following	  morning,	  their	  boats	  
now	  laden	  with	  the	  commandeered	  supplies.	  Over	  the	  next	  few	  days	  they	  would	  often	  see	  
villagers	  up	  ahead	  crossing	  the	  river	  in	  a	  hurry.	  ‘Perhaps	  the	  word	  about	  our	  earlier	  acts	  of	  
pillaging,	  murder,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  depredation	  had	  reached	  their	  ears.’	  	  Further	  looting	  
occurred	  as	  the	  ‘grim	  threatening	  band	  of	  not	  so	  merry	  men’	  came	  across	  settlements	  that	  had	  
the	  misfortune	  to	  lie	  on	  their	  path,	  before	  a	  train	  finally	  carried	  them	  to	  Padang,	  leaving	  the	  
local	  communities	  to	  await	  the	  next	  troop	  of	  brigands	  in	  uniform.105	  
Grafton’s	  evasion	  travelogue	  is	  similarly	  illustrated	  with	  examples	  of	  misfortune	  and	  piracy,	  
which	  started	  when	  the	  junk	  that	  had	  been	  carefully	  guarded	  in	  Singapore,	  grounded	  on	  rocks	  
shortly	  after	  departure.	  Unable	  to	  find	  room	  on	  the	  lifeboat	  to	  which	  some	  officers	  (including	  
his	  C.O.,	  Major	  Rowley	  Conwy)	  had	  decanted,	  some	  of	  the	  ORs	  swam	  for	  it	  to	  a	  nearby	  island,	  
where	  their	  fortunes	  changed	  and	  they	  were	  given	  a	  boat	  by	  a	  leper	  colony.	  On	  the	  next	  island	  
they	  came	  across	  an	  ‘unfriendly	  and	  threatening’	  group	  of	  inhabitants	  loading	  oil	  on	  a	  boat.	  In	  
the	  absence	  of	  any	  other	  form	  of	  communication,	  the	  language	  of	  force	  majeure	  sufficed.	  ‘Only	  
by	  showing	  them	  our	  one	  grenade	  did	  we	  convince	  them	  that	  we	  were	  leaving	  when	  they	  did.’	  	  
On	  another	  island	  a	  motor	  launch	  was	  discovered.	  It	  belonged	  to	  a	  Chinese	  man	  who	  had	  
taken	  pity	  on	  them	  and	  offered	  the	  hungry	  men	  food	  for	  their	  journey.	  A	  heated	  discussion	  
ensued,	  with	  one	  of	  the	  more	  visceral	  members	  of	  the	  group,	  Ginger	  Sussex,	  suggesting	  that	  
their	  benefactor	  be	  murdered	  for	  his	  boat.	  Fortunately	  for	  him	  it	  was	  discovered	  that	  the	  
engine	  was	  missing	  before	  threatening	  words	  were	  turned	  into	  murderous	  deeds.106	  	  
Despite	  another	  incident	  with	  unfriendly	  islanders	  near	  Sumatra,	  most	  of	  the	  contacts	  Grafton	  
refers	  to	  were	  positive,	  with	  food	  and	  support	  being	  given	  freely	  and	  free	  of	  charge	  by	  Malay,	  
Chinese	  and	  Indian	  communities	  along	  the	  way,	  presumably	  at	  no	  small	  risk	  to	  themselves	  
given	  the	  rapidly	  encroaching	  Japanese	  forces,	  both	  on	  land	  and	  at	  sea.	  Whilst	  Grafton’s	  own	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  IWM:	  Oakley,	  V.F.T.	  (Docs	  8278)	  pp15-­‐33.	  
106	  IWM:	  Grafton;	  pp5-­‐28.	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words	  in	  the	  grenade	  incident	  indicate	  a	  sense	  of	  his	  active	  ownership	  of	  (if	  indeed	  not	  his	  
involvement	  in)	  some	  of	  the	  less	  savoury	  episodes,	  he	  was	  far	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  lot	  of,	  
and	  grateful	  for	  the	  assistance	  rendered	  from,	  the	  local	  populations.	  Within	  his	  own	  group	  he	  
was	  able	  to	  distinguish	  his	  outlook	  from	  that	  of	  less	  open-­‐minded	  colleagues,	  as	  he	  recalled	  on	  
the	  occasion	  when	  a	  Chinese	  trader	  had	  fed	  them	  and	  arranged	  a	  guide	  for	  the	  next	  stage	  of	  
their	  voyage.	  ‘Sussex	  was	  convinced	  that	  every	  native	  was	  in	  league	  with	  the	  Japanese,	  whilst	  I	  
was	  convinced	  that	  they	  were	  just	  as	  frightened	  of	  reprisals	  from	  them	  for	  harbouring	  enemy	  
soldiers.’107	  
Whilst	  Oakley	  was	  by	  no	  means	  the	  feral	  alpha	  male	  that	  Ginger	  Sussex	  was,	  that	  role	  being	  
occupied	  in	  his	  group	  by	  Jock,	  nevertheless	  he	  certainly	  seems	  to	  have	  shared	  his	  innate	  
suspicion	  of	  anyone	  who	  wasn’t	  British.	  On	  only	  one	  occasion	  on	  his	  journey	  did	  he	  recall	  any	  
assistance	  being	  given	  voluntarily	  to	  his	  ‘grim	  threatening	  band’,	  everything	  else	  was	  taken	  by	  
force,	  with	  little	  sense	  of	  remorse.	  Having	  left	  the	  Chinese	  seamen	  (minus	  their	  previously	  
decanted	  Captain)	  with	  their	  now	  sinking	  junks,	  he	  recalled	  that	  ‘As	  our	  mental	  state	  was	  
singularly	  attuned	  to	  self-­‐preservation	  .	  .	  .	  we	  were	  untroubled	  with	  guilty	  feelings	  that	  we	  
were	  leaving	  the	  Chinese	  crew	  to	  solve	  alone	  a	  terrible	  predicament	  of	  our	  making.’	  108	  
There	  are	  several	  possible	  explanations	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  responses	  of	  the	  local	  
populations	  recorded	  in	  these	  accounts,	  informed	  in	  turn	  by	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  mind-­‐
sets	  of	  the	  authors.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  Grafton’s	  group	  did	  actually	  experience	  greater	  
hospitality	  than	  Oakley’s.	  This	  may	  have	  been	  down	  to	  pure	  chance,	  but	  it	  may	  also	  have	  
reflected	  a	  more	  positive	  reaction	  to	  less	  aggressive	  behaviour	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  servicemen	  
involved.	  The	  belligerent	  attitude	  of	  Ginger	  Sussex	  had	  less	  support	  and	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  
dominate	  the	  group	  psyche	  in	  the	  Grafton	  party,	  and	  threats	  were	  used	  only	  once,	  and	  as	  a	  
last	  resort.	  In	  comparison	  Jock’s	  activities,	  whilst	  shocking	  to	  Oakley,	  were	  not	  condemned,	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  IWM:	  Grafton;	  pp11-­‐12.	  
108	  IWM:	  Oakley;	  p27.	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and	  such	  behaviour	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  adopted	  as	  the	  group	  norm	  from	  its	  very	  beginnings.	  
It	  is	  not	  hard	  to	  imagine	  that	  a	  friendly	  introduction	  was	  more	  likely	  to	  beget	  greater	  sympathy	  
in	  return,	  even	  if	  only	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  transients	  as	  fast	  as	  possible	  and	  return	  to	  some	  form	  of	  
normality	  before	  the	  Japanese	  arrived.	  Alternatively,	  an	  approach	  based	  on	  hostility	  and	  
belligerence	  was	  always	  likely	  to	  generate	  fear	  and	  loathing.	  	  
Perceptions	  of	  hostility	  from	  local	  populations	  were	  not	  necessarily	  a	  precursor	  to	  acts	  of	  
piracy	  however.	  The	  account	  of	  Rohan	  Rivett,	  an	  Australian	  journalist	  who	  was	  evacuated	  from	  
Singapore	  on	  the	  12th	  of	  February,	  contains	  abundant	  praise	  for	  the	  support	  given	  by	  the	  
Chinese	  and	  Malay	  communities	  that	  aided	  his	  party	  after	  their	  ship	  was	  bombed	  out	  of	  
commission	  at	  Banka	  Island	  several	  days	  later.	  This	  did	  not	  preclude	  them	  from	  stealing	  a	  
couple	  of	  Chinese	  boats	  to	  get	  away	  from	  Banka,	  and	  Rivett	  noted	  that	  ‘…	  the	  Chinese	  …	  would	  
not	  have	  been	  unduly	  pleased	  with	  our	  proceedings.	  But	  we	  were	  in	  no	  frame	  of	  mind	  to	  
consider	  the	  rights	  and	  wrongs	  of	  annexation.’109	  
Such	  acts	  were	  frequently	  the	  subject	  of	  heated	  discussions	  amongst	  the	  small	  groups	  hastily	  
thrown	  together	  by	  circumstances.	  Rivett’s	  heterogeneous	  group,	  comprising	  a	  mixture	  of	  
nationalities,	  service	  arms	  and	  ranks,	  twice	  debated	  the	  wisdom	  of	  hijacking	  local	  trading	  
vessels	  in	  better	  condition	  than	  their	  now	  overloaded	  craft.	  On	  both	  occasions,	  to	  Rivett’s	  
dismay,	  the	  majority	  favoured	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  the	  traders	  continued	  on	  their	  way	  
undisturbed.	  These	  democratically	  arrived	  at	  decisions	  were	  not	  however	  as	  altruistic	  as	  they	  
might	  first	  appear,	  the	  majority	  voting	  on	  the	  more	  self-­‐serving	  premise	  that	  they	  feared	  the	  
response	  from	  the	  traders’	  friends	  once	  they	  realised	  what	  had	  happened.110	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Rivett,	  Rohan.	  (1946)	  Behind	  Bamboo:	  An	  Inside	  Story	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Prison	  Camps.	  Angus	  and	  
Robertson,	  Sydney.	  p45.	  The	  similarity	  between	  Rivett’s	  words	  and	  those	  subsequently	  written	  by	  
Oakley	  (see	  fn	  108	  above)	  may	  reflect	  a	  similarity	  of	  circumstance,	  but	  there	  is	  also	  the	  possibility	  that	  
they	  may	  not	  be	  entirely	  co-­‐incidental.	  Rivett’s	  book	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  immediate	  
post-­‐war	  period,	  lending	  it	  a	  wider	  audience	  and	  potentially	  informing	  subsequent	  accounts.	  
110	  Rivett,	  Behind	  Bamboo,	  p70.	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Officers	  were	  by	  no	  means	  immune	  to	  such	  behaviour,	  as	  Colonel	  Dillon,	  who	  had	  selflessly	  
remained	  on	  the	  route	  to	  maintain	  order,	  described.	  ‘I	  soon	  found	  that	  the	  worst-­‐behaved	  
were	  not	  necessarily	  the	  deserters	  or	  Other	  Ranks	  …	  There	  was	  a	  distinct	  air	  of	  sauve	  qui	  peut	  
abroad	  among	  some	  civilians,	  some	  men	  and	  some	  officers	  …’.111	  One	  such	  officer	  may	  have	  
been	  Grafton’s	  Battery	  Commander,	  Major	  Rowley-­‐Conwy,	  who	  crossed	  swords	  with	  Dillon	  at	  
Rengat	  on	  the	  Indragiri	  River,	  over	  the	  latter’s	  insistence	  that	  he	  would	  have	  to	  wait	  his	  turn	  on	  
the	  route	  	  to	  Padang.	  Despite	  pleading	  that	  he	  was	  an	  escaped	  POW	  and	  not	  on	  the	  official	  
evacuation,	  Rowley-­‐Conwy	  was	  instructed	  to	  join	  the	  queue.	  His	  response	  to	  Dillon’s	  order	  was	  
blunt:	  ‘I	  don’t	  remember	  seeing	  anything	  in	  King’s	  Regulations	  about	  escaping	  by	  numbers.’112	  
This	  wasn’t	  the	  first	  occasion	  when	  he	  had	  disobeyed	  instructions.	  He	  had	  already	  walked	  out	  
of	  a	  conference	  to	  discuss	  the	  surrender	  in	  the	  early	  hours	  of	  the	  15th	  of	  February,	  despite	  the	  
adjutant	  insisting	  that	  he	  stayed.	  	  
He	  had	  already	  requisitioned	  a	  junk	  some	  days	  before,	  renaming	  it	  the	  Conwy	  Castle,	  and	  cast	  
off	  (with	  Grafton	  on	  board)	  early	  on	  the	  16th	  having	  repelled	  unwanted	  boarders	  at	  
gunpoint.113	  Justification	  for	  his	  actions	  (and	  those	  of	  many	  others)	  was	  apparently	  contained	  
in	  Wavell’s	  last	  order	  to	  Percival,	  agreeing	  to	  the	  surrender.	  This	  contained	  the	  caveat	  that	  
‘Just	  before	  final	  cessation	  of	  fighting,	  opportunity	  should	  be	  given	  to	  any	  determined	  bodies	  
of	  men	  or	  individuals	  to	  try	  and	  effect	  escape	  by	  any	  means	  possible.’114	  Geoffrey	  Brooke	  has	  
suggested	  that	  Percival	  would	  have	  had	  little	  time	  to	  communicate	  this	  message,	  and	  is	  
perhaps	  seeking	  to	  provide	  some	  post-­‐hoc	  validation	  for	  such	  actions	  when	  he	  says	  that	  the	  
order	  ‘changed	  deserters	  …	  into	  bona	  fide	  escapees	  whose	  duty	  it	  was	  to	  get	  away.’115	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Brooke,	  Singapore’s	  Dunkirk,	  p65.	  ‘Sauve	  qui	  peut’	  translates	  as	  ‘every	  man	  for	  himself’.	  
112	  Skidmore,	  Ian.	  (1974)	  Escape	  from	  the	  Rising	  Sun:	  The	  incredible	  voyage	  of	  the	  ‘Sederhana	  Djohanis.	  
Futura	  Publications,	  Aylesbury.	  p87.	  Rowley-­‐Conwy’s	  assertion	  that	  he	  was	  an	  escaped	  POW	  is	  
questionable,	  as	  he	  had	  never	  been	  taken	  prisoner	  and	  hadn’t	  waited	  to	  surrender.	  
113	  Skidmore,	  Escape,	  p32.	  
114	  Wigmore,	  Lionel.	  (1957)	  Australia	  in	  the	  War	  of	  1939-­‐1945.	  Series	  1	  –	  Army:	  Vol	  IV	  –	  The	  Japanese	  
Thrust.	  Australian	  War	  Memorial.	  p378.	  
115	  Brooke,	  Singapore’s	  Dunkirk,	  p106.	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Following	  the	  junk’s	  truncated	  voyage,	  Rowley-­‐Conwy	  set	  off	  to	  try	  and	  find	  help	  for	  his	  
marooned	  gunners,	  and	  on	  several	  trips	  in	  requisitioned	  boats	  around	  the	  islands	  he	  rescued	  a	  
number	  of	  stranded	  evacuees,	  but	  failed	  to	  locate	  most	  of	  his	  own	  men.	  At	  one	  point,	  a	  
recalcitrant	  Malay	  pilot,	  disturbed	  by	  the	  appearance	  of	  Rowley	  ‘in	  his	  torn	  khaki	  drill,	  his	  
green	  hat	  pulled	  piratically	  over	  his	  eyes	  and	  a	  Thompson	  sub-­‐machine	  gun	  slung	  over	  his	  
shoulder’	  and	  who	  had	  visibly	  dropped	  his	  hand	  to	  his	  revolver	  holster,	  required	  strong	  words	  
from	  the	  local	  Dutch	  controller	  before	  he	  would,	  albeit	  unwillingly,	  act	  as	  a	  guide.116	  Rowley-­‐
Conwy,	  having	  by-­‐passed	  Colonel	  Dillon’s	  queue	  at	  Rengat,	  eventually	  arrived	  at	  Padang	  on	  the	  
5th	  of	  March.	  Unable	  to	  find	  a	  berth	  on	  the	  last	  ship	  out,	  he	  was	  fortunate	  to	  be	  given	  a	  place	  
on	  a	  sailing	  boat	  that	  had	  been	  stashed	  up	  the	  coast	  by	  the	  CO	  in	  Padang,	  on	  which	  he,	  and	  
Geoffrey	  Brooke,	  eventually	  reached	  Colombo.117	  
The	  flight	  from	  Singapore	  was	  typified	  by	  many	  small	  but	  diverse	  bands	  being	  thrown	  together	  
by	  chance.	  Within	  these	  groups	  their	  responses	  to	  their	  fraught	  circumstances,	  and	  to	  the	  local	  
populations,	  were	  often	  mediated	  through	  group	  discussions.	  All	  were	  the	  recipients	  of	  help	  
and	  assistance	  from	  the	  communities	  through	  which	  they	  passed,	  and	  none	  of	  them	  would	  
have	  got	  as	  far	  as	  they	  did	  without	  it.	  Where	  such	  help	  was	  not	  forthcoming,	  and	  driven	  by	  
desperation,	  most	  of	  the	  men	  were	  capable	  of	  acting	  in	  a	  piratical	  manner,	  although	  the	  
extreme	  antipathy	  demonstrated	  by	  a	  few	  was	  frequently	  mitigated	  by	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  
of	  the	  groups	  they	  were	  a	  part	  of.	  	  Taylor,	  benefitting	  from	  an	  early	  and	  trouble	  free	  
departure,	  and	  Rowley-­‐Conwy	  and	  Brooke,	  the	  fortunate	  recipients	  of	  a	  place	  on	  a	  secreted	  
vessel,	  were	  lucky	  and	  got	  away	  to	  Ceylon.	  	  Many	  others	  were	  less	  fortunate	  and,	  like	  Rivett,	  
Oakley	  and	  Grafton,	  were	  made	  to	  march	  into	  captivity.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Skidmore,	  Escape,	  p61.	  
117	  Skidmore,	  Escape,	  pp93-­‐95.	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1.5.	  The	  March	  into	  Captivity.	  
The	  shock	  of	  defeat	  by	  Japan,	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  an	  ignominious	  capitulation	  to	  an	  Asian	  
enemy,	  led	  to	  a	  number	  of	  the	  men	  referencing	  a	  sense	  of	  shame,	  over	  and	  above	  that	  which	  
might	  be	  expected	  from	  a	  defeated	  army,	  and	  in	  particular	  at	  how	  their	  surrender	  would	  be	  
viewed	  at	  home.	  In	  addition	  to	  immediately	  expressed	  impressions	  of	  shame,	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  
could	  also	  manifest	  themselves	  indirectly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  capitulation,	  or	  be	  stimulated	  or	  
amplified	  retrospectively	  on	  returning	  home	  after	  the	  war.	  As	  news	  of	  the	  surrender	  came	  
through,	  Pte	  Henderson	  reflected	  ironically	  on	  the	  first	  two	  verses	  of	  an	  old	  imperial	  poem	  
remembered	  from	  his	  school	  days,	  The	  Private	  of	  the	  Buffs:	  
Last	  night	  among	  his	  fellow	  roughs,	  
He	  jested,	  quaffed	  and	  swore,	  
A	  drunken	  private	  of	  the	  Buffs,	  	  
Who	  never	  looked	  before.	  
Today	  beneath	  the	  foeman’s	  frown,	  	  
He	  stands	  in	  Elgin’s	  place,	  
Ambassador	  from	  Britain’s	  crown,	  
And	  type	  of	  all	  of	  her	  race.	  
	  
Poor,	  reckless,	  rude,	  lowborn,	  untaught,	  
Bewildered	  and	  alone,	  
A	  heart	  with	  English	  instinct	  fraught,	  
He	  yet	  can	  call	  his	  own.	  
Aye,	  tear	  his	  body	  limb	  from	  limb,	  	  
Bring	  axe	  or	  cord	  or	  flame,	  [sic]	  
He	  only	  knows	  that	  not	  through	  him,	  
Shall	  England	  come	  to	  shame.118	  
	  
Whilst	  he	  went	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  any	  shame	  that	  had	  accrued	  was	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  
generals,	  he	  did	  internalise	  some	  remorse	  of	  his	  own,	  generated	  by	  the	  sense	  that	  he	  had	  
trusted	  those	  same	  officers,	  and	  by	  implication	  the	  mantra	  of	  imperialistic	  superiority,	  to	  hold	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  IWM:	  Henderson;	  p260.	  Written	  in	  1860	  by	  Sir	  Francis	  Doyle,	  the	  poem	  was	  based	  on	  the	  alleged	  
decapitation	  of	  a	  British	  private	  captured	  by	  the	  Chinese	  in	  the	  Second	  Opium	  War,	  for	  refusing	  to	  
prostrate	  himself	  before	  his	  captors.	  When	  writing	  his	  account	  in	  the	  1970s,	  Henderson	  appears	  to	  be	  
quoting	  the	  lines	  from	  memory,	  hence	  the	  variation	  of	  verse	  2,	  line	  6,	  which	  should	  read;	  ‘Bring	  cord,	  or	  
axe,	  or	  flame’	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out	  and	  win	  the	  day:	  ‘The	  bitter	  part	  of	  my	  amusement	  however	  was	  caused	  by	  the	  thought	  
that	  I,	  a	  Communist,	  had	  really	  believed	  that	  here	  in	  Singapore	  the	  thin	  red	  line	  would	  hold	  
out.	  Was	  there	  no	  public	  schoolboy	  here	  “to	  rally	  the	  ranks”	  with	  the	  cry	  “play	  up,	  play	  up	  and	  
play	  the	  game?”	  ’119	  The	  issue	  of	  the	  shame	  of	  defeat	  was	  echoed	  in	  another	  account:	  ‘We	  all	  
knew	  that	  in	  England,	  people	  who	  did	  not	  understand,	  thought	  we	  had	  shamed	  our	  nation	  and	  
our	  flag.’120	  This	  post-­‐war	  assertion,	  whilst	  perhaps	  informed	  by,	  and	  in	  response	  to,	  
unfavourable	  reactions	  on	  returning	  to	  the	  UK,	  is	  indicative	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  shame	  continued	  
to	  resonate	  strongly	  with	  the	  former	  POWs.	  
	  Such	  feelings	  were	  reinforced	  in	  a	  more	  immediate	  manner	  by	  the	  Japanese	  policy	  of	  making	  
their	  prisoners	  march	  into	  captivity,	  through	  streets	  filled	  with	  the	  local	  populations	  who	  until	  
recently	  had	  usually	  been	  the	  erstwhile	  subjects	  of	  the	  British	  Empire.121	  Such	  marches	  took	  
place	  all	  over	  the	  newly	  conquered	  zone	  of	  Japanese	  occupation,	  and	  would	  be	  repeated	  
subsequently	  when	  cohorts	  of	  POWs	  were	  relocated	  to	  meet	  the	  victor’s	  labour	  requirements.	  
These	  events,	  and	  the	  responses	  of	  the	  civilians	  lining	  the	  routes,	  were	  frequently	  recorded	  by	  
the	  newly	  captured	  servicemen,	  and	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  both	  the	  outlooks	  of	  the	  prisoners	  and	  
their	  impressions	  of	  those	  who	  were	  watching	  them.	  
Accounts	  of	  the	  fourteen	  mile	  march	  from	  Singapore	  city	  to	  Changi	  contain	  a	  mixed	  and	  
frequently	  ethnically	  defined	  set	  of	  attitudes	  that	  were	  perceived	  as	  being	  displayed	  by	  the	  
local	  populations.	  	  One	  soldier	  writing	  of	  his	  experiences	  immediately	  after	  the	  war	  recalled	  
that	  there	  were	  ‘streets	  of	  weeping	  Chinese,	  Malays,	  Indians,	  and	  all	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
conglomeration	  of	  nations	  which	  go	  to	  make	  the	  population	  of	  Singapore.’122	  This	  somewhat	  
romanticised	  view	  of	  universally	  distraught	  colonial	  subjects,	  whilst	  not	  suffering	  from	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  IWM:	  Henderson;	  p261.	  
120	  IWM:	  Carpenter;	  p41.	  
121	  Gerald	  Horne	  accurately	  describes	  such	  an	  event	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  as	  a	  “March	  of	  Humiliation”;	  Horne,	  
Race	  War!	  p81.	  	  	  
122	  IWM:	  Holden,	  E.	  (Docs	  2510);	  p3.	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effects	  of	  time	  on	  the	  memory,	  may	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  the	  more	  immediate	  afterglow	  of	  
freedom	  and	  the	  restoration	  of	  British	  imperial	  authority.	  
	  A	  more	  ethnically	  differentiated	  civilian	  response	  is	  remembered	  by	  others,	  in	  defeat	  it	  seems	  
that	  the	  local	  populations	  had	  become	  more	  easily	  identifiable.	  The	  Chinese	  were	  widely	  seen	  
as	  being	  supportive,	  whilst	  the	  Malay	  and	  Indian	  populations	  exhibited	  more	  variable	  
reactions.	  Pte	  Carpenter	  saw	  the	  Chinese	  as	  friendly,	  whilst	  ‘some	  of	  the	  Malayans	  and	  Indians	  
gave	  hoots	  of	  derision	  on	  seeing	  us.’	  Despite	  such	  a,	  for	  him,	  uncharacteristically	  even	  handed	  
description,	  he	  went	  on	  to	  describe	  how	  the	  streets	  were	  packed	  with	  civilians,	  ‘obviously	  to	  
greet	  the	  conquerors	  of	  the	  mighty	  British.	  Yes	  this	  was	  their	  day,	  poor	  ignorant	  bloody	  
fools.’123	  Whilst	  not	  a	  few	  may	  well	  have	  gathered	  to	  greet	  the	  Japanese,	  and	  conversely,	  as	  
many	  may	  have	  been	  there	  to	  deride	  the	  newly	  humbled	  British,	  his	  own	  intolerance	  rises	  to	  
the	  surface	  again	  when	  he	  collectively	  ascribes	  such	  perspectives	  to	  the	  whole	  crowd	  of	  ‘poor	  
ignorant	  bloody	  fools’.	  With	  a	  similar,	  but	  less	  judgemental,	  pattern	  of	  ethnic	  distinction,	  Pte	  
Bailey	  recounted	  that	  the	  Chinese	  were	  sullen	  to	  the	  Japanese,	  whilst	  some	  of	  the	  Indians	  
demonstrated	  deference	  to	  their	  new	  overlords,	  and	  others	  ‘were	  actually	  welcoming.’124	  
These	  latter	  accounts	  seem	  more	  realistic,	  reflecting	  Chinese	  apprehensions	  (soon	  to	  be	  
confirmed)	  of	  their	  precarious	  new	  circumstances,	  and	  some	  overt	  Indian	  and	  Malay	  
resentment	  of	  British	  colonialism.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  Chinese	  were	  necessarily	  
contented	  subjects	  of	  the	  British	  Empire,	  and	  once	  the	  binding	  effect	  of	  the	  common	  Japanese	  
enemy	  had	  been	  removed,	  it	  would	  be	  members	  of	  the	  Chinese	  community	  who	  would	  lead	  
the	  post-­‐war	  fight	  for	  independence	  in	  Malaysia.	  	  
Only	  rarely	  did	  any	  antipathy	  from	  the	  crowd	  take	  a	  non-­‐verbal	  form,	  although	  it	  could	  still	  be	  
oral	  in	  its	  provenance,	  as	  when	  a	  group	  of	  ‘arab	  traders’	  spat	  at	  one	  officer	  as	  he	  walked	  past	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  IWM:	  Carpenter;	  p43.	  
124	  IWM:	  Bailey,	  C.	  (Sound	  4647);	  Reel	  3.	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them.125	  Gunner	  Whitehead,	  captured	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  recalled	  hearing	  that	  ‘some	  locals	  jeered	  
and	  threw	  stones’	  at	  passing	  POWs,	  but	  that	  his	  experience	  was	  that	  bystanders	  had	  ‘looked	  
on	  impassively’	  with	  ‘dour	  stoicism’.126	  	  More	  common	  were	  reports	  of	  many	  ‘native	  children	  
along	  our	  route,	  who	  apparently	  taking	  pity	  on	  our	  very	  unhappy	  condition,	  were	  holding	  tins	  
of	  water	  to	  quench	  our	  thirst	  if	  we	  needed	  them.’127	  	  
Just	  over	  a	  month	  later	  at	  Padang	  on	  Sumatra,	  the	  later	  arrivals	  on	  the	  route	  from	  Singapore	  
went	  through	  a	  similarly	  public	  display	  of	  their	  new	  status,	  as	  they	  were	  marched	  through	  the	  
streets	  from	  the	  Chinese	  School	  where	  they	  had	  been	  staying,	  to	  a	  Dutch	  army	  barracks	  to	  
begin	  their	  captivity.	  Among	  their	  number	  were	  Grafton	  and	  Oakley,	  and	  their	  divergent	  
accounts	  of	  the	  same	  journey	  clearly	  demonstrate	  their	  differing	  racial	  mind-­‐sets,	  how	  these	  
conditioned	  their	  responses	  to	  the	  local	  people,	  and	  how	  they	  perceived	  the	  locals	  to	  be	  
responding	  to	  them.	  
On	  arriving	  at	  Padang,	  Oakley’s	  account	  pre-­‐empts	  the	  official	  march	  into	  captivity,	  as	  he	  
recalls	  ‘shuffling	  through	  streets	  lined	  with	  curious	  and	  sullen	  natives’	  on	  his	  way	  to	  the	  
accommodation	  at	  the	  Chinese	  school.	  En	  route	  to	  the	  school	  he	  notes	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  jealousy	  
that	  a	  Ghurkha	  and	  two	  Sikhs	  had	  managed	  to	  disappear	  into	  the	  crowd,	  ‘their	  brown	  skins	  
allowing	  them	  to	  blend	  in	  easily	  with	  a	  sympathetic	  and	  friendly	  segment	  of	  the	  local	  native	  
population.’	  Britain’s	  military	  past	  would	  also	  resonate	  in	  his	  mind	  as	  he	  disparagingly	  referred	  
to	  Colonel	  Warren,	  the	  escape	  route	  organiser,	  as	  someone	  seeking	  to	  perpetuate	  ‘the	  thin	  red	  
line	  syndrome	  of	  yesteryear.’	  He	  also	  claimed	  that	  he	  had	  become	  a	  prisoner	  of	  the	  Dutch	  and	  
was	  prevented	  from	  leaving	  the	  school,	  although	  this	  had	  not	  precluded	  some	  naval	  personnel	  
from	  managing	  to	  get	  out	  to	  reconnoitre	  the	  port.128	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  IWM:	  de	  Cavley;	  p13.	  
126	  Whitehead,	  John	  S.	  and	  Bennett,	  George	  B.	  (1990)	  Escape	  to	  Fight	  on:	  With	  204	  Military	  Mission	  in	  
China.	  Robert	  Hale,	  London.	  p40.	  
127	  IWM:	  Strong;	  p13.	  
128	  IWM:	  Oakley;	  pp34-­‐38.	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Grafton	  seems	  to	  have	  enjoyed	  a	  more	  amenable	  week	  in	  Padang,	  mostly	  spent	  at	  another	  
camp	  at	  the	  Malay	  School,	  and	  having	  received	  a	  few	  guilders	  in	  pay,	  he	  was	  able	  to	  go	  into	  
town	  for	  a	  haircut	  and	  a	  meal.129	  Furthermore	  he	  was	  also	  able	  to	  take	  out	  a	  book	  on	  loan	  
from	  the	  Seaman’s	  Mission,	  and	  buy	  the	  latest	  Sax	  Rhomer	  novel	  from	  a	  bookshop	  he	  was	  
browsing	  in.130	  Whilst	  in	  town	  he	  had	  come	  across	  members	  of	  his	  battery,	  who	  described	  a	  
‘state	  of	  near	  rebellion’	  on	  their	  journey	  that	  had	  resulted	  from	  the	  perceived	  incompetence	  of	  
their	  officers.	  Presumably	  it	  was	  during	  this	  contact	  that	  he	  learned	  that	  his	  Battery	  
Commander	  (Rowly-­‐Conwy)	  had	  already	  left.131	  	  
Towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  week	  Grafton	  must	  have	  been	  transferred	  to	  the	  Chinese	  School	  as	  he	  
was	  there	  at	  the	  surrender,	  and	  his	  account	  briefly	  converges	  with	  that	  of	  Oakley,	  as	  they	  both	  
describe	  a	  Japanese	  officer	  destroying	  a	  picture	  of	  Chang	  Kai	  Chek	  that	  had	  been	  hanging	  on	  
the	  wall.	  Even	  at	  this	  apparently	  convergent	  moment	  there	  is	  a	  discernable	  difference	  in	  how	  
the	  event	  was	  remembered.	  Oakley	  recalled	  that	  the	  officer	  ‘pointed	  and	  screamed	  at	  a	  fading	  
picture	  of	  Chang	  Kai	  Chek.	  This	  was	  dragged	  off	  the	  wall	  and	  viciously	  hacked	  to	  pieces’.132	  
Grafton	  noted	  a	  slightly	  more	  measured	  action:	  ‘He	  ordered	  it	  to	  be	  taken	  down	  and	  it	  was	  
jumped	  on	  a	  few	  times.’133	  	  
The	  differences	  in	  their	  outlooks	  and	  perceptions	  were	  even	  more	  explicitly	  displayed	  on	  the	  
march	  to	  the	  Dutch	  army	  camp	  and	  into	  captivity,	  through	  streets	  lined	  with	  civilians.	  Oakley	  
described	  the	  situation	  with	  typical	  negativity:	  ‘Lining	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  street	  were	  jeering	  
crowds	  of	  natives	  who	  hurled	  jibes	  and	  solid	  objects	  in	  our	  direction.’134	  His	  view,	  
unsurprisingly,	  was	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  that	  of	  Grafton,	  who	  saw	  that	  the	  ‘local	  population	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Colonel	  Warren	  had	  dispensed	  funds	  to	  provide	  each	  officer	  with	  an	  eight	  guilder	  allowance,	  and	  five	  
for	  the	  men.	  Brooke,	  Singapore’s	  Dunkirk,	  p75.	  
130	  Ironically	  this	  book	  would	  have	  been	  The	  Island	  of	  Fu	  Manchu,	  published	  by	  Cassell,	  London,	  in	  1941.	  
131	  IWM:	  Grafton;	  pp28-­‐29.	  
132	  IWM:	  Oakley;	  p39.	  
133	  IWM:	  Grafton;	  p30.	  
134	  IWM:	  Oakley;	  p40.	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for	  the	  most	  part	  sympathetically	  inclined,	  and	  showed	  it	  whenever	  possible	  by	  passing	  us	  
food.	  This	  of	  course	  did	  not	  please	  the	  Japs	  and	  there	  were	  some	  nasty	  beatings.’	  135	  
These	  accounts	  are	  not	  necessarily	  irreconcilable.	  The	  regime	  (and	  the	  financial	  allowances)	  
may	  have	  been	  different	  in	  the	  Chinese	  School	  from	  those	  pertaining	  at	  the	  Malay	  School.	  
Grafton	  noted	  that	  there	  was	  a	  restriction	  on	  going	  into	  town	  at	  a	  later	  point	  in	  the	  week,	  and	  
this	  may	  have	  coincided	  with	  his	  transfer	  to	  join	  Oakley	  in	  the	  Chinese	  School.	  Similarly,	  on	  the	  
Japanese	  march	  to	  captivity,	  it	  may	  have	  been	  the	  people	  hurling	  abuse	  and	  more	  substantial	  
objects	  at	  Oakley	  who	  constituted	  the	  residual	  “lesser	  part”	  of	  the	  crowd	  that	  Grafton	  
remembered.136	  The	  one	  event	  that	  it	  can	  be	  said	  with	  certainty	  where	  both	  were	  present	  was	  
the	  destruction	  of	  the	  picture	  of	  Chang	  Kai	  Chek.	  This	  is	  instructive	  as	  it	  clearly	  contrasts	  
Oakley’s	  tendency	  to	  dramatic	  reconstruction	  with	  Grafton’s	  more	  measured	  approach.	  	  
Furthermore,	  regardless	  of	  the	  possible	  reconciliation	  of	  the	  differing	  accounts,	  their	  actual	  
content	  reveals	  divergent	  outlooks.	  Oakley	  exhibits	  an	  almost	  entirely	  pessimistic	  perspective	  
on	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  time	  at	  Padang,	  and	  chooses	  to	  record	  events	  in	  a	  negative	  fashion.	  It	  
seems	  unlikely	  that	  he	  would	  not	  have	  seen	  the	  gifts	  being	  given	  by	  the	  sympathetic	  locals	  
lining	  the	  route,	  or	  the	  beatings	  that	  they	  received	  for	  their	  kindness.	  Such	  acts	  however	  did	  
not	  fit	  with	  his	  narrative	  of	  negativity,	  so	  he	  chose	  instead	  to	  record	  the	  slights	  (whether	  in	  
reality	  or	  through	  misinterpretation)	  that	  he	  perceived.	  An	  intrinsic	  element	  of	  his	  negativity	  is	  
directed	  at	  anyone	  who	  is	  not	  British,	  with	  special	  reference	  in	  this	  context	  to	  those	  with	  
‘brown	  skins’,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  erstwhile	  comrades	  in	  arms	  like	  the	  Gurkhas	  and	  
Sikhs,	  or	  the	  members	  of	  the	  local	  community.137	  Written	  over	  fifty	  years	  after	  the	  liberation	  
his	  account	  reveals	  that	  the	  intervening	  years	  have	  done	  little	  or	  nothing	  to	  soften	  his	  world-­‐
view,	  and	  the	  racialized	  perspectives	  that	  inform	  it.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  IWM:	  Grafton;	  p31.	  
136	  It	  is	  indeed	  possible,	  given	  the	  different	  outlooks	  of	  the	  men,	  that	  the	  objects	  hurled	  at	  Oakley	  and	  
the	  items	  of	  food	  passed	  to	  Grafton	  were	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing.	  
137	  The	  Dutch	  were	  also	  a	  considerable	  object	  of	  his	  antipathy,	  as	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  a	  later	  chapter.	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The	  more	  balanced	  nature	  of	  Grafton’s	  narrative	  and	  its	  lack	  of	  dramatization	  lend	  it	  a	  greater	  
cogency,	  and	  intuitively	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  more	  accurate	  representation	  of	  the	  events	  in	  
Padang.	  It	  has	  a	  greater	  sense	  of	  objectivity,	  unencumbered	  by	  the	  baggage	  of	  essentialised	  
perspectives.	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  his	  own	  views	  had	  moderated	  and	  changed	  by	  the	  
time	  of	  writing	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  but	  this	  seems	  unlikely	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  memories	  that	  
he	  retained	  from	  the	  war.	  	  
	  
The	  march	  into	  captivity	  added	  a	  final	  chapter	  to	  the	  emotional	  rollercoaster	  that	  the	  men	  had	  
experienced	  since	  they	  had	  shipped	  out	  from	  Britain	  a	  few	  months	  before.	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  
sections,	  their	  mental	  outlook	  informed	  how	  they	  related	  to	  the	  civilians	  around	  them.	  In	  their	  
newly	  straitened	  circumstances	  they	  were	  mostly	  appreciative	  of	  the	  unsolicited	  support	  
frequently	  given	  to	  them	  by	  those	  who	  they	  passed.	  Common	  humanity	  usually	  outweighed	  
any	  post-­‐colonial	  antipathy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  local	  populations,	  and	  the	  men	  were	  largely	  
grateful	  for	  it.	  Few	  could	  have	  imagined	  the	  ordeal	  that	  awaited	  them	  as	  they	  entered	  the	  













Chapter	  2.	  Sources	  of	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  Antipathy.	  
	  
2.1.	  Introduction.	  
Few	  opponents	  in	  the	  long	  history	  of	  British	  warfare	  have	  generated	  as	  much	  antipathy	  as	  did	  
the	  Japanese	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Only	  25	  years	  previously	  Japan	  had	  been	  a	  valued	  
ally	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  patrolling	  the	  Indian	  and	  Pacific	  Oceans	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  
crucial	  naval	  support	  to	  the	  Mediterranean	  Fleet,	  occupying	  German	  possessions	  in	  Asia	  and	  
helping	  to	  suppress	  a	  mutiny	  by	  elements	  of	  the	  Indian	  garrison	  in	  Singapore	  in	  1915.138	  
Following	  the	  armistice	  in	  1918,	  Japanese	  diplomacy	  suffered	  several	  reverses,	  at	  Versailles	  in	  
1919	  and	  at	  the	  Washington	  Naval	  Conference	  in	  1921,	  which	  set	  it	  on	  the	  road,	  via	  Manchuria	  
and	  China,	  to	  its	  belated	  (or	  from	  a	  Chinese	  perspective,	  early)	  entry	  into	  the	  Second	  World	  
War.139	  	  	  
In	  the	  combat	  zones	  of	  this	  conflict	  little	  quarter	  was	  given	  or	  expected,	  in	  a	  particularly	  brutal	  
series	  of	  campaigns.	  Whilst	  the	  taking	  of	  prisoners	  would	  prove	  problematic	  at	  times	  to	  both	  
sides	  in	  the	  supposedly	  more	  civilised	  war	  being	  fought	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  in	  Asia	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  Gow,	  Ian.	  “The	  Royal	  Navy	  and	  Japan,	  1900-­‐1920:	  Strategic	  Re-­‐Evaluation	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Japanese	  
Navy.”	  p	  46;	  and	  Hirama,	  Yoichi.	  “The	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  Alliance	  and	  the	  First	  World	  War.”pp57-­‐58.	  Both	  
in	  Gow,	  Ian,	  Hirama,	  Yoichi,	  and	  Chapman,	  John,	  (eds)	  (2003)	  The	  History	  of	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  Relations,	  
1600-­‐2000.	  Volume	  III:	  The	  Military	  Dimension.	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  Basingstoke.	  Hirama	  relates	  how,	  
exactly	  27	  years	  before	  the	  surrender	  of	  Singapore	  in	  1942,	  a	  group	  of	  Indian	  Army	  soldiers	  attacked	  a	  
camp	  on	  the	  island	  holding	  German	  POWs,	  killed	  the	  British	  officers	  and	  released	  the	  prisoners.	  The	  
rebellion	  was	  eventually	  suppressed	  by	  a	  scratch	  force	  of	  European	  and	  Japanese	  civilian	  volunteers,	  
around	  200	  British	  regulars,	  85	  men	  from	  the	  Sultan	  of	  Johore’s	  private	  army,	  an	  assortment	  of	  Russian	  
and	  French	  seamen,	  and	  around	  150	  Japanese	  military	  personnel.	  
139	  At	  both	  conferences	  there	  were	  gains	  as	  well	  as	  losses	  made	  by	  Japan.	  In	  1919	  the	  disappointment	  at	  
losing	  the	  insertion	  of	  a	  racial	  equality	  clause	  into	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  Covenant	  was	  partially	  offset	  by	  
the	  consolidation	  of	  economic	  and	  territorial	  gains	  from	  Germany	  in	  the	  region.	  Similarly	  at	  Washington,	  
whilst	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  Alliance	  was	  a	  source	  of	  some	  regret,	  there	  were	  also	  benefits	  
arising	  from	  the	  treaties	  signed	  there,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  ratios	  of	  certain	  naval	  vessels	  that	  
were	  agreed	  upon.	  These	  provided	  the	  Japanese	  with	  a	  potentially	  superior	  permitted	  tonnage	  in	  the	  
Pacific	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  the	  US	  and	  UK	  Navies,	  both	  of	  which	  had	  a	  wider	  geographical	  fleet	  
dispersal.	  See	  Murashima,	  Shigeru.	  “The	  Opening	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  Century	  and	  the	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  
Alliance,	  1895-­‐1923.”,	  and	  Steeds,	  David.	  “Anglo-­‐Japanese	  Relations,	  1902-­‐23:	  a	  Marriage	  of	  
Convenience.”	  Both	  in;	  Nish,	  Ian,	  and	  Yoichi,	  Kibata.	  (eds)	  (2000)	  The	  History	  of	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  
Relations.	  Volume	  I:	  The	  Political-­‐Diplomatic	  Dimension,	  1600-­‐1930.	  MacMillan	  Press,	  Basingstoke.	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Pacific	  such	  practices	  were	  widespread	  and	  near	  endemic.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  then	  ironic	  in	  this	  
context	  that	  the	  major	  source	  of	  anti-­‐Japanese	  sentiment	  would	  arise	  from	  their	  treatment	  of	  
the	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  British	  POWs	  who	  fell	  into	  their	  hands	  in	  Singapore	  and	  elsewhere	  at	  
the	  start	  of	  the	  war,	  many	  of	  whom	  would	  not	  survive	  the	  incarceration	  of	  three	  and	  a	  half	  
years.	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  seek	  to	  trace	  the	  development	  of	  such	  negative	  sentiments	  amongst	  
the	  POWs	  and	  examine	  the	  validity	  of	  some	  potential	  explanations,	  contrasting	  the	  societal	  
antagonism	  espoused	  by	  John	  Dower140	  against	  Tarak	  Barkawi’s	  model	  of	  antipathy	  gained	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  direct	  contacts	  in	  the	  combat	  context.141	  
There	  is	  a	  relative	  abundance	  of	  material	  regarding	  the	  views	  held	  by	  the	  BORs	  in	  respect	  to	  
the	  Japanese,	  initially	  as	  opponents	  and	  then	  subsequently	  as	  captors.	  This	  richness	  of	  records	  
continues	  into	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  and	  allows	  for	  a	  longitudinal	  survey	  of	  British	  attitudes,	  
before,	  during	  and	  after	  the	  war.	  In	  addition	  there	  is	  also	  a	  rich	  seam	  of	  historiography,	  much	  
of	  it	  prompted	  by	  the	  perceived	  need	  to	  restore	  good	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  nations	  after	  
1945.	  This	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  period	  up	  to	  repatriation	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1945,	  whilst	  the	  
post-­‐war	  period	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  a	  subsequent	  section.	  
It	  is	  worth	  clarifying	  who	  is	  included	  in	  the	  group	  labelled	  “Japanese”.	  Many	  of	  the	  enemy	  
personnel	  that	  the	  POWs	  came	  into	  contact	  with	  were	  not	  Japanese,	  but	  had	  been	  recruited	  
from	  within	  its	  Empire	  and	  from	  conquered	  territories.	  The	  Japanese	  colonies	  of	  Korea	  and	  
Formosa	  supplied	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  guards	  in	  camps	  across	  Asia,	  as	  exemplified	  by	  the	  1,280	  
Korean	  guards	  on	  the	  Burma-­‐Thai	  Railway	  who	  considerably	  outnumbered	  the	  125	  Japanese	  
officers	  and	  NCOs	  who	  were	  guarding	  them	  as	  construction	  commenced.142	  Formosans	  in	  
Borneo	  and	  the	  Pacific	  archipelagos,	  Indonesians,	  some	  recruited	  from	  the	  Dutch	  colonial	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  Dower,	  War	  Without	  Mercy.	  
141	  Barkawi,	  Tarak.	  (2004)	  “Peoples,	  Homelands,	  and	  Wars?	  Ethnicity,	  the	  Military	  and	  Battle	  among	  
British	  Imperial	  Forces	  in	  the	  War	  against	  Japan.”	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History,	  Vol	  46,	  
pp134-­‐163.	  
142	  Flower,	  “Captors	  and	  Captives”,	  in:	  Moore	  and	  Fedorowich,	  Prisoners	  of	  War,	  p236.	  There	  were	  




forces,	  and	  in	  Singapore	  many	  of	  the	  Sikhs	  who	  had	  previously	  policed	  the	  island,	  found	  
themselves	  guarding	  allied	  POWs.	  Whilst	  complaints	  about	  these	  guards	  and	  their	  actions	  
were	  frequent,	  particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Koreans	  under	  whose	  constraint	  many	  of	  the	  
British	  found	  themselves	  on	  the	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway,	  they	  were	  usually	  seen	  as	  acting	  at	  
the	  direction	  of	  their	  colonial	  masters,	  the	  Japanese,	  upon	  whom	  the	  ultimate	  blame	  lay.143	  For	  
this	  reason	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  on	  the	  attitudes	  of	  the	  POWs	  to	  the	  Japanese,	  both	  
before	  and	  during	  the	  war	  in	  the	  east.	  	  The	  prisoners	  would	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  range	  of	  
Japanese	  subjects,	  not	  all	  of	  whom	  were	  enemy	  combatants,	  including	  soldiers,	  sailors	  and	  
engineers,	  as	  well	  as,	  for	  those	  who	  were	  sent	  to	  Japan,	  work	  supervisors	  and	  civilians	  at	  large.	  
The	  primary	  aim	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  relationship	  with	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  
institutional	  Japan.	  
In	  this	  chapter	  the	  development	  of	  attitudes	  to	  the	  Japanese	  prior	  to	  captivity	  is	  examined	  
with	  specific	  reference	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  popular	  media.	  The	  importance	  posited	  by	  some	  
POWs	  and	  academics	  of	  caricatures	  and	  other	  racial	  stereotyping	  in	  the	  media	  is	  investigated,	  
as	  is	  the	  changing	  editorial	  position	  that	  the	  press	  took	  towards	  Japan.	  On	  arrival	  in	  Asia	  official	  
briefings	  acted	  to	  compound	  such	  caricatures	  of	  the	  enemy	  and	  fed	  into	  the	  rumour	  mill	  that	  
operated	  during	  the	  Malayan	  Campaign	  and	  the	  battle	  for	  Singapore.	  The	  deterioration	  in	  
relations	  during	  the	  period	  of	  captivity	  is	  then	  considered	  and	  assessed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
theories	  of	  combat	  motivation	  that	  have	  been	  developed	  to	  account	  for	  the	  brutality	  of	  the	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  Henderson,	  like	  many	  of	  his	  colleagues,	  noted	  that	  the	  Koreans	  often	  ‘outdid	  the	  Japanese	  
themselves	  in	  acts	  of	  brutality	  against	  the	  prisoners	  of	  war.’	  p545.	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2.2.	  Early	  antipathy:	  Essentialised	  caricatures	  in	  the	  press.	  
For	  a	  few	  of	  the	  men	  an	  antagonism	  towards	  the	  Japanese	  was	  evident	  from	  the	  start	  of	  their	  
time	  in	  Asia,	  with	  diary	  entries	  referring	  to	  ‘yellow	  bastards’,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  none	  of	  
them	  had	  as	  yet	  had	  any	  direct	  contacts.	  Whilst	  such	  epithets	  are	  perhaps	  not	  surprising,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  impending	  hostilities	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  bombed,	  
the	  responses	  from	  some	  of	  the	  British	  troops	  to	  the	  Japanese	  soldiers	  when	  they	  first	  came	  
face	  to	  face	  with	  them	  are	  suggestive	  of	  a	  deeper	  seated	  pre-­‐existing	  antipathy.	  Until	  the	  fall	  
of	  Singapore	  most	  of	  the	  men	  had	  not	  seen	  a	  Japanese,	  apart	  from	  inanimately	  at	  a	  distance	  in	  
planes.	  Even	  those	  who	  thought	  they	  had	  met	  them	  in	  combat	  were	  often	  confused	  as	  to	  the	  
identities	  of	  those	  ranged	  against	  them,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapter.	  	  
Writing	  about	  the	  surrender	  many	  years	  later,	  some	  of	  the	  men	  remarked	  on	  the	  appearance	  
of	  the	  Japanese,	  emerging	  out	  of	  the	  jungle	  after	  ten	  weeks	  of	  combat,	  by	  saying	  that	  they	  
resembled	  the	  caricatures	  drawn	  in	  the	  press.	  As	  one	  soldier	  wrote:	  ‘I	  was	  rather	  taken	  aback	  
to	  see	  that	  the	  Japs	  looked	  the	  very	  personification	  of	  the	  caricatures	  usually	  drawn	  in	  
newspapers.	  The	  reputation	  as	  fearless	  fighters	  that	  had	  preceded	  them	  down	  the	  Malayan	  
peninsula	  now	  seemed	  almost	  laughable.’144	  	  Another	  recalled	  that	  ‘they	  all	  filled	  the	  
caricature	  Jap	  I	  led	  [sic]	  to	  expect.’145	  A	  more	  explicitly	  racialized	  representation	  was	  drawn	  in	  
the	  diaries	  of	  several	  soldiers	  :	  ‘They	  are	  swarthy	  little	  men,	  overgrown	  monkeys,	  clad	  in	  	  
jungle	  green,	  festooned	  in	  leaves	  and	  twigs	  …	  They	  would	  gutterally	  grunt,	  they	  speak	  so	  
rapidly.’	  146	  Diminutive	  size,	  the	  jungle	  location	  and	  visual	  appearance	  were	  accompanied	  by	  a	  
simian	  soundtrack	  in	  these	  contemporary	  essentialised	  images	  of	  the	  Japanese.	  	  ‘Bloody	  lot	  of	  
monkeys	  all	  of	  them’	  was	  how	  one	  newly	  interned	  private	  described	  a	  gathering	  of	  senior	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  IWM:	  Grafton:(Docs	  6466)	  p30.	  
145	  IWM:	  Dixon;	  p52.	  
146	  IWM:	  Houghton;	  17/2/42.	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Japanese	  officers.147	  John	  Dower	  has	  asserted	  that	  ’the	  simian	  image	  had	  already	  become	  …	  
integral	  to	  Western	  thinking	  by	  this	  time’,	  although	  he	  cites	  little	  evidence	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  
hostilities	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  British	  press	  were	  responsible.148	  Such	  views	  suggest	  that	  
essentialised	  images	  should	  be	  easy	  to	  locate	  in	  the	  newspapers	  of	  the	  period,	  and	  that	  such	  
representations	  might	  have	  at	  the	  least	  played	  a	  part	  in	  the	  development	  and	  sustenance	  of	  
such	  attitudes.	  	  
The	  importance	  of	  the	  popular	  press	  in	  attitude	  formation	  has	  been	  suggested	  by	  Jon	  Pardoe,	  
who	  wrote	  that	  ‘ordinary	  men	  and	  women	  read	  mainly	  newspapers,	  and	  more	  of	  them	  than	  
ever	  before.	  Serious	  reading	  took	  up	  little	  time.	  The	  cinema	  was	  the	  essential	  social	  habit,	  with	  
newsreels	  part	  of	  every	  programme.’149	  In	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  role	  of	  the	  press	  in	  influencing	  
public	  opinion	  and	  developing	  the	  stereotypes	  outlined	  above,	  a	  number	  of	  publications	  were	  
surveyed.	  The	  main	  focus	  was	  on	  the	  Daily	  Mirror,	  which	  had	  been	  re-­‐positioned	  from	  right	  to	  
left	  during	  the	  1930s,	  growing	  its	  circulation	  in	  the	  process	  to	  1.4	  million	  by	  1939.	  The	  Mirror	  
was	  selected	  for	  its	  relevance	  to	  the	  subject	  group,	  claiming	  to	  speak	  for	  the	  ordinary	  Briton	  
and	  serviceman	  during	  the	  war.	  In	  addition	  the	  Daily	  Express,	  the	  Picture	  Post,	  the	  Evening	  
Standard,	  The	  Times,	  the	  Manchester	  Guardian	  and	  the	  Yorkshire	  Post	  were	  also	  scrutinised.	  	  
Whilst	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  this	  section	  is	  on	  the	  press,	  the	  Pathé	  Archive	  was	  also	  surveyed	  to	  
assess	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  newsreels	  during	  this	  period,	  and	  a	  brief	  examination	  of	  the	  
potential	  impact	  of	  popular	  literature	  is	  made.	  
Despite	  the	  contemporary	  simian	  references	  outlined	  above,	  and	  the	  post-­‐hoc	  attribution	  of	  
such	  representations	  to	  caricatures	  in	  the	  press,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  to	  be	  found	  of	  such	  
allusions,	  either	  in	  writing	  or	  graphically,	  in	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  start	  of	  hostilities	  in	  Asia.	  A	  
search	  of	  the	  Mirror	  revealed	  just	  two	  articles	  that	  featured	  both	  Japan	  and	  one	  of	  a	  variety	  of	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  IWM:	  Parry;	  26/2/42.	  
148	  Dower,	  War	  Without	  Mercy,	  p84.	  
149	  Pardoe,	  Jon.	  “British	  Writing	  on	  Contemporary	  Japan,	  1924-­‐1941:’	  Newspapers,	  Books,	  Reviews	  and	  
Propoganda.’”	  In:	  Daniels,	  Gordon,	  and	  Tsuzuki,	  Chushichi	  (eds).	  (2002)	  The	  History	  of	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  
Relations	  1600-­‐2000:	  Volume	  5:	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Perspectives.	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  Basingstoke.	  p281.	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simian	  references,	  between	  the	  start	  of	  1937	  and	  the	  end	  of	  November,	  1941.	  The	  first	  was	  in	  
response	  to	  a	  swelling	  mailbag	  protesting	  the	  Japanese	  attack	  on	  Shanghai,	  and	  contained	  the	  
by-­‐line;	  ‘Greed	  is	  the	  “General”	  of	  Japan’s	  armed	  baboons.’150	  This	  choice	  of	  wording	  was	  
unique	  for	  the	  period	  in	  question,	  and	  may	  well	  have	  been	  inspired	  as	  a	  sop	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  
feeling	  and	  the	  use	  of	  such	  language	  by	  the	  Mirror’s	  readers	  in	  their	  letters.	  The	  only	  other	  
simian	  reference	  would	  appear	  in	  an	  article	  that	  mentioned	  Japan	  over	  a	  year	  later,	  in	  a	  
Cassandra	  column	  that	  drew	  attention	  to	  an	  intimidating	  monkey	  at	  Regents	  Park,	  who	  ‘by	  
fighting,	  	  bullying,	  maltreating	  and	  general	  terrorism,	  he	  raised	  himself	  to	  be	  the	  leader.	  	  …	  He	  
is	  the	  supreme	  leader	  of	  cowed	  and	  beaten	  totalitarian	  Monkey	  Hill.’	  However	  the	  story’s	  
punch	  line	  revealed	  a	  comparator	  somewhat	  closer	  to	  home	  than	  Japan:	  ‘EIN	  VOLK!	  EIN	  REICH!	  
EIN	  FUHRER!’151	  
The	  Picture	  Post	  was	  first	  published	  in	  October	  1938,	  and	  within	  months	  its	  popular	  graphic	  
format	  had	  gained	  a	  circulation	  of	  over	  one	  million	  copies.	  It	  reported	  regularly	  on	  the	  
situation	  in	  China,	  particularly	  where	  British	  interests	  had	  been	  affected,	  with	  a	  partisan	  voice,	  
although	  only	  once	  did	  it	  utilise	  simian	  representations.	  A	  double	  page	  spread	  featuring	  
‘JAPAN’S	  PRO-­‐AXIS	  CABINET’	  was	  immediately	  followed	  by	  another	  with	  a	  similar	  layout,	  with	  
pictures	  of	  chimpanzees	  giving	  ‘A	  LESSON	  IN	  POLITICS’.	  The	  article	  advised	  readers	  to	  ‘let	  no	  
out	  of	  date	  ideas	  of	  honour,	  civilisation,	  or	  concerns	  for	  individuals	  stand	  in	  your	  way.	  Learn	  
from	  the	  apes.	  They	  know.’	  One	  of	  the	  chimp	  cabinet	  members	  went	  on	  to	  state:	  ‘Our	  
invincible	  simian	  army,	  urged	  on	  by	  our	  glorious	  ape	  leaders,	  will	  ensure	  that	  no	  human	  foot	  
shall	  ever	  be	  set	  within	  our	  bars!	  We	  proclaim	  the	  invincible	  right	  of	  apes	  to	  dominate	  the	  
earth.’152	  This	  strident	  comparison	  of	  the	  Japanese	  cabinet	  with	  a	  group	  of	  apes	  was	  not	  lost	  
on	  the	  respondent	  who	  sent	  in	  a	  letter	  of	  ‘Simian	  Protest’	  for	  a	  subsequent	  edition.	  ‘An	  ape	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  Daily	  Mirror:	  25/9/1937;	  p13.	  
151	  Daily	  Mirror:	  14/11/1938;	  p13.	  
152	  Picture	  Post:	  26/10/1940;	  pp26-­‐29.	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has	  instructed	  me	  to	  protest	  at	  the	  juxtaposition	  of	  two	  pages	  of	  portraits	  of	  the	  Japanese	  
Cabinet,	  and	  two	  of	  portraits	  of	  Apes	  (Oct	  26).’153	  	  
The	  work	  of	  New	  Zealander	  David	  Low,	  for	  the	  London	  Evening	  Standard,	  provided	  the	  only	  
other	  simian	  references	  prior	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  hostilities	  in	  the	  east,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  the	  only	  
British	  source	  cited	  by	  Dower	  preceding	  the	  conflict154.	  It	  took	  him	  some	  time	  to	  evolve	  the	  
simian	  characteristics;	  a	  Japanese	  soldier	  emerging	  from	  the	  jungle,	  to	  disturb	  two	  western	  
sailors	  sat	  on	  a	  bench,	  utilised	  an	  ape	  like	  posture	  and	  style	  of	  movement,	  but	  as	  yet	  deployed	  
no	  direct	  physiological	  resemblance.	  	  By	  July	  1941	  however	  he	  shows	  Japan	  as	  a	  monkey	  
armed	  with	  a	  knife,	  swinging	  from	  a	  palm	  tree,	  unable	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  attack	  the	  western	  
allies	  or	  the	  USSR.	  Some	  months	  later	  he	  drew	  simian	  Japanese	  admirals	  boarding	  their	  flag-­‐
ship,	  which	  was	  crewed	  by	  human	  ratings.155	  These	  examples	  stand	  out	  not	  only	  for	  the	  explicit	  
nature	  of	  the	  images	  they	  contained,	  but	  also	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  rarity.	  
It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  Japanese	  directly	  attacked	  western	  territory	  in	  Asia	  and	  the	  Pacific	  that	  the	  
popular	  press	  started	  to	  make	  simian	  representations	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  Low	  revisited	  the	  
theme	  soon	  after,	  with	  an	  image	  of	  three	  monkeys	  sat	  eating	  on	  a	  beach	  in	  Malaya	  whilst	  
casting	  covetous	  eyes	  on	  the	  distant	  island	  of	  Singapore,	  somewhat	  optimistically	  captioned:	  
‘The	  next	  course	  doesn’t	  come	  so	  easily’.	  	  However,	  he	  would	  only	  explicitly	  use	  the	  simian	  
reference	  again	  once,	  several	  months	  later	  in	  March	  1942,	  as	  a	  monkey	  swinging	  from	  a	  palm	  
was	  straining	  to	  carry	  the	  coconuts	  of	  conquest	  that	  it	  had	  gathered.	  Despite	  drawing	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  Picture	  Post:	  9/11/1940;	  p3.	  
154	  Dower,	  War	  Without	  Mercy,	  p87.	  Low	  had	  frequently	  lampooned	  the	  assorted	  dictators	  of	  the	  time,	  
but	  perhaps	  saved	  sharpest	  criticism	  for	  the	  vacillating	  democracies.	  











than	  fifty	  further	  cartoons	  about	  Japan	  during	  the	  war,	  only	  two	  would	  make	  similar,	  although	  
less	  clearly	  illustrated	  references.	  	  POWs	  rescued	  from	  a	  torpedoed	  Japanese	  transport	  in	  early	  
1944	  brought	  further	  news	  of	  the	  situation	  that	  they	  were	  enduring	  in	  captivity,	  and	  Low	  
depicted	  a	  clearly	  human	  Japanese	  guard,	  albeit	  one	  with	  an	  ape	  like	  posture	  and	  hairy	  arms,	  
at	  the	  gate	  of	  a	  camp.	  A	  similar	  image	  was	  used	  just	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  as	  a	  loin	  cloth	  
wearing	  man	  was	  surrounded	  by	  the	  destruction	  of	  Japan,	  entitled	  ‘Interminable	  Finale’.156	  	  	  
The	  Jane	  cartoon	  strip	  in	  the	  Mirror	  had	  her	  parents	  topically	  evacuating	  from	  Hong	  Kong	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  November	  1941.	  They	  returned	  with	  a	  Chinese	  servant	  and	  a	  pet	  monkey,	  leading	  
to	  opportunities	  for	  the	  strip	  to	  conflate	  East	  Asian	  characters	  with	  monkeys.	  	  The	  cartoon	  was	  
also	  able	  to	  respond	  swiftly	  to	  developments	  in	  the	  wider	  world,	  as	  the	  villain	  of	  the	  storyline	  
evolved	  from	  being	  a	  ‘NAZI’	  on	  the	  6th	  of	  December,	  to	  the	  clearly	  more	  orientalised	  ‘COUNT	  
ZERO’	  two	  weeks	  later.157	  	  
It	  would	  however	  take	  the	  arrival	  in	  mid-­‐January	  1942	  of	  the	  first	  news	  of	  Japanese	  atrocities	  
at	  the	  fall	  of	  Hong	  Kong,	  before	  the	  popular	  papers	  fully	  went	  to	  war	  with	  their	  racialized	  
depictions.	  	  The	  Mirror	  published	  a	  cartoon	  picturing	  a	  gorilla	  in	  a	  crate	  on	  a	  table,	  bearing	  the	  
legend	  ‘URGENT	  –	  TROUBLE:	  PRODUCE	  OF	  MALAYA’,	  facing	  an	  empty	  chair	  with	  ‘CHURCHILL’	  
written	  on	  it.	  The	  caption	  read	  ‘Waiting	  for	  Master!’.158	  	  On	  the	  same	  day	  the	  Picture	  Post	  
devoted	  its	  whole	  issue	  to	  a	  lengthy	  and	  unfavourable	  analysis	  of	  Japan	  and	  the	  Japanese,	  
including	  some	  graphic	  photographs	  of	  atrocities	  from	  previous	  campaigns	  in	  China.	  The	  
‘JAPAN:	  SPECIAL’	  also	  illustrated	  the	  ‘THE	  DOUBLE	  FACE	  OF	  A	  TWO	  FACED	  COUNTRY’	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  









157	  Daily	  Mirror:	  6/12/1941;	  p2;	  20/12/1941;	  p2.	  
158	  Daily	  Mirror:	  17/1/1942;	  p3.	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pictures	  of	  Hirohito	  in	  traditional	  and	  western	  dress,	  and	  related	  how	  the	  ‘Japanese	  are	  born	  
into	  a	  land	  of	  perpetual	  and	  incalculable	  violence	  …	  this	  natural	  background	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  
character	  of	  the	  people.’159	  	  
One	  week	  later	  the	  Mirror	  returned	  to	  the	  simian	  theme	  in	  its	  main	  cartoon,	  which	  featured	  
three	  adjacent	  cages,	  containing	  the	  British	  lion,	  the	  Australian	  kangaroo,	  and	  a	  Japanese	  ape.	  
The	  ape	  is	  breaking	  through	  the	  wall	  separating	  it	  from	  the	  kangaroo,	  who	  is	  shouting	  with	  
some	  urgency	  at	  the	  sleeping	  British	  lion	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  “Hey!	  –	  Mr	  Lion!”160	  Whilst	  the	  
rapid	  adoption	  of	  such	  pejorative	  representations	  is	  not	  surprising	  given	  the	  outbreak	  of	  
hostilities,	  their	  significance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  POWs	  lies	  in	  their	  timing.	  The	  men	  captured	  
at	  Singapore	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  Asia	  would	  not	  have	  been	  able	  to	  see	  these	  post	  hostility	  
newspapers	  and	  thus	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  them.	  
This	  does	  not	  however	  preclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  some	  influence	  from	  the	  rare	  pre-­‐war	  
representations.	  Grafton	  and	  Dixon,	  the	  soldiers	  that	  referred	  to	  caricatures	  in	  the	  press	  in	  
their	  post-­‐hoc	  memoirs,	  were	  both	  Londoners	  and	  it	  is	  not	  beyond	  the	  bounds	  of	  possibility	  
that	  they	  may	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  Low’s	  cartoons	  in	  the	  Evening	  Standard,	  either	  directly	  
by	  seeing	  the	  relevant	  editions,	  or	  indirectly,	  at	  that	  time	  or	  indeed	  later,	  by	  talking	  with	  
people	  who	  had	  seen	  them.	  The	  likelihood	  of	  them	  seeing	  the	  papers	  first	  hand	  is	  however	  
mitigated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Dixon	  enlisted	  in	  October	  1939	  and	  would	  thus	  have	  needed	  to	  be	  
on	  leave	  in	  London	  at	  the	  right	  time	  to	  have	  seen	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  Standard,	  whilst	  Grafton	  joined	  
in	  May	  1941,	  and	  thus	  would	  similarly	  have	  missed	  two	  of	  the	  three	  cartoons,	  assuming	  that	  
either	  of	  them	  read	  the	  paper.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159	  Picture	  Post:	  17/1/1942;	  p7.	  
160	  Daily	  Mirror:	  24/1/1942;	  p3.	  The	  Australian	  government	  was	  by	  now	  becoming	  increasingly	  
concerned	  at	  the	  speed	  of	  the	  Japanese	  advance;	  a	  month	  later,	  his	  resolution	  no	  doubt	  increased	  by	  
the	  Japanese	  bombing	  raid	  on	  Darwin	  on	  the	  19th	  of	  February,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  John	  Curtin	  insisted	  
that	  the	  Australian	  Corps	  returning	  from	  the	  Middle	  East	  should	  come	  straight	  home,	  and	  not,	  as	  
Churchill	  requested,	  be	  diverted	  to	  Rangoon.	  Schofield,	  Victoria.	  (2006;	  2010	  edn)	  Wavell:	  Soldier	  and	  
Statesman.	  Pen	  and	  Sword	  Military,	  Barnsley.	  p248.	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Houghton	  (from	  Gateshead)	  and	  Parry	  (Chorley,	  Lancashire)	  both	  drew	  their	  contemporaneous	  
simian	  portraits	  without	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight	  or	  access	  to	  Low’s	  cartoons,	  although	  the	  
national	  popular	  press	  would	  have	  been	  available	  to	  them	  for	  most	  of	  the	  time.	  	  Their	  more	  
directly	  derogatory	  references	  are	  suggestive	  of	  a	  wider	  level	  of	  prejudice	  operating	  amongst	  a	  
significant	  segment	  of	  the	  population	  at	  a	  societal	  level,	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  had	  Grafton	  and	  
Dixon	  been	  writing	  at	  the	  same	  time	  they	  might	  have	  used	  similar	  terminology,	  instead	  of	  
employing	  the	  more	  acceptable	  ‘caricatures’	  in	  a	  euphemistic	  sense	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  	  
	  
2.3.	  The	  press	  and	  the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	  
In	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  clearer	  insight	  into	  the	  apparently	  equivocal	  nature	  of	  the	  press	  regarding	  
the	  Japanese,	  and	  its	  role	  in	  reflecting	  or	  influencing	  attitudes	  towards	  them,	  two	  
contemporary	  themes	  of	  the	  pre-­‐war	  period	  were	  investigated.	  There	  were	  two	  significant	  and	  
overlapping	  threads	  to	  the	  press	  coverage	  of	  the	  new	  Japanese	  aggression	  in	  China	  in	  1937	  
and	  1938.	  The	  first	  was	  in	  response	  to	  the	  initial	  hostilities	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  impact	  of	  air	  
warfare	  on	  civilian	  populations.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  global	  campaign	  in	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  1937	  for	  a	  
boycott	  of	  Japanese	  goods.	  The	  subsequent	  attack	  on	  Nanking,	  and	  more	  particularly	  the	  
brutal	  aftermath	  of	  its	  occupation,	  would	  provide	  a	  second	  focus	  for	  the	  newspapers.	  	  An	  
examination	  of	  these	  episodes	  and	  how	  they	  were	  reported	  will	  help	  to	  elucidate	  the	  role,	  if	  
any,	  of	  the	  press	  in	  shaping	  attitudes	  of	  ordinary	  Britons	  to	  the	  Japanese	  in	  the	  immediate	  pre-­‐
war	  period,	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  potential	  insights	  to	  that	  mind-­‐set.	  In	  addition	  a	  brief	  
consideration	  will	  be	  given	  to	  contemporary	  newsreels	  and	  popular	  literature	  in	  the	  1930s.	  
2.3.1.	  The	  boycott	  of	  Japanese	  goods,	  1937-­‐1938.	  
The	  onset	  of	  the	  Second	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  in	  July	  of	  1937,	  and	  the	  associated	  indiscriminate	  
aerial	  bombing	  of	  civilians,	  particularly	  in	  the	  ten	  week	  long	  Battle	  of	  Shanghai	  that	  raged	  from	  
mid-­‐August	  to	  the	  end	  of	  November,	  has	  been	  identified	  by	  numerous	  authors	  as	  contributing	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to	  and	  reinforcing	  anti-­‐Japanese	  feeling	  amongst	  the	  British	  public	  at	  that	  time.161	  	  The	  first	  
mention	  of	  a	  boycott	  was	  recorded	  in	  the	  Manchester	  Guardian	  at	  the	  start	  of	  September,	  and	  
referred	  to	  an	  unofficial	  mass	  movement	  by	  the	  Chinese	  community	  in	  Malaya,	  that	  was	  
estimated	  to	  be	  costing	  Japanese	  business	  around	  £50,000	  per	  week.162	  	  
Apart	  from	  this	  one	  report,	  for	  most	  of	  September	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  boycott	  disappeared	  from	  
the	  pages	  of	  the	  press.	  It	  had	  however	  gained	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  traction	  amongst	  the	  general	  
public,	  and	  this	  groundswell	  of	  opinion	  was	  noted	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  month.	  	  The	  Daily	  Mirror	  
dedicated	  a	  whole	  page	  to	  its	  ‘Live	  Letter	  Box’	  column,	  in	  response	  to	  a	  large	  postbag	  
regarding	  the	  situation	  in	  China.	  The	  paper	  noted	  that	  ‘the	  civilised	  world	  stands	  by	  and	  calmly	  
stomachs	  the	  slaughter	  of	  the	  innocents	  in	  China	  …	  “Live	  Letter	  Box”	  is	  packed	  to-­‐day	  with	  the	  
infuriated	  protests	  of	  our	  readers…’.	  From	  the	  hundreds	  of	  letters	  received,	  the	  Mirror	  
selected	  three	  which	  allowed	  it	  to	  present	  its	  own	  position	  through	  its	  responses,	  which	  were	  
effectively	  that	  ‘a	  boycott	  would	  hurt	  the	  ordinary	  Japanese,	  not	  the	  warlords’;	  ‘that	  China	  can	  
take	  it’;	  and	  that	  Britain	  needed	  to	  be	  prepared	  in	  the	  eventuality	  that	  it	  was	  itself	  the	  target	  of	  
aerial	  bombing.163	  Some	  ten	  days	  later	  the	  Mirror	  returned	  to	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  potential	  
damage	  to	  the	  ‘ordinary	  Japanese’,	  in	  an	  editorial	  that	  attacked	  a	  resolution	  to	  the	  Labour	  
Party	  conference	  presented	  by	  Hugh	  Dalton,	  calling	  for	  a	  boycott	  of	  Japanese	  goods.	  164	  This	  
sympathetic	  and	  differentiated	  	  tone	  was	  somewhat	  at	  odds	  with	  that	  of	  the	  letter	  writers,	  
who	  expressed	  less	  polite	  references	  to	  ‘those	  yellow	  swine	  –	  the	  Japs’,	  and	  to	  a	  ‘short,	  thick	  
lipped,	  slit	  eyed	  Japanese	  Prince’.	  	  The	  third	  letter	  was	  a	  little	  more	  conciliatory,	  albeit	  bearing	  
a	  more	  subtly	  presented	  simian	  reference,	  enquiring	  ‘how	  can	  we	  expect	  the	  Orientals	  to	  be	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  See:	  Daniels,	  Gordon.	  “Elites,	  Government	  and	  Citizens:	  Some	  British	  Perceptions	  of	  Japan,	  1850-­‐
2000.”	  p12;	  Daniels,G.,	  and	  Charrier,	  Philip.’	  “Nation	  Shall	  Speak	  Peace	  Unto	  Nation.”	  The	  BBC	  and	  
Japan,	  1929-­‐1939.’	  p259;	  and	  Pardoe,	  J.,	  “British	  Writing”,	  p285;	  all	  in	  Daniels,	  and	  Tsuzuki,	  The	  History	  
of	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  Relations.	  
162	  Manchester	  Guardian:	  1/9/1937;	  p4.	  This	  figure	  was	  an	  estimate	  provided	  by	  Reuters	  in	  Singapore.	  	  
163	  Daily	  Mirror:	  25/9/1937;	  p13.	  
164	  Daily	  Mirror:	  5/10/1937;	  p13.	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calmed	  by	  the	  preachings	  of	  the	  West,	  whose	  warlike	  methods	  they	  have	  so	  successfully	  
aped.’165	  
The	  high-­‐water	  mark	  of	  the	  boycott	  movement	  in	  the	  UK	  was	  reached	  in	  mid-­‐October	  1937,	  
with	  a	  series	  of	  rallies	  in	  major	  cities.	  Ten	  thousand	  people	  attended	  a	  rally	  in	  London	  
according	  to	  the	  Guardian	  (although	  The	  Times	  correspondent	  only	  saw	  several	  thousand),	  
whilst	  there	  were	  reputed	  to	  be	  three	  thousand	  at	  a	  meeting	  in	  Manchester,	  and	  two	  
thousand	  in	  Liverpool.166	  Those	  commercial	  interests	  which	  had	  little	  to	  gain	  from	  restraints	  on	  
Japanese	  trade	  had	  already	  started	  to	  lobby,	  and	  after	  the	  TUC	  announced	  its	  unanimous	  
support	  for	  a	  National	  Council	  for	  Labour	  resolution	  calling	  for	  a	  boycott	  on	  the	  same	  day	  as	  
the	  rallies,	  it	  was	  largely	  downhill	  for	  the	  movement,	  both	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  in	  the	  press.	  A	  
range	  of	  institutional	  reasoning	  was	  deployed	  to	  deflect	  support;	  the	  Mirror	  cited	  the	  effects	  
on	  ordinary	  Japanese;	  the	  Government	  (and	  the	  opposition)	  suggested	  that	  any	  action	  taken	  
would	  need	  to	  be	  in	  co-­‐operation	  with	  the	  USA167;	  the	  Co-­‐operative	  Wholesale	  Society	  claimed	  
it	  could	  not	  act	  based	  purely	  on	  the	  wishes	  of	  a	  vocal	  minority	  of	  members168;	  and	  by	  August	  of	  
1938	  the	  TUC	  had	  declared	  that	  whilst	  it	  supported	  a	  boycott	  in	  principle,	  the	  net	  effect	  would	  
be	  to	  benefit	  Nazi	  Germany	  as	  the	  principal	  alternative	  supplier.169	  
There	  had	  been	  an	  attempt	  to	  gauge	  British	  public	  opinion	  towards	  different	  nationalities,	  
religious	  and	  racial	  groups	  in	  this	  period,	  by	  the	  Mass	  Observation	  organisation.	  It	  had	  asked	  its	  
respondents	  to	  rank	  in	  ‘order	  of	  preference	  …	  which	  of	  the	  following	  races	  you	  would	  prefer	  
the	  British	  nation	  to	  collaborate	  and	  associate	  with.’	  The	  ten	  categories	  were	  (in	  the	  
respondents’	  order	  of	  preference);	  USA,	  Scandinavia,	  France,	  Russia,	  Ireland,	  Jewish,	  Polish,	  
Italian,	  Asiatic	  and	  Negro.	  Whilst	  indicative	  of	  a	  generalised	  racial	  hierarchy	  (and	  giving	  a	  clear	  
perspective	  on	  where	  most	  of	  the	  Empire’s	  subjects	  lay	  within	  it)	  the	  survey	  offers	  little	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  Daily	  Mirror:	  25/9/1937;	  p13.	  
166	  Manchester	  Guardian:	  18/10/1937;	  pp11-­‐12;	  The	  Times:	  18/10/1937;	  p16.	  
167	  Manchester	  Guardian:	  20/12/1937;	  p8.	  
168	  Daily	  Express:	  7/6/1938;	  p2.	  
169	  Daily	  Express:	  22/8/1938;	  p9.	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than	  anecdotal	  evidence	  in	  relation	  to	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  relations,	  hidden	  as	  they	  are	  within	  the	  
‘Asiatic’	  category,	  one	  that	  encompassed	  over	  half	  of	  the	  world’s	  population	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  
of	  ethnicities.170	  
The	  lack	  of	  enthusiasm	  from	  institutional	  and	  establishment	  Britain	  for	  the	  boycott	  on	  
Japanese	  goods	  is	  shown	  in	  sharp	  relief	  when	  contrasted	  with	  the	  efforts	  elsewhere.	  Figures	  
comparing	  the	  first	  six	  months	  of	  1938	  with	  those	  for	  the	  same	  period	  in	  1937	  show	  the	  effect	  
of	  the	  campaign	  globally:171	  
Table	  1.	  Effects	  of	  the	  boycott	  on	  Japanese	  goods,	  1937-­‐1938.	  
	   %	  decrease	  in	  value	  of	  imports	  from	  Japan	  	  
(Jan-­‐June	  1937	  :	  Jan-­‐June	  1938)	  
Straits	  Settlements	   -­‐75%	  
British	  Malaya	   -­‐66%	  
Netherlands	  East	  Indies	   -­‐62%	  
United	  States	   -­‐48%	  
Philippines	   -­‐34%	  
Canada	   -­‐28%	  
India	   -­‐27%	  
South	  Africa	   -­‐24%	  
United	  Kingdom	   -­‐9%	  
	  
Whilst	  it	  is	  unfair	  to	  compare	  the	  British	  performance	  with	  that	  of	  the	  Chinese	  community	  of	  
the	  Malayan	  Peninsula,	  who	  were	  unsurprisingly	  strident	  in	  their	  support	  for	  their	  homeland,	  
the	  boycott	  in	  Britain	  looks	  particularly	  ineffective	  when	  seen	  alongside	  the	  fall	  in	  trade	  with	  
Japan	  exhibited	  by	  a	  range	  of	  other	  nations	  and	  colonies	  bordering	  the	  Pacific	  and	  Indian	  
Oceans.	  Even	  allowing	  for	  differences	  in	  the	  portfolios	  of	  imports,	  including	  those	  resulting	  
from	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  distance,	  the	  boycott	  was	  singularly	  unsuccessful	  in	  real	  terms	  in	  
the	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  Mass	  Observation:	  Directive	  on	  Race;	  June1	  39.	  	  Rank	  ordering	  based	  on	  a	  sample	  of	  5%	  of	  447	  
responses.	  
171	  Manchester	  Guardian:	  23/11/1938;	  p6.	  Figures	  compiled	  by	  the	  Geneva	  Office	  of	  the	  International	  
Peace	  Campaign	  using	  the	  Monthly	  Summary	  of	  Foreign	  Trade	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Finance	  in	  Tokyo.	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The	  boycott	  movement	  in	  the	  UK	  arose	  quickly	  and	  independently	  of	  the	  press,	  popular	  or	  
broadsheet,	  from	  across	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  society.	  However,	  once	  the	  newspapers	  caught	  up	  
with	  it,	  its	  days	  were	  numbered	  as	  most	  of	  them,	  and	  the	  establishment	  they	  were	  a	  part	  of,	  
found	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons	  not	  to	  support	  it.	  By	  December	  1937,	  the	  campaign	  had	  sunk	  almost	  
as	  quickly	  as	  it	  had	  risen,	  with	  a	  timing	  that	  was	  particularly	  and	  cruelly	  ironic,	  given	  the	  events	  
that	  were	  then	  unfolding	  in	  Nanking.	  
2.3.2.	  Press	  coverage	  of	  the	  Nanking	  Atrocity.172	  
The	  capture	  of	  Nanking,	  then	  the	  capital	  city	  of	  China,	  on	  the	  13th	  December	  1937,	  was	  
followed	  by	  six	  weeks	  of	  murder,	  rape	  and	  looting	  on	  a	  scale	  that	  defied	  the	  comprehension	  of	  
most	  western	  commentators.	  The	  International	  Military	  Tribunal	  at	  Tokyo	  estimated	  that	  
between	  100,000-­‐200,000	  Chinese	  were	  killed,	  including	  captured	  soldiers	  in	  a	  systematic	  
slaughter	  of	  POWs,	  and	  civilians	  in	  the	  less	  structured	  anarchy	  that	  reigned	  in	  the	  city	  and	  its	  
suburbs	  during	  the	  period.	  It	  was	  also	  stated	  that	  20,000	  women	  were	  raped.173	  Harold	  
Timperley,	  an	  Australian	  journalist	  working	  for	  the	  Manchester	  Guardian	  who	  was	  in	  the	  city	  at	  
the	  time,	  estimated	  that	  the	  death	  toll	  ‘within	  and	  near	  the	  walls	  of	  Nanking’	  was	  around	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172	  There	  has	  been	  much	  historiographical	  debate	  on	  this	  subject	  over	  the	  past	  45	  years.	  This	  has	  
extended	  to	  its	  title.	  In	  common	  western	  discourse	  in	  is	  usually	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Rape	  of	  Nanking”;	  
many	  historians	  refer	  to	  it	  as	  “The	  Nanking	  Massacre”	  (see:	  Fogel,	  Joshua	  A.	  (ed)	  (2000)	  The	  Nanking	  
Massacre	  in	  History	  and	  Historiography.	  Univ	  of	  California	  Press,	  London.).	  The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “The	  
Nanking	  Incident”	  by	  right–wing	  writers	  in	  Japan	  has	  been	  criticised	  by	  many	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  
these	  events,	  although	  one	  author	  has	  cautioned	  that	  whilst	  the	  Japanese	  word	  jiken	  translates	  as	  
incident,	  its	  meaning	  is	  ‘more	  commonly	  used	  to	  denote	  serious	  crimes,	  including	  mass	  murder	  (see;	  
Penney,	  Matthew.	  (2008)	  “Far	  from	  Oblivion:	  The	  Nanking	  Massacre	  in	  Japanese	  Historical	  Writing	  for	  
Children	  and	  Young	  Adults.”	  Holocaust	  and	  Genocide	  Studies,	  Vol	  22,	  p47.).	  The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
“Atrocity”	  has	  been	  suggested	  as	  being	  appropriate	  as	  it	  encompasses	  both	  the	  rapes	  and	  the	  massacres	  
that	  took	  place,	  and	  I	  have	  followed	  this	  terminology.	  See;	  Wakabatashi,	  Bob	  Tadashi.	  (ed)	  (2007:	  2008	  
edn)	  The	  Nanking	  Atrocity,	  1937-­‐38:	  Complicating	  the	  Picture.	  	  Berghahn	  Books,	  London.	  p	  ix.	  
173	  IMTFE;	  Judgment,	  Chapter	  X:	  Verdicts,	  p.	  1180;	  cited	  in	  Sedgewick,	  James	  Burnham.	  (2009)	  “Memory	  
on	  Trial:	  Constructing	  and	  Contesting	  the	  ‘Rape	  of	  Nanking’	  at	  the	  International	  Military	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  
Far	  East,	  1946–1948.”Modern	  Asian	  Studies,	  Vol	  43,	  p1239.	  This	  top	  end	  of	  this	  figure	  has	  been	  used	  by	  
authors	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period,	  both	  in	  Britain	  (see;	  Lord	  Russel	  of	  Liverpool.	  (1958)	  The	  Knights	  of	  
Bushido:	  A	  Short	  History	  of	  Japanese	  War	  Crimes.	  Cassell,	  London.	  pp41-­‐42.)	  	  and	  Japan	  (see;	  Inoue,	  
Kiyoshi.	  (1966)	  Nihon	  no	  rekishi.	  (History	  of	  Japan)	  Vol.	  2.	  Iwanami	  Shoten,	  Tokyo.	  p192).	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40,000,	  based	  on	  evidence	  from	  the	  Red	  Swastika	  Society174.	  The	  death-­‐toll	  would	  have	  been	  
considerably	  higher	  had	  not	  many	  thousands	  of	  civilians	  found	  refuge	  in	  the	  Nanking	  Safety	  
Zone	  set	  up	  by	  the	  international	  community,	  to	  which	  the	  westerners	  were	  themselves	  largely	  
confined.	  	  
As	  the	  Japanese	  soldiers	  continued	  their	  campaign	  of	  rape	  and	  pillage	  into	  January	  of	  1938,	  
attempts	  by	  a	  few	  senior	  officers	  and	  officials	  to	  regain	  control	  of	  the	  rampaging	  army	  were	  
largely	  unsuccessful.	  It	  would	  be	  February	  before	  some	  semblance	  of	  order	  was	  restored,	  
following	  the	  arrival	  of	  an	  emissary	  from	  the	  Emperor,	  and	  the	  unprecedented	  recall	  of	  three	  
of	  the	  most	  senior	  commanders	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  
It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  their	  return	  to	  Japan	  was	  prompted	  less	  by	  the	  carnage	  that	  
occurred	  under	  their	  command	  and	  more	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  unfavourable	  reports	  of	  these	  
activities	  were	  appearing	  in	  the	  world’s	  press.	  The	  reality	  of	  this	  proposition,	  certainly	  as	  far	  as	  
the	  British	  newspapers	  were	  concerned,	  was	  considerably	  more	  nuanced.	  For	  the	  entire	  period	  
most	  of	  the	  British	  press	  was	  reporting	  on	  Nanking	  from	  a	  parochial	  viewpoint,	  the	  outrages	  
that	  they	  were	  headlining	  being	  those	  that	  were	  carried	  out	  on	  western	  interests.	  In	  the	  
immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  city’s	  fall	  it	  was	  the	  attacks	  on	  the	  Royal	  Navy	  vessels	  HMS	  
Ladybird	  and	  HMS	  Bee,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  on	  the	  USS	  Panay,	  	  that	  were	  the	  focus	  of	  attention,	  and	  
this	  was	  reflected	  at	  the	  governmental	  level	  as	  official	  notes	  of	  protest	  were	  exchanged	  with	  
the	  Japanese	  Government.	  By	  January	  the	  story	  had	  moved	  onshore,	  as	  Japanese	  soldiers,	  
having	  already	  pillaged	  most	  of	  Nanking,	  sought	  fresh	  rapine	  in	  the	  relatively	  undisturbed	  
landscape	  of	  the	  Safety	  Zone,	  and	  western	  property.	  
In	  mid-­‐January	  John	  Allison,	  the	  US	  Consul,	  had	  complained	  of	  Japanese	  soldiers	  removing	  
goods	  from	  American	  owned	  buildings;	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  month	  it	  was	  the	  Chinese	  women	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  Timperley,	  Harold.	  (1938)	  What	  War	  Means:	  The	  Japanese	  Terror	  in	  China;	  A	  Documentary	  Record.	  
Gollancz,	  London.	  p59.	  This	  figure	  didn’t	  include	  numbers	  from	  the	  more	  distant	  suburbs.	  The	  Red	  
Swastika	  Society	  was	  a	  Chinese	  charitable	  aid	  organisation	  that	  buried	  most	  of	  the	  dead	  in	  Nanking.	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who	  were	  sheltering	  within	  their	  walls	  who	  had	  become	  the	  target.	  	  The	  Times	  reported	  that	  
Allison	  was	  slapped	  by	  a	  guard	  when	  investigating	  ‘the	  removal	  by	  Japanese	  soldiers	  from	  the	  
American	  owned	  Nanking	  University	  of	  a	  Chinese	  woman	  whom	  they	  were	  alleged	  to	  have	  
raped.’175	  After	  more	  than	  six	  weeks	  of	  industrial	  scale	  depravity	  The	  Times	  had	  made	  its	  first	  
report	  on	  the	  suffering	  of	  the	  local	  population:	  one	  alleged	  rape.	  On	  the	  same	  day,	  the	  Daily	  
Mirror	  ran	  a	  piece	  headlined	  ‘ARMED	  JAPANESE	  RAID	  BRITON’S	  HOME’,	  which	  described	  how	  
the	  raiders	  came	  to	  rob	  not	  the	  British	  owner,	  but	  his	  Chinese	  servants.	  The	  article	  went	  on	  to	  
report	  the	  slapping	  incident,	  whilst	  also	  giving	  space	  for	  the	  Japanese	  ‘version	  of	  the	  affair’.	  176	  
The	  Mirror	  had	  previously	  noted	  Allison’s	  concerns	  over	  abducted	  women	  several	  days	  before,	  
the	  first	  reference	  to	  hint	  at	  a	  wider	  scale	  of	  outrage,	  in	  a	  report	  on	  MPs	  in	  the	  Japanese	  
Parliament	  attempting	  to	  control	  the	  Army,	  headlined	  ‘WAR-­‐WEARY	  MPS	  OF	  JAPAN	  TRY	  TO	  
HOLD	  UP	  ARMY	  VOTE’.177	  	  
The	  narrative	  that	  the	  Army	  was	  operating	  outside	  the	  remit	  of	  more	  reasonable	  home	  
elements,	  in	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  Imperial	  Palace,	  was	  also	  endorsed	  by	  both	  The	  Times	  
and	  the	  Guardian.	  	  The	  Times	  noted	  the	  dressing	  down	  given	  by	  General	  Matsui	  to	  his	  officers	  
over	  the	  indiscipline,	  and	  stated	  that	  ‘the	  frankness	  of	  their	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	  in	  
admonishing	  them	  will	  be	  widely	  recognised.’178	  On	  the	  General’s	  recall	  to	  Japan,	  the	  Guardian	  
reported	  in	  an	  editorial	  that	  this	  ‘shows	  the	  Government	  is	  determined	  to	  control	  the	  military	  
extremists	  and	  that	  it	  has	  the	  power	  to	  exercise	  its	  authority.’179	  That	  the	  reporting	  in	  this	  
period	  was	  so	  parochial	  was	  not	  surprising,	  given	  the	  inherent	  editorial	  bias	  and	  the	  
readership’s	  assumed	  primary	  interest	  in	  Britons	  abroad.	  Furthermore,	  quite	  apart	  from	  their	  
problems	  in	  the	  comprehension	  of	  such	  large	  scale	  carnage,	  those	  reporting	  back	  from	  the	  
scene	  faced	  major	  logistical	  difficulties	  in	  both	  identifying	  what	  was	  going	  on	  outside	  their	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  The	  Times:	  29/1/1938;	  p	  12.	  
176	  Daily	  Mirror:	  28/1/1938;	  p3.	  
177	  Daily	  Mirror:	  24/1/1938;	  p3.	  
178	  The	  Times:	  8/2/1938;	  p13.	  	  
179	  Manchester	  Guardian:	  25/2/1938;	  p10.	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restricted	  horizons	  and	  then	  relaying	  that	  information	  back	  home,	  filtered	  through	  the	  
Japanese	  censors.	  
Censorship	  was	  however	  a	  selective	  tool,	  only	  applied	  where	  reports	  were	  considered	  too	  
unfavourable,	  and	  only	  one	  newspaper	  appeared	  to	  suffer.	  The	  Guardian	  had	  hinted	  on	  Boxing	  
Day	  that	  reports	  ‘were	  slowly	  leaking	  through	  from	  Nanking	  that	  Japanese	  soldiers	  took	  a	  
terrible	  revenge	  for	  the	  outrages	  of	  1927.’180	  Some	  weeks	  after	  in	  late	  January	  1938	  the	  paper	  
ran	  several	  stories	  complaining	  that	  cables	  from	  their	  correspondent,	  Harold	  Timperley,	  had	  
been	  suppressed.	  He	  had	  attempted	  to	  send	  details	  of	  a	  report	  from	  the	  China	  Daily	  News	  
Christmas	  Day	  edition,	  which	  had	  detailed	  ‘the	  scenes	  of	  horror	  perpetrated	  in	  Nanking	  after	  
the	  occupation	  of	  the	  Japanese	  forces’,	  and	  estimated	  that	  more	  than	  10,000	  people	  had	  been	  
killed	  thus	  far,	  including	  civilians.181	  A	  week	  later	  it	  reported	  that	  officers	  had	  taken	  part	  in	  the	  
looting	  and	  that	  ‘in	  many	  cases	  young	  girls	  were	  raped	  in	  broad	  daylight	  while	  others	  looked	  
on	  in	  terror.	  Earlier	  reports	  that	  Japanese	  soldiers	  poured	  gasoline	  over	  civilians	  and	  set	  them	  
on	  fire	  have	  also	  been	  substantiated.’182	  Over	  the	  next	  few	  days	  further	  details	  of	  mass	  rapes	  
and	  young	  children	  being	  bayoneted,	  ‘all	  attested	  by	  foreigners	  whose	  evidence	  is	  
indisputable’	  were	  published,	  but	  only	  in	  the	  Guardian.183	  	  
In	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  press	  the	  story	  of	  the	  brutality	  was	  largely	  ignored,	  and	  this	  self-­‐censorship	  
was	  tacitly	  acknowledged	  when	  The	  Times	  referred	  to	  ‘Nanking	  during	  the	  days	  when	  incidents	  
occurred	  which	  are	  still	  unknown	  to	  the	  public	  here’,	  in	  an	  article	  about	  the	  recall	  of	  the	  army	  
commanders	  to	  Japan.184	  As	  already	  noted,	  Harold	  Timperley’s	  account	  of	  the	  episode	  
published	  in	  July	  1938,	  included	  estimates	  that	  40,000	  were	  killed,	  of	  whom	  30%	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180	  Manchester	  Guardian:	  26/12/1937;	  p12.	  In	  March	  and	  April	  of	  1927	  the	  consulates	  of	  foreign	  
governments	  in	  Nanking,	  including	  Britain,	  America	  and	  Japan	  were	  attacked	  and	  looted	  by	  Chinese	  
Nationalist	  troops,	  during	  which	  a	  number	  of	  foreign	  civilians	  were	  killed.	  
181	  Manchester	  Guardian:	  29/1/1938;	  p11.	  
182	  Manchester	  Guardian:	  5/2/1938;	  p15.	  
183	  Manchester	  Guardian:	  7/2/1938;	  p10.	  The	  greater	  reliability	  placed	  on	  (western)	  ‘foreigners’	  as	  a	  
source	  of	  information,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  local	  Asian	  populations,	  is	  a	  theme	  that	  will	  recur	  in	  a	  
subsequent	  chapter	  examining	  the	  cholera	  outbreak	  on	  the	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway	  during	  1943.	  
184	  The	  Times:	  24/2/1938;	  p12.	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civilians.185	  Apart	  from	  the	  Guardian,	  this	  book	  (although	  not	  the	  shocking	  figures)	  was	  only	  
reviewed	  in	  The	  Times,	  and	  generated	  minimal	  column	  inches	  anywhere	  else.186	  It	  would	  take	  
some	  time	  before	  the	  popular	  press	  would	  start	  sharing	  the	  details	  of	  Nanking	  with	  their	  
readership.	  The	  Mirror	  mentioned	  the	  notorious	  case	  of	  Subaltern	  Noya,	  and	  his	  contest	  with	  a	  
fellow	  officer	  as	  to	  who	  could	  kill	  the	  most	  people	  with	  a	  sword,	  in	  early	  1940,187	  and	  in	  an	  
editorial	  the	  following	  year	  concerning	  China,	  Timperley’s	  figure	  of	  40,000	  dead	  was	  quoted,	  
alongside	  the	  rape	  of	  85%	  of	  women	  aged	  between	  14	  and	  62.188	  	  
However	  it	  would	  not	  be	  until	  March	  1942,	  and	  the	  statement	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  by	  
Anthony	  Eden	  regarding	  the	  atrocities	  at	  the	  fall	  of	  Hong	  Kong,	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  Nanking	  was	  
laid	  bare	  before	  the	  British	  public.	  Speaking	  in	  Parliament,	  Eden	  referred	  to	  the	  accounts	  given	  
by	  the	  few	  that	  had	  escaped	  from	  Hong	  Kong:	  ‘Their	  testimony	  establishes	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
Japanese	  Army	  perpetrated	  against	  their	  helpless	  military	  prisoners	  and	  the	  civil	  population,	  
without	  distinction	  of	  race	  or	  colour,	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  barbarities	  which	  aroused	  the	  horror	  of	  
the	  civilised	  world	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Nanking	  massacre	  of	  1937.’189	  	  
His	  speech	  removed	  the	  official	  wall	  of	  silence	  that	  had	  surrounded	  the	  affair	  and	  had	  the	  
effect	  of	  galvanising	  the	  popular	  press	  into	  informing	  their	  readership	  of	  the	  events	  at	  
Nanking,	  albeit	  in	  a	  fashion	  still	  riddled	  with	  inconsistency	  and	  inaccuracy.	  The	  Express	  
reported	  that	  ‘a	  week	  of	  massacre	  followed’	  the	  capture	  of	  the	  city,	  in	  which	  ’20,000	  men	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185	  Timperley,	  What	  War	  Means,	  p59.	  
186	  The	  Times:	  19/7/1938;	  p19.	  The	  reviewer	  appeared	  to	  justify	  the	  lack	  of	  figures	  when	  noting	  that:	  
‘The	  danger	  of	  such	  a	  book	  …	  is	  that	  we	  should	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  fundamental	  issue	  [Japan’s	  waging	  war	  
in	  China]	  in	  a	  natural	  horror	  of	  the	  details.’	   	  
187	  Daily	  Mirror:	  26/2/1940;	  p15.	  This	  episode	  was	  first	  recorded	  in	  two	  stories	  in	  the	  Japan	  Advertiser	  
on	  the	  7th	  and	  14th	  of	  December	  1937.	  Timperley	  reproduced	  these	  articles	  in	  Appendix	  F	  of	  What	  War	  
Means	  (pp284-­‐285).	  The	  two	  men	  concerned	  were	  executed	  following	  hearings	  at	  the	  Nanking	  Military	  
Tribunal.	  In	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  one	  author	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  story	  was	  a	  ‘fictive’	  account,	  created	  
by	  a	  journalist	  for	  patriotic	  reasons.	  Wakabayashi,	  Bob	  Tadashi.	  (2000)	  “The	  Nanking	  100-­‐Man	  Killing	  
Contest	  Debate:	  War	  Guilt	  amid	  Fabricated	  Illusions,	  1971-­‐75.”	  Journal	  of	  Japanese	  Studies,	  Vol.	  26,	  
p366.	  
188	  Daily	  Mirror:	  9/7/1941;	  p2.	  
189	  Daily	  Mirror:	  11/3/1942;	  p3.	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women	  and	  children	  were	  killed.’190	  The	  Mirror	  also	  foreshortened	  the	  episode,	  as	  being	  
immediately	  after	  the	  fall.	  It	  cited	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  who	  claimed	  that	  ‘200,000	  civilians	  were	  
murdered	  in	  a	  week’.191	  Whilst	  the	  latter	  figure	  would	  prove	  in	  time	  to	  be	  more	  realistic	  as	  far	  
as	  the	  International	  Military	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Far	  East	  (IMTFE)	  was	  concerned,	  the	  deaths	  were	  
spread	  over	  a	  longer	  period,	  and	  thus	  both	  Chiang	  and	  the	  Mirror	  were	  using	  it	  for	  propaganda	  
purposes.	  	  The	  detail	  in	  the	  Express	  story	  and	  the	  previous	  publication	  in	  the	  Mirror,	  indicate	  
that	  both	  papers	  were	  aware	  of	  Timperley’s	  account.	  Whilst	  the	  Mirror’s	  inflated	  figure	  can	  be	  
explained	  for	  the	  reasons	  given	  above,	  it	  is	  less	  easy	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  Express	  chose	  to	  
present	  a	  reduced	  timescale	  for	  the	  atrocity	  and	  halve	  Timperley’s	  overall	  estimate	  of	  1938,	  
although	  this	  inaccuracy	  was	  consistent	  with	  the	  reluctance	  of	  the	  popular	  press	  to	  engage	  
with	  the	  story	  as	  it	  emerged	  after	  the	  fact.	  Iris	  Chang	  has	  written	  that	  ‘The	  Rape	  of	  Nanking	  
was	  front	  page	  news	  across	  the	  world,	  and	  yet	  most	  of	  the	  world	  stood	  by	  and	  did	  nothing	  
while	  an	  entire	  city	  was	  butchered.’192	  In	  Britain,	  with	  the	  honourable	  exception	  of	  the	  
Manchester	  Guardian,	  it	  was	  the	  newspapers	  themselves	  that	  kept	  the	  full	  story	  off	  the	  front,	  
or	  any	  other,	  pages.	  	  
The	  newspapers	  generally	  regarded	  the	  Army	  as	  being	  unrepresentative	  of	  the	  Japanese	  
people	  as	  a	  whole,	  both	  at	  the	  institutional	  and	  the	  individual	  levels,	  and	  hoped	  that	  more	  
reasonable	  elements	  might	  prevail.	  The	  first	  papers	  to	  break	  ranks	  with	  this	  differentiated	  
perspective	  were	  the	  Guardian	  and	  the	  Yorkshire	  Post	  at	  the	  end	  of	  December	  1941,	  a	  few	  
days	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Hong	  Kong,	  the	  accompanying	  atrocities	  attached	  to	  which	  were	  still	  
unknown,	  but	  stimulated	  more	  by	  the	  bombing	  of	  Manila.	  A	  Guardian	  editorial	  cited	  a	  speech	  
by	  the	  former	  isolationist	  Senator	  Wheeler	  who	  stated	  that	  ‘The	  Japanese	  are	  an	  inhuman	  and	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  Daily	  Express:	  11/3/1942;	  p3.	  
191	  Daily	  Mirror:	  11/3/1942;	  p3.	  
192	  Chang,	  Iris.	  (1997)	  The	  Rape	  of	  Nanking:	  The	  Forgotten	  Holocaust	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  Penguin	  Books,	  
London.	  p221.	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half	  civilised	  race,	  and	  in	  future	  will	  have	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  such.’193	  The	  Yorkshire	  Post	  editorial	  
on	  the	  same	  day	  repeated	  and	  amplified	  the	  theme	  of	  a	  singular	  Japanese	  character:	  
The	  Japanese	  aim	  is	  evidently	  to	  destroy	  whatever	  bears	  the	  name	  of	  an	  enemy.	  It	  is	  
an	  aim	  which	  fits	  in	  well	  with	  the	  Japanese	  philosophy,	  a	  philosophy	  which	  ascribes	  a	  
kind	  of	  divinity,	  diffused	  through	  each	  and	  all	  of	  its	  members,	  to	  the	  Japanese	  race.	  
Intoxicated	  by	  such	  a	  doctrine	  a	  Japanese	  airman	  may	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  every	  right	  
to	  contribute	  to	  victory	  by	  the	  extermination	  of	  anything	  living	  on	  the	  enemy’s	  side	  
without	  asking	  if	  his	  victims	  are	  of	  any	  military	  significance.194	  
	  
Indiscriminate	  brutality	  had	  now	  become	  a	  defining	  characteristic	  ascribable	  to	  every	  member	  
of	  ‘the	  Japanese	  race’,	  and	  would	  remain	  so	  in	  the	  press	  for	  the	  duration.	  	  
There	  was	  also	  the	  issue	  of	  self-­‐censorship,	  which	  had	  been	  so	  clearly	  evinced	  during	  the	  
abdication	  crisis,	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  Governmental	  influence	  on	  how	  and	  what	  was	  
reported.	  Official	  censorship	  was	  certainly	  applied	  before	  the	  war	  to	  the	  colonial	  press	  in	  Hong	  
Kong,	  where	  Chinese	  language	  papers	  were	  proscribed	  from	  using	  epithets	  for	  the	  Japanese	  
such	  as	  ‘dwarf	  pirates’	  and	  ‘shrimp	  barbarians’.195	  This	  was	  one	  small	  part	  of	  what	  Colin	  Smith	  
described	  as	  ‘the	  most	  blatant	  appeasement’	  of	  Japan,	  which	  continued	  from	  Chamberlain’s	  
and	  into	  Churchill’s	  premierships,	  and	  included	  an	  embargo	  on	  military	  shipments	  to	  the	  
Chinese	  through	  Hong	  Kong	  from	  1939,	  the	  closure	  in	  1940	  of	  the	  Burma	  Road	  and	  the	  
withdrawal	  of	  most	  of	  the	  troops	  stationed	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  North	  China.	  196	  	  Given	  the	  solitary	  
and	  desperate	  nature	  of	  Britain’s	  position	  by	  mid-­‐1940	  Smith’s	  analysis	  seems	  a	  little	  harsh,	  
although	  such	  actions	  only	  served	  to	  increase	  perceptions	  of	  its	  imperial	  weakness	  and	  
encouraged	  those	  Japanese	  pushing	  for	  further	  expansion.	  	  	  
Whilst	  the	  Government	  was	  no	  doubt	  keen	  to	  mitigate	  the	  potentially	  harmful	  effects	  of	  
unfavourable	  press	  reports	  on	  its	  diplomacy	  with	  Japan	  in	  the	  pre-­‐war	  period,	  there	  is	  little	  
evidence	  to	  support	  any	  such	  overt	  influences.	  The	  Mirror	  and	  the	  Picture	  Post	  would	  both	  find	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193	  Manchester	  Guardian:	  29/12/1941;	  p6	  
194	  Yorkshire	  Post:	  29/12/1941;	  p2.	  
195	  Snow,	  Philip.	  (2003)	  The	  Fall	  of	  Hong	  Kong.	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  London.	  p31.	  
196	  Smith,	  Singapore	  Burning,	  p27.	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themselves	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  wartime	  Government	  over	  certain	  issues,	  so	  it	  seems	  
improbable	  that	  they	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  be	  cowed	  in	  peacetime.	  Even	  the	  Government’s	  
attempts	  to	  keep	  the	  lid	  on	  the	  publication	  of	  reports	  from	  the	  fall	  of	  Hong	  Kong,	  whilst	  
negotiations	  were	  on-­‐going	  about	  the	  exchange	  of	  diplomats,	  were	  only	  partially	  successful	  
and	  were	  eventually	  swept	  away,	  albeit	  primarily	  by	  reports	  in	  the	  American	  press.	  	  
2.3.3.	  Newsreels.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  popular	  press,	  the	  British	  public	  were	  informed	  about	  the	  world	  through	  the	  
medium	  of	  the	  cinema	  newsreels.	  Whilst	  the	  names	  of	  Gaumont,	  British	  Movietone	  and	  
Empire	  Newsreel	  have	  faded	  with	  time,	  that	  of	  British	  Pathé	  has	  survived	  in	  an	  online	  
archive.197	  	  A	  search	  using	  the	  term	  “Japanese”	  between	  1937	  and	  1940	  generated	  172	  film	  
clips,	  mostly	  regarding	  the	  war	  in	  China,	  but	  also	  including	  a	  number	  of	  more	  pacific	  pursuits	  
from	  civilian	  life.	  The	  tone	  of	  these	  newsreels	  followed	  a	  similar	  trajectory	  to	  that	  found	  in	  the	  
press,	  even	  handed	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  conflict	  until	  the	  attacks	  on	  Pearl	  
Harbour	  and	  Malaya,	  at	  which	  juncture	  the	  visual	  discourse	  took	  on	  a	  far	  more	  partisan	  and	  
anti-­‐Japanese	  outlook.	  
Typical	  of	  the	  pre	  1941	  output	  is	  a	  collection	  of	  clips	  that	  report	  on	  the	  war	  as	  ‘a	  great	  conflict	  
between	  Oriental	  powers.’	  No	  side	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  newsreels	  relate	  developments	  in	  China,	  
frequently	  using	  film	  supplied	  by	  the	  Japanese	  military.	  There	  is	  considerable	  focus	  on	  western	  
parochial	  interests,	  and	  the	  armed	  forces	  of	  Britain	  and	  America	  that	  are	  seen	  to	  be	  protecting	  
them,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  International	  Zone	  in	  Shanghai,	  where	  Chinese	  civilians	  
were	  searched	  to	  make	  sure	  they	  are	  not	  smuggling	  arms	  into	  the	  zone.	  This	  approach	  is	  
encapsulated	  in	  the	  Editor’s	  Note	  that	  introduces	  one	  of	  the	  clips:	  ‘"Editor's	  Note:	  Further	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  The	  National	  Lottery	  funded	  digitisation	  of	  its	  entire	  archive	  of	  over	  90,000	  clips	  in	  2002.	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fighting	  around	  Shanghai	  and	  on	  the	  Yangtse	  River	  leads	  great	  powers	  to	  take	  joint	  action	  for	  
protection	  of	  nationals	  in	  danger	  zones	  while	  they	  seek	  to	  end	  conflict	  in	  the	  Far	  East."’198	  
Once	  the	  western	  powers	  became	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  war	  the	  commentary	  takes	  on	  a	  
strongly	  vituperative	  tone	  against	  the	  Japanese.	  The	  American	  commentator	  on	  a	  ‘March	  of	  
Time’	  reel	  entitled	  ‘China	  Fights	  Back’	  talks	  of	  how	  “Hitler’s	  ally”,	  the	  Japanese	  Army	  led	  by	  
“Tokyo’s	  cocky	  militarists	  ...	  raped	  and	  ravaged”	  across	  China,	  earning	  the	  “contempt	  of	  the	  
civilised	  world.”	  At	  several	  points	  in	  the	  film	  the	  Japanese	  are	  represented	  in	  cartoon	  form	  as	  
monstrous	  apes	  (one	  of	  which	  is	  wearing	  a	  sign	  saying	  ‘Axis	  Powers’),	  and	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  
earlier	  films	  great	  emphasis	  is	  put	  on	  the	  heroic	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  and	  his	  brave	  Chinese	  forces,	  
and	  their	  need	  for	  heavy	  weapons	  from	  America	  so	  that	  they	  might	  better	  fight	  the	  enemy,	  the	  
Japanese.199	  
	  A	  British	  voiced	  clip	  titled	  "VENGEANCE!	  NOTHING	  LESS"	  from	  1942	  is	  even	  more	  strident	  in	  its	  
message.	  The	  viewer	  is	  instructed	  to	  “Look	  closely	  at	  this	  man.	  He	  is	  the	  Emperor	  of	  Japan,	  
whose	  forces	  have	  committed	  the	  appalling	  atrocities	  against	  British,	  Empire	  and	  Chinese	  
troops	  and	  civilians,	  men	  and	  women,	  in	  Hong	  Kong”,	  	  as	  an	  image	  of	  Hirohito	  on	  horseback	  is	  
shown.	  As	  the	  action	  moves	  on	  to	  Japanese	  troops	  advancing,	  the	  narrator,	  his	  voice	  steadily	  
increasing	  in	  anger,	  exhorts	  the	  audience	  that	  "these	  are	  the	  swine	  who	  bound	  and	  bayoneted	  
our	  helpless	  soldiers	  in	  their	  hands...	  let	  the	  cry	  be	  vengeance!	  Bloody	  vengeance!"200	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	  http://www.britishpathe.com/video/world-­‐faces-­‐crisis-­‐as-­‐japan-­‐and-­‐china-­‐clash-­‐in-­‐
far/query/Japanese	  	  
199	  http://www.britishpathe.com/video/march-­‐of-­‐time-­‐china-­‐fights-­‐back/query/Japanese	  	  
This	  clip	  is	  archived	  as	  being	  from	  1940	  –	  this	  is	  clearly	  an	  error	  in	  the	  archiving	  process,	  perhaps	  
understandable	  in	  the	  context	  of	  having	  digitised	  so	  many	  items	  in	  such	  a	  short	  space	  of	  time.	  In	  one	  
shot	  of	  the	  film	  American	  officers	  are	  seen	  studying	  casualty	  figures	  up	  to	  June	  1941,	  and	  the	  content	  
and	  its	  tone	  clearly	  suggest	  a	  provenance	  that	  is	  post	  7th	  December	  1941.	  
200	  http://www.britishpathe.com/video/vengeance-­‐nothing-­‐less/query/vengeance+nothing+less	  	  
85	  
	  
2.3.4.	  Popular	  literature.	  
The	  working	  class	  consumption	  of	  books	  was	  increased	  during	  the	  1930s	  by	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  
‘twopenny	  libraries’,	  the	  first	  of	  which	  was	  opened	  in	  Harlesden	  by	  Ray	  Smith	  in	  1930.	  These	  
institutions	  lent	  out	  books,	  primarily	  works	  of	  popular	  fiction,	  for	  2d	  with	  no	  deposit	  or	  
subscription	  required.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade	  such	  institutions	  had	  become	  commonplace	  in	  
working	  class	  areas	  and	  beyond,	  often	  as	  an	  adjunct	  to	  pre-­‐existing	  businesses	  and	  shops.	  
Their	  rapid	  growth	  has	  been	  described	  as	  ‘an	  event	  of	  some	  significance	  in	  the	  history	  of	  
reading.’201	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  study,	  popular	  fiction	  of	  the	  period	  and	  the	  historiography	  of	  race	  most	  
frequently	  intersect	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Sax	  Rohmer,	  and	  in	  particular	  his	  Fu	  Manchu	  detective	  
series,	  often	  seen	  as	  a	  significant	  contributor	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  ‘Yellow	  Peril.’202	  After	  a	  hiatus	  of	  
fourteen	  years	  he	  resurrected	  the	  character	  in	  1931,	  as	  the	  twopenny	  libraries	  started	  their	  
rapid	  expansion,	  and	  published	  seven	  new	  volumes	  up	  to	  1941,	  including	  The	  Drums	  of	  Fu	  
Manchu	  in	  1939203	  and	  The	  Island	  of	  Fu	  Manchu	  in	  1941.204	  These	  works	  featured	  the	  highly	  
essentialised	  Chinese	  arch-­‐villain	  himself,	  ably	  supported	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  menacing	  characters,	  
usually	  of	  Asian	  origins	  and	  orientalised	  construction.	  Indian	  Thugs,	  Burmese	  dacoits,	  
Mongolian	  and	  Sumatran	  strong	  arm	  men	  and	  a	  West	  Dyak	  from	  Borneo	  were	  all	  recruited	  
into	  Rohmer’s	  pan-­‐Asian	  gang	  of	  evildoers,	  occasionally	  supplemented	  by	  rogues	  from	  the	  
Andaman	  Islands	  and	  Haiti.	  
Whilst	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  such	  stereotypical	  imagery,	  amplified	  in	  cinematic	  versions,	  could	  
contribute	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  general	  antipathy	  to	  Asians,	  there	  are	  reasons	  for	  suggesting	  that,	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201	  Hilliard,	  Christopher.	  (2014)	  “The	  Twopenny	  Library:	  The	  Book	  Trade,	  Working-­‐Class	  Readers,	  and	  
‘Middlebrow’	  Novels	  in	  Britain,	  1930–42.”	  Twentieth	  Century	  British	  History.	  Vol.	  25,	  pp200,211.	  In	  an	  
example	  of	  class	  based	  paternalism	  he	  cites	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  City	  of	  Westminster’s	  Library	  
Committee,	  that	  it	  would	  not	  be	  fulfilling	  its	  remit	  if	  ‘readers	  of	  low	  cultural	  equipment’	  were	  to	  be	  
abandoned	  to	  the	  new	  outlets.	  p212.	  
202	  See	  Clegg,	  Jenny.	  (1994)	  Fu	  Manchu	  and	  the	  ‘Yellow	  Peril’:	  The	  Making	  of	  a	  Racist	  Myth.	  Trentham	  
Books,	  Stoke-­‐on-­‐Trent.	  
203	  Rohmer,	  Sax	  (1939)	  The	  Drums	  of	  Fu	  Manchu.	  Cassell,	  London.	  
204	  Rohmer,	  Sax	  (1941)	  The	  Island	  of	  Fu	  Manchu.	  Cassell,	  London.	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respect	  of	  the	  BORs’	  outlooks	  on	  the	  Japanese,	  the	  effects	  may	  have	  been	  more	  limited.205	  
Despite	  Fu	  Manchu	  casting	  his	  recruitment	  net	  widely	  across	  the	  continent,	  Japanese	  
members	  are	  notably	  absent	  from	  his	  gang.	  Indeed	  in	  The	  Drums	  of	  Fu	  Manchu	  the	  only	  
character	  from	  Japan	  is	  Mr	  Osaki,	  a	  scientist	  who	  has	  come	  to	  Britain	  to	  gain	  weapons	  
technology	  for	  his	  government,	  and	  is	  assassinated	  by	  the	  doctor.	  
A	  second	  factor	  that	  suggests	  Rohmer’s	  influence	  was	  on	  the	  wane	  was	  provided	  by	  an	  article	  
in	  the	  Daily	  Mirror	  in	  1934,	  which	  reported	  on	  the	  growing	  twopenny	  library	  phenomenon.	  The	  
head	  librarian	  at	  Ray	  Smith’s	  original	  premises	  in	  Harlesden	  stated	  that	  the	  ‘rising	  generation	  
has	  very	  definite	  and	  different	  ideas	  about	  literature.’	  They	  want	  ‘quick-­‐fire	  storytelling	  about	  
real	  things.’	  He	  continued	  to	  say	  that	  ‘they	  don’t	  even	  get	  thrilled	  by	  the	  Chinamen	  and	  dope	  
dens	  that	  Sax	  Rohmer	  wrote	  about.’206	  In	  this	  context	  Sax	  Rohmer’s	  upper	  class	  heroes,	  
bringing	  their	  colonial	  experience	  and	  patrician	  attitudes	  to	  bear	  upon	  the	  natives	  of	  Harlesden	  
and	  Essex	  in	  his	  storylines,	  were	  of	  little	  interest	  to	  the	  twopenny	  library	  borrowers.	  After	  all,	  
they	  were	  the	  natives	  of	  Harlesden	  and	  Essex	  themselves	  and	  evidently	  they	  had	  little	  interest	  
in	  tales	  of	  interlopers	  from	  Belgravia.	  Whilst	  such	  works	  were	  no	  doubt	  part	  of	  the	  palette	  of	  
influences	  that	  could	  contribute	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  views	  in	  the	  wider	  public	  that	  were	  now	  
consuming	  them,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Japanese	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  such	  a	  
specific	  impact.	  	  
2.3.5.	  The	  Press	  and	  the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War:	  Summary.	  
Given	  the	  grave	  nature	  of	  events	  in	  China,	  the	  popular	  media	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  denigrate	  
Japanese	  actions	  on	  many	  occasions.	  Whilst	  the	  bombing	  of	  cities,	  and	  particularly	  Shanghai,	  
received	  some	  fairly	  neutral	  coverage,	  most	  of	  the	  press	  was	  guilty	  by	  omission	  with	  regard	  to	  
their	  lack	  of	  reporting	  of	  the	  outrages	  at	  Nanking.	  Following	  the	  attacks	  on	  Malaya	  and	  Pearl	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205	  The	  Chinese	  Government	  in	  the	  1930s	  	  was	  so	  concerned	  by	  the	  unfavourable	  stereotyping	  that	  it	  
attempted	  to	  get	  Hollywood	  film	  versions	  cancelled.	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  of	  National	  Biography;	  Ward,	  
Arthur	  Henry	  (pseud:	  Sax	  Rohmer)	  http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/view/article/39472	  
206	  Daily	  Mirror:	  9/11/1934,	  p12.	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Harbour	  the	  pendulum	  of	  press	  propagandising	  swung	  against	  Japan,	  and	  more	  vituperative	  
and	  racialized	  representations	  became	  the	  norm.	  However,	  by	  that	  time	  the	  ill-­‐fated	  18th	  
Division	  was	  already	  in	  convoy	  to	  Asia,	  their	  next	  information	  regarding	  the	  Japanese	  would	  
come	  from	  their	  own	  officers.	  
	  
2.4.	  Official	  Briefings	  and	  Informal	  Rumours.	  
Whilst	  the	  foregoing	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  press	  were	  unlikely	  as	  the	  major	  source	  of	  early	  
antipathy	  and	  racialized	  characterisations,	  evidence	  from	  the	  papers	  suggests	  that	  such	  views	  
were	  held	  by	  a	  sizeable	  part	  of	  the	  population.	  	  Such	  impressions	  were	  no	  doubt	  compounded	  
in	  such	  men,	  and	  developed	  fresh	  in	  others,	  by	  the	  military	  briefings	  given	  on	  board	  the	  
troopships	  by	  their	  officers,	  before	  arriving	  in	  Singapore.	  These	  sessions	  were	  widely	  reported	  
by	  the	  soldiers	  and	  were	  consistent	  in	  their	  downplaying	  of	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  the	  enemy,	  
based	  upon	  a	  range	  of	  defects	  that	  afflicted	  the	  Japanese	  nation	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  were	  thus	  
assumed	  to	  affect	  the	  ability	  of	  its	  individual	  fighting	  men.	  Sapper	  Coates	  provided	  a	  compact	  
summary	  of	  such	  received	  wisdom	  in	  his	  poem,	  Sam	  at	  War:	  
23.	  
So	  we	  continued	  our	  half	  world	  trip,	  
Till	  one	  evening	  we	  had	  the	  tip,	  
That	  this	  time	  it	  was	  going	  to	  be	  the	  Jap,	  
They	  gave	  us	  the	  lowdown	  on	  this	  chap.	  
	  
24.	  
No	  good	  at	  this,	  No	  good	  at	  that,	  
Very	  poor	  shots	  &	  as	  blind	  as	  a	  bat,	  
No	  good	  by	  day	  and	  worse	  by	  night,	  
Show	  him	  a	  bayonet,	  he’ll	  run	  with	  fright.207	  
	  
Such	  views	  were	  expressed,	  in	  part	  at	  least,	  in	  an	  ultimately	  misguided	  attempt	  to	  boost	  the	  
confidence	  of	  the	  troops	  according	  to	  Cpl	  Henderson,	  who	  had	  the	  rare	  confidence	  to	  question	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  IWM:	  Coates.	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the	  standard	  characterisations	  being	  presented	  and	  warn	  of	  their	  dangers.208	  	  The	  briefings	  
also	  reflected	  a	  wider	  sense	  of	  what	  John	  Ferris	  has	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘military	  ethno-­‐centrism	  
adulterated	  with	  racism’	  that	  was	  prevalent	  within	  significant	  sections	  of	  the	  military	  
hierarchy.209	  This	  was	  implicitly	  recognised	  in	  a	  1945	  War	  Office	  booklet	  about	  “The	  Japanese	  
Soldier”,	  which	  noted	  that:	  ‘Before	  the	  war	  started	  he	  was	  classified	  as	  a	  rather	  fine	  type	  of	  
almost	  human	  ape,	  imitative,	  brave,	  but	  without	  originality,	  capable	  of	  fighting	  according	  to	  
the	  set	  exercises	  of	  the	  book	  and	  easily	  beaten	  by	  the	  superior	  resources	  and	  initiative	  of	  the	  
white	  races.’210	  However,	  even	  this	  post-­‐hoc	  assessment,	  with	  some	  reference	  to	  essentialised	  
national	  characteristics,	  seems	  more	  accurate	  than	  that	  actually	  given	  to	  the	  troops	  heading	  
east	  in	  1941.	  The	  War	  Office	  was	  perhaps	  at	  this	  time	  still	  unable	  to	  admit	  that	  it	  had	  
misjudged	  the	  situation	  so	  badly,	  and	  was	  thus	  keen	  to	  provide	  what	  reads	  more	  like	  a	  
contemporary	  (1945)	  description	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Soldier,	  in	  order	  to	  lay	  a	  smokescreen	  
around	  their	  previous	  failings.	  
Such	  views	  were	  not	  however	  ubiquitous,	  nor	  were	  all	  briefings	  so	  erroneous	  and	  misleading.	  
Brigadier	  Simson	  of	  the	  Royal	  Engineers	  was	  sent	  out	  by	  ship	  to	  Singapore	  in	  mid-­‐1941,	  to	  take	  
up	  the	  post	  of	  Chief	  Engineer	  at	  Malaya	  Command,	  with	  instructions	  from	  the	  War	  Office	  to	  
stiffen	  the	  defences.	  
As	  senior	  officer	  on	  board	  I	  arranged	  lectures	  for	  the	  Army	  and	  RAF	  personnel.	  Among	  
the	  reinforcements	  for	  Malaya	  were	  several	  British	  officers	  who	  were	  going	  out	  as	  
Japanese	  interpreters.	  They	  knew	  much	  about	  the	  military,	  naval	  and	  air	  potential	  of	  
Japan,	  and	  confirmed	  that	  we	  would	  find	  the	  Japanese	  a	  powerful,	  resourceful	  and	  
aggressive	  opponent,	  if	  war	  started.211	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Unfortunately	  for	  the	  men	  of	  the	  18th	  Division	  who	  were	  sent	  out	  to	  Singapore	  later	  that	  year,	  
such	  realistic	  and	  accurate	  appraisals	  were	  neither	  widespread	  nor	  provided,	  and	  Simson’s	  
subsequent	  attempts	  to	  bolster	  the	  defensive	  capabilities	  of	  the	  theatre	  were	  to	  flounder	  
under	  the	  combined	  weight	  of	  institutional	  apathy,	  military	  inertia	  and	  poor	  communications.	  
The	  last	  words	  of	  Cpl	  Henderson	  to	  his	  Captain	  regarding	  the	  misleading	  lectures	  had	  been	  to	  
warn	  that	  ‘once	  such	  a	  ploy	  is	  exposed,	  the	  men	  may	  never	  trust	  their	  leaders	  again.’	  212	  The	  
accuracy	  of	  this	  prediction	  would	  be	  found	  in	  the	  account	  of	  Private	  Carpenter.	  He	  noted	  with	  
some	  vitriol	  the	  painful	  realisation	  that	  ‘the	  truth	  as	  we	  discovered	  later	  was	  the	  opposite	  of	  
what	  they	  had	  so	  glibly	  told	  us.	  Those	  two	  had	  either	  got	  loose	  from	  a	  loony	  house	  or	  they	  
were	  the	  World’s	  champion	  LIARS.	  They	  could	  not	  have	  been	  more	  wrong.’213	  	  
As,	  contrary	  to	  most	  official	  expectations,	  the	  Japanese	  tide	  continued	  to	  flow	  down	  Malaya	  
towards	  Singapore,	  the	  British	  imperial	  forces	  were	  in	  a	  usually	  chaotic	  retreat.	  Such	  confusion	  
provided	  a	  fertile	  ground	  for	  the	  spreading	  of	  rumours	  regarding	  Japanese	  behaviour,	  in	  Hong	  
Kong,	  Malaya,	  and	  then	  finally	  in	  Singapore	  itself.	  Whilst	  still	  on	  board	  the	  USS	  Mount	  Vernon,	  
somewhere	  between	  Mombasa	  and	  Singapore,	  and	  several	  days	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Hong	  Kong,	  
Carpenter	  described	  the	  Japanese	  as	  ‘murdering,	  raping,	  looting	  as	  they	  advanced	  and	  worst	  of	  
all	  taking	  no	  prisoners.’214	  Whilst	  it	  is	  probable	  that	  this	  account	  may	  have	  benefitted	  from	  
some	  hindsight,	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  rumour	  mill	  is	  given	  greater	  credence	  by	  the	  words	  of	  
Henderson,	  who	  recalled	  the	  ‘horror	  stories	  concerning	  the	  Japanese’	  on	  the	  retreat	  to	  
Singapore.	  One	  of	  the	  platoons	  of	  the	  5th	  Beds/Herts	  was	  rumoured	  to	  have	  eventually	  
surrendered	  after	  hand	  to	  hand	  fighting:	  	  
The	  story	  as	  I	  heard	  it	  was	  that	  the	  Japs	  had	  tied	  their	  prisoners	  to	  the	  trees	  and	  then	  
bayoneted	  them	  to	  death.	  …	  At	  the	  time	  I	  dismissed	  this	  and	  the	  other	  stories	  we	  were	  
hearing,	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  rubbish	  we	  could	  expect	  to	  find	  being	  peddled	  around	  in	  a	  tight	  
situation	  such	  as	  the	  one	  we	  were	  in.215	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Rumour	  could	  also	  inform	  decisions	  as	  to	  whether	  to	  stay	  or	  try	  to	  escape	  from	  Singapore.	  L.	  
Bdr.	  Grafton	  and	  his	  comrades	  ‘took	  into	  consideration	  the	  uncivilised	  reputation	  that	  
preceded	  the	  Japs	  from	  the	  very	  start	  of	  the	  war	  on	  December	  6th.	  Stories	  of	  atrocities	  which	  
tended	  to	  be	  believed,	  took	  on	  credence	  when	  we	  had	  been	  confronted	  by	  the	  massacre	  at	  
Alexandra	  Hospital.’216	  	  
This	  range	  of	  responses	  to	  the	  official	  briefings	  and	  informal	  rumours	  offer	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  
mind-­‐sets	  and	  attitudes	  of	  the	  troops.	  There	  were	  those,	  typified	  by	  Carpenter,	  who	  had	  
initially	  accepted	  largely	  without	  question	  the	  information	  that	  they	  were	  receiving,	  and	  for	  
some	  of	  whom	  this	  would	  have	  been	  re-­‐enforcing	  pre-­‐existing	  prejudices.	  As	  Grafton	  suggests,	  
such	  reports	  had	  a	  fairly	  widespread	  traction	  amongst	  the	  men,	  and	  there	  were	  only	  a	  minority	  
who	  would	  actively	  challenge	  the	  established	  narrative.	  	  Henderson	  typifies	  this	  latter	  group,	  
his	  left-­‐wing	  background	  no	  doubt	  helping	  to	  inform	  his	  suspicions	  as	  to	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  
establishment	  line.	  In	  his	  account	  there	  are	  several	  acknowledgements	  of	  occasions	  where	  his	  
analysis	  would	  subsequently	  prove	  incorrect,	  as	  in	  the	  reports	  of	  brutality	  that	  he	  had	  
questioned	  on	  the	  retreat,	  and	  his	  honesty	  on	  such	  occasions	  lends	  credibility	  to	  the	  overall	  
veracity	  of	  his	  memoir.	  
Henderson	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  his	  initial	  reticence	  to	  believe	  everything	  that	  was	  said	  about	  the	  
Japanese	  and	  in	  this	  respect,	  somewhat	  ironically,	  the	  popular	  press	  had	  played	  a	  more	  
demonstrable	  role	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  caricatures,	  albeit	  over	  twenty	  years	  previously.	  	  
Reports	  of	  German	  atrocities	  in	  1914	  had	  received	  wide	  circulation	  in	  the	  papers	  and	  the	  Daily	  
Mirror	  was	  no	  exception.	  Headlines	  such	  as	  ‘HUNS	  MASSACRE	  80	  CHILDREN’	  and	  ‘MORE	  
PICTORIAL	  EVIDENCE	  OF	  THE	  “GERM-­‐HUNS”	  BRUTALITY’	  introduced	  readers	  to	  stories	  that	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detailed	  events	  such	  as	  one	  where	  ‘Even	  women	  with	  tiny	  babies	  were	  brutally	  treated	  by	  the	  
Kaiser’s	  Huns.’217	  	  
In	  the	  1920s	  such	  reports	  had	  come	  to	  be	  discredited	  as	  was	  confirmed	  by	  Private	  Dawson,	  a	  
journalist	  in	  civilian	  life	  and	  a	  self-­‐proclaimed	  socialist.	  Writing	  his	  memoir	  soon	  after	  the	  
liberation	  he	  noted	  that	  ‘we	  were	  inclined	  to	  regard	  the	  stories	  we	  heard	  about	  their	  cruelty	  as	  
being	  in	  the	  same	  category	  as	  the	  atrocity	  stories	  told	  of	  the	  Germans	  in	  the	  1914-­‐18	  war.’218	  
The	  ubiquity	  of	  such	  views	  would	  be	  amply	  demonstrated	  on	  the	  home	  front	  in	  early	  1944,	  as	  
the	  Government	  sought	  to	  publicise	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  POWs	  were	  suffering,	  and	  
in	  which	  it	  had	  considerable	  difficulty	  in	  overcoming	  public	  scepticism.219	  Given	  that	  the	  men	  
who	  surrendered	  in	  1941	  were	  not	  even	  born	  in	  1914,	  and	  would	  have	  been	  young	  children	  in	  
the	  1920s,	  the	  persistence	  and	  reproduction	  of	  this	  memory	  (accurate	  or	  otherwise)	  
demonstrates	  the	  power	  of	  inherited	  societal	  consciousness	  to	  pass	  seamlessly,	  if	  not	  always	  
immutably,	  through	  the	  generations.	  
	  
2.5.	  The	  Experience	  of	  Captivity.	  
Dawson’s	  initial	  forbearance	  towards	  his	  captors	  would	  eventually	  evaporate	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  
jungle,	  as	  he,	  like	  many	  others,	  suffered	  his	  Japanese	  epiphany	  on	  the	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  
Railway:	  
We	  wanted	  to	  be	  fair.	  We	  persuaded	  ourselves	  that	  ours	  was	  the	  dispassionate	  view.	  
That	  we	  were	  being	  sensible.	  But	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  remain	  either	  dispassionate	  or	  sensible	  
when	  one	  is	  being	  continually	  beaten	  for	  failing	  to	  accomplish	  tasks	  which	  are	  entirely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217	  Daily	  Mirror;	  15/9/1914;	  p2;	  12/9/1914;	  p7.	  
218	  IWM:	  Dawson,S.	  (Docs	  3156)	  p37.	  More	  recently	  John	  Ramsden	  has	  written	  of	  such	  accounts	  of	  
German	  brutality	  that	  ‘while	  these	  were	  exaggerated,	  they	  were	  not	  entirely	  fanciful.’	  Ramsden,	  John.	  
(2006;	  2007	  edn)	  Don’t	  Mention	  The	  War:	  The	  British	  and	  the	  Germans	  since	  1890.	  Abacus,	  London.	  
p111.	  See	  also	  Horne,	  John,	  and	  Kramer,	  Alan.	  (2002)	  German	  Atrocities,	  1914:	  A	  History	  of	  Denial.	  Yale	  
University	  Press,	  New	  Haven.	  
219	  Kraljic,	  Tatjana.	  (2005)	  Forgotten	  Armies:	  British	  and	  American	  Troops	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  the	  




beyond	  one’s	  strength.	  And	  so	  our	  opinions	  changed.	  We	  found	  the	  stories	  told	  of	  
Japanese	  kicking	  Chinese	  women	  to	  death	  in	  the	  streets	  of	  Singapore	  the	  day	  after	  we	  
had	  capitulated	  more	  easy	  to	  believe.	  We	  had	  always	  disliked	  the	  Japanese	  but	  had	  
argued	  that	  it	  was	  born	  of	  misunderstanding.	  Now	  we	  began	  to	  hate	  them.	  And	  hate	  
once	  developed	  grew	  rapidly	  until	  we	  hated	  the	  whole	  race.	  And	  we	  shall	  continue	  to	  
hate	  them.	  That	  day	  decided	  us.	  From	  being	  misunderstood	  fellow	  humans	  they	  
became,	  as	  we	  flung	  ourselves	  wearily	  to	  rest	  that	  night,	  what	  we	  always	  regarded	  
them	  as	  being	  afterwards	  –	  “little	  yellow	  bastards”.220	  
	  
As	  with	  Grafton,	  bitter	  experience	  had	  acted	  to	  confirm	  earlier	  rumours	  and	  undermine	  his	  
previous	  attempts	  to	  equitably	  rationalise	  his	  situation.	  In	  this	  passage,	  the	  sentiments	  of	  
which	  he	  repeats	  several	  times	  elsewhere	  in	  his	  account,	  Dawson	  seems	  to	  be	  exhibiting	  a	  
sense	  of	  liberal	  guilt	  regarding	  his	  earlier	  judgement	  of	  the	  Japanese,	  and	  is	  attempting	  to	  
exorcise	  it.	  Despite	  his	  earlier	  more	  nuanced	  perspectives,	  he	  is	  now	  asserting	  that	  ‘we	  always	  
disliked	  the	  Japanese’.	  In	  responding	  to	  the	  anger	  that	  he	  feels	  as	  a	  result	  of	  his	  previous	  
naivety,	  he	  has	  re-­‐directed	  it	  with	  interest	  at	  the	  nearest	  target,	  the	  object	  of	  his	  
misconceptions,	  the	  Japanese.	  	  In	  a	  further	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  his	  own	  personal	  sense	  of	  
responsibility	  he	  uses	  the	  first	  person	  plural,	  more	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  share	  the	  sense	  of	  culpability	  
than	  as	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  any	  widespread	  distribution	  of	  his	  initially	  tolerant	  outlook.	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein	  Henderson	  attempted	  to	  rationalise	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  guards,	  particularly	  
as	  it	  grew	  steadily	  worse	  on	  the	  Railway:	  
A	  general	  response	  to	  this	  increased	  violence	  from	  our	  troops	  was	  to	  put	  it	  down	  to	  
national	  characteristics;	  to	  be	  Japanese	  was	  to	  be	  sadistic.	  I	  and	  the	  remainder	  of	  my	  
comrades	  opposed	  this	  mindless	  thinking	  at	  every	  opportunity	  but	  in	  doing	  so	  we	  had	  
to	  be	  careful	  not	  to	  become	  apologists	  for	  the	  Japanese	  whose	  behaviour	  certainly	  
needed	  some	  explaining.221	  
	  
For	  Henderson,	  as	  a	  communist,	  the	  human	  race	  was	  ‘biologically	  indivisible’,	  and	  thus	  
‘national	  characteristics’	  were	  a	  gross	  generalisation	  and	  an	  anathema	  to	  both	  him	  and	  his	  
fellow	  party	  members	  in	  the	  camps.	  However,	  even	  he	  would	  hint	  at	  national	  traits	  when	  he	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noted	  in	  a	  Montesquieuan	  fashion	  that	  ‘people	  who	  are	  the	  products	  of	  widely	  different	  
environments	  will	  have	  adapted	  to	  these	  environments	  both	  physically	  and	  mentally.’222	  Whilst	  
he	  exemplified	  the	  physiological	  differences	  with	  his	  reference	  to	  the	  varying	  incidence	  of	  
melanin	  in	  skin,	  he	  made	  no	  attempt	  to	  ascribe	  a	  resulting	  effect	  on	  mentality	  and	  hence	  
avoided	  contradicting	  and	  questioning	  his	  core	  beliefs,	  in	  the	  search	  for	  a	  solution	  to	  such	  an	  
intractable	  problem.	  It	  was	  an	  exercise	  that	  challenged	  even	  his	  well-­‐developed	  sense	  of	  
reason	  and	  his	  considerable	  ability	  to	  rationalise	  the	  situation	  he	  found	  himself	  in.	  
I	  have	  to	  admit	  that	  although	  my	  personal	  belief	  in	  our	  common	  heritage	  has	  never	  
been	  shaken,	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  Japanese	  did	  take	  some	  understanding.	  In	  the	  
discussions	  that	  were	  constantly	  going	  on	  in	  the	  camp	  I	  was	  often	  hard-­‐pressed	  to	  
counter	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  of	  different	  origins	  from	  the	  remainder	  
of	  the	  human	  race.223	  
	  
An	  indication	  of	  just	  how	  hard	  pressed	  he	  was	  in	  arguing	  his	  position	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
subsequent	  paragraph,	  where	  he	  details	  the	  dietary	  based	  analysis	  of	  one	  of	  his	  colleagues,	  
who	  was	  known	  for	  his	  sense	  of	  repartee.	  Whilst	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  
‘human	  like	  the	  rest	  of	  us’,	  George	  Haywood	  blamed	  thousands	  of	  years	  of	  eating	  rice	  and	  
their	  captors	  implicit	  jealousy	  of	  the	  POWs’	  previous	  consumption	  of	  ‘real	  food	  like	  potatoes	  
and	  cabbage	  and	  beef	  and	  steamed	  apple	  puddings’,	  for	  the	  treatment	  being	  meted	  out.	  
‘We’re	  the	  first	  proper	  eaters	  they’ve	  had	  in	  their	  power.	  No	  wonder	  they	  take	  every	  
opportunity	  to	  kick	  the	  living	  shit	  out	  of	  us.’224	  	  
It	  is	  telling	  that	  Dawson	  and	  Henderson,	  two	  of	  the	  most	  initially	  equitable	  of	  the	  men,	  found	  
their	  experience	  of	  the	  Railway	  so	  challenging	  to	  their	  sense	  of	  tolerance.	  If	  even	  they	  found	  
themselves	  undergoing	  such	  changes	  in	  outlook,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  cohort	  
would	  have	  had	  such	  a	  Japanophobic	  perspective.	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  despite	  the	  fact	  
that	  many	  of	  the	  men,	  like	  Dawson,	  developed	  a	  profound	  antipathy	  against	  the	  Japanese,	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most	  of	  them,	  like	  Dawson,	  also	  recorded	  at	  least	  one	  example	  of	  ‘that	  rare	  phenomenon	  –	  a	  
decent	  Japanese.’	  Indeed	  he	  noted	  that	  he	  had	  come	  across	  several	  such	  ‘exceptions	  to	  the	  
rule’	  during	  his	  captivity,	  indicating	  that	  such	  figures	  were	  perhaps	  not	  quite	  as	  exceptional	  as	  
he	  initially	  suggested.225	  	  
Another	  example	  of	  sympathetic	  Japanese	  behaviour	  comes	  from	  Sgt	  E.	  Davies,	  who	  having	  
avoided	  the	  Railway,	  was	  eventually	  shipped	  to	  Japan.	  In	  Muroran	  Camp	  in	  the	  Hakodate	  area	  
he	  initially	  suffered	  ‘constant	  beatings,	  kickings	  and	  bashings.’	  The	  arrival	  of	  Lt	  Col.	  Emoto	  to	  
take	  command	  of	  the	  Hakodate	  camps	  led	  to	  a	  complete	  change	  of	  regime:	  ‘He	  speaks	  fluent	  
English	  and	  seems	  to	  be	  pro-­‐British.	  Does	  all	  in	  his	  power	  to	  help	  us.	  Gets	  us	  more	  rice,	  
canteens	  and	  clothing	  &	  looks	  into	  any	  request	  that	  we	  ask	  of	  him.	  He	  stops	  beatings	  and	  
slappings	  by	  guards	  and	  honchos.’	  Not	  surprisingly,	  given	  Emoto’s	  addressing	  of	  the	  twin	  issues	  
of	  food	  and	  brutality,	  the	  POW	  officers	  commanding	  the	  camps	  sent	  him	  a	  letter	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
hostilities	  thanking	  him	  for	  his	  ‘exemplary	  treatment	  of	  our	  personnel	  …	  [and]	  the	  numerous	  
kindnesses’	  that	  he	  had	  shown	  to	  the	  men.226	  Such	  good	  Japanese	  were	  frequently	  viewed	  
through	  a	  lens	  of	  western	  religious	  or	  cultural	  affinity;	  Dawson	  refers	  to	  one	  of	  his	  favoured	  
guards	  as	  ‘a	  Christian’,	  whilst	  Davies	  records	  that	  Emoto	  spoke	  fluent	  English.	  	  Dawson	  refers	  
to	  another	  of	  his	  reasonable	  guards,	  a	  Japanese-­‐American	  mini-­‐cab	  driver	  who	  had	  the	  
misfortune	  to	  be	  in	  Japan	  on	  holiday	  when	  the	  war	  started,	  as	  having	  ‘much	  sympathy	  with	  
our	  western	  way	  of	  our	  life’.227	  
For	  those	  POWs	  who	  were	  shipped	  to	  Japan	  there	  were	  also	  contacts	  with	  Japanese	  out	  of	  
uniform.	  In	  this	  context	  it	  is	  instructive	  to	  return	  to	  the	  cases	  of	  Parry	  and	  Houghton,	  the	  
diarists	  who	  exhibited	  early	  antipathy	  towards	  the	  Japanese	  military,	  and	  whose	  negative	  
perspectives	  had	  only	  been	  enhanced	  by	  their	  experiences	  of	  captivity.	  They	  both	  commented	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favourably	  regarding	  the	  men	  crewing	  the	  ships	  that	  transported	  them.	  For	  Parry,	  on	  board	  
the	  Hakasoka	  Maru,	  ‘The	  crew	  as	  far	  as	  Nips	  went,	  were	  an	  agreeable	  crowd	  …	  [and]	  were	  by	  
far	  and	  away	  the	  most	  sympathetic	  and	  decent	  Japs	  we	  ever	  came	  across.’228	  	  
When	  arriving	  in	  Japan	  they	  received	  a	  similarly	  unexpected	  sympathetic	  response	  from	  the	  
civilian	  population.	  On	  disembarking	  at	  Suimonseri,	  Houghton	  noted	  that	  the	  ‘people	  [are]	  so	  
courteous	  though	  examining	  us	  in	  a	  shy	  sort	  of	  way.’229	  Similarly,	  in	  transit	  to	  his	  new	  camp	  at	  
Sendai,	  Parry	  recorded	  that	  ‘Japs	  and	  women	  stood	  up	  for	  us	  in	  Tokyo’s	  overhead	  railway.’230	  
Whilst	  pre-­‐war	  Japanese	  society	  had	  a	  reputation	  for	  politeness,	  such	  acts	  must	  have	  seemed	  
a	  profound	  contradiction	  to	  the	  behaviour	  of	  its	  military	  in	  the	  camps.	  Such	  sympathy	  was	  
reciprocated	  by	  Houghton	  and	  Parry,	  who,	  in	  common	  with	  many	  of	  their	  comrades,	  noted	  
that	  the	  allied	  blockade	  was	  having	  a	  widespread	  effect	  on	  civilians,	  who	  were	  visibly	  suffering	  
the	  effects	  of	  hunger.	  	  
Of	  course	  not	  all	  civilian	  contacts	  were	  so	  civil,	  as	  Clifford	  Bailey	  recalled	  from	  a	  stopover	  in	  
Tokyo	  in	  October	  1944.	  Lined	  up	  for	  a	  propaganda	  photograph,	  his	  group	  were	  abused	  and	  
spat	  at	  whilst	  children	  threw	  stones	  at	  them.	  Even	  in	  this	  situation	  he	  demonstrated	  some	  
sense	  of	  empathy,	  suggesting	  that	  such	  behaviour	  was	  “understandable	  given	  the	  air	  raids”,	  
although	  at	  this	  time	  the	  Strategic	  Air	  Campaign	  was	  in	  its	  infancy,	  and	  small	  in	  scale	  compared	  
to	  the	  devastation	  that	  would	  occur	  the	  following	  year.231	  Such	  negative	  experiences	  with	  the	  
Japanese	  non-­‐combatants	  were	  however	  rare,	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  more	  positive	  reports	  and	  
the	  people	  that	  they	  came	  from,	  are	  indicative	  of	  a	  more	  nuanced	  outlook	  on	  the	  “Japanese”	  
as	  a	  whole	  people	  than	  the	  established	  narrative,	  and	  indeed	  many	  of	  the	  individual	  accounts,	  
would	  present	  on	  an	  initial	  reading.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228	  IWM:	  Parry;	  The	  Hakasoka	  Maru;	  pp3-­‐6.	  For	  many	  the	  journey	  would	  prove	  far	  less	  amenable,	  and	  
the	  ships	  were	  the	  second	  largest	  source	  of	  fatalities	  in	  captivity,	  mostly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  drowning	  	  after	  
Allied	  submarine	  and	  air	  attacks	  sank	  the	  vessels;	  see	  MacArthur,	  Brian.	  (2005)	  Surviving	  the	  Sword:	  
Prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese	  1942-­‐1945.	  Time	  Warner,	  London.	  pp325-­‐343.	  
229	  IWM:	  Houghton;	  28/6/1944.	  
230	  IWM:	  Parry;	  9/8/1944.	  
231	  IWM:	  Bailey;	  Reel6.	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Whilst	  the	  preceding	  section	  has	  served	  to	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  POWs’	  
experience,	  and	  to	  question	  the	  validity	  of	  assumptions	  as	  to	  its	  uniformity,	  the	  generality	  of	  a	  
negative	  attitude	  towards	  the	  Japanese,	  fed	  by	  frequent	  hunger,	  overwork	  and	  low	  level	  (as	  
well	  as	  in	  some	  cases	  more	  harsh)	  brutality	  is	  undeniable.	  Under	  such	  circumstances	  it	  is	  no	  
surprise	  that	  eventually	  even	  the	  most	  tolerant	  of	  servicemen	  would	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  
antipathy	  to	  their	  captors.	  For	  some	  this	  reflected	  pre-­‐existing	  attitudes,	  whilst	  for	  others	  it	  
would	  be	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  transformative	  experience	  of	  captivity.	  	  Whilst	  there	  has	  been	  little	  
historiographical	  discussion	  of	  such	  effects	  within	  the	  POW	  discourse,	  there	  are	  some	  parallels	  
to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  field	  of	  research	  into	  the	  brutalisation	  of	  warfare	  and	  combat	  motivation,	  in	  
which	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  societal	  prejudice	  as	  the	  source	  of	  antipathy	  is	  
contrasted	  with	  that	  of	  the	  transformative	  power	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  war	  and	  of	  military	  
service.	  Craig	  Cameron	  typifies	  the	  former	  school	  of	  thought.	  When	  writing	  about	  the	  First	  
Marine	  Division	  in	  the	  Pacific	  War,	  he	  suggests	  that	  the	  American	  troops	  were	  already	  imbued	  
with	  ‘sweeping	  stereotypes	  of	  the	  Japanese	  character	  akin	  to	  those	  prevalent	  in	  pre-­‐war	  
American	  society	  as	  a	  whole’,	  and	  that	  such	  racist	  images	  ‘were	  as	  basic	  to	  most	  marines	  as	  
their	  rifles.’232	  Such	  pre-­‐determined	  outlooks	  are	  asserted	  to	  have	  underpinned	  the	  ability	  of	  
these	  marines	  to	  indulge	  in	  the	  brutality	  of	  what	  John	  Dower	  referred	  to	  as	  War	  Without	  
Mercy.233	  
Whilst	  such	  theory	  may	  possess	  some	  explanatory	  power	  in	  such	  a	  binary	  situation,	  where	  
historically	  specific	  racialised	  relations	  exist,	  it	  becomes	  more	  problematic	  in	  an	  equally	  violent	  
theatre	  like	  that	  in	  Burma,	  where	  pre-­‐existing	  racial	  animosities	  were	  largely	  absent.	  The	  multi-­‐
national	  nature	  of	  the	  British	  imperial	  forces	  in	  the	  14th	  Army,	  and	  the	  religious	  and	  caste	  
differentiations	  within	  its	  largest	  component,	  the	  Indian	  Army,	  mitigate	  any	  suggestion	  of	  a	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  Cameron,	  Craig	  M.	  (1994)	  American	  Samurai:	  Myth,	  Imagination	  and	  the	  Conduct	  of	  Battle	  in	  the	  First	  
Marine	  Division,	  1941-­‐1951.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Cambridge.	  p125.	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  Dower,	  War	  Without	  Mercy.	  	  For	  an	  example	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  in	  the	  European	  theatre,	  see:	  




universally	  held	  antecedent	  antipathy.	  In	  this	  context	  Tarak	  Barkawi	  has	  argued	  against	  the	  
primacy	  of	  ethnicity	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  combat	  violence,	  proposing	  that	  for	  the	  troops	  in	  
Burma	  the	  process	  of	  identity	  construction	  occurred	  only	  once	  they	  had	  arrived	  in	  the	  army,	  
and	  it	  was	  re-­‐enforced	  through	  combat,	  ’rather	  than	  being	  pre-­‐given	  by	  civilian	  society.’	  For	  
him	  ‘ethnic	  relations	  were	  shaped	  and	  conditioned	  by	  military	  organisation	  and	  wartime	  
experience.’234	  With	  specific	  reference	  to	  British	  troops	  in	  Burma,	  Barkawi	  uses	  the	  
assessments	  of	  the	  War	  Staff	  at	  the	  India	  Office	  to	  suggest	  that:	  ‘Before	  the	  sudden	  entry	  of	  
Japan	  into	  the	  war,	  the	  average	  British	  soldier	  knew	  little	  or	  nothing	  of	  the	  Japanese’,	  and	  that	  
it	  was	  only	  after	  contact	  in	  combat	  that	  they	  developed	  ‘significant	  animosity’	  towards	  
them.235	  	  
At	  first	  glance	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  both	  mechanisms	  were	  at	  
work	  in	  the	  prison	  camps.	  Despite	  a	  total	  lack	  of	  previous	  contacts,	  some	  of	  the	  men	  exhibited	  
an	  early	  antipathy	  towards	  the	  Japanese,	  indicative	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  societal	  sources	  for	  such	  
antagonism,	  evidence	  of	  which	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  to	  be	  in	  the	  popular	  press,	  if	  not	  of	  it,	  
in	  the	  pre-­‐war	  period.	  Both	  schools	  of	  thought	  utilise	  the	  issue	  of	  homogeneity,	  or	  lack	  of	  it,	  as	  
a	  part	  of	  their	  rationale,	  Cameron	  asserting	  that	  the	  racial	  binary	  of	  the	  war	  in	  the	  Pacific	  was	  a	  
cause	  of	  brutality,	  whilst	  Barkawi	  argues	  that	  the	  multi-­‐cultural	  scenario	  in	  Burma	  precludes	  
antecedent	  racism	  as	  a	  factor.	  The	  men	  of	  the	  18th	  Division	  were	  largely	  (although	  not	  
exclusively)	  drawn	  from	  East	  Anglia,	  making	  them	  ethnically	  a	  considerably	  more	  uniform	  
population	  than	  Cameron’s	  marines,	  and	  thus	  theoretically	  even	  more	  susceptible	  to	  his	  
concept	  of	  societal	  stereotyping.	  There	  are	  however	  weaknesses	  in	  such	  a	  simplistic	  approach	  
as	  applied	  to	  this	  situation.	  Early	  antipathy	  was	  by	  no	  means	  ubiquitous,	  and	  even	  amongst	  
those	  who	  demonstrated	  it	  there	  was	  a	  large	  proportion	  who	  were	  writing	  after	  the	  war,	  and	  
thus	  potentially	  informed	  by	  the	  negative	  experiences	  of	  captivity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234	  Barkawi,	  “Peoples,	  “Homelands,	  and	  Wars?”,	  p149;	  p162:	  	  
For	  a	  similar	  analysis	  of	  British	  and	  American	  forces	  in	  Burma	  see	  also	  Kraljic,	  “Forgotten	  Armies:”	  
235	  Barkawi;	  “Peoples,	  Homelands	  and	  Wars”,	  p158.	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Barkawi’s	  model	  for	  the	  development	  of	  antipathy	  in	  combat	  troops	  bears	  closer	  comparison	  
to	  that	  of	  the	  POWs.	  Initially	  the	  men	  exhibited	  a	  near	  total	  ignorance	  of	  the	  Japanese,	  apart	  
from	  a	  loose	  sense	  of	  colonial	  and	  orientalised	  racial	  superiority	  amongst	  some	  that	  may	  be	  
suggested	  from	  their	  contemporary	  and	  post	  hoc	  writings.	  Their	  first	  major	  education	  as	  to	  
their	  opponents	  would	  be	  the	  ‘morale	  boosting’	  military	  lectures	  that	  they	  received	  before	  
reaching	  Singapore.	  The	  second	  lesson,	  in	  contradiction	  to	  those	  briefings,	  followed	  rapidly	  in	  
the	  days	  and	  weeks	  leading	  to	  the	  surrender,	  and	  although	  there	  was	  some	  fertile	  ground	  in	  
which	  rumours	  could	  develop,	  much	  of	  the	  antipathy	  from	  this	  episode	  was	  directed	  at	  their	  
officers.	  It	  would	  be	  the	  experience	  of	  captivity	  that	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  cause	  of	  
anti-­‐Japanese	  attitudes,	  an	  experience	  that	  would	  eventually	  test	  even	  the	  most	  politically	  or	  
religiously	  open-­‐minded	  prisoners	  to	  the	  limits	  of	  their	  tolerance.	  	  
	  
2.6.	  Redemption	  and	  the	  Resumption	  of	  Western	  Hegemony.	  
As	  their	  ordeal	  ended,	  in	  August	  (and	  for	  some	  in	  remote	  locations,	  September)	  of	  1945,	  many	  
of	  the	  men	  would	  attempt	  to	  rediscover	  a	  sense	  of	  this	  tolerance.	  As	  relief	  supplies	  were	  air-­‐
dropped	  to	  the	  eagerly	  waiting	  former	  prisoners,	  some	  loads	  missed	  their	  target	  and	  landed	  
outside	  the	  camps,	  and	  needed	  to	  be	  retrieved	  from	  the	  civilian	  populations,	  who	  were	  in	  
many	  locations,	  including	  Japan,	  in	  almost	  as	  bad	  a	  situation	  as	  the	  men	  themselves.	  Supplies	  
of	  food	  and	  clothes	  that	  were	  surplus	  to	  requirements	  were	  frequently	  shared	  with	  the	  locals,	  
and	  even	  with	  those	  few	  guards	  that	  remained.	  L.	  Bdr	  Toze,	  whose	  war	  ended	  in	  Korea,	  noted	  
in	  his	  diary	  that	  women	  and	  children	  were	  mobbing	  the	  lads	  for	  cigarettes	  and	  gum	  and	  that	  
‘we	  are	  loathe	  to	  accept	  money	  for	  purchases.’	  A	  Japanese	  guard	  was	  caught	  trying	  to	  steal	  
some	  of	  the	  parachute	  material:	  having	  been	  put	  in	  the	  cells	  for	  ten	  minutes	  and	  then	  made	  to	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carry	  water	  buckets	  for	  two	  hours,	  the	  astonished	  guard	  was	  then	  ‘given	  a	  big	  meal	  and	  as	  
much	  parachute	  as	  he	  wanted.	  They	  can’t	  understand	  that	  sort	  of	  treatment.’236	  
For	  a	  few	  of	  the	  POWs	  at	  the	  end	  of	  captivity	  such	  magnanimity	  was	  narrated	  through,	  and	  
indeed	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  result	  of,	  a	  reversion	  to	  the	  seemingly	  redemptive	  and	  orientalised	  
visions	  of	  western	  cultural	  superiority.	  Carpenter,	  on	  a	  train	  to	  a	  transit	  camp	  in	  Bangkok,	  
recalled	  coming	  upon	  a	  group	  of	  bedraggled	  Japanese	  POWs	  who	  were	  being	  used	  to	  load	  
wood	  for	  trains.	  Some	  of	  them	  were	  suffering	  from	  dysentery	  and	  too	  weak	  to	  move,	  they	  lay	  
in	  their	  own	  waste,	  a	  situation	  that	  would	  no	  doubt	  have	  held	  some	  resonance	  for	  the	  now	  
liberated	  British	  who	  gave	  them	  food,	  water	  and	  cigarettes.	  
We	  had	  suffered	  3	  ½	  years	  of	  this	  ourselves,	  but	  unlike	  the	  Japs	  we	  showed	  
compassion	  to	  our	  former	  enemies.	  	  That	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  civilised	  Christians	  
and	  inhuman	  heathens….	  All	  the	  terrible	  things	  we	  had	  dreamed	  of	  doing	  to	  our	  
captors	  if	  we	  ever	  had	  the	  chance,	  well	  here	  was	  our	  chance,	  but	  not	  a	  single	  one	  of	  us	  
thought	  about	  revenge.	  That	  is	  compassion!237	  
	  
Although	  this	  story	  occurs	  in	  a	  number	  of	  accounts	  at	  differing	  times,	  and	  thus,	  not	  for	  the	  first	  
time	  in	  Carpenter’s	  account,	  may	  be	  somewhat	  apocryphal,	  this	  does	  not	  detract	  from	  its	  use	  
in	  this	  context	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  power	  of	  resurgent	  western	  values,	  linked	  again	  in	  this	  
example	  to	  the	  civilising	  influence	  of	  Christianity.	  What	  tends	  to	  lend	  its	  message	  of	  moral	  
superiority	  less	  substance	  in	  this	  particular	  case	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  same	  author	  offers	  a	  
somewhat	  conflicting	  account	  of	  allied	  compassion	  at	  Camp	  Tamuan	  at	  the	  surrender.	  Here	  
several	  British	  paratroopers	  entered	  the	  camp,	  having	  been	  covertly	  observing	  it	  with	  a	  view	  to	  
organising	  resistance	  to	  any	  attempts	  to	  kill	  the	  prisoners.	  Despite	  their	  instructions	  forbidding	  
any	  reprisals	  on	  the	  guards,	  the	  senior	  officer	  of	  the	  rescue	  party,	  on	  seeing	  the	  condition	  of	  
the	  prisoners,	  is	  alleged	  to	  have	  given	  them	  a	  half	  hours	  grace	  ‘and	  turned	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  the	  
proceedings.	  I	  suppose	  this	  will	  be	  frowned	  upon	  by	  the	  do	  gooders	  and	  they	  will	  call	  us	  
animals.	  My	  answer	  is	  simple	  –	  they	  should	  have	  been	  there.’	  Whilst	  still	  awaiting	  departure	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orders	  at	  Tamuan	  some	  three	  weeks	  later,	  a	  group	  of	  prisoners	  were	  brought	  back	  to	  the	  camp	  
from	  a	  jungle	  work	  party,	  their	  beatings	  by	  the	  Korean	  guards	  a	  sign	  that	  this	  group	  were	  
unaware	  of	  the	  end	  of	  hostilities.	  ‘The	  Korean	  guards	  …	  never	  stood	  a	  chance’	  before	  order	  
was	  restored	  by	  the	  paratroopers.238	  
Wirless	  Operater	  Oakley,	  awaiting	  repatriation	  from	  Singapore,	  experienced	  conflicting	  
emotions	  on	  a	  visit	  to	  the	  harbour.	  Walking	  with	  a	  fellow	  POW	  they	  paused	  ‘to	  watch	  with	  
uncontrolled	  glee	  some	  Jap	  soldiers	  being	  made	  to	  work	  clearing	  debris	  at	  the	  rate	  they	  
previously	  demanded	  of	  us.’	  An	  Australian	  guard	  wandered	  over,	  and	  offered	  to	  turn	  his	  back	  if	  
they	  wanted	  to	  exact	  some	  revenge.	  When	  they	  both	  declined	  his	  offer,	  the	  guard	  knocked	  a	  
Japanese	  prisoner	  unconscious	  with	  his	  rifle	  butt	  regardless.	  For	  Oakley,	  who	  had	  been	  happy	  
to	  enjoy	  the	  reversal	  of	  roles	  in	  the	  context	  of	  work,	  this	  was	  a	  disturbing	  step	  too	  far:	  	  
‘Although	  we	  had	  witnessed	  similar	  Jap	  viciousness	  on	  a	  regular	  basis,	  we	  both	  found	  it	  most	  
unsettling	  that	  our	  side	  could	  be	  just	  as	  depraved.’239	  
Whilst	  there	  was	  undoubtedly	  revenge	  and	  retaliation	  in	  a	  number	  of	  locations,	  frequently	  
involving	  the	  victorious	  allied	  troops	  and	  their	  new	  Japanese	  prisoners,	  for	  most	  of	  the	  POWs	  
survival	  outweighed	  any	  immediate	  passion	  for	  vengeance.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  emotions	  was	  
relief,	  often	  joyful,	  as	  Private	  Dixon	  remembered;	  ‘this	  to	  me	  was	  not	  the	  time	  to	  retaliate	  but	  
to	  rejoice.’240	  At	  other	  places	  the	  relief	  was	  more	  subdued,	  expressed	  with	  a	  mute	  sense	  of	  
numbness.	  ‘The	  truck	  pulled	  out	  of	  camp.	  We	  watched	  it	  go	  in	  silence.	  From	  our	  men	  came	  no	  
shouts	  of	  anger,	  no	  threats	  of	  violence,	  no	  demonstration	  of	  anti-­‐Japanese	  feeling.	  …	  The	  
silence	  said	  it	  all.’241	  
Many	  of	  the	  accounts	  also	  went	  silent	  upon	  repatriation,	  as	  the	  former	  prisoners	  attempted	  to	  
re-­‐adjust	  to	  freedom	  and	  civilian	  life	  again.	  It	  would	  be	  some	  time	  before	  ex-­‐POWs,	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individually	  through	  their	  memoirs	  and	  collectively	  in	  the	  associations	  that	  sprang	  up	  in	  the	  
post-­‐war	  period,	  would	  find	  their	  voice	  again.	  
	  
2.7.	  Conclusions.	  
The	  widespread	  antipathy	  of	  British	  POWs	  for	  their	  Japanese	  captors	  was	  not	  a	  uniform	  
condition,	  and	  varied	  in	  both	  its	  development	  and	  its	  origins.	  For	  some	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  sense	  of	  
racial	  superiority	  and	  antagonism	  was	  present	  from	  the	  start,	  whilst	  in	  others	  the	  development	  
of	  enmity	  would	  be	  the	  result	  of	  their	  bitter	  experience	  of	  captivity.	  
Those	  servicemen	  who	  exhibited	  early	  antipathy	  did	  so	  through	  the	  use	  of	  racialized	  epithets	  
and	  imagery,	  with	  some	  suggesting	  that	  the	  press	  were	  a	  source	  of	  such	  images.	  Detailed	  
scrutiny	  of	  the	  newspapers	  of	  the	  period	  found	  only	  a	  little	  evidence	  to	  support	  such	  a	  
connection.	  Indeed,	  when	  examined	  in	  the	  context	  of	  two	  substantial	  opportunities	  to	  
denigrate	  Japan,	  the	  widespread	  movement	  to	  boycott	  Japanese	  goods	  and	  the	  Nanking	  
Atrocity,	  the	  press	  was	  neutral	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  verged	  on	  being	  sympathetic	  to	  that	  nation’s	  
cause.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  attack	  on	  the	  Allies	  in	  1941	  that	  the	  press	  propaganda	  machine	  
swung	  into	  action	  against	  the	  new	  enemy,	  by	  which	  time	  its	  opportunity	  to	  influence	  the	  men	  
on	  convoy	  to	  their	  new	  destination	  in	  Singapore	  had	  largely	  passed.	  	  	  
The	  pages	  of	  the	  newspapers,	  whilst	  not	  leading	  anti-­‐Japanese	  feeling	  in	  the	  pre-­‐war	  period,	  
did	  however	  on	  rare	  occasions	  reflect	  it.	  The	  letters	  sent	  to	  the	  Daily	  Mirror	  in	  response	  to	  the	  
attack	  on	  Shanghai	  in	  1937	  shine	  a	  bright	  light	  through	  a	  narrow	  window	  onto	  the	  selected	  
views	  of	  its	  ordinary	  readership.	  	  The	  double	  page	  spread	  featuring	  the	  ‘ape	  cabinet’	  in	  the	  
Picture	  Post	  was	  a	  more	  explicit,	  if	  equally	  rare	  opportunity	  for	  a	  reader’s	  response	  to	  indicate	  
the	  acceptance	  that	  such	  ideas	  had	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  public	  at	  large.	  A	  further	  confirmation	  
of	  the	  widespread	  traction	  of	  this	  imagery	  was	  its	  more	  common	  usage	  as	  soon	  as	  hostilities	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opened.	  The	  use	  of	  simian	  and	  other	  racialised	  cartoons	  and	  tropes	  in	  the	  Jane	  strip,	  and	  those	  
that	  followed	  it	  into	  the	  war	  of	  print,	  indicate	  that	  the	  press	  knew	  that	  such	  images	  would	  be	  
readily	  received	  and	  understood	  by	  their	  readerships.	  Whilst	  the	  men	  of	  the	  18th	  Division	  were	  
not	  exposed	  to	  the	  newly	  antagonistic	  pages	  of	  the	  British	  press,	  they	  were	  subjected	  to	  
similarly	  essentialised	  and	  thus	  far	  more	  dangerous	  misrepresentations	  of	  their	  awaiting	  foe,	  
the	  Japanese	  serviceman.	  	  
Not	  all	  of	  the	  men	  were	  taken	  in	  by	  such	  evocations	  however,	  with	  some,	  particularly	  those	  
with	  a	  left	  of	  centre	  outlook,	  questioning	  not	  only	  such	  imagery	  but	  also	  the	  briefings	  and	  the	  
rumours	  that	  followed	  them	  into	  combat.	  Such	  tolerant	  perspectives	  would	  eventually	  be	  
tested	  to	  their	  limits	  and	  succumb	  to	  the	  harsh	  reality	  that	  most	  faced	  in	  captivity.	  This	  
experiential	  development	  of	  antipathy	  offers	  some	  parallels	  to	  the	  process	  of	  combat	  
motivation	  and	  antagonism,	  as	  suggested	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Barkawi	  and	  Kraljic	  for	  the	  14th	  
Army	  in	  the	  Burma	  theatre	  of	  operations.	  	  
Whilst	  the	  continuum	  between	  early	  and	  later	  developing	  antipathy	  provides	  a	  useful	  model	  
for	  tracking	  the	  trajectory	  of	  negative	  attitudes	  to	  the	  Japanese,	  there	  are	  very	  human	  
contradictions	  and	  complexities	  contained	  within	  it,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  danger	  that	  in	  
oversimplifying	  the	  situation,	  it	  becomes	  an	  entirely	  singular	  experience.	  	  Whilst	  this	  chapter	  
has	  focussed	  on	  the	  development	  of	  antipathy	  and	  some	  of	  its	  causes,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
recognise	  that	  there	  were	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  POW	  experiences,	  not	  all	  of	  them	  negative.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  major	  paradoxes	  involves	  an	  oft	  stated	  hatred	  for	  all	  Japanese,	  in	  accounts	  that	  had	  
frequent	  positive	  references	  to	  both	  civilians	  and	  servicemen	  that	  would	  seem	  to	  contradict	  
such	  all-­‐encompassing	  assertions.	  Even	  the	  most	  vitriolic	  accounts	  contain	  some	  such	  
sympathetic	  expression,	  the	  cases	  of	  Houghton	  and	  Parry	  being	  rich	  and	  remarkable	  examples	  
of	  just	  such	  varied	  responses.	  Some	  of	  the	  more	  cerebral	  accounts	  even	  acknowledge	  the	  
intellectual	  inconsistency	  of	  such	  a	  position,	  whilst	  continuing	  to	  adopt	  it.	  In	  Dawson’s	  account	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the	  strength	  of	  feeling	  generated	  by	  the	  worst	  aspects	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  captivity	  served	  to	  
overpower	  the	  not	  uncommon	  more	  positive	  incidents.	  	  
Before	  the	  war	  the	  press	  had	  portrayed	  a	  differentiated	  Japanese	  population,	  separating	  the	  
militarists	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  society,	  including	  the	  Emperor,	  Parliament	  and	  the	  civilian	  masses.	  
Even	  the	  officers	  were	  separated	  from	  the	  ordinary	  soldiers.	  Once	  hostilities	  commenced	  the	  
whole	  Japanese	  population	  became	  one	  amorphous	  entity,	  to	  be	  defeated.	  For	  many	  of	  the	  
POWs	  the	  “Japanese”	  were	  similarly	  amalgamated,	  regardless	  of	  the	  better	  elements	  that	  they	  
came	  across	  and	  the	  variety	  of	  conditions	  encountered,	  and	  became	  an	  ordeal	  to	  be	  survived.	  
It	  was	  the	  Japanese	  command	  structure	  that	  held	  ultimate	  power	  over	  the	  multi-­‐national	  force	  
of	  men	  that	  guarded	  them,	  and	  thus	  these	  few	  men	  came	  to	  represent	  Japan	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  
many	  of	  their	  eyes.	  
Much	  of	  the	  received	  version	  of	  how	  the	  POWs	  viewed	  their	  world	  of	  captivity	  has	  been	  
informed	  by	  the	  development	  of	  a	  post-­‐war	  discourse	  that	  has	  come	  to	  be	  defined	  by	  a	  largely	  
singular	  memory	  of	  that	  incarceration.	  The	  final	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  post-­‐war	  period,	  
through	  the	  often	  divergent	  strands	  of	  individual	  reconciliation	  and	  mass	  media	  














The	  group	  with	  whom	  the	  BORs	  would	  have	  most	  contact	  during	  captivity	  were	  their	  fellow	  
prisoners	  of	  war.	  Whilst	  the	  respective	  allied	  commands	  would	  try	  to	  keep	  them	  apart	  for	  
organisational	  reasons,	  the	  different	  nationalities	  were	  frequently	  sharing	  the	  same	  camps	  and	  
work	  parties.	  In	  this	  chapter	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  British	  POWs	  and	  their	  former	  
comrades-­‐in-­‐arms	  will	  be	  examined	  to	  see	  how	  international	  relations	  fared	  under	  the	  stresses	  
and	  strains	  of	  incarceration.	  Such	  inter-­‐communal	  relations	  have	  been	  posited	  by	  Australian	  
historian	  Rosalind	  Hearder	  as	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  existing	  literature:	  
There	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  broad	  scholarship	  in	  cross-­‐cultural	  aspects	  of	  captivity	  between	  the	  
various	  allied	  forces.	  Major	  studies	  tend	  to	  follow	  national	  lines,	  with	  relationships	  
between	  the	  Allied	  groups	  only	  mentioned	  occasionally,	  and	  usually	  perpetuate	  
stereotypes	  about	  the	  behaviours	  and	  motivations	  of	  various	  groups,	  without	  regard	  
to	  differences	  of	  location	  or	  camp,	  standards	  of	  health,	  or	  leadership.243	  
	  
This	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  make	  a	  small	  start	  in	  addressing	  this	  lacuna,	  whilst	  providing	  further	  
insights	  in	  to	  the	  mind-­‐sets	  of	  the	  British	  prisoners.	  
	  In	  general	  the	  different	  nationalities	  rubbed	  along	  together,	  the	  needs	  of	  prison	  life	  and	  the	  
shared	  antipathy	  to	  the	  Japanese	  providing	  the	  common	  bond	  that	  linked	  them	  together.	  
Contained	  within	  the	  accounts	  and	  the	  literature	  there	  was	  however	  one	  major	  exception	  to	  
this	  picture	  of	  allied	  harmony,	  the	  Dutch.	  Such	  antipathy	  was	  by	  no	  means	  ubiquitous;	  there	  
were	  as	  many	  men	  who	  had	  good	  things	  to	  say	  as	  there	  were	  those	  whose	  perspectives	  were	  
negative,	  but	  whatever	  the	  outlook,	  this	  particular	  location	  of	  antagonism	  was	  widely	  
recognised.	  	  It	  is	  the	  British	  outlooks	  on	  the	  Dutch	  that	  provide	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter,	  and	  a	  
variety	  of	  reasons	  for	  the	  tensions	  between	  them	  are	  identified,	  including	  a	  perceived	  lack	  of	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fighting	  spirit,	  linguistic	  difference	  and	  the	  problematic	  locations	  of	  food	  and	  work.	  	  I	  propose	  
however	  that	  the	  most	  common	  source	  of	  antipathy,	  where	  it	  was	  expressed,	  was	  racial	  
difference,	  a	  factor	  that	  could	  also	  lie	  submerged	  below	  some	  of	  the	  other	  reasons	  that	  were	  
articulated.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  Dutch	  prisoners	  were	  Eurasian,	  and	  it	  was	  this	  aspect	  that	  was	  a	  
key	  factor	  for	  many	  of	  those	  BORs	  who	  expressed	  negative	  attitudes	  towards	  them.	  	  
Following	  this	  introduction	  a	  back-­‐ground	  survey	  is	  provided	  of	  the	  overall	  allied	  POW	  
situation,	  including	  the	  non-­‐European	  servicemen	  captured	  at	  the	  various	  allied	  surrenders	  in	  
Asia	  during	  the	  early	  months	  of	  the	  war.	  British	  relations	  with	  their	  English	  speaking	  allies,	  
from	  Australia,	  Canada	  and	  the	  USA	  are	  briefly	  considered,	  before	  a	  lengthier	  analysis	  of	  those	  
with	  the	  Dutch	  POWs.	  The	  definition	  of	  being	  Dutch	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  East	  Indies	  (NEI)	  at	  that	  
time,	  and	  the	  demographics	  of	  the	  Koninklijk	  Nederlands	  Indisch	  Leger	  (KNIL),	  the	  Dutch	  
Colonial	  Army,	  are	  clarified	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  in	  elucidating	  why	  race	  was	  the	  single	  most	  
common	  factor	  in	  a	  persistent	  antipathy	  from	  some	  of	  the	  BORs	  towards	  the	  Dutch	  during	  
captivity.	  The	  lesser	  factors	  of	  pre-­‐captivity	  obstructiveness	  and	  fighting	  spirit,	  and	  those	  of	  
post	  surrender	  jealousies	  in	  the	  camps	  are	  then	  considered	  before	  the	  concluding	  remarks.	  
	  
3.2.	  Prisoners	  of	  War:	  A	  General	  Survey.	  
Between	  the	  fall	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  in	  late	  December	  1941	  and	  the	  surrender	  on	  the	  Bataan	  
peninsula	  in	  the	  Philippines	  in	  early	  April	  of	  1942,	  the	  Japanese	  had	  captured	  large	  swathes	  of	  
territory	  as	  well	  as	  over	  280,000	  allied	  servicemen,	  including	  around	  140,000	  colonial	  troops.	  
There	  had	  been	  two	  main	  thrusts,	  the	  first	  down	  the	  Malayan	  peninsula	  and	  thence	  into	  the	  
western	  zone	  of	  the	  NEI,	  whilst	  the	  other	  had	  conquered	  the	  Philippine	  archipelago	  en-­‐route	  
to	  the	  eastern	  part	  of	  the	  NEI	  and	  the	  Pacific	  island	  chains.	  The	  thrusts	  down	  the	  Malayan	  
peninsula	  and	  into	  the	  NEI	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  British	  and	  all	  of	  the	  Dutch	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and	  Australian	  captives,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  much	  smaller	  number	  of	  Americans,	  most	  of	  who	  were	  
captured	  during	  the	  campaign	  in	  the	  Philippines.	  A	  lesser	  number	  of	  British	  in	  Burma,	  and	  
British	  and	  Canadians	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  also	  entered	  captivity.	  After	  these	  initial	  successes,	  with	  
the	  exception	  of	  some	  unfortunate	  airmen,	  there	  would	  be	  few	  further	  prisoners	  to	  be	  taken	  
as	  the	  momentum	  of	  the	  war	  quickly	  turned	  against	  the	  Japanese	  following	  the	  crucial	  naval	  
and	  air	  encounters,	  in	  the	  Coral	  Sea	  and	  at	  Midway	  in	  May	  and	  June	  of	  1942.	  Despite	  the	  swift	  
halting	  of	  the	  Japanese	  juggernaut,	  it	  would	  take	  three	  and	  a	  half	  years	  and	  two	  atomic	  bombs	  
before	  the	  men	  taken	  prisoner	  in	  those	  early	  days	  would	  be	  released	  from	  captivity.	  As	  Table	  2	  
shows,	  many	  of	  them	  never	  came	  back.	  
Table	  2.	  “Western”	  POW	  numbers	  and	  mortality,	  1941-­‐1945.244	  
 Prisoners of War Total Deaths Death Rate (%) 
British 50,016        (50,016) 12,433         (12,433) 25              (25) 
Dutch 42,233        (37,000) 8,500           (8,500) 20              (23) 
American 25,600        (21,580) 10,650         (7,107) 41              (33) 
Australian 22,376        (21,726) 8,031           (7,412) 36             (34)                  
Canadian 1,684          (1,691) 267              (273) 16              (16) 
Total 141,909      (132,134) 39,881         (35,756) 28              (27) 
(Figures	  in	  brackets	  are	  from	  the	  Tokyo	  War	  Crimes	  Trial.)	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  Hack,	  Carl,	  and	  Blackburn,	  Kevin,	  “Japanese–occupied	  Asia	  from	  1941	  to	  1945:	  one	  occupier,	  many	  
captivities	  and	  memories.”	  in	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives,	  p4.	  This	  table	  represents	  a	  
modification	  of	  the	  figures	  presented	  in	  the	  Tokyo	  War	  Crimes	  Trial	  record,	  in	  that	  it	  includes	  the	  later	  
upward	  revisions	  to	  the	  national	  figures	  of;	  Dutch	  POWs	  by	  de	  Jong,	  L.	  (2002)	  The	  Collapse	  of	  a	  Colonial	  
Society:	  The	  Dutch	  in	  Indonesia	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  KITLV,	  Leiden.	  p272;	  American	  POWs	  by	  
Kerr,	  E.	  Bartlett.	  (1985)	  Surrender	  and	  Survival:	  The	  Experience	  of	  American	  POWs	  in	  the	  Pacific	  1941-­‐
1945.	  Willian	  Morrow,	  New	  York.	  p339;	  Australian	  POWs	  by	  McCormack	  and	  Nelson,	  “The	  Bridge	  on	  the	  
River	  Kwai	  and	  King	  Rat”,	  in;	  McCormack	  and	  Nelson,	  The	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway,	  p162;	  Canadian	  
POWs	  in	  Johnson,	  Gregory	  A.	  “The	  Canadian	  Experience	  of	  the	  Pacific	  War:	  Betrayal	  and	  forgotten	  
captivity.”	  in	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives,	  p133.	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3.2.1.	  Differences	  in	  mortality.	  
There	  has	  been	  little	  analysis	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  mortality	  rates	  experienced	  by	  the	  POWs	  of	  
the	  different	  allied	  nations	  in	  Asia.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  not	  a	  surprise	  given	  the	  national	  focus	  of	  
most	  authors	  and	  the	  consequent	  dearth	  of	  comparative	  studies	  that	  bridge	  such	  boundaries.	  
At	  some	  specific	  locations,	  where	  the	  relative	  figures	  are	  available,	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  
to	  identify	  the	  causes	  of	  national	  variations.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  “F”	  Force,	  the	  7,062	  men	  
sent	  to	  the	  Railway	  from	  Changi	  in	  April	  of	  1943,	  consisting	  of	  3,662	  Australians	  and	  3,400	  
Britons.	  Within	  a	  year	  1,060	  of	  the	  Australians	  and	  2,036	  of	  the	  British	  had	  died,	  29%	  and	  60%	  
respectively.	  McCormack	  ascribes	  this	  difference	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  British	  authorities	  had	  
believed	  the	  Japanese	  when	  they	  stated	  that	  this	  was	  a	  posting	  that	  required	  no	  work	  or	  
marching,	  and	  thus	  selected	  men	  who	  were	  already	  sick.	  The	  Australians	  were	  less	  trusting	  and	  
picked	  the	  fittest	  men	  they	  could	  find.245	  This	  variation	  of	  mortality	  rates,	  contradicting	  those	  
at	  the	  population	  level,	  was	  it	  seems	  to	  do	  with	  the	  specific	  criteria	  for	  selection	  as	  opposed	  to	  
any	  intrinsic	  national	  characteristics.	  At	  the	  Burma	  end	  of	  the	  Railway,	  in	  the	  No5	  Group	  of	  
prisoners,	  the	  demographics	  of	  mortality	  were	  also	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  overall	  figures,	  with	  the	  
“Asian	  Dutch”	  troops	  suffering	  28%	  losses,	  compared	  to	  21%	  of	  Americans	  and	  only	  14%	  of	  
Australians.246	  	  
Such	  examples	  demonstrate	  the	  complexities	  introduced	  by	  situational	  factors	  into	  any	  
attempt	  to	  rationalise	  the	  theatre	  wide	  figures.	  A	  more	  useful	  approach,	  although	  one	  still	  
fraught	  with	  issues	  of	  numerical	  accuracy,	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  key	  general	  locations	  of	  mortality	  
and	  there	  were	  two	  of	  these.	  The	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway	  was	  the	  final	  resting	  place	  for	  at	  
least	  12,399	  prisoners,	  and	  probably	  several	  thousand	  more.247	  The	  other	  major	  source	  of	  
mortality	  was	  the	  Japanese	  transport	  ships	  used	  to	  move	  the	  POW	  labour	  forces	  to	  new	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  McCormack,	  Gavan.	  “Apportioning	  the	  blame:	  Australian	  trials	  for	  railway	  crimes.”	  In;	  McCormack	  
and	  Nelson,	  The	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway,	  pp100-­‐101.	  
246	  Kinvig,	  River	  Kwai	  Railway,	  p166.	  	  	  
247	  Kinvig,	  River	  Kwai	  Railway,	  p198.	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workplaces.	  Whilst	  there	  were	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  men	  who	  died	  due	  to	  the	  poor	  
conditions	  on	  board,	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  deaths	  occurred	  when	  the	  “hellships”	  were	  sunk	  by	  
the	  Allies.	  Exact	  numbers	  are	  again	  elusive,	  the	  figures	  ranging	  from	  a	  Japanese	  estimate	  of	  
10,800	  (out	  of	  50,000	  so	  transported)248	  to	  the	  22,001	  claimed	  by	  Van	  Waterford.249	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  lack	  of	  precision	  in	  the	  statistics,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  around	  
two	  thirds	  of	  the	  POW	  deaths	  in	  Asia	  occurred	  at	  these	  locations.	  These	  figures	  suggest	  at	  least	  
a	  partial	  explanation	  for	  the	  national	  cohort	  with	  the	  lowest	  mortality	  rates.	  The	  Canadians,	  
captured	  at	  Hong	  Kong,	  benefitted	  from	  not	  working	  on	  the	  Railway	  and	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
four	  ships	  that	  took	  them	  to	  Japan	  made	  that	  shorter	  journey	  successfully.250	  	  
Less	  clear	  cut	  is	  why	  the	  Dutch	  suffered	  relatively	  less	  overall	  than	  the	  other	  allies	  (excepting	  
the	  Canadians),	  having	  experienced	  both	  the	  Railway	  and	  the	  hellships.251	  	  This	  has	  been	  
attributed	  to	  their	  greater	  resistance	  to	  tropical	  diseases,	  supposedly	  inherent	  in	  those	  of	  local	  
descent,	  and	  accumulated	  by	  those	  of	  European	  origin	  during	  their	  time	  in	  the	  Indies.	  Whilst	  
there	  is	  some	  validity	  in	  this	  argument	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  local	  ecological	  
knowledge	  in	  providing	  extra	  food	  sources	  and	  the	  utility	  of	  prior	  experience	  of	  tropical	  
medicine,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  systematic	  vaccination	  against	  some	  conditions,	  there	  are	  however	  a	  
number	  of	  factors	  that	  mitigate	  the	  validity	  of	  such	  a	  blanket	  assertion.	  As	  already	  noted,	  the	  
“Asian	  Dutch”	  had	  the	  highest	  mortality	  rate	  on	  the	  Burma	  end	  of	  the	  Railway,	  despite	  their	  
prior	  vaccinations	  and	  greater	  botanical	  knowledge.	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  Daws,	  Gavan.	  (1994:	  2005	  edn)	  Prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese.	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  London.p297.	  	  
249	  Waterford,	  Van.	  (1994)	  Prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese	  in	  World	  War	  II:	  Statistical	  History,	  Personal	  
Narratives	  and	  Memorials	  Concerning	  POWs	  in	  Camps	  and	  on	  Hellships,	  Civilian	  Internees,	  Asian	  Slave	  
Laborers	  and	  Others	  Captured	  in	  the	  Pacific	  Theater.	  McFarland	  and	  Company,	  Jefferson,	  North	  Carolina.	  
p168.	  Of	  this	  number	  at	  least	  4,120	  were	  Javanese	  labourers	  on	  board	  the	  Junyo	  Maru,	  sunk	  off	  Sumatra	  
in	  September	  1944.	  1,520,	  mostly	  Dutch,	  POWs	  also	  perished	  after	  HMS	  Tradewind	  torpedoed	  the	  ship.	  
Waterford	  was	  himself	  one	  of	  the	  few	  survivors.	  
250	  Roland,	  Charles	  G.	  (2001)	  Long	  Night’s	  Journey	  into	  Day:	  Prisoners	  of	  War	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Japan,	  
1941-­‐1945.	  Wilfred	  Laurier	  Univ	  Press.,	  pp209-­‐215.	  
251Dutch	  losses	  on	  the	  Railway	  of	  3,100,	  and	  a	  further	  4,000	  on	  the	  ships	  are	  suggested	  in:	  de	  Jong,	  L.	  




Even	  more	  problematic	  is	  this	  respect	  is	  the	  primary	  assumption	  that	  local	  people	  were	  
innately	  better	  equipped	  to	  deal	  with	  tropical	  diseases.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  inconsistencies	  in	  this	  
assumption	  is	  to	  be	  found	  on	  the	  railroads.	  On	  the	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway	  a	  much	  larger	  
proportion	  of	  locally	  recruited	  labourers	  died	  than	  did	  POWs252.	  	  On	  the	  less	  well	  known,	  but	  
equally	  deadly,	  Paken	  Baroe	  Railway	  in	  Sumatra,	  the	  ratio	  of	  civilian	  deaths	  was	  even	  higher.	  
Of	  the	  22,000	  Indonesian	  labourers	  (romusha)	  who	  made	  it	  to	  the	  railway	  (thousands	  had	  
already	  died	  when	  the	  Jonyu	  Maru	  was	  sunk),	  only	  5,000	  survived,	  a	  mortality	  rate	  of	  around	  
77%,	  as	  compared	  to	  that	  for	  the	  POWs	  of	  14%.253	  	  Whilst	  the	  romusha	  certainly	  died	  in	  their	  
thousands	  of	  the	  same	  combination	  of	  disease,	  malnutrition	  and	  overwork	  as	  did	  the	  POWs,	  
meaningful	  comparisons	  are	  again	  rendered	  problematic	  by	  the	  differing	  conditions	  that	  the	  
two	  groups	  found	  themselves	  in.	  The	  limited	  camp	  organisation	  and	  medical	  care	  that	  was	  
available	  to	  the	  POWs	  gave	  them	  a	  far	  better	  chance	  of	  survival	  than	  their	  civilian	  
counterparts,	  who	  were	  treated	  with	  even	  less	  consideration	  by	  the	  Japanese.	  	  Local	  
populations,	  including	  the	  NEI	  Dutch,	  were	  intrinsically	  no	  more	  immune	  to	  disease	  than	  their	  
western	  counterparts.	  
Whilst	  the	  Americans	  were	  only	  present	  on	  the	  Railway	  in	  small	  numbers,	  their	  initial	  period	  of	  
captivity	  on	  the	  Philippines	  was	  more	  testing	  than	  that	  experienced	  by	  most	  of	  their	  allies.	  The	  
Bataan	  Death	  March	  was	  followed	  by	  an	  extremely	  harsh	  first	  few	  months	  at	  Camp	  O’Donnell,	  
where	  one	  officer	  calculated	  that	  17%	  of	  the	  Americans	  who	  survived	  the	  death	  march	  
perished	  between	  the	  end	  of	  April	  and	  the	  start	  of	  July,	  1942.254	  Their	  losses	  on	  the	  transport	  
ships	  were	  almost	  certainly	  greater	  than	  those	  suffered	  by	  the	  other	  allies,	  as	  a	  higher	  
proportion	  of	  their	  POWs	  were	  sent	  to	  Japan.255	  Similar	  specific	  locations	  of	  mortality	  helped	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  See	  Chapter	  5	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  exposition	  of	  the	  condition	  of	  Asian	  Labourers	  on	  the	  Railway.	  
253	  de	  Jong,	  The	  Collapse,	  p385	  
254	  Olson,	  John	  E.	  (1985)	  O'Donnell:	  Andersonville	  of	  the	  Pacific.	  Lake	  Quivara,	  KS:	  pp1-­‐6.	  Cited	  in	  U.S.	  
Prisoners	  of	  War	  and	  Civilian	  American	  Citizens	  Captured	  and	  Interned	  by	  Japan	  in	  World	  War	  II:	  The	  
Issue	  of	  Compensation	  by	  Japan.	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  Report	  for	  Congress.	  
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/usprisoners_japancomp.htm#the	  
255	  Waterford,	  Prisoners,	  pp153-­‐168.	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to	  inflate	  figures	  of	  Australian	  mortality;	  Hank	  Nelson	  estimated	  that	  35%	  of	  those	  who	  died	  
did	  so	  on	  the	  Railway,	  23%	  in	  Borneo	  (the	  location	  of	  the	  Sandakan	  Death	  March	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  war),	  20%	  at	  sea,	  9%	  on	  Ambon	  and	  13%	  at	  other	  locations.256	  	  
Such	  specific	  additional	  locations	  offer	  some	  explanation	  for	  the	  higher	  losses	  incurred	  by	  both	  
nations	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  British,	  but	  such	  factors	  can	  be	  at	  best	  only	  indicative.	  Qualitative	  
and	  quantitative	  issues	  await	  any	  historian	  brave	  enough	  to	  attempt	  a	  treatment	  of	  this	  
subject.	  The	  difficulty	  in	  ascertaining	  precise	  causes	  of	  death	  in	  many	  locations,	  and	  the	  
identification	  of	  differing	  logistical	  and	  organisational	  conditions,	  both	  geographically	  and	  
temporally,	  make	  theatre	  wide	  international	  comparisons	  problematic.	  There	  is	  a	  very	  large	  
(but	  far	  from	  complete)	  set	  of	  data	  regarding	  different	  sites	  and	  causes	  of	  mortality,	  in	  need	  of	  
integration	  into	  a,	  if	  not	  fully	  comprehensive,	  then	  at	  least	  a	  more	  comprehensible	  corpus.	  
These	  constraints	  go	  some	  way	  to	  explaining	  the	  lack	  of	  comparative	  studies	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
academic	  literature.	  
3.2.2.	  Colonial	  POWs	  and	  Japanese	  segregation.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  140,000	  Western	  prisoners,	  the	  Japanese	  also	  captured	  a	  similar	  number	  of	  
soldiers	  serving	  in	  the	  colonial	  armies	  of	  Britain,	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  NEI.	  The	  Japanese	  promptly	  
separated	  the	  British	  and	  Dutch	  prisoners	  from	  their	  white	  officers,	  and	  adopted	  a	  carrot	  and	  
stick	  approach	  to	  redirecting	  their	  loyalties.	  The	  Indian	  Army	  had	  provided	  around	  half	  of	  the	  
British	  rank	  and	  file	  in	  Malaya	  and	  Singapore	  and	  shortly	  after	  the	  surrender	  most	  of	  its	  60,000	  
captured	  soldiers	  were	  gathered	  together	  at	  Farrer	  Park	  in	  Singapore	  and	  urged	  to	  join	  the	  
Indian	  National	  Army.257	  	  There	  are	  differing	  estimates	  as	  to	  how	  successful	  such	  inducements	  
were;	  numbers	  ranging	  from	  20,000	  to	  30,000	  men	  have	  been	  suggested.258	  For	  those	  who	  did	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  Nelson,	  Hank.	  “Measuring	  the	  railway.”	  In	  McCormack	  and	  Nelson,	  The	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway,	  p20.	  
257	  Douds,	  G.J.	  “Indian	  POWs	  in	  the	  Pacific,	  1941-­‐45.”	  In	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives,	  p60.	  
258	  Douds	  (p60)	  suggests	  20,000,	  based	  on	  wartime	  British	  government	  documents,	  which	  would	  be	  a	  
third	  of	  his	  overall	  total.	  In	  contrast,	  Peter	  Stanley	  has	  proposed	  that	  30,000	  were	  recruited,	  and	  
constituted	  three	  quarters	  of	  a	  total	  of	  40,000	  Indian	  prisoners.	  Stanley,	  Peter.	  (2002)”"Great	  in	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not	  take	  the	  Emperor’s	  yen,	  an	  uncertain	  future	  awaited.	  Many	  of	  those	  who	  chose	  not	  to	  sign	  
up	  found	  themselves	  sent	  to	  the	  outer	  reaches	  of	  the	  Japanese	  domain,	  primarily	  to	  New	  
Guinea,	  New	  Britain	  and	  Bougainville,	  where	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  some	  of	  them	  
became	  the	  victims	  of	  Japanese	  cannibalism,	  as	  the	  allied	  stranglehold	  on	  shipping	  left	  outlying	  
enemy	  garrisons	  in	  a	  state	  of	  starvation.259	  
Some	  23,000	  non-­‐European	  Dutch	  troops	  went	  through	  the	  same	  process	  of	  separation	  and	  
around	  15,000	  were	  recruited	  to	  Japanese	  forces,	  in	  this	  case	  as	  heiho,	  in	  auxiliary	  units	  
formed	  to	  support	  the	  Japanese	  military.260	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  50%	  of	  these	  men	  died	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  conditions	  that	  they	  endured.261	  The	  majority	  of	  these	  “volunteers”	  initially	  
came	  from	  the	  Javanese	  contingent,	  as	  the	  Japanese	  were	  reticent	  to	  recruit	  the	  Christian	  
Ambonese	  and	  Manadonese	  who	  were	  perceived	  as	  more	  loyal	  to	  the	  Dutch	  cause.	  The	  latter	  
would	  eventually	  be	  subject	  to	  such	  conscription,	  with	  many	  choosing	  to	  remain	  in	  captivity,	  
whilst	  others	  used	  their	  new	  degree	  of	  freedom	  to	  escape	  to	  Australia	  or	  to	  join	  guerrilla	  
forces	  in	  the	  Philippines.262	  
The	  initial	  treatment	  of	  the	  large	  number	  of	  Filipino	  troops	  captured	  on	  the	  Bataan	  peninsula	  
was	  considerably	  more	  severe	  than	  that	  experienced	  by	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Indian	  Army	  and	  
the	  KNIL.	  Of	  the	  62,100	  Filipinos	  taken	  prisoner,	  it	  has	  been	  estimated	  that	  between	  5,000	  and	  
10,000	  died	  on	  the	  Death	  March	  to	  Camp	  O’Donnell.263	  Their	  ordeal	  continued	  in	  the	  
desperate	  conditions	  at	  that	  camp	  for	  several	  months,	  with	  334	  dying	  on	  the	  worst	  day	  of	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
adversity":	  Indian	  prisoners	  of	  war	  in	  New	  Guinea.”	  Journal	  of	  the	  Australian	  War	  Memorial,	  No	  37.	  
http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/indians.asp	  
259	  Tanaka,	  Yuki.	  (1996)	  Hidden	  Horrors:	  Japanese	  War	  Crimes	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  Westview	  Press,	  Oxford.	  
pp	  120-­‐124.	  Australians,	  local	  civilians	  and	  Formosan	  auxiliaries	  were	  also	  victims	  of	  such	  acts.	  pp111-­‐
134.	  
260	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  “Japanese-­‐occupied	  Asia”;	  in	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives,	  p14.	  
261	  De	  Jong,	  The	  Collapse,	  p307.	  
262	  A	  party	  of	  47	  Ambonese	  heiho	  escaped	  from	  the	  Tanimbar	  Islands;	  22	  made	  it	  to	  Australia,	  whilst	  20	  
died	  at	  sea	  and	  5	  were	  recaptured	  and	  executed.	  In	  the	  Philippines	  a	  group	  of	  10	  Manadonese	  heiho	  
joined	  a	  guerrilla	  band	  in	  August	  1943;	  in;	  de	  Jong,	  The	  Collapse,	  p307.	  
263	  Falk,	  Stanley	  L.	  (1962)	  Bataan:	  The	  March	  of	  Death.	  Norton,	  New	  York.	  pp196-­‐198.	  Falk	  suggests	  that	  
around	  650	  out	  of	  the	  9,921	  American	  prisoners	  died	  on	  the	  march.	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captivity	  at	  O’Donnell.264	  Eventually	  the	  Japanese	  screened	  and	  released	  most	  of	  the	  Filipino	  
troops,	  recruiting	  some	  into	  the	  Philippine	  Constabulary.265	  There	  has	  been	  little	  discussion	  of	  
the	  continued	  captivity	  and	  suffering	  of	  the	  Filipinos	  in	  the	  American	  literature	  or	  of	  the	  
reasons	  why	  they	  were	  held	  for	  much	  longer	  than	  their	  Indian	  and	  Indonesian	  counterparts	  
before	  being	  offered	  their	  parole.266	  It	  seems	  possible	  that	  this	  was	  a	  response	  to	  the	  longer	  
and	  stiffer	  resistance	  put	  up	  by	  a	  force	  that	  was,	  unusually	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  initial	  
encounters	  of	  the	  war,	  largely	  made	  up	  of	  Asian	  colonial	  troops.267	  The	  Japanese	  may	  well	  
have	  been	  attempting	  to	  punish	  the	  Filipinos	  for	  their	  continued	  resistance,	  and	  to	  
emphatically	  demonstrate	  who	  was	  now	  in	  charge.	  
With	  most	  of	  the	  Asian	  prisoners	  released	  or	  recruited	  into	  Japanese	  auxiliary	  formations,	  and	  
those	  members	  of	  the	  Indian	  Army	  who	  had	  refused	  to	  join	  the	  INA	  being	  kept	  apart	  from	  the	  
rest	  of	  the	  POWs,	  contacts	  between	  them	  and	  the	  BORs	  would	  be	  very	  rare.	  More	  frequent	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  “Japanese-­‐occupied	  Asia”;	  in	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives,	  p10.	  
265	  One	  young	  prisoner	  who	  had	  joined	  the	  Constabulary	  was	  selected	  by	  the	  Japanese	  to	  be	  one	  of	  a	  
party	  of	  27	  Filipino	  pensionados	  ,	  young	  scholars	  sent	  to	  Japan	  to	  be	  trained	  as	  future	  leaders	  of	  a	  
Japanese	  controlled	  Philippines.	  Whilst	  there	  he	  had	  an	  interview	  with	  General	  Masaharu	  Homma,	  the	  
commander	  of	  the	  Japanese	  forces	  in	  the	  Bataan	  campaign.	  De	  Asis,	  Leocadio.	  (1979)	  From	  Bataan	  to	  
Tokyo:	  Diary	  of	  a	  Filipino	  Student	  in	  Wartime	  Japan,	  1943-­‐1944.	  The	  University	  of	  Kansas.	  pp143-­‐146.	  
266	  In	  an	  example	  of	  this	  approach	  that	  elides	  the	  continued	  months	  of	  suffering	  for	  the	  Filipino	  
prisoners,	  one	  historian	  bluntly	  notes	  that	  after	  the	  march	  from	  Bataan:	  ’Most	  Filipino	  POWs	  were	  then	  
paroled.’	  In;	  Corbett,	  P.	  Scott.	  “In	  the	  eye	  of	  a	  hurricane:	  Americans	  in	  Japanese	  custody	  during	  World	  
War	  II.”;	  in	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives,	  p114.	  
267	  In	  his	  diary	  entry	  regarding	  the	  meeting	  with	  General	  Homma,	  de	  Asis	  noted	  that	  the	  Filipinos	  ‘were	  
bearing	  practically	  the	  whole	  brunt	  of	  the	  fight	  in	  Bataan’	  and	  that	  they	  had	  suffered	  50,000	  deaths.	  




3.3.	  Relations	  with	  Australian,	  American	  and	  Canadian	  POWs.	  
Contacts	  with	  fellow	  allied	  prisoners	  of	  differing	  nationality	  were	  contingent	  upon	  the	  place	  of	  
capture	  and	  the	  subsequent	  movements	  ordered	  by	  the	  Japanese	  to	  meet	  labour	  
requirements.	  Those	  that	  were	  captured	  in	  the	  NEI,	  had	  close	  experience,	  both	  before	  and	  
after	  capitulation,	  of	  the	  Dutch.	  This	  continued	  and	  incorporated	  those	  Britons	  captured	  in	  
Malaya	  and	  Singapore,	  as	  many	  were	  sent	  through	  Changi	  and	  up	  to	  the	  Railway.	  These	  
locations	  were	  shared	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  Australians	  who	  had	  surrendered	  at	  the	  fall	  of	  
Singapore.	  Contacts	  with	  Americans	  were	  initially	  rare,	  but	  increased	  as	  the	  fittest	  of	  the	  
survivors	  of	  the	  Railway	  were	  transported	  to	  Japan	  upon	  its	  completion,	  and	  joined	  the	  large	  
number	  of	  US	  POWs	  who	  had	  already	  been	  shipped	  there	  from	  the	  Philippines.	  It	  was	  also	  in	  
Japan	  that	  the	  BORs	  came	  into	  limited	  contact	  with	  the	  smaller	  numbers	  of	  Canadian	  other	  
ranks	  that	  had	  been	  taken	  prisoner	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  where	  their	  officers	  had	  remained.268	  
Most	  references	  to	  their	  English	  speaking	  fellow	  prisoners	  (including	  the	  Dutch	  of	  European	  
origins)	  are	  positive,	  if	  on	  occasion	  a	  little	  stereotyped.	  Typical	  of	  many	  were	  the	  views	  
expressed	  by	  one	  NCO,	  Percy	  Mutimer:	  “The	  Aussies	  were	  the	  best	  people	  in	  the	  world	  …	  their	  
nature,	  their	  happy	  go	  [lucky]	  style,	  their	  derision	  for	  the	  Japanese,	  their	  toughness,	  and	  they	  
had	  a	  terrific	  sense	  of	  humour.”	  The	  Americans	  he	  met	  were	  also	  “a	  great	  bunch,	  although	  a	  
little	  raw”,	  not	  having	  seen	  any	  action.	  Unused	  to	  bombing	  raids,	  they	  would	  dive	  to	  the	  floor	  if	  
someone	  made	  the	  sound	  of	  a	  plane,	  much	  to	  the	  amusement	  of	  the	  BORs.	  Mutimer	  recalled	  
with	  regret	  that	  his	  outlooks	  were	  also	  coloured	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  chauvinistic	  superiority;	  “Proud	  
of	  being	  British	  and	  all	  of	  that	  rubbish	  –	  I’m	  not	  proud	  of	  it	  looking	  back	  on	  it.”269	  In	  a	  similar	  
vein	  Bdr	  Parry	  described	  the	  Canadians	  he	  met	  in	  Japan	  in	  the	  last	  year	  of	  the	  war	  as	  ‘a	  fine	  
crowd’,	  although	  he	  qualified	  his	  view	  regarding	  their	  ability	  to	  take	  the	  punishing	  work	  regime	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268	  The	  Canadians	  mostly	  shared	  camps	  with	  US	  prisoners	  in	  Japan.	  
269	  IWM:	  Mutimer,	  P.J.	  (Sound	  4801)	  Reel2.	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at	  Sendai	  Camp:	  	  ‘Don’t	  think	  the	  Canadians	  will	  stick	  the	  mine	  as	  well	  as	  our	  boys	  have	  
done.’270	  	  
There	  were	  of	  course	  exceptions	  to	  this	  harmonious	  picture,	  jealousies	  arose	  over	  American	  
Red	  Cross	  parcels	  and	  catering	  rackets	  in	  some	  of	  the	  camps	  in	  Japan,	  and	  finally	  after	  the	  war	  
as	  Americans	  were	  repatriated	  before	  the	  British	  and	  the	  Australians.271	  But	  these	  were	  largely	  
seen	  for	  the	  exceptional	  events	  that	  they	  were,	  and	  have	  been	  consigned	  as	  uncharacteristic	  
and	  unrepresentative	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  prisoners	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  world.	  For	  the	  
Dutch,	  and	  in	  particular	  those	  of	  Eurasian	  heritage,	  the	  record	  has	  been	  less	  tolerant.	  
	  
3.4.	  Relations	  with	  Dutch	  POWs.	  
In	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  remarks,	  particularly	  those	  of	  an	  unfavourable	  nature,	  regarding	  
their	  English	  speaking	  allies,	  the	  Dutch	  drew	  a	  number	  of	  comments,	  positive	  and	  negative	  in	  
equal	  measure,	  from	  twelve	  of	  the	  twenty	  documentary	  records	  that	  constituted	  the	  core	  case	  
studies	  for	  this	  project.	  These	  accounts	  confirm	  Hearder’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  Dutch	  were	  
‘usually	  the	  whipping	  boys	  of	  Allied	  descriptions	  of	  behaviour	  in	  captivity.’272	  Even	  the	  fraternal	  
brotherhood	  of	  freemasonry	  was	  not	  immune	  from	  these	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  tensions,	  as	  when	  at	  
Changi,	  in	  ‘another	  part	  of	  the	  camp	  Dutch	  Freemasons	  meeting	  under	  the	  Grand	  Orient	  of	  the	  
Netherlands,	  actually	  initiated	  a	  candidate,	  though	  British	  and	  Australian	  Masons	  refused	  to	  
acknowledge	  its	  regularity.’273	  	  Max	  Hastings	  has	  written	  of	  a	  near	  ubiquitous	  tension	  in	  camps	  
which	  the	  Dutch	  were	  sharing	  with	  other	  allied	  prisoners,	  suggesting	  that	  ‘selfishness	  on	  behalf	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270	  IWM:	  Parry;	  19/5/1945;	  25/5/1945.	  
271	  Many	  of	  the	  Dutch	  were	  still	  languishing	  in	  Thailand	  in	  late	  1946	  as	  the	  British	  prevaricated	  over	  
allowing	  them	  back	  to	  the	  NEI,	  then	  in	  a	  state	  of	  civil	  unrest.	  See	  Ooms,	  Arno.	  “The	  Dutch	  Community	  in	  
Thailand,	  1945-­‐46.”	  In	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives.	  pp278-­‐302.	  
272	  Hearder,	  “Memory,	  methodology,	  and	  myth.”	  




of	  their	  own	  people’	  was	  responsible.274	  Whilst	  some	  of	  the	  antipathy	  expressed	  by	  the	  BORs	  
in	  this	  study	  falls	  under	  such	  a	  heading,	  it	  does	  not	  satisfactorily	  explain	  a	  more	  underlying	  
sense	  of	  antagonism	  present	  in	  most	  of	  the	  negative	  accounts.	  	  The	  factor	  of	  race	  becomes	  
more	  explicit	  in	  some	  of	  the	  sound	  records	  at	  the	  IWM,	  where	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  the	  anti-­‐
Dutch	  narrative	  frequently	  leads	  the	  interviewer	  to	  ask	  about	  attitudes	  to	  the	  Dutch,	  usually	  
prompted	  by	  a	  reference	  to	  shared	  camps	  from	  the	  interviewee.275	  Before	  analysing	  race	  as	  a	  
source	  of	  antagonism,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  more	  clearly	  define	  who	  ”the	  Dutch”	  were.	  
3.4.1.	  The	  racial	  demographics	  of	  the	  KNIL.	  
The	  effects	  of	  more	  than	  300	  years	  of	  colonial	  rule	  and	  the	  attempts	  by	  the	  authorities	  to	  
rationalise	  and	  regulate	  the	  social,	  racial,	  political	  and	  economic	  hierarchies	  that	  developed	  
during	  this	  time,	  left	  what	  was	  at	  first	  view	  a	  complex	  and	  often	  contradictory	  set	  of	  rules	  and	  
categorisations.	  In	  order	  to	  clarify	  this	  situation	  and	  understand	  the	  responses	  of	  the	  BORs	  to	  
their	  Dutch	  fellow	  captives,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  first	  comprehend	  something	  of	  the	  racial	  
constitution	  of	  the	  colonial	  army	  of	  the	  NEI,	  the	  KNIL,	  and	  that	  of	  the	  wider	  population	  that	  it	  
was	  recruited	  from.	  
Unlike	  the	  more	  recent	  colonial	  arrival	  in	  the	  region	  of	  the	  British,	  French	  and	  Americans,	  the	  
Dutch	  had	  a	  longer	  history	  of	  settlement	  that	  dated	  back	  to	  the	  late	  16th	  century.	  In	  common	  
with	  the	  other	  imperial	  powers	  this	  had	  led	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  to	  classify	  the	  offspring	  
from	  relationships	  between	  the	  white	  colonisers	  and	  the	  local	  Asian	  populations,	  but	  on	  a	  
much	  larger	  scale	  given	  the	  longer	  time	  scales	  involved.	  In	  1892	  the	  authorities	  decided	  to	  
grant	  Dutch	  nationality	  (and	  hence	  European	  legal	  status)	  to	  these	  children,	  on	  condition	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274	  Hastings,	  Max.	  (2007)	  Nemesis:	  The	  Battle	  for	  Japan,	  1944-­‐45.	  Harper	  Perennial,	  London.	  pp378-­‐379.	  
275	  Whilst	  not	  as	  prevalent	  or	  pre-­‐ordained	  in	  the	  interview	  plan	  as	  the	  standard	  question	  at	  the	  end	  
regarding	  ‘attitudes	  to	  the	  Japanese’,	  the	  regularity	  of	  its	  occurrence	  endorses	  the	  notion	  that	  this	  
location	  of	  tension	  is	  a	  standard	  part	  of	  the	  FEPOW	  narrative.	  Some	  BORs	  actually	  raise	  the	  subject	  in	  
response	  to	  the	  widespread	  notions	  of	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  antipathy,	  stating	  their	  more	  favourable	  outlooks	  in	  
an	  attempt	  to	  redress	  the	  balance;	  see;	  IWM:	  Henderson,	  p490.	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they	  were	  recognised	  by	  their	  (white)	  father.276	  Concerned	  by	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  white	  
women	  taking	  Indonesian	  husbands,	  a	  patriarchal	  mixed	  marriage	  law	  was	  introduced	  in	  1898	  
that	  stipulated	  that	  the	  (white)	  wife,	  and	  any	  offspring,	  would	  not	  be	  classed	  as	  European.277	  
In	  a	  further	  less	  formal	  classification	  of	  those	  holding	  European	  status	  and	  being	  of	  Dutch	  
nationality,	  new	  arrivals	  from	  Holland	  were	  termed	  totoks,	  whilst	  those	  Dutch	  of	  European	  
origins,	  but	  born	  in	  the	  Indies,	  and	  those	  European	  Dutch	  of	  mixed	  descent,	  were	  grouped	  
together	  as	  Indisch,	  in	  more	  of	  a	  cultural	  categorisation.278	  Stoler	  has	  suggested	  that	  in	  1900	  
the	  Indisch	  population	  accounted	  for	  around	  75%	  of	  the	  European	  category,279	  whilst	  at	  the	  
1930	  census,	  74%	  of	  those	  with	  Dutch	  nationality	  were	  Indisch	  and	  26%	  were	  totoks.	  Thus	  in	  a	  
population	  of	  60.7	  million	  in	  1930,	  there	  were	  158,000	  Dutch	  nationals	  born	  in	  the	  NEI,	  and	  
56,000	  who	  were	  born	  in	  Holland.280	  	  De	  Jong	  has	  estimated	  that	  at	  the	  start	  of	  hostilities	  in	  
Asia	  the	  number	  holding	  Dutch	  nationality	  in	  the	  NEI	  was	  360,000,	  of	  whom	  80,000	  were	  white	  
Dutch,	  and	  280,000	  were	  Eurasian	  Dutch.281	  
The	  KNIL	  recruited	  around	  two	  thirds	  of	  its	  membership	  from	  the	  Dutch	  nationals	  and	  the	  
remainder	  from	  local	  Indonesians,	  primarily	  in	  Java,	  Ambon	  and	  Manado.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276	  Kemperman,	  Jeroen.	  “Introduction.”	  In	  de	  Jong,	  The	  Collapse,	  p11.	  There	  were	  two	  other	  categories	  
in	  this	  colonial	  classification,	  ‘Natives’	  (Indonesians)	  and	  ‘Foreign	  Orientals’.	  Japanese,	  Filipinos,	  Thais	  
and	  Egyptians	  would	  be	  granted	  ‘European’	  status	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century.	  
277	  Stoler,	  Anne	  Laura.	  “Sexual	  Affronts	  and	  Racial	  Frontiers:	  European	  Identities	  and	  the	  Cultural	  Politics	  
of	  Exclusion	  in	  Colonial	  Southeast	  Asia.”	  In;	  Cooper,	  Frederick,	  and	  Stoler,	  Anne	  Laura.	  (1997)	  Tensions	  of	  
Empire:	  Colonial	  Cultures	  in	  Bourgeois	  World.	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  London.	  p217.	  
278	  Totok	  is	  derived	  from	  a	  Javanese	  word	  for	  new.	  The	  category	  of	  Indisch	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  range	  of	  
definitional	  variations,	  some	  adopting	  a	  more	  specific	  Eurasian	  ethnic	  basis,	  others	  a	  wider	  pan-­‐ethnic	  
cultural	  basis.	  See;	  Houben,	  Vincent	  J.H.	  “Boundaries	  of	  Race.”	  in	  Fischer-­‐Tine,	  Harald.,	  and	  Gehrmann,	  
Susanne.	  (2009)	  Empires	  and	  Boundaries:	  Rethinking	  Race,	  Class	  and	  Gender	  in	  Colonial	  Settings.	  
Routledge,	  London.	  pp69-­‐70.	  
279	  Stoler,	  “Sexual	  Affronts”,	  in;	  Cooper	  and	  Stoler,	  Tensions,	  p	  198-­‐99.	  
280	  Van	  Imhoff,	  Evert,	  and	  Beets,	  Gijs.	  (2004)	  “A	  Demographic	  History	  of	  the	  Indo-­‐Dutch	  Population,	  
1930-­‐2001.”	  Journal	  of	  Population	  Research.	  Vol	  21,	  p54.	  
281	  De	  Jong,	  The	  Collapse,	  p509.	  Naturally,	  given	  the	  uncertainty	  attached	  to	  quantitative	  issues	  in	  most	  
aspects	  of	  the	  study	  of	  POWs	  in	  Asia,	  there	  are	  alternative	  figures.	  Raben	  proposes	  that	  260,000	  out	  of	  
290,000	  Europeans	  at	  that	  time	  were	  Dutch,	  most	  of	  whom	  were	  Dutch	  Eurasians.	  Raben,	  Remco.	  
“Dutch	  memories	  of	  captivity	  in	  the	  Pacific	  War.”	  in:	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives,	  p94.	  Van	  
Imhoff	  and	  Beets	  suggest	  that	  there	  would	  have	  been	  305,000	  holding	  European	  status;	  in;	  van	  Imhoff	  
and	  Beets,	  “A	  Demographic	  History”,	  p55.	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hostilities	  in	  1941	  there	  were	  around	  65,000	  serving	  in	  the	  KNIL282,	  roughly	  two	  thirds	  of	  whom	  
were	  Dutch	  nationals	  (the	  majority	  being	  Eurasians)	  and	  one	  third	  Indonesians.283	  As	  already	  
noted,	  most	  of	  the	  Indonesians	  had	  been	  detached	  from	  the	  Dutch	  nationals	  early	  in	  captivity,	  
and	  in	  most	  locations	  the	  latter	  group	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  homogenous	  cohort	  by	  the	  Japanese.	  	  
There	  was	  one	  location	  where	  there	  was	  a	  further	  separation	  based	  along	  racial	  lines,	  and	  that	  
was	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  prisoners	  to	  be	  sent	  to	  Japan	  after	  the	  Railway	  had	  been	  completed.	  
Here	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  Japanese	  selected	  only	  the	  white	  Dutch	  to	  make	  the	  
journey,	  possibly	  reflecting	  issues	  of	  adjustment	  to	  the	  Japanese	  climate	  or	  a	  wider	  political	  
desire	  not	  to	  be	  contradicting	  the	  concept	  of	  pan-­‐Asian	  solidarity	  in	  front	  of	  the	  home	  
population.284	  In	  contradiction	  to	  this	  assertion	  are	  photographs	  from	  camps	  in	  Japan	  in	  which	  
Dutch	  Eurasians	  are	  clearly	  visible.285	  The	  explanation	  for	  this	  apparent	  incongruity	  is	  to	  be	  
found	  in	  a	  working	  party	  sent	  to	  Japan	  from	  Java	  in	  October	  1942,	  when	  the	  Dutch	  commander	  
at	  Cimahi	  Camp	  was	  ordered	  to	  select	  a	  group	  of	  700	  men	  with	  some	  technical	  knowledge.	  The	  
Dutch	  CO	  used	  the	  opportunity	  to	  rid	  himself	  of	  what	  he	  considered	  to	  be	  undesirable	  
elements	  of	  his	  command,	  and	  along	  with	  around	  100	  British,	  Australian	  and	  American	  troops,	  
he	  deliberately	  chose	  600	  Dutch	  Eurasian	  lower	  ranks.	  In	  a	  statement	  shortly	  after	  his	  
liberation	  one	  Dutch	  officer	  described	  the	  process	  in	  terms	  that	  echoed	  standard	  colonial	  
tropes	  of	  the	  social	  effects	  of	  miscegenation	  and	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  its	  resultant	  
offspring:	  
It	  would	  appear	  that	  in	  this	  selection	  procedure	  …	  the	  worst	  elements	  were	  singled	  out	  
…	  The	  majority	  of	  this	  contingent	  of	  prisoners	  of	  war	  comprised	  individuals	  from	  the	  
city	  and	  from	  the	  lower	  echelons	  of	  Indonesian	  society.	  Incited	  and	  informed	  by	  
troublemakers	  …	  this	  group	  of	  POWs	  was	  virtually	  a	  military	  gang.	  …	  All	  authority	  other	  
than	  that	  of	  the	  Japanese	  was	  denied.	  This	  attitude	  was	  also	  often	  noticeable	  among	  
the	  more	  educated.	  …	  A	  large	  number	  of	  these	  Dutch	  Eurasians	  …	  were	  opposed	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282	  De	  Jong,	  The	  Collapse,	  p283.	  
283	  Ooms,	  “The	  Dutch	  community”	  in;	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives.	  p	  278.	  
284	  Ooms,	  “The	  Dutch	  Community”,	  in;	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives,	  pp278,297.	  
285	  For	  example	  see:	  Raben,	  Representing,	  p180.	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	  there	  were	  also	  references	  in	  British	  
accounts	  that	  contradict	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  this	  selection	  process.	  
118	  
	  
full-­‐blooded	  Europeans	  and	  saw	  nothing	  but	  good	  …	  in	  a	  collaboration	  with	  an	  
enduring	  domination	  by	  Japan.286	  
	  
This	  supposedly	  troublesome	  and	  untrustworthy	  group	  of	  assorted	  city	  slickers,	  lower	  class	  
layabouts	  and	  those	  who,	  despite	  their	  education,	  remained	  ungrateful	  for	  everything	  the	  
colonial	  regime	  had	  done	  for	  them,	  were	  sent	  to	  Japan	  before	  official	  Japanese	  policy	  
regarding	  the	  importation	  of	  labour	  to	  the	  home	  islands	  had	  crystallised.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
completion	  of	  the	  Railway	  a	  year	  later,	  this	  racial	  parameter	  had	  been	  established.	  
There	  was	  also	  a	  differential	  policy	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  Dutch	  civilians	  and	  their	  internment.	  
The	  Japanese	  could	  be	  as	  concerned	  by	  racial	  mixing	  as	  their	  colonial	  predecessors,	  and	  were	  
similarly	  troubled	  when	  it	  came	  to	  issues	  of	  categorisation	  and	  definition.	  They	  developed	  a	  
classification	  of	  Eurasians	  for	  the	  NEI	  that	  had	  eight	  sub-­‐divisions,	  including	  one	  which	  
proscribed	  those	  born	  in	  the	  Indies	  whose	  parents	  were	  both	  totoks.287	  Despite	  such	  a	  complex	  
system,	  for	  political,	  practical	  and	  no	  doubt	  logistical	  reasons,	  the	  majority	  of	  internees	  were	  
white	  Dutch,	  and	  if	  proof	  were	  provided	  of	  an	  Indonesian	  grandparent	  the	  civilian	  usually	  
remained,	  initially	  at	  least,	  at	  liberty.288	  Even	  with	  the	  greater	  part	  of	  the	  Dutch	  national	  
population	  remaining	  at	  large,	  over	  105,000	  were	  still	  interned,	  men,	  women	  and	  children	  in	  
roughly	  equal	  numbers,	  a	  figure	  far	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  25,000	  other	  nationals	  interned	  by	  the	  
Japanese.	  Around	  13%	  of	  them	  died,	  again	  a	  number	  far	  in	  excess	  of	  that	  of	  the	  other	  
internees,	  of	  whom	  around	  5%	  did	  not	  survive.289	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286	  Cited	  in;	  de	  Jong,	  The	  Collapse,	  p348.	  
287	  De	  Jong,	  The	  Collapse,	  p513.	  
288	  Such	  an	  arbitrary	  categorization	  was	  not	  foolproof,	  as	  the	  case	  of	  the	  de	  Rochemont	  family	  
demonstrated.	  Whilst	  her	  Eurasian	  husband	  Eddij,	  a	  sergeant	  in	  the	  KNIL,	  went	  into	  captivity,	  his	  Dutch	  
born	  wife	  Nettij,	  with	  their	  two	  children,	  managed	  to	  escape	  internment	  by	  convincing	  the	  Japanese	  
that	  she	  too	  had	  been	  born	  locally	  and	  was	  of	  mixed	  descent.	  Kok,	  Rene.	  “Sedan	  de	  Luxe”.	  In;	  Raben,	  
Representing,	  pp181-­‐182.	  
289	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  “Japanese-­‐occupied	  Asia”,	  in;	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives,	  pp5-­‐6.	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Thus	  whilst	  in	  the	  civilian	  camps	  Dutch	  of	  European	  origin	  were	  the	  larger	  part	  of	  those	  Dutch	  
nationals	  interned,	  in	  the	  POW	  camps	  it	  was	  Dutch	  Eurasians	  that	  constituted	  the	  majority	  of	  
those	  Dutch	  with	  whom	  the	  BORs	  would	  come	  into	  contact	  with.	  
3.4.2.	  Race	  as	  a	  source	  of	  antipathy.	  
In	  order	  to	  identify	  race	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  attitudes	  to	  the	  Dutch,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  step	  back	  and	  
consider	  the	  prevalence	  of	  such	  thinking	  at	  a	  general	  level	  amongst	  the	  BORs.290	  In	  order	  to	  get	  
some	  general	  idea	  of	  this	  the	  diaries	  were	  scrutinised	  for	  the	  use	  of	  racial	  epithets,	  and	  whilst	  
there	  were	  several	  in	  use,	  by	  far	  the	  most	  widespread	  was	  the	  term	  “wog”.291	  Half	  of	  the	  
twelve	  diarists	  used	  this	  term,	  several	  of	  them	  with	  considerable	  frequency.292	  It	  was	  
employed	  as	  a	  derogatory	  expression	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  local	  peoples,	  including	  the	  Javanese,	  
Tamils	  and	  Koreans.293	  Its	  use	  was	  by	  no	  means	  ubiquitous	  however,	  with	  other	  diarists	  
consciously	  using	  the	  then	  less	  racially	  loaded	  term	  ‘natives’	  as	  a	  descriptor	  of	  local	  
populations,	  indicating	  that	  whilst	  racialized	  outlooks	  were	  quite	  common,	  they	  were	  by	  no	  
means	  all-­‐pervasive.294	  Tony	  Kushner	  reached	  a	  similar	  conclusion	  in	  his	  study	  of	  the	  responses	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290	  Race	  is	  considered	  in	  this	  context	  as	  visible	  physiological	  difference,	  as	  opposed	  to	  more	  loosely	  used	  
meanings	  current	  at	  the	  time	  where	  it	  could	  also	  be	  used	  in	  the	  context	  of	  nationality	  and	  religion.	  
Angus	  Calder	  critiqued	  Mass	  Observation	  for	  their	  confusing	  admixture	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘race’	  and	  ‘nation’	  
in	  their	  June	  1939	  Race	  Directive,	  although	  such	  conflations	  were	  a	  common	  practice	  at	  the	  time.	  
Calder,	  Angus.	  “Mass	  Observation:	  1937-­‐1949”,	  in:	  Bulmer,	  Martin	  (ed)	  (1985)	  Essays	  on	  the	  History	  of	  
British	  Sociological	  Research.	  CUP.	  pp133-­‐135.	  
291	  In	  this	  survey	  post	  hoc	  memoirs	  (none	  of	  which	  contained	  such	  epithets	  apart	  from	  those	  specifically	  
aimed	  at	  the	  Japanese)	  were	  discounted	  due	  to	  the	  effects	  of;	  changes	  over	  time	  in	  what	  was	  deemed	  
socially	  acceptable	  language,	  and	  those	  that	  might	  result	  from	  a	  more	  public	  audience	  for	  the	  document	  
concerned.	  Diaries,	  written	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  with	  a	  much	  reduced	  audience	  scope	  provided	  a	  more	  
realistic	  lens	  through	  which	  contemporary	  thinking	  could	  be	  gauged.	  An	  example	  of	  the	  mutability	  of	  
such	  linguistic	  terminology	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  published	  version	  of	  Rose’s	  diaries,	  where	  he	  states:	  
‘The	  locals	  stopped	  accepting	  Japanese	  paper	  money.’	  Rose,	  William	  C.	  (2002)	  You	  Shook	  My	  Hand:	  
Once	  Upon	  	  A	  Wartime	  12.	  Extracts	  from	  the	  diaries	  of	  Sergeant	  William	  C.	  Rose	  R.A.F.V.R.	  Japanese	  
P.O.W.	  Barny	  Books,	  Hough	  on	  the	  Hill,	  Grantham.	  p24.	  The	  original	  manuscript	  entry	  read:	  ‘WOGS	  
WOULD	  NOT	  ACCEPT	  JAP	  PAPER	  MONEY.’	  IWM:	  Rose,	  3/5/1942.	  
292	  See:	  IWM:	  Houghton;	  Parry;	  Pitfield	  and	  Rose.	  
293	  Gavan	  Daws	  suggested	  that	  the	  term	  had	  a	  much	  wider	  applicability	  when	  used	  by	  the	  POWs.	  	  He	  
wrote	  that:	  ‘For	  the	  British,	  in	  their	  own	  famous	  phrase,	  Wogs	  (meaning	  lesser	  breeds	  with	  a	  touch	  of	  
the	  tar	  brush)	  began	  at	  Calais.’	  Daws,	  Prisoners,	  pp21-­‐22.	  Despite	  this	  strident	  turn	  of	  phrase,	  as	  part	  an	  
explanation	  that	  he	  intends	  to	  use	  the	  prisoners’	  own	  words,	  unconditioned	  by	  any	  present	  day	  
conceptions	  of	  political	  correctness,	  in	  the	  text	  he	  only	  uses	  the	  word	  once,	  in	  an	  non-­‐quoted	  reference	  
to	  tobacco.	  See	  p115.	  
294	  See:	  IWM:	  Flello;	  Holden	  and	  Strong.	  
120	  
	  
to	  the	  Mass	  Observation	  directives	  on	  race,	  suggesting	  that	  ‘anti-­‐black	  racism	  was	  far	  from	  
universally	  accepted	  in	  Britain’	  at	  that	  time.295	  	  
Kushner’s	  research	  was	  focussed	  on	  attitudes	  in	  Britain	  itself,	  where	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
population	  were	  lacking	  direct	  contacts	  with	  people	  of	  colour,	  and	  whilst	  still	  acknowledging	  
the	  importance	  of	  the	  colonial	  discourse	  he	  identified	  a	  much	  wider	  set	  of	  factors	  that	  
influenced	  racial	  thinking	  at	  home.296	  In	  contrast,	  the	  prisoners	  in	  Asia	  had	  found	  themselves	  
directly	  exposed	  to	  the	  discursive	  effects	  of	  empire,	  both	  on	  the	  journey	  to	  Asia	  and	  upon	  
arrival.	  Sheila	  Patterson,	  examining	  racialized	  attitudes	  in	  South	  London	  in	  the	  1950s	  found	  
that	  such	  effects	  could	  have	  a	  profound,	  although	  again	  not	  a	  universal,	  impact.	  	  
This	  is	  the	  sort	  of	  temporary	  “white	  man	  boss”	  situation	  that	  arises	  when	  British	  
troops	  or	  technicians	  are	  stationed	  in	  colonial	  territories	  or	  when	  British	  sailors	  go	  
ashore	  in	  Middle	  East	  or	  Asian	  ports.	  Such	  contacts	  are	  usually	  superficial,	  transient,	  
and	  unrepresentative,	  but	  they	  produce	  vivid	  and	  often	  derogatory	  impressions	  which	  
are	  the	  more	  difficult	  to	  correct	  because	  they	  are	  gained	  at	  first	  hand.	  Indeed,	  in	  South	  
London	  the	  only	  people,	  apart	  from	  a	  pathologically	  prejudiced	  handful,	  who	  displayed	  
uncompromising	  verbal	  hostility	  towards	  the	  coloured	  newcomers	  seemed	  to	  be	  those	  
who	  had	  had	  such	  first-­‐hand	  contacts	  with	  coloured	  people	  overseas	  during	  the	  war.	  
This	  “wog	  complex”	  was	  not	  evident	  in	  all	  who	  had	  served	  overseas,	  but	  it	  was	  
reasonably	  widespread,	  and	  of	  course	  tended	  to	  influence	  the	  views	  of	  others	  to	  some	  
extent.297	  
	  
Such	  colonially	  informed	  notions	  would	  continue	  to	  persist	  in	  captivity,	  despite	  the	  temporary	  
hiatus	  in	  the	  imperial	  hegemony	  that	  had	  generated	  them,	  and	  they	  were	  sharpened	  in	  the	  
minds	  of	  some	  of	  the	  men	  by	  the	  close	  proximity	  of	  their	  Dutch	  colleagues,	  with	  whom	  they	  
could	  now	  be	  living	  cheek	  by	  jowl.	  Felicia	  Yap	  has	  summarised	  this	  novel	  situation	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  civilian	  internees;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295	  Kushner,	  We	  Europeans,	  p227.	  
296	  In	  particular	  he	  identifies	  the	  influence	  of	  American	  media	  projections	  and	  the	  subsequent	  arrival	  of	  
Black	  GIs	  and	  their	  treatment	  by	  their	  white	  colleagues.	  Kuschner,	  We	  Europeans,	  pp	  124-­‐127;	  133-­‐134.	  




…	  internment	  effectively	  placed	  many	  Europeans	  into	  unaccustomed	  and	  uncontrolled	  
intimacy	  with	  the	  “undomesticated	  bodies”	  of	  Eurasians	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  and	  that	  the	  
bodily	  traumas	  of	  incarceration	  were	  aggravated	  by	  an	  underlying	  racial	  dimension.298	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Before	  examining	  the	  ‘racial	  dimension’,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  clarify	  one	  final	  aspect	  of	  the	  
situation	  regarding	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  relations,	  which	  is	  the	  range	  of	  descriptions	  that	  the	  BORs	  
used	  in	  describing	  their	  KNIL	  colleagues.	  As	  Ooms	  notes;	  ‘Due	  to	  different	  colonial	  practices	  
many	  English-­‐speaking	  POWs	  did	  not	  consider	  these	  men	  to	  be	  Dutch,	  but	  described	  them	  as	  
Javanese,	  Indonesian,	  Black	  Dutch	  or	  Eurasian.’299	  Further	  variations	  on	  this	  theme	  included	  
Colonial	  Dutch,	  Dutch	  Colonials	  and	  Coloured	  Dutch.	  Such	  terminology	  needs	  careful	  reading,	  
even	  more	  so	  when	  it	  is	  absent	  and	  the	  generic	  term	  Dutch	  is	  used.	  During	  his	  voyage	  to	  Japan	  
Sgt	  Rose	  uses	  the	  terms	  Dutch	  Javanese,	  Dutch,	  Dutch	  Colonials	  and	  Dutch	  again	  to	  
interchangeably	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  group	  of	  KNIL	  prisoners	  before	  they	  disembarked.300	  
Whilst	  no	  record	  has	  been	  found	  of	  the	  Dutch	  prisoners	  being	  referred	  to	  as	  “wogs”,	  possibly	  
reflecting	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  European	  blood	  that	  had	  lifted	  the	  Eurasian	  
men	  one	  step	  up	  in	  the	  contemporary	  perceptions	  of	  racial	  hierarchy,	  such	  a	  derogatory	  
meaning	  is	  implicit	  in	  many	  of	  the	  other	  descriptions	  outlined	  above.301	  Sgt	  Rose,	  on	  board	  the	  
Tofuku	  Maru	  bound	  for	  Japan,	  along	  with	  the	  aforementioned	  600	  Eurasian	  “troublemakers”	  
from	  Cimahi	  Camp,	  noted	  that:	  ‘NATURALLY	  THE	  ENGLISH	  LADS	  DO	  NOT	  GO	  MUCH	  ON	  THE	  
DUTCH	  COLONIALS	  &	  THEIR	  HABITS.’	  Three	  weeks	  later	  his	  outlook	  had	  not	  improved,	  as	  his	  
diary	  makes	  clear.	  ‘RUMOUR	  HAS	  IT	  THAT	  WE	  MAY	  SOON	  DOCK	  AT	  AN	  ISLAND	  SOUTH	  OF	  
JAPAN	  ON	  EITHER	  MON.	  OR	  TUES.	  NEXT	  &	  THERE	  LEAVE	  THE	  DUTCH!!’302	  In	  a	  similarly	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  Yap,	  “Eurasians”,	  p504.	  
299	  Ooms,	  “The	  Dutch	  Community”,	  in:	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives,	  p278.	  
300	  IWM:	  Rose;	  18/10/1942-­‐23/11/1942.	  
301	  There	  may	  also	  be	  an	  element	  of	  differentiating	  the	  military	  from	  the	  civilian	  in	  this	  context.	  Sgt	  Rose,	  
who	  invariably	  referred	  to	  Javanese	  civilians	  as	  ‘wogs’,	  noted	  that	  a	  ‘LARGE	  NUMBER	  OF	  JAVANESE	  
TROOPS	  RELEASED	  BY	  JAPS.’	  IWM:	  Rose;	  24/5/42.	  There	  may	  also	  have	  been	  a	  reason	  closer	  to	  home;	  
his	  wife’s	  maiden	  name	  was	  Khan,	  and	  had	  she	  been	  in	  Asia	  under	  the	  Japanese	  occupation	  rules	  she	  
would	  have	  possibly	  escaped	  internment,	  given	  that	  her	  grandfather	  was	  from	  Afghanistan.	  	  
302	  IWM:	  Rose;	  1/11/1942.;	  21/11/1942.	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dismissive	  vein,	  Pte	  Holden	  recalled	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  Dutch	  contingent	  at	  Nombrudai	  Camp	  on	  
the	  Railway:	  ‘We	  had	  our	  first	  contact	  with	  the	  Dutch	  prisoners	  here	  and	  were	  not	  
impressed.’303	  Another	  BOR	  recalled	  a	  bombing	  raid	  at	  Nom	  Pladuk	  in	  September	  1944,	  by	  
which	  time	  most	  of	  the	  white	  Dutch	  prisoners	  would	  have	  been	  sent	  to	  Japan:	  ‘I	  must	  mention	  
that	  the	  Dutch	  casualties	  exceeded	  ours	  immensely	  because	  these	  people	  can	  NOT	  keep	  their	  
heads	  in	  an	  emergency.’304	  Whilst	  the	  reactions	  of	  other	  nationalities	  to	  bombing	  raids	  were	  
the	  source	  of	  some	  comment	  by	  the	  BORs,	  who	  had	  already	  experienced	  the	  German	  raids	  at	  
home,	  they	  were	  never	  as	  disparaging	  or	  loaded	  with	  the	  racial	  imputation	  of	  ‘these	  people’.	  
The	  officers,	  despite	  their	  greater	  degree	  of	  separation	  from	  the	  lower	  ranks,	  were	  not	  
immune	  to	  such	  pronouncements.	  In	  a	  letter	  home	  just	  after	  the	  war	  had	  ended,	  Lt	  Hines	  
wrote:	  
Despite	  there	  being	  no	  love	  lost	  between	  ourselves	  and	  our	  gallant	  allies	  (Dutch),	  we	  
had	  a	  terrific	  party	  yesterday	  in	  celebration	  of	  Queen	  Wilhelmina	  of	  Holland’s	  
birthday.	  They	  are	  terrific	  boys	  for	  Royal	  Family	  birthday	  celebrations.	  As	  individuals	  
they	  are	  very	  charming	  but	  as	  a	  community	  they	  are	  perfectly	  poisonous.305	  
	  
This	  passage	  confirms	  that	  Dutch	  antagonism	  transcended	  the	  boundaries	  of	  military	  hierarchy	  
and	  provides	  a	  somewhat	  dismissive	  reference	  to	  ‘our	  [not	  so]	  gallant	  allies’;	  however	  it	  is	  the	  
final	  sentence	  that	  is	  most	  instructive	  in	  the	  present	  context.	  Whether	  the	  charming	  
individuals	  are	  the	  fellow	  (white)	  officers	  with	  whom	  he	  would	  have	  been	  likely	  to	  have	  had	  
the	  closest	  contacts	  is	  unclear;	  less	  disputable	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  poisonous	  community	  to	  
which	  he	  refers	  would	  have	  been	  primarily	  Eurasian.	  
Although	  the	  Dutch	  officers	  were	  predominantly	  white,	  there	  were	  a	  few	  Eurasians	  who	  had	  
managed	  to	  scale	  the	  colonial	  military	  hierarchy.	  	  This	  could	  be	  a	  source	  of	  surprise	  and	  
discomfort	  to	  their	  British	  colleagues	  as	  Lt	  Steeds	  recalled,	  when	  the	  new	  doctor	  arrived	  at	  his	  
camp	  near	  the	  Higashimizome	  coal	  mine	  in	  Japan.	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  IWM:	  Holden;	  p9.	  
304	  IWM:	  Caldwell;	  7/9/1944.	  
305	  IWM:	  Hines,	  D.V.	  (Docs	  463)	  31/8/1945.	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We	  were	  a	  little	  disappointed	  at	  first	  that	  he	  should	  be	  our	  new	  doctor,	  but	  later	  on	  he	  
proved	  to	  be	  a	  great	  asset.	  Dr	  Klerks	  was	  a	  small	  man,	  with	  Javanese	  blood	  showing	  
prominently	  in	  his	  physique	  and	  in	  his	  temperament.	  …	  He	  was	  a	  solitary	  man	  and	  
seldom	  came	  into	  our	  rooms	  at	  other	  times;	  no	  doubt	  his	  oriental	  outlook	  and	  the	  
need	  to	  speak	  in	  English	  kept	  him	  apart.306	  
	  
Steeds	  employs	  a	  standard	  racial	  device	  in	  his	  assessment	  of	  Dr	  de	  Klerks,	  ascribing	  his	  
personality	  to	  his	  mixed	  racial	  background.	  In	  explaining	  the	  doctor’s	  lack	  of	  socialisation,	  
Steeds	  plays	  on	  the	  established	  negative	  Dutch	  tropes	  of	  aloofness	  and	  language	  difference.	  
Yet	  Klerks	  was	  a	  capable	  linguist,	  able	  to	  speak	  not	  only	  English	  but	  also	  Japanese.307	  Language	  
is	  sometimes	  cited	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  Dutch	  isolation,	  but	  given	  that	  even	  more	  accounts	  stress	  
that	  most	  Dutch	  of	  European	  origin	  spoke	  English	  this	  may	  reflect	  a	  further	  element	  of	  racial	  
tensions	  dressed	  up	  this	  time	  in	  linguistic	  clothing.	  Presumably	  by	  the	  time	  that	  the	  British	  
officers	  realised	  what	  an	  asset	  his	  medical	  experience	  was,	  the	  initial	  cold	  reception	  had	  made	  
him	  realise	  that	  he	  was	  never	  really	  welcome	  outside	  of	  the	  surgery.	  
Although	  these	  documentary	  records	  are	  suggestive	  of	  a	  racially	  constructed	  antipathy	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  the	  authors,	  the	  most	  conclusive	  evidence	  of	  such	  perspectives	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  several	  
of	  the	  oral	  accounts	  at	  the	  IWM.	  Sgt	  Baynes	  was	  perhaps	  a	  little	  confused	  as	  to	  the	  origins	  of	  
the	  mixed	  race	  Dutch	  group	  put	  on	  his	  working	  party,	  believing	  them	  to	  be	  Sumatran	  and	  
Javanese	  civilians	  who	  had	  donned	  uniforms	  as	  they	  thought	  life	  would	  be	  easier	  in	  the	  POW	  
camps.	  He	  was	  much	  clearer	  regarding	  the	  apportionment	  of	  racial	  characteristics	  to	  the	  
different	  elements	  of	  the	  Dutch	  contingent:	  “The	  full	  Dutch	  were	  mostly	  alright	  and	  mostly	  
spoke	  English	  –	  the	  half-­‐castes	  were	  bone	  idle”	  and	  claimed	  they	  “no	  speak	  English.”308	  More	  
personally	  ambivalent	  towards	  the	  Dutch	  was	  another	  BOR,	  but	  he	  also	  recalled	  that	  there	  was	  
no	  love	  lost	  between	  them	  and	  the	  English.	  When	  prompted	  for	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  he	  
suggested	  that	  “they	  were	  a	  pretty	  hard	  and	  rough	  lot	  [and]	  there	  were	  lots	  of	  ex-­‐criminals”	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306	  IWM:	  Steeds,	  A.J.	  (Docs	  8398)	  p189.	  
307	  Steeds	  would	  return	  to	  this	  theme	  in	  his	  account,	  as	  he	  recalled	  at	  Motoyama	  Camp	  that:	  ‘The	  Dutch	  
troops	  were	  bound	  to	  stick	  completely	  by	  themselves	  on	  account	  of	  the	  language	  difficulties.’	  p214.	  
308	  IWM:	  Baynes,	  L.L.	  (Sound	  23226)	  Reel10.	  
124	  
	  
their	  ranks,	  before	  racially	  qualifying	  his	  statement	  by	  adding	  that	  “the	  [white]	  planters	  were	  
nice	  people.”309	  
Another	  NCO	  reiterated	  the	  sense	  of	  racially	  differentiated	  antipathy	  towards	  the	  KNIL	  
members:	  “None	  of	  us	  liked	  the	  Dutch,	  not	  the	  European	  Dutch,	  they’re	  a	  different	  race	  
entirely,	  but	  the	  East	  Indies	  Dutch	  we	  found	  quite	  different.”310	  He	  returned	  to	  this	  theme	  later	  
in	  the	  interview,	  repeating	  the	  colour	  coded	  distinction,	  before	  adding	  by	  way	  of	  explanation	  
for	  his	  attitudes	  a	  textbook	  statement	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  miscegenation,	  demonstrating	  in	  the	  
process	  the	  power	  of	  scientific	  racism	  to	  persist	  into	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  
Where	  you	  have	  three	  different	  nationalities	  [British,	  Australian	  and	  American]	  and	  
they	  all	  cordially	  detest	  the	  fourth	  [Dutch],	  they	  can’t	  all	  be	  wrong	  …	  not	  the	  European	  
Dutch	  for	  whom	  I	  have	  a	  tremendous	  respect,	  but	  the	  East	  Indies	  Dutch	  -­‐	  since	  there’s	  
no	  colour	  bar	  -­‐	  nothing	  against	  them,	  but	  they	  seem	  to	  have	  inherited	  the	  vices	  of	  both	  
races	  and	  the	  virtues	  of	  neither,	  which	  is	  often	  the	  case	  with	  mixed	  breeds.311	  
	  
What	  Yap	  has	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘pre-­‐war	  colonial	  discourses	  which	  had	  frequently	  interpreted	  
Eurasians	  as	  a	  form	  of	  degeneration,	  transgression,	  adulteration	  and	  impurity’	  had	  evidently	  
been	  nourished	  in	  the	  POW	  camps,	  and	  in	  this	  case	  survived	  well	  into	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.312	  
There	  is	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  reciprocal	  evidence	  to	  be	  found	  regarding	  the	  views	  of	  those	  on	  the	  
receiving	  end	  of	  such	  racialized	  outlooks	  in	  the	  camps.	  A	  rare,	  if	  only	  partial,	  exception	  to	  this	  
is	  the	  account	  of	  Lionel	  de	  Rosario,	  a	  member	  of	  D	  (Eurasian)	  Company	  of	  the	  2nd	  Battalion	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309	  IWM:	  Mutimer,	  P.J.	  (Sound	  4801)	  Reel10.	  
310	  IWM:	  Woodhouse,	  T.F.	  (Sound	  6184)	  Reel2.	  
311	  IWM:	  Woodhouse,	  Reel4.	  Houben	  writes	  that	  stereotypes	  of	  Indisch-­‐ness	  ‘were	  grounded	  in	  an	  
ideology	  of	  supremacy	  of	  the	  White	  race,	  arguing	  that	  through	  mixing	  the	  bad	  qualities	  of	  both	  White	  
and	  brown	  would	  become	  prevalent.’	  Houben,	  “Boundaries”,	  in	  Fischer-­‐Tine	  and	  Gehrman,	  Empires	  and	  
Boundaries,	  pp71-­‐72.	  	  
312	  Yap,	  “Eurasians”,	  p497.	  There	  was	  an	  alternative	  school	  of	  thought	  at	  this	  time	  that	  saw	  “racial	  
crossing”	  as	  a	  means	  to	  improving	  the	  national	  character	  of	  a	  nation.	  Christopher	  Thorne	  writes	  of	  
President	  Roosevelt	  ‘burbling	  away	  in	  his	  hare-­‐brained	  fashion’	  about	  breeding	  out	  the	  delinquency	  of	  
the	  Japanese.	  Apparently	  he	  thought	  that	  the	  Dutch-­‐Javanese	  crossings	  were	  a	  good	  example	  of	  what	  
could	  be	  achieved.	  Thorne,	  Allies,	  pp8,167.	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the	  Singapore	  Volunteer	  Corps,	  which	  had	  entered	  captivity	  at	  the	  surrender.313	  At	  Songkurai	  
Camp	  on	  the	  Railway	  he	  recalled	  that	  he	  got	  into	  an	  argument	  with	  a	  BOR	  who	  had	  called	  a	  
fellow	  Eurasian	  volunteer	  a	  ‘black	  bastard’.	  The	  offending	  soldier	  was	  told	  to	  desist,	  but	  he	  
then	  sneered	  at	  de	  Rosario;	  ‘Get	  off	  my	  back,	  you	  black	  bastard.’	  This	  was	  too	  much,	  so	  de	  
Rosario	  knocked	  him	  down,	  knelt	  on	  his	  chest	  and	  warned	  him	  to	  ‘Never	  dare	  to	  call	  me	  or	  any	  
of	  my	  colleagues	  a	  black	  bastard	  again.	  If	  you	  do	  I’ll	  smash	  your	  big	  mouth!’314	  	  
Whilst	  he	  must	  have	  been	  cognisant	  of	  many	  other	  examples	  of	  prejudice	  being	  expressed	  
during	  his	  time	  as	  a	  POW,	  this	  was	  the	  only	  one	  that	  was	  in	  the	  book,	  and	  he	  was	  if	  anything	  
more	  annoyed	  with	  the	  ‘bastard’	  part	  of	  the	  phrase.315	  Having	  earlier	  resisted	  the	  exhortations	  
of	  his	  fellow	  Eurasians	  that	  they	  should	  stick	  together	  on	  the	  Railway	  and	  that	  he	  should	  not	  
follow	  the	  advice	  of	  a	  white	  mentor	  who	  had	  known	  his	  father,	  de	  Rosario	  straddled	  the	  
boundaries	  of	  race	  and	  the	  expectations	  of	  those	  on	  either	  side.	  His	  story	  demonstrates	  some	  
of	  the	  complexities	  of	  Eurasian	  identity	  and	  the	  danger	  of	  making	  generalised	  assumptions	  
that	  ignore	  individual	  agency,	  but	  unfortunately	  provides	  only	  a	  fleeting	  view	  of	  what	  the	  BOR	  
accounts	  suggest	  was	  a	  wider	  issue	  surrounding	  race.	  
3.4.3.	  Pre-­‐captivity	  sources	  of	  antipathy.	  
The	  earliest	  complaints	  about	  the	  Dutch	  came	  in	  the	  context	  of	  their	  lack	  of	  support	  in	  the	  
attempt	  to	  evade	  the	  Japanese	  through	  Sumatra.	  On	  reaching	  the	  port	  of	  Padang	  on	  the	  west	  
coast	  on	  the	  10th	  of	  March	  1942,	  L.Bdr	  Grafton	  and	  his	  fellow	  travellers	  were	  met	  by	  Col	  
Warren	  who	  had	  been	  organising	  the	  escape	  route,	  and	  ‘a	  fat	  Dutchman’316,	  who	  ordered	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313	  Most	  of	  the	  other	  volunteer	  units	  had	  been	  disbanded	  prior	  to	  the	  surrender,	  but	  many	  of	  these	  men	  
would	  be	  identified	  and	  executed	  in	  the	  Sook	  Ching	  episode	  and	  other	  Japanese	  sweeps,	  including	  de	  
Rosario’s	  brother.	  
314	  De	  Rosario,	  Lionel.	  (1995)	  Nippon	  Slaves.	  Janus	  Publishing	  Company,	  London.	  pp129-­‐130.	  Apparently	  
nearby	  Australians	  were	  urging	  him	  to	  ‘teach	  the	  Pommie	  bastard	  a	  good	  lesson.’	  
315	  This	  in	  itself	  may	  reflect	  issues	  surrounding	  mixed	  race	  parentage	  in	  the	  colonial	  setting.	  




them	  to	  give	  up	  their	  arms	  as	  Padang	  had	  now	  been	  declared	  an	  open	  city.	  This	  was	  an	  
unpopular	  decision:	  
It	  made	  a	  very	  bad	  start	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  British	  and	  the	  Dutch	  colonial	  
troops,	  who	  had	  not	  so	  far,	  when	  encountered	  been	  inclined	  to	  be	  helpful.	  Over	  the	  
next	  few	  days	  we	  made	  endless	  plans	  [to	  escape]	  each	  of	  which	  was	  quickly	  
abandoned.	  Always	  we	  came	  up	  against	  the	  Dutch	  authorities’	  obstructive	  attitude.317	  	  
	  
Similar	  sentiments	  were	  expressed	  at	  this	  location	  by	  Wireless	  Operator	  Oakley,	  whose	  sixty	  
page	  memoir	  describes	  in	  florid	  detail	  his	  own	  private	  war	  with	  the	  Dutch	  right	  up	  to	  and	  
beyond	  the	  Japanese	  surrender.	  	  
Contemplating	  our	  position,	  we	  felt	  much	  anger	  at	  the	  local	  Dutch	  authorities	  for	  not	  
providing	  any	  medical	  attention,	  nor	  keeping	  us	  aware	  of	  the	  current	  military	  
situation,	  and	  being	  treated	  as	  an	  enemy	  with	  our	  freedom	  expressly	  denied.318	  	  
	  
Meanwhile	  on	  Java	  a	  similar	  fog	  of	  recrimination	  was	  settling	  over	  the	  failure	  to	  mount	  a	  
successful	  defence	  against	  the	  Japanese	  invasion,	  and	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  Dutch	  as	  allies.	  
Aircraftman	  2nd	  Class	  Gregory	  recalled	  that	  the	  Javanese	  ‘may	  perhaps	  have	  felt	  that	  they	  
were	  uninvolved	  in	  any	  quarrel	  between	  Japan	  and	  the	  Dutch.	  However	  the	  Dutch	  to	  whom	  I	  
spoke	  gave	  the	  same	  impression	  of	  being	  equally	  uninvolved.’319	  	  To	  Lt	  Hobbs	  	  ‘it	  was	  clear	  
from	  the	  start	  that	  the	  Dutch	  didn’t	  mean	  to	  fight,	  they	  were	  not	  at	  all	  helpful	  to	  us.’320	  	  Oakley	  
was	  of	  a	  similar	  outlook,	  concluding	  that	  ‘the	  Dutch	  had	  surrendered	  without	  firing	  a	  single	  
bullet.’321	  	  	  
The	  recriminations	  were	  however	  mutual,	  particularly	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  British	  failures	  in	  
Malaya	  and	  Singapore	  that	  had	  made	  the	  Japanese	  advance	  to	  the	  NEI	  so	  much	  easier.	  Oakley	  
recalled	  a	  predictably	  obstructive	  Dutch	  MO	  ‘who	  explained	  that	  as	  we	  British	  did	  not	  defend	  
Singapore	  successfully	  their	  way	  of	  life	  had	  been	  upset	  and,	  therefore,	  we	  had	  to	  pay	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317	  IWM:	  Grafton;	  pp27-­‐30.	  
318	  IWM:	  Oakley;	  p38.	  
319	  IWM:	  Gregory;	  p8.	  
320	  IWM:	  Hobbs;	  p13.	  
321	  IWM:	  Oakley;	  p42.	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price.’322	  	  Loet	  Velmans,	  A	  Dutch	  Jew	  who	  had	  escaped	  from	  Holland	  with	  his	  parents	  before	  
shipping	  out	  to	  the	  NEI	  where	  he	  joined	  the	  KNIL,	  shared	  a	  similar	  disappointment.	  He	  recalled	  
that:	  ‘When	  Singapore	  fell	  ...	  I	  lost	  all	  respect	  for	  the	  British.	  I	  had	  counted	  on	  them	  to	  have	  
better	  defences	  than	  ours.’323	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  February,	  the	  hastily	  constructed	  American-­‐
British-­‐Dutch-­‐Australian	  Command	  (ABDA)	  had	  been	  equally	  rapidly	  dissolved,	  giving	  many	  
Dutch	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  British	  had	  left	  them	  ‘in	  the	  lurch.’324	  This	  view	  was	  amplified	  by	  
another	  KNIL	  prisoner,	  Cornelius	  Evers,	  who	  on	  hearing	  that	  General	  Wavell	  had	  flown	  off	  to	  
India,	  felt	  that	  ‘“we”	  had	  already	  been	  given	  up	  even	  before	  the	  Japanese	  made	  their	  
landings.’325	  
At	  a	  more	  local	  level	  there	  is	  plenty	  of	  evidence	  of	  Dutch	  forces	  performing	  their	  duties,	  and	  
indeed	  being	  upset	  by	  the	  surrender	  order.	  The	  English	  banker,	  Sgt	  Baker,	  of	  the	  Surabaya	  
Home	  Guard	  recalled	  that	  they	  were	  ‘pretty	  disgusted	  and	  refused	  to	  lay	  down	  their	  arms.’326	  
Scholte	  has	  suggested	  that	  in	  some	  areas	  of	  Java	  the	  British	  forces	  fled	  for	  the	  hills	  when	  the	  
Japanese	  invaded,	  using	  the	  Dutch	  to	  do	  the	  fighting	  as	  their	  outer	  defences.327	  	  This	  assertion	  
is	  supported	  by	  the	  description	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  Lauren	  van	  der	  Post’s	  Special	  Mission	  
43	  found	  itself,	  in	  late	  April	  (some	  5	  weeks	  after	  the	  surrender	  on	  Java),	  when	  camped	  on	  the	  
upper	  slopes	  of	  a	  mountain,	  and	  protected	  by	  an	  ‘early	  warning	  trench	  system	  manned	  by	  
Dutch	  territorials.’328	  	  	  
Casualty	  figures	  for	  the	  Java	  and	  Sumatra	  campaigns	  in	  1942	  would	  seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  
British	  Army	  did	  not	  see	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  action,	  losing	  9	  killed	  and	  1	  wounded,	  whilst	  5,716	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were	  recorded	  as	  missing	  and	  POWs.	  The	  post-­‐war	  peacekeeping	  operation	  would	  prove	  far	  
more	  costly,	  resulting	  in	  655	  killed	  and	  over	  1,600	  wounded.329	  In	  contrast	  the	  KNIL	  lost	  around	  
800	  men	  killed	  during	  the	  Japanese	  invasion.330	  Lt	  Steeds	  (6th	  HAA	  RA)	  had	  also	  been	  stationed	  
in	  Sumatra,	  where	  he	  had	  made	  the	  following	  observation:	  	  
We	  made	  the	  acquaintance	  of	  some	  pleasant	  Hollanders.	  They	  were	  inclined	  to	  be	  
contemptuous	  of	  the	  British	  effort	  in	  Malaya.	  What	  we	  did	  not	  know	  and	  could	  
scarcely	  have	  anticipated	  was	  the	  appalling	  lack	  of	  co-­‐operation	  between	  Netherlands	  
and	  British	  forces,	  leading	  to	  a	  mutual	  distrust	  which	  made	  the	  later	  tragedies	  a	  matter	  
of	  sequence.331	  
	  
The	  ‘later	  tragedies’	  to	  which	  Steeds	  referred	  were	  the	  defeats	  by	  the	  Japanese	  in	  the	  NEI	  and	  
the	  ordeals	  that	  would	  befall	  the	  troops	  of	  both	  nations	  in	  captivity,	  where	  the	  fraught	  
conditions	  could	  frequently	  add	  to	  the	  tensions	  between	  the	  Dutch	  and	  the	  British.	  
3.4.4.	  Antipathy	  in	  captivity.	  
As	  the	  servicemen	  entered	  captivity	  in	  the	  NEI	  a	  new	  potential	  source	  of	  tension	  came	  clearly	  
into	  view.	  It	  was	  perhaps	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  Dutch	  officers,	  imprisoned	  in	  their	  own	  camps,	  
were	  at	  the	  surrender	  quite	  well	  placed	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  surroundings.	  It	  was	  equally	  
unsurprising	  that	  Grafton,	  with	  possibly	  little	  more	  than	  the	  shirt	  on	  his	  back	  and	  the	  books	  he	  
had	  purchased	  in	  Padang	  to	  his	  name,	  was	  less	  than	  impressed.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Most	  of	  the	  buildings	  were	  already	  occupied	  by	  Dutch	  troops.	  The	  European	  Dutch	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  troops	  watched	  our	  humiliating	  progress	  across	  the	  green	  to	  our	  allocated	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  accommodation	  as	  they	  lounged	  in	  their	  easy	  chairs	  on	  the	  verandas	  in	  great	  comfort,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  smoking	  large	  cigars	  and	  sipping	  cool	  drinks	  served	  by	  their	  batmen.	  They	  still	  had	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  their	  possessions	  and	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  money.332	  
	  
Oakley	  must	  have	  got	  to	  the	  camp	  a	  few	  minutes	  before,	  as	  when	  he	  arrived	  there	  were	  ‘Picnic	  
tables	  covered	  in	  bananas,	  melons,	  and	  other	  assorted	  snacks	  were	  being	  casually	  nibbled	  by	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the	  Dutch	  as	  they	  lounged	  easily.’333	  	  Whilst	  these	  complaints	  might	  have	  some	  class	  based	  
resonance	  amongst	  the	  BORs	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  own	  officers,	  in	  this	  particular	  location	  the	  
class	  basis	  for	  such	  privileges	  was	  subsumed	  beneath	  a	  veneer	  of	  national	  jealousy.	  Perhaps	  
surprisingly	  given	  what	  had	  gone	  before,	  it	  is	  only	  once	  in	  captivity	  that	  Oakley	  saw	  the	  genesis	  
of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  antipathy.	  	  
They	  resented	  our	  independence	  of	  thought	  and	  action,	  and	  continuous	  refusal	  to	  
acknowledge	  their	  perceived	  overriding	  authority.	  Thus	  began	  the	  British-­‐Dutch	  
enmity	  that	  would	  last	  for	  the	  duration.334	  
	  
Not	  all	  Dutch	  POWs	  were	  able	  to	  enjoy	  such	  a	  privileged	  lifestyle	  however.	  Cornelius	  Evers	  was	  
only	  able	  to	  take	  a	  little	  money	  with	  him	  into	  captivity,	  and	  this	  small	  sum	  did	  not	  last	  very	  
long.335	  	  Nor	  were	  all	  Dutchmen	  reticent	  in	  sharing	  their	  good	  fortune,	  as	  Gregory,	  despite	  his	  
earlier	  misgivings	  about	  the	  fighting	  spirit	  of	  the	  KNIL,	  recalled	  at	  his	  first	  POW	  camp	  at	  
Tjilatjap:	  ‘Our	  Dutch	  friends,	  who	  still	  had	  guilders	  in	  their	  pockets,	  were	  very	  generous	  to	  us,	  
enabling	  us	  to	  supplement	  our	  rice	  ration	  with	  sundry	  additions,	  which	  spelt	  relative	  luxury	  to	  
us.’336	  
Whilst	  the	  differing	  circumstances	  experienced	  in	  the	  NEI,	  both	  before	  and	  after	  capitulation,	  
may	  have	  some	  possible	  explanatory	  power	  as	  to	  the	  varying	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  Dutch,	  
particularly	  the	  privileged	  classes,	  they	  are	  less	  useful	  in	  explaining	  the	  antipathy	  that	  
continued	  in	  new	  locations	  as	  KNIL	  POWs	  were	  transported	  to	  Changi,	  the	  Railway	  and	  
beyond.	  Indeed	  for	  some	  of	  the	  many	  British	  troops	  arriving	  at	  Changi	  for	  the	  first	  time	  from	  
the	  NEI,	  it	  must	  have	  been	  a	  familiar	  experience	  to	  arrive	  in	  a	  camp	  where	  a	  group	  of	  officers	  
were	  already	  very	  comfortably	  ensconced	  and	  concerned	  by	  the	  new	  arrivals,	  or	  the	  “Java	  
Rabble”	  as	  they	  became	  known.	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Jealousies	  over	  food	  would	  continue	  into	  captivity,	  with	  canteens	  and	  cookhouses	  being	  
perennial	  sites	  of	  mistrust,	  regardless	  of	  who	  ran	  them.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  class	  issues	  mentioned	  
above,	  the	  situational	  factor	  could	  be	  translated	  into	  one	  of	  nationality.	  Despite	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  
such	  practices,	  catering	  became	  a	  site	  of	  anti-­‐Dutch	  sentiments	  at	  some	  camps.	  Bdr	  Parry	  at	  
Sendai	  Camp	  in	  Japan	  noted	  that:	  ‘Before	  long	  the	  Dutch	  will	  be	  out	  of	  the	  cookhouse,	  they	  
have	  swindled	  us	  all	  along,	  and	  at	  last	  something	  is	  being	  done	  about	  it.’337	  Sgt	  Rose	  found	  
himself	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  serving	  counter	  at	  Mitsushima	  Camp	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  1943.	  
Here,	  temporarily	  separated	  from	  any	  Dutch	  contacts,	  he	  had	  found	  a	  new	  source	  of	  complaint	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  multiracial	  Singapore	  Technical	  Corps	  (STC).338	  His	  diary	  reveals	  that	  the	  STC	  
were	  less	  than	  happy	  with	  his	  messing	  arrangements,	  ‘complaining	  about	  the	  way	  I	  had	  
arranged	  for	  the	  rice	  to	  be	  distributed.	  The	  STC	  lads	  would	  lean	  over	  the	  dishes	  to	  check	  there	  
was	  the	  same	  amount	  in	  each	  bowl.	  I	  am	  not	  popular	  with	  the	  STC.’339	  
There	  were	  some	  places	  however	  where	  the	  cooks	  did	  very	  well	  with	  limited	  resources.	  The	  
café	  that	  briefly	  flourished	  at	  Changi,	  before	  its	  Dutch	  proprietor	  Loet	  Velmans	  was	  sent	  up	  
country,	  was	  one	  example	  of	  such	  creativity.340	  Perhaps	  some	  of	  his	  staff	  were	  sent	  to	  Wampu	  
Camp	  on	  the	  Railway,	  where	  Cpl	  Flello	  noted	  that	  ‘The	  Dutch	  seem	  to	  be	  taking	  over	  the	  
administration	  of	  Wompu	  Camp.	  They	  have	  set	  up	  a	  marvellous	  canteen	  there,	  the	  best	  effort	  I	  
have	  seen	  since	  being	  a	  POW.’341	  	  Given	  the	  culinary	  disasters	  that	  were	  attached	  to	  the	  British	  
cooks’	  early	  acquaintance	  with	  rice,	  it	  might	  with	  hindsight	  have	  seemed	  preferable	  to	  leave	  its	  
preparation	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  those	  with	  local	  knowledge.	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The	  workplace	  occasionally	  featured	  as	  a	  site	  of	  tension,	  as	  noted	  by	  Rose	  when	  he	  had	  been	  
reunited	  with	  a	  largely	  Dutch-­‐Javanese	  contingent	  at	  Kanose	  Camp	  in	  Japan.	  The	  new	  arrivals	  
were	  initially	  something	  of	  a	  logistical	  problem.	  
We	  managed	  to	  squeeze	  them	  in	  somehow	  but	  it	  wasn’t	  a	  good	  situation.	  Living	  too	  
close	  to	  your	  neighbours	  can	  cause	  tension	  and	  bad	  tempers	  and	  we	  certainly	  didn’t	  
want	  that	  added	  to	  our	  other	  problems.342	  
	  
However	  he	  may	  have	  been	  warming	  to	  his	  new	  neighbours,	  as	  after	  making	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  
lazy	  Dutch	  in	  his	  working	  party,	  within	  in	  a	  couple	  of	  days	  he	  was	  able	  to	  record	  that	  there	  had	  
been	  ‘more	  improvement	  in	  Dutch	  lads	  cooperation.’343	  
British	  working	  practices	  were	  also	  the	  source	  of	  some	  Dutch	  criticism.	  Velmans	  recalled	  that	  
at	  Hellfire	  Pass	  on	  the	  Railway,	  British	  and	  Australian	  troops	  would	  indulge	  their	  rivalry	  by	  
seeing	  who	  could	  work	  hardest	  and	  drill	  the	  most	  holes.	  He	  compared	  this	  to	  the	  
‘lacksadaisical	  Dutch,	  working	  at	  the	  slowest	  pace	  they	  could’	  and	  thus	  saving	  their	  energy	  for	  
the	  fight	  to	  stay	  alive.	  He	  suggests	  that	  this	  factor	  did	  not	  go	  unnoticed	  by	  the	  Japanese,	  who	  
ranked	  the	  POWs	  in	  descending	  order	  of	  endurance;	  Australians,	  British,	  Americans	  and	  the	  
Dutch	  in	  last	  place.344	  	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  Cornelius	  Evers,	  shortly	  to	  serve	  in	  the	  British	  Army	  as	  an	  acting	  Major,	  
investigating	  war	  crimes,	  recalled	  another	  incident.	  Some	  POWs	  of	  both	  nations	  had	  been	  
working	  for	  the	  Japanese	  and	  Korean	  guards	  on	  domestic	  duties	  during	  their	  captivity.	  After	  
the	  Japanese	  capitulation,	  Evers	  consulted	  with	  his	  MOs	  and	  NCOs,	  and	  an	  order	  was	  issued	  
for	  Dutch	  POWs	  to	  stop	  providing	  such	  services	  immediately.	  They	  were	  surprised	  the	  next	  
morning,	  when	  lined	  up	  for	  roll	  call,	  to	  see	  the	  British	  water	  carriers	  still	  carrying	  out	  their	  
duties	  for	  the	  guards.	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  IWM:	  Rose;	  5/6/1945.	  
343	  IWM:	  Rose;	  14/6/1945;	  17/6/1945.	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  Velmans,	  Long	  Way	  Back,	  pp6;138.	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The	  group	  of	  British	  water	  carriers	  for	  the	  bath	  of	  the	  Japanese	  and	  Korean	  (ex-­‐)	  
guards,	  passed	  the	  Dutch	  lines	  under	  a	  hail	  of	  “boos”	  from	  their	  allies!	  The	  situation	  
became	  dangerously	  tense	  ...	  At	  my	  insistence	  the	  catcalls	  were	  not	  repeated	  during	  
the	  following	  days	  but	  the	  difference	  in	  our	  attitude	  in	  this	  matter	  gave	  us	  something	  
to	  think	  about.345	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  foregoing	  analysis	  has	  focussed	  on	  the	  tensions	  of	  captivity,	  there	  were	  many	  
examples	  of	  co-­‐operation,	  from	  the	  sharing	  of	  botanical	  knowledge	  in	  the	  search	  for	  vital	  extra	  
nutrition	  to	  the	  understated	  general	  collaboration	  of	  daily	  camp	  life.	  One	  example	  from	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  war	  highlights	  the	  mutual	  support	  and	  assistance	  that	  could	  be	  given,	  even	  in	  the	  
most	  fraught	  of	  situations.	  Sgt	  E.W.	  Davies	  recorded	  the	  occasion	  when	  a	  search	  at	  Nisi	  Asi	  
Betu	  Camp	  in	  Japan	  had	  turned	  up	  a	  diary	  in	  the	  possession	  of	  Pte	  Allen,	  a	  British	  prisoner.	  It	  
contained	  all	  the	  details	  of	  camp	  treatment	  and	  of	  news	  items	  received	  from	  one	  of	  the	  Dutch	  
prisoners	  who	  had	  a	  secret	  radio.	  Allen	  was	  locked	  in	  the	  guardroom	  and	  told	  that	  he	  would	  
get	  no	  food	  until	  he	  gave	  up	  the	  name	  the	  Japanese	  wanted.	  Davies	  noted	  the	  selflessness	  of	  
the	  Dutchman	  concerned,	  his	  fellow	  KNIL	  prisoners	  and	  of	  the	  British	  POWs:	  	  
Jongsmeyer	  offers	  to	  give	  himself	  up	  to	  save	  Allen.	  Put	  to	  the	  vote	  by	  English	  and	  
turned	  down.	  Dutch	  promise	  to	  save	  Allen	  by	  smuggling	  food	  into	  guardroom	  at	  night.	  
They	  do	  this.	  Allen	  officially	  without	  food	  for	  four	  days	  11th-­‐15th.346	  	  	  
	  
Whilst	  it	  was	  perhaps	  fortunate	  for	  Allen	  that	  this	  was	  the	  month	  of	  August	  1945,	  neither	  he,	  
nor	  his	  English	  or	  Dutch	  comrades	  were	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  how	  close	  they	  were	  to	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  war,	  and	  to	  avoiding	  an	  almost	  certain	  death	  sentence,	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  contents	  
of	  the	  diary.	  Such	  altruistic	  behaviour,	  by	  both	  groups	  of	  POWs	  after	  three	  and	  a	  half	  years	  in	  
captivity,	  provides	  an	  illustration	  of	  a	  greater	  complexity	  and	  depth	  to	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  relations	  
than	  that	  suggested	  by	  some	  of	  the	  accounts.	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  Death	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The	  Japanese	  conquests	  of	  western	  imperial	  territories	  during	  the	  opening	  months	  of	  the	  war	  
in	  Asia	  and	  the	  Pacific	  saw	  over	  280,000	  allied	  servicemen	  captured.	  Around	  half	  of	  this	  
number	  were	  colonial	  troops	  who	  within	  a	  few	  months	  were	  mostly	  paroled	  or	  recruited	  into	  
Japanese	  auxiliary	  formations,	  with	  the	  remainder	  enduring	  wartime	  captivity	  segregated	  from	  
their	  white	  colleagues.	  The	  major	  exception	  to	  this	  racially	  based	  seperation	  were	  the	  Dutch	  
nationals	  of	  Eurasian	  descent,	  who	  made	  up	  the	  larger	  part	  of	  the	  KNIL	  in	  captivity,	  and	  a	  much	  
smaller	  cohort	  of	  British	  subjects	  of	  similarly	  mixed	  origins.	  
Reflecting	  their	  initial	  location	  of	  surrender	  and	  subsequent	  Japanese	  labour	  deployments,	  
British	  prisoners	  would	  have	  frequent	  contact	  during	  the	  early	  years	  of	  captivity	  with	  the	  
Australian	  and	  Dutch	  cohorts	  in	  South	  East	  Asia,	  and	  in	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  war	  they	  also	  had	  
wider	  associations	  with	  the	  	  Americans	  in	  Japan.	  Relations	  with	  their	  fellow	  suffering	  
Australian	  and	  American	  prisoners	  were	  usually	  cordial,	  the	  accounts	  of	  the	  men	  reflecting	  
occasional	  spats,	  but	  on	  the	  whole	  they	  were	  seen	  almost	  universally	  in	  a	  positive	  light.	  	  
The	  major	  exception	  to	  this	  picture	  of	  allied	  harmony	  was	  a	  more	  frequently	  stated	  aversion	  to	  
their	  Dutch	  colleagues	  that	  was	  found	  in	  around	  25%	  of	  the	  cases	  scrutinised.	  This	  was	  by	  no	  
means	  universal,	  indeed	  a	  similar	  number	  of	  accounts	  demonstrating	  a	  positive	  outlook	  were	  
found,	  frequently	  stimulated	  by	  an	  awareness	  of	  this	  antipathetic	  discourse.	  Those	  men	  of	  a	  
less	  sympathetic	  outlook	  often	  cited	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  ranging	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  co-­‐operation	  
in	  the	  combat	  period	  to	  an	  assortment	  of	  camp	  based	  resentments	  over	  facilities	  in	  captivity.	  
In	  all	  of	  these	  categories	  such	  factors	  could	  at	  times	  be	  ascribed	  to	  each	  of	  the	  nations,	  before	  
and	  during	  captivity,	  including	  the	  British	  themselves.	  Their	  persistent	  application	  to	  the	  Dutch	  
is	  suggestive	  of	  a	  more	  fundamental	  issue	  at	  play.	  Language	  difference	  was	  also	  cited	  on	  
occasions,	  but	  in	  contradiction	  to	  this	  as	  an	  element	  of	  tension	  were	  the	  more	  numerous	  
positive	  references,	  including	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  white	  Dutch	  could	  usually	  speak	  English	  well.	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This	  linguistically	  differentiated	  approach	  to	  the	  Dutch	  contingent	  suggests	  that	  difference	  
itself	  may	  have	  been	  as	  much	  a	  factor	  as	  language.	  
There	  was	  a	  common,	  although	  by	  no	  means	  ubiquitous,	  feeling	  of	  white	  superiority	  amongst	  
the	  British	  population	  at	  large	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  war,	  overlapping	  with	  a	  more	  specific	  national	  
chauvinism,	  that	  was	  particularly	  prevalent	  amongst	  those	  with	  overseas	  service.	  This	  could	  be	  
seen	  in	  the	  language	  used	  by	  some	  of	  the	  diarists.	  Close	  contact	  with	  the	  Dutch	  Eurasians	  led	  
to	  a	  number	  of	  the	  men	  describing	  them	  in	  a	  specifically	  derogatory	  fashion,	  with	  others	  
disguising	  a	  fundamentally	  racialized	  assessment	  behind	  general	  situational	  issues.	  This	  colour	  
coded	  approach	  to	  the	  Dutch	  was	  made	  explicit	  in	  several	  of	  the	  oral	  records,	  by	  men	  who	  
were	  either	  active	  contributors	  to	  such	  a	  narrative	  or	  merely	  recording	  their	  observations.	  	  
Whilst	  not	  all	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Dutch	  comments	  had	  a	  racial	  foundation,	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  
them	  did,	  but	  even	  then	  these	  men	  were	  still	  a	  minority	  in	  the	  overall	  population	  of	  British	  
POWs.	  They	  represented	  no	  larger	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  prisoners	  than	  those	  who	  had	  
something	  positive	  to	  say	  about	  their	  Dutch	  allies.	  The	  persistence	  of	  the	  story	  of	  Dutch	  
antipathy	  in	  the	  POW	  discourse	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  a	  historical	  reality	  as	  experienced	  and	  
witnessed	  by	  many	  in	  the	  camps	  (and	  before).	  Unbalanced	  considerations	  of	  the	  subject,	  
which	  ignore	  the	  many	  positive	  records	  and	  attribute	  those	  tensions	  that	  there	  were	  to	  issues	  







Chapter	  4.	  ‘Here	  if	  anywhere,	  men	  should	  have	  been	  equal.’347	  
	  
4.1.	  Introduction.	  
Whilst	  the	  BORs	  managed	  to	  get	  along	  to	  a	  greater	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Dutch,	  a	  lesser	  degree	  
with	  their	  fellow	  allied	  prisoners	  of	  war	  of	  differing	  nationality,	  there	  was	  one	  cohort	  that	  was	  
a	  frequent	  source	  of	  criticism,	  the	  British	  officers.	  Such	  complaints	  were	  found	  in	  most	  of	  the	  
accounts;	  only	  rarely	  would	  there	  be	  no	  negative	  views	  expressed.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  persistent	  
and	  eloquent	  in	  such	  comments	  was	  Private	  Dawson,	  his	  bitterness	  clearly	  visible	  and	  still	  
fresh	  in	  his	  mind	  as	  he	  wrote	  shortly	  after	  the	  war:	  	  
Here,	  if	  anywhere,	  men	  should	  have	  been	  equal.	  That	  we	  were	  not	  was	  the	  reason	  why	  
relations	  between	  officers	  and	  men	  were	  often	  strained.	  Strained?	  There	  were	  times	  
when	  we	  hated	  the	  officers	  and	  applied	  to	  them	  epithets	  which	  ought	  perhaps	  to	  have	  
been	  reserved	  for	  the	  Japanese.	  
It	  rankled	  with	  all	  the	  men	  that,	  right	  from	  the	  start,	  one	  of	  the	  few	  international	  
agreements	  which	  the	  Japanese	  observed	  was	  that	  the	  officers	  should	  receive	  their	  
pay.	  Or	  at	  any	  rate	  such	  a	  proportion	  of	  it	  as	  meant	  that	  they	  never	  suffered	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  men	  did.	  	  
They	  lived	  comfortably	  and	  rarely	  worked,	  apart	  from	  a	  few	  of	  them,	  their	  task,	  so	  long	  
as	  they	  were	  with	  us	  ,	  being	  to	  supervise	  the	  working	  parties	  and	  see	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  
us	  did	  the	  work	  which	  the	  Japanese	  wanted	  doing.	  They	  could	  not	  under	  such	  
circumstances	  hope	  to	  be	  popular.348	  
	  
The	  relations	  between	  the	  officers	  and	  men	  of	  the	  British	  Army	  were	  the	  cause	  for	  some	  
official	  concern	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  war,	  as	  the	  new	  influx	  of	  often	  better	  educated	  soldiers	  
filled	  the	  ranks.	  They	  came	  with	  a	  different	  set	  of	  expectations	  of	  army	  life	  and	  conditions	  and	  
Dawson,	  a	  journalist	  by	  profession,	  was	  such	  a	  man.	  Jeremy	  Crang	  suggests	  that	  whilst	  
‘comforts	  and	  privileges	  accorded	  to	  officers	  were	  generally	  accepted	  if	  they	  were	  the	  result	  of	  
military	  necessity,	  those	  for	  which	  there	  seemed	  to	  be	  little	  justification	  …	  were	  resented	  by	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many	  of	  the	  soldiers.’	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  ‘the	  restrictions	  of	  wartime	  did	  serve	  to	  
narrow	  differences	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  standard	  of	  living	  between	  officers	  and	  men.’349	  	  	  
Whilst	  this	  may	  have	  been	  true	  for	  that	  part	  of	  the	  army	  still	  actively	  pursuing	  the	  war,	  the	  
men	  who	  went	  into	  captivity	  in	  Asia	  in	  1942	  would	  remain	  part	  of	  a	  service	  that	  was	  largely	  
frozen	  into	  the	  military	  caste	  system	  of	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  conflict,	  if	  not	  the	  pre-­‐war	  era.	  
The	  concept	  of	  the	  military	  necessity	  for	  privilege	  would	  become	  increasingly	  questionable	  to	  
most	  of	  the	  men,	  as	  the	  differential	  conditions	  of	  captivity	  served	  to	  considerably	  increase	  the	  
relative	  contrasts	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  standard	  of	  living	  between,	  and	  indeed	  the	  respective	  life	  
chances	  of,	  the	  men	  and	  their	  officers.	  The	  men	  were	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  due	  to	  the	  inter-­‐
related	  factors	  of	  having	  to	  endure	  hard	  labour	  whilst	  having	  less	  financial	  sway	  in	  the	  
economy	  of	  the	  camps,	  and	  thus	  less	  able	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  officers	  in	  the	  market	  for	  food	  
to	  supplement	  their	  meagre	  rations.	  The	  impact	  of	  these	  factors	  on	  their	  health	  was	  the	  cause	  
of	  a	  considerable	  variation	  in	  the	  relative	  mortality	  rates	  of	  the	  BORs	  and	  their	  officers,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  source	  of	  many	  complaints.	  
This	  chapter	  commences	  with	  a	  rank	  based	  analysis	  of	  the	  POW	  mortality	  rates,	  and	  examines	  
the	  causes	  for	  the	  variations	  found.	  The	  key	  mortality	  factors	  of	  nutrition,	  money	  and	  work	  are	  
reviewed,	  with	  specific	  reference	  to	  calorific	  intakes	  and	  pay	  scales,	  and	  how	  the	  BORs	  
responded	  to	  inequities	  in	  these	  areas.	  Issues	  of	  hierarchy	  within	  the	  other	  ranks	  are	  also	  
examined	  through	  the	  same	  analytic	  lens	  of	  mortality	  and	  its	  causes.	  Finally	  both	  positive	  and	  
negative	  connotations	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  contentious	  issues	  of	  discipline	  and	  officers	  
representing	  the	  men	  with	  the	  Japanese	  are	  considered	  as	  further	  locations	  of	  tension	  
between	  the	  BORs	  and	  their	  commissioned	  colleagues.	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4.2.	  Rank	  Based	  Differential	  Mortality.	  
Charles	  Roland	  has	  suggested	  that	  ‘sheer	  survival	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  fundamental	  measure’	  
of	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  differential	  conditions	  between	  the	  ranks.	  He	  cites	  the	  mortality	  rates	  of	  
POWs	  of	  the	  Royal	  Australian	  Navy,	  excluding	  those	  who	  were	  executed,	  of	  2.9%	  of	  officers	  
and	  35%	  [sic	  32%]	  for	  the	  men.350	  He	  also	  calculated	  figures	  for	  the	  Canadian	  POWs	  captured	  
at	  Hong	  Kong;	  5.6%	  of	  officers	  and	  16%	  of	  the	  men	  died	  in	  captivity.351	  	  In	  a	  similar	  analysis	  
Joan	  Beaumont	  provides	  figures	  for	  that	  part	  of	  the	  Australian	  Gull	  Force	  imprisoned	  on	  
Hainan.	  Whilst	  no	  officers	  died,	  the	  mortality	  rate	  for	  NCOs	  was	  14%	  and	  that	  for	  privates	  was	  
27%.	  For	  those	  sent	  to	  Ambon	  the	  situation	  was	  far	  worse,	  but	  still	  favourable	  to	  the	  officers,	  
of	  whom	  19%	  died.	  The	  respective	  rates	  for	  NCOs	  and	  privates	  were	  62%	  and	  75%.352	  	  At	  Camp	  
O’Donnell	  in	  the	  Philippines,	  Major	  Michael	  Zarate	  of	  the	  US	  Marine	  Corps	  found	  that	  only	  
3.8%	  of	  those	  who	  died	  were	  officers,	  a	  proportion	  far	  below	  the	  15%	  of	  the	  camp’s	  
population	  that	  they	  constituted.353	  	  	  
Similar	  studies	  have	  not	  been	  made	  of	  the	  figures	  for	  British	  prisoners.	  The	  record	  made	  by	  Lt	  
Hobbs	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  contains	  the	  only	  such	  data	  found	  that	  offers	  a	  comparison	  
between	  the	  BORs	  and	  their	  officers,	  in	  a	  note	  copied	  from	  an	  Australian	  intelligence	  report	  
detailing	  the	  shocking	  figures	  for	  the	  men	  of	  “B”	  Force	  sent	  to	  Borneo.	  Of	  the	  party	  of	  838	  
officers	  and	  men	  that	  arrived	  in	  Jesselton	  in	  October	  1942,	  ‘only	  30	  officers	  and	  2	  ORs	  are	  alive	  
today.’354	  	  Hidden	  within	  these	  bare	  figures	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  of	  the	  original	  number	  of	  838,	  the	  
vast	  majority	  would	  have	  been	  ORs.	  This	  was	  however	  an	  exceptional	  location	  of	  captivity;	  life	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351	  Roland,	  Long	  Night’s	  Journey,	  p78.	  
352	  Beaumont,	  Gull	  Force,	  p212.	  Gull	  Force	  was	  an	  Australian	  unit	  taken	  prisoner	  on	  Ambon	  in	  the	  NEI	  in	  
1942.	  
353	  Zarate,	  Michael	  A.	  (1991)	  “American	  Prisoners	  of	  Japan:	  Did	  rank	  have	  its	  privileges?”	  Master	  of	  
Military	  Art	  and	  Science	  Thesis.	  OCLC	  No:	  41405940:	  	  Naval	  War	  College,	  Newport	  RI	  02841.	  p79.	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had	  been	  very	  hard	  from	  the	  start	  for	  the	  men	  in	  this	  part	  of	  Borneo,	  and	  most	  of	  the	  surviving	  
other	  ranks	  were	  killed	  on	  the	  Sandakan	  death	  marches	  just	  before	  the	  war	  ended.	  
In	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  more	  representative	  picture	  of	  relative	  British	  mortality	  two	  sources	  were	  
surveyed;	  at	  the	  macro	  level	  a	  sample	  of	  the	  Japanese	  card	  index	  of	  (most)	  British	  POWs	  was	  
made,	  whilst	  at	  the	  regimental	  level,	  records	  of	  the	  125th	  Anti-­‐Tank	  Regiment,	  part	  of	  the	  18th	  
Division,	  were	  examined.355	  	  	  	   	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  card	  index	  sample	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  3.	   	  
Table	  3:	  Mortality	  rates	  in	  captivity:	  BORs	  v	  British	  Officers.356	  
Box	  No	   BOR	  Names	   BOR	  
Mortality	  Rate	  
Officer	  Names	   Officer	  
Mortality	  Rate	  
WO	  345/4	   Barwell,	  R.	  –
Bassett,	  J.	  
10/30	   Base,	  J.	  –	  	  
Beavon,	  J.A.D.	  
1/30	  
WO	  345/14	   Davies,	  A.	  –	  
Davies,	  D.E.	  
8/30	   Davies,	  D.	  –	  
Dawson,	  H.U.	  
1/30	  
WO	  345/24	   Hatch,	  A.R.	  –	  
Hatton,	  G.E.	  
9/30	   Haward	  –	  	  
Heard,	  H.	  
5/30	  
WO	  345/34	   McMoreland,R.	  –	  
McNeil,T.	  
4/30	   McMorine,	  J.	  –	  
Makepeace,	  A.	  
0/30	  
WO	  345/44	   Roach,	  J.E.	  	  –	  
Roberts,	  A.E.	  
6/30	   Roach,	  J.P.R.	  –	  
Robinson,	  J.F.	  
2/30	  
WO	  345/54	   Walpole,	  H.T.	  –	  
Walsh,	  T.	  
8/30	   Walsh,	  G.G.	  –	  
Waters,	  M.E.	  
2/30	  
TOTAL	   	   45/180	  	  (25%)	  
	  
	   11/180	  	  (6.1%)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355	  The	  card	  index	  is	  held	  at	  The	  National	  Archive.	  UKNA:	  345	  Series.	  This	  collection	  of	  55	  boxes	  contains	  
the	  record	  cards	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  POWs,	  and	  those	  who	  never	  returned	  are	  identified	  by	  a	  red	  
cross	  over	  the	  card.	  Six	  boxes	  were	  selected	  at	  regular	  intervals	  to	  mitigate	  the	  possibility	  of	  any	  
regionalized	  or	  alphabetical	  bias.	  From	  each	  of	  the	  boxes	  the	  first	  30	  other	  ranks	  and	  the	  first	  30	  officers	  
(all	  army	  in	  both	  groups)	  were	  recorded,	  with	  the	  attendant	  mortality	  rate.	  	  
	  The	  records	  of	  the	  125th	  A-­‐T	  Regt	  were	  collated	  from	  a	  number	  of	  sources;	  A	  contemporary	  typed	  
breakdown	  of	  mortalities	  in	  the	  camps	  by	  date,	  cause,	  location	  and	  rank	  is	  held	  in:	  IWM:	  Wylie,	  J.	  (Docs	  
6872).	  Contained	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  history	  of	  the	  regiment	  is	  a	  Roll	  of	  Honour,	  listing	  by	  rank	  those	  who	  
died	  as	  well	  as	  those	  who	  survived:	  IWM:	  125th	  Anti-­‐Tank	  Regiment,	  Royal	  Artillery.	  1939-­‐1945.	  Copy	  
Number	  79/1170.	  A	  similar	  listing,	  also	  providing	  place	  of	  burial	  (where	  known)	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
Registers	  of	  War	  Dead	  for	  the	  regiment,	  on	  the	  COFEPOW	  website:	  
http://www.cofepow.org.uk/pages/armedforces_125th.html	  




The	  major	  conclusion	  from	  these	  figures	  is	  that	  there	  was	  indeed	  a	  considerable	  difference	  in	  
the	  relative	  mortality	  rates	  of	  the	  ORs	  (25%)	  and	  their	  officers	  (6.1%),	  the	  officers	  being	  over	  
four	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  survive,	  a	  ratio	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  international	  figures	  already	  
considered.	  A	  comparison	  is	  frequently	  made	  between	  the	  mortality	  rates	  of	  British	  POWs	  in	  
Germany	  (5.1%)357	  and	  that	  in	  Asia	  (25%),	  and	  ascribing	  the	  difference	  to	  the	  harshness	  of	  the	  
conditions	  imposed	  by	  the	  Japanese.	  This	  survey	  demonstrates	  that	  as	  far	  as	  the	  officer	  corps	  
was	  concerned,	  the	  survival	  rates	  were	  little	  different	  whether	  you	  were	  an	  officer	  captured	  by	  
the	  Japanese	  or	  a	  prisoner	  of	  the	  Germans.358	  
The	  records	  of	  the	  125th	  Anti-­‐Tank	  Regiment,	  a	  Territorial	  Army	  unit	  that	  was	  initially	  recruited	  
from	  the	  Sunderland	  area,	  allow	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  review	  of	  mortality	  by	  rank	  and	  show	  a	  









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357	  Mackenzie,	  S.P.	  (1994)	  “The	  Treatment	  of	  Prisoners	  of	  War	  in	  World	  War	  II.”	  	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  
History.	  Vol.	  66,	  p510.	  	  	  
358	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  however	  that	  the	  5.1%	  figure	  for	  Germany	  is	  a	  consolidated	  figure,	  that	  if	  broken	  
down	  into	  its	  structural	  components	  may	  reveal	  a	  similar	  pattern	  of	  variance.	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Table	  4:	  125th	  Anti-­‐Tank	  Regiment:	  Mortality	  in	  captivity	  by	  rank.359	  
Rank	   Mortality	  in	  captivity	  
(died/total	  captured)	  	  	  	  
Mortality	  
Officers	   4/31	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13%	  
Warrant	  Officers	   2/11	   	  	  	  	  18%	  
Other	  Ranks	   171/545	   31%	  
Sergeant	   9/36	   25%	  
Lance	  Sergeant	   5/19	   26%	  
Bombardier	   12/48	   25%	  
Lance	  Bombardier	   16/52	   31%	  
Gunner	   129/390	   33%	  
	  
These	  figures	  demonstrate	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  hierarchical	  nature	  of	  mortality	  in	  captivity,	  
including	  the	  continuation	  of	  rank	  based	  stratification	  within	  the	  ORs	  themselves.	  Whilst	  
particular	  aspects	  of	  these	  numbers	  are	  reviewed	  during	  the	  course	  of	  this	  chapter,	  it	  is	  worth	  
noting	  at	  this	  stage	  the	  above	  average	  rates	  of	  mortality	  at	  all	  levels	  for	  the	  125th.	  This	  is	  a	  
reflection	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  sent	  off	  in	  early	  working	  parties	  from	  Singapore,	  in	  
October	  1942,	  to	  locations	  that	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  among	  the	  more	  testing.	  	  One	  battery	  was	  
sent	  to	  Formosa	  and	  suffered	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  losing	  twelve	  men,	  mostly	  to	  
beriberi,	  as	  the	  effects	  of	  malnutrition	  migrated	  from	  morbidity	  to	  mortality.	  The	  other	  three	  
batteries	  were	  sent	  up-­‐country	  to	  the	  Railway	  and	  were	  dispersed	  along	  its	  length,	  where	  97	  of	  
their	  number	  died,	  mostly	  between	  June	  and	  December	  of	  1943,	  from	  dysentery	  (22),	  cholera	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359	  Figures	  arrived	  at	  by	  amalgamating	  the	  information	  in	  all	  three	  sources	  (see	  fn354;	  p150)	  for	  deaths,	  
removing	  those	  caused	  before	  captivity	  or	  as	  a	  result	  of	  wounds	  sustained	  in	  combat;	  for	  total	  
establishment	  the	  mortality	  figures	  were	  added	  to	  the	  numbers	  who	  were	  repatriated	  according	  to	  the	  
Roll	  of	  Honour	  (see	  fn354	  above).	  There	  is	  some	  contradiction	  contained	  in	  the	  unofficial	  regimental	  
history	  as	  it	  states	  in	  the	  text	  that	  25	  officers	  and	  400	  men	  had	  gone	  into	  River	  Valley	  Camp	  in	  Singapore	  
in	  April	  1942.	  (IWM:	  History	  of	  the	  125th	  Anti-­‐Tank	  Regt;	  p21).	  This	  may	  be	  because	  some	  officers	  and	  
men	  had	  been	  left	  in	  Changi	  due	  to	  illness.	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(17),	  beriberi	  (12)	  and	  amoebic	  dysentery	  (7),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  other	  conditions.	  	  A	  
further	  seventeen	  were	  lost	  at	  sea,	  having	  survived	  the	  Railway	  but	  not	  the	  allied	  attacks	  on	  
shipping	  bound	  for	  Japan.360	  Whilst	  such	  losses	  at	  sea	  and	  those	  in	  allied	  air-­‐raids	  were	  usually	  
a	  matter	  of	  bad	  luck,	  the	  deaths	  in	  the	  camps	  were	  the	  result	  of	  a	  more	  selective	  process	  that	  
worked	  	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  lower	  ranks,	  reflecting	  their	  relative	  lack	  of	  status	  in	  the	  
economy	  of	  captivity.361	  
	  
4.3.	  The	  Camp	  Economy/	  Causes	  of	  Mortality.	  
Central	  to	  the	  health	  and	  survival	  chances	  of	  the	  POWs,	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  officers,	  was	  
the	  trinity	  of	  inter-­‐related	  factors	  around	  which	  the	  camp	  economy	  and	  the	  health	  of	  the	  men	  
centred;	  food,	  money	  and	  work.	  	  
4.3.1.	  Nutrition.	  
For	  the	  POWs	  life	  in	  captivity	  was	  subject	  to	  a	  finely	  balanced	  calorific	  and	  nutritional	  
equation.	  If	  the	  inputs	  of	  food	  were	  exceeded	  by	  the	  calories	  expended	  then	  fairly	  rapidly	  the	  
prisoners	  would	  become	  vulnerable	  to	  diseases	  associated	  with	  malnutrition,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  
more	  susceptible	  in	  their	  weakened	  state	  to	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  potentially	  life	  threatening	  but	  
always	  debilitating	  illnesses	  that	  abounded	  in	  the	  camps,	  particularly	  in	  the	  tropics.	  Whilst	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360	  The	  particularly	  high	  rate	  for	  officers	  in	  the	  125th	  	  is	  primarily	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  of	  the	  
them	  went	  with	  their	  men	  and	  were	  thus	  unable	  to	  enjoy	  the	  more	  amenable	  and	  less	  life	  threatening	  
conditions	  pertaining	  at	  Changi	  for	  the	  duration.	  A	  large	  number	  of	  officers	  who	  had	  served	  in	  the	  Indian	  
Army	  or	  the	  Volunteer	  Forces	  no	  longer	  had	  units	  to	  which	  they	  were	  attached,	  and	  they,	  along	  with	  
those	  of	  the	  Malaya	  Command,	  were	  less	  thus	  likely	  to	  find	  themselves	  sent	  on	  working	  parties.	  A	  party	  
of	  300	  such	  officers	  would	  eventually	  be	  sent	  to	  the	  Railway	  as	  part	  of	  “H”	  Force.	  	  
361	  There	  were	  however	  instances	  where	  the	  officers	  were	  allowed	  to	  sleep	  on	  the	  decks	  of	  ships,	  giving	  
them	  a	  greater	  chance	  of	  survival	  than	  the	  men	  in	  the	  holds,	  which	  were	  sometimes	  locked.	  See;	  IWM:	  
Steeds;	  21/10/1942.	  Not	  all	  officers	  were	  happy	  at	  such	  inequitable	  arrangements.	  See;	  IWM:	  Eva;	  p46.	  
A	  similar	  example	  of	  differentiated	  travelling	  arrangements	  was	  noted	  by	  Pte	  Houghton	  on	  the	  train	  to	  
Thailand,	  when	  officers	  had	  ridden	  on	  top	  of	  the	  metal	  cars	  whilst	  the	  men	  sweated	  it	  out	  below:	  




under	  normal	  circumstances	  the	  men	  would	  have	  been	  getting	  3-­‐4,000	  calories	  a	  day,362	  
captivity	  brought	  a	  sharp	  decrease	  in	  intake.	  Food	  supplies	  varied	  through	  time	  and	  location,	  
but	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  trace	  a	  general	  downward	  trajectory	  during	  captivity	  in	  the	  medical	  
literature.	  	  
At	  Bandoeng	  Camp	  on	  Java	  it	  was	  estimated	  that	  the	  men	  were	  getting	  2,000	  calories	  a	  day	  in	  
September	  1942,363	  whilst	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  it	  was	  around	  1,800	  at	  that	  time.364	  By	  1944	  at	  camps	  
in	  Japan	  the	  figure	  had	  fallen	  to	  1,500	  calories	  a	  day,	  and	  down	  to	  as	  low	  as	  1,000	  in	  1945.365	  
Quality	  of	  diet	  was	  also	  an	  issue,	  as	  the	  usual	  staple	  ration	  of	  polished	  rice	  was	  as	  monotonous	  
to	  the	  taste	  buds	  as	  it	  was	  deficient	  in	  nutrients.	  Fat,	  protein	  and	  most	  importantly	  vitamins	  
were	  severely	  lacking	  in	  the	  diet.366	  This	  led	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  vitamin	  
deficiency	  conditions	  including	  pellagra	  and	  beriberi,	  which	  were	  compounded	  by	  the	  frequent	  
gastric	  illnesses	  that	  limited	  the	  absorption	  of	  the	  few	  nutrients	  that	  were	  in	  the	  diet.	  With	  
weakened	  immune	  systems	  and	  decreasing	  levels	  of	  overall	  health	  many	  of	  the	  POWs	  
experienced	  repeated	  bouts	  of	  dysentery	  and	  malaria,	  in	  a	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  disease	  for	  which	  
they	  often	  had	  inadequate	  treatment	  and	  little,	  if	  any,	  time	  for	  convalescence.367	  This	  was	  the	  
context	  in	  which	  food	  became	  of	  crucial	  importance	  to	  survival,	  and	  the	  acquisition	  of	  
additional	  calories	  to	  supplement	  the	  inadequate	  ration	  scales	  was	  vital	  to	  maintain	  health.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362	  Whitfield,	  R.G.S.	  (1947)	  “Anomalous	  Manifestations	  of	  Malnutrition	  in	  Japanese	  Prison	  Camps.”	  
British	  Medical	  Journal.	  Vol	  2,	  No	  4517,	  p164.	  	  
363	  Dunlop,	  E.E.	  (1946)	  “Medical	  Experiences	  in	  Japanese	  Captivity.”	  British	  Medical	  Journal.	  Vol2,	  No	  
4474,	  p481.	  
364	  Whitfield,	  “Anomalous	  Manifestations”,	  p164.	  
365	  Roland,	  Charles	  G.,	  and	  Shannon,	  Harry	  S.	  (1991)	  “Prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese:	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  Weight	  Loss	  
and	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  Diseases	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  two	  Camps.”	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Medicine	  and	  Allied	  Sciences.	  Vol	  46,	  
p71.	  
366	  Whitfield,	  a	  RNVR	  Surgeon	  captured	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  calculated	  that	  in	  1942	  the	  men	  were	  getting	  less	  
than	  half	  of	  their	  normal	  fat,	  protein	  and	  Vitamin	  C	  requirements.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  B	  vitamins	  similar	  
shortfalls	  were	  experienced	  for	  Thiamine	  and	  Riboflavin,	  whilst	  they	  only	  got	  one	  hundredth	  of	  the	  
required	  Niacin.	  In;	  Whitfield,	  “Anomalous	  Manifestations”,	  p164.	  
367	  Gupta,	  L.M.	  (1946)	  “Malnutrition	  in	  Recovered	  Prisoners	  of	  War	  and	  Internees.”	  British	  Medical	  
Journal.	  Vol	  1,	  No	  4451,	  p646.	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4.3.2.	  Food	  and	  money.	  
Even	  while	  the	  men	  were	  still	  in	  convoy	  on	  their	  way	  east	  there	  had	  been	  grumbling	  about	  the	  
fare	  on	  offer.	  On	  the	  American	  troopships	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  licensed	  bar	  was	  more	  than	  
compensated	  for	  in	  most	  cases	  by	  the	  abundance	  and	  quality	  of	  meals	  provided.	  On	  one	  ship	  
the	  Brigadier	  felt	  that	  the	  men	  were	  having	  too	  much	  of	  a	  good	  thing	  and	  ordered	  British	  
cooks	  into	  the	  kitchen	  to	  prepare	  reduced	  portions,	  leading	  one	  soldier	  to	  note;	  ‘speaking	  for	  
myself	  and	  I	  am	  sure	  for	  most	  of	  the	  lower	  ranks,	  we	  were	  fed	  up	  with	  our	  sparse	  diet,	  the	  
food	  was	  terrible,	  and	  very	  little	  of	  it.’368	  Meanwhile	  on	  the	  upper	  decks	  it	  was	  a	  different	  
culinary	  experience,	  as	  one	  officer	  recalled:	  ‘Food	  was	  excellent.	  Chateaubriand	  steaks,	  
tournedos	  of	  beef,	  Sole,	  with	  chicken	  &	  Duck	  at	  least	  once	  a	  day.	  The	  cheese	  of	  which	  I	  rarely	  
partook	  was	  also	  excellent.’	  Despite	  eating	  in	  the	  First	  Class	  Dining	  Room,	  his	  waiter	  was	  ‘one	  
of	  the	  worst’,	  and	  there	  was,	  with	  the	  ship	  just	  over	  halfway	  to	  Cape	  Town,	  	  only	  one	  wine	  left	  
in	  the	  cellar	  to	  accompany	  the	  otherwise	  ‘superb’	  Christmas	  dinner.369	  	  
John	  Colville,	  taking	  a	  sabbatical	  from	  being	  Winston	  Churchill’s	  Assistant	  Private	  Secretary	  to	  
serve	  as	  a	  pilot	  in	  the	  RAF	  during	  the	  mid-­‐war	  years,	  was	  taken	  aback	  by	  the	  contrasting	  
cuisine	  on	  board	  a	  ship	  to	  Cape	  Town,	  in	  which	  he	  was	  sharing	  the	  lower	  decks	  with	  3,000	  
other	  ranks.	  ‘The	  menus	  for	  the	  five-­‐course	  dinners	  for	  the	  commissioned	  ranks	  were	  handed	  
round	  on	  the	  mess-­‐decks	  while	  we	  were	  fed	  on	  our	  unsavoury	  rations.’370	  Geoffrey	  Field	  has	  
suggested	  that	  ‘In	  few	  places	  …	  was	  the	  gulf	  between	  officers	  and	  men	  more	  glaring	  than	  on	  
the	  overcrowded	  ships	  that	  took	  thousands	  of	  troops	  from	  England	  around	  the	  Cape	  to	  Suez	  or	  
the	  Far	  East.371	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  many	  of	  the	  men	  who	  made	  that	  journey,	  that	  gulf	  would	  widen	  
in	  captivity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368	  IWM:	  Carpenter;	  p4.	  
369	  IWM:	  Merrett;	  pp3-­‐5.	  
370	  Colville,	  J.	  (1985)	  The	  Fringes	  of	  Power:	  10	  Downing	  Street	  diaries	  1939–55.	  W.W.Norton	  and	  
Company,	  London.	  pp451-­‐452.	  He	  would	  go	  on	  to	  be	  Private	  Secretary	  to	  Princess	  Elizabeth	  between	  
1947	  and	  1949.	  
371	  Field,	  Blood,	  Sweat	  and	  Toil,	  pp265-­‐265.	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On	  paper	  such	  perceptions	  seem	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Japanese	  would	  normally	  issue	  
rations	  based	  on	  total	  camp	  strength,	  with	  no	  differentiation	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  rank.	  There	  
were	  however	  occasions	  where	  such	  apparent	  equity	  was	  not	  the	  case	  with	  supplies	  provided	  
by	  the	  captors.	  Charles	  Roland	  assessed	  the	  debriefing	  of	  an	  officer	  who	  had	  escaped	  from	  
Hong	  Kong	  in	  1944,	  who	  had	  stated	  that	  ‘the	  Japanese	  gave	  POWs	  a	  regular	  monthly	  supply	  of	  
tooth	  powder,	  washing	  soap	  and	  toilet	  paper’	  as	  well	  as	  toothbrushes	  and	  face	  towels.	  Roland	  
suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  duplicity	  contained	  in	  Goodwin’s	  account:	  
This	  must	  have	  been	  while	  Goodwin	  was	  in	  Argyle	  Street	  Camp,	  where	  officers	  
unquestionably	  were	  better	  supplied	  than	  were	  the	  men	  in	  Sham	  Shui	  Po.	  Again,	  the	  
unconscious	  arrogance	  of	  the	  officers	  appears;	  the	  phrase	  “gave	  POWs”	  obviously	  is	  
capable	  of	  being	  read	  as	  “all	  POWs”	  rather	  than	  “POW	  officers,”	  though	  the	  latter	  is	  
what	  is	  meant.	  372	  
	  
Similar	  examples	  of	  officers	  drawing	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  false	  equivalences,	  in	  an	  attempt	  
to	  conflate	  their	  experiences	  with	  those	  of	  the	  men,	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  a	  number	  of	  the	  
ensuing	  accounts	  in	  specific	  reference	  to	  the	  issues	  of	  food	  and	  work.	  Although	  no	  food,	  or	  
only	  half	  rations,	  would	  be	  issued	  to	  those	  too	  sick	  to	  work	  (and	  it	  was	  usually	  the	  other	  ranks	  
that	  were	  required	  to	  work)	  such	  shortfalls	  could	  sometimes	  be	  distributed	  among	  the	  whole	  
camp	  population.373	  However	  the	  officers	  were	  much	  better	  placed	  to	  purchase	  much	  needed	  
extra	  food,	  either	  through	  official	  canteens	  or	  less	  licitly	  on	  the	  black	  market,	  due	  to	  their	  
greater	  wealth.	  
Initially	  this	  would	  have	  been	  from	  funds	  taken	  by	  them	  into	  captivity.	  Thus	  while	  Cpl	  Flello	  
was	  noting	  after	  a	  month	  in	  captivity	  the	  ‘loud	  complaints’	  of	  the	  BORs	  at	  Changi	  at	  having	  to	  
eat	  “limed	  rice”374,	  Lt	  Steeds	  in	  a	  camp	  on	  Java	  recalled	  that	  he	  and	  his	  fellow	  officers	  had	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372	  Roland,	  Long	  Night’s	  Journey,	  p84.	  
373	  This	  was	  not	  always	  the	  case;	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  men	  wouldn’t	  go	  sick	  in	  a	  case	  study	  of	  
camps	  in	  Japan,	  as	  the	  men	  didn’t	  want	  to	  go	  on	  half	  rations.	  Roland	  and	  Shannon:	  “Prisoners”,	  p81.	  
374	  IWM:	  Flello;	  21/3/1942.	  The	  Japanese,	  unprepared	  for	  the	  large	  numbers	  of	  prisoners	  taken	  at	  
Singapore,	  had	  issued	  the	  next	  year’s	  planting	  seed	  that	  had	  been	  preserved	  in	  sulphur.	  Flello	  was	  also	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able	  to	  purchase	  ‘some	  attractive	  food,	  tinned	  asparagus,	  lobster,	  salmon,	  bottles	  of	  excellent	  
Swiss	  jam	  and	  so	  forth.	  We	  had	  chicken	  nearly	  every	  day.’	  Not	  only	  was	  the	  fare	  excellent,	  but	  
the	  service	  was	  good	  as	  well.	  ‘The	  Mess	  was	  also	  improved	  by	  John’s	  new	  batman,	  Lewington.	  
…	  [He]	  had	  been	  either	  a	  butler	  or	  a	  “gentleman’s	  gentleman”,	  and	  his	  expert	  hand	  as	  a	  waiter	  
was	  very	  welcome.’375	  Captain	  Inglefield	  at	  Changi	  recalled	  enjoying	  a	  similarly	  good	  table,	  
although	  perhaps	  it	  was	  not	  quite	  as	  good	  as	  that	  at	  Divisional	  HQ,	  where	  the	  General	  had	  his	  
own	  special	  chef,	  rumoured	  to	  have	  been	  at	  The	  Berkeley	  Hotel:	  ‘We	  prided	  ourselves	  on	  our	  
cuisine	  though	  the	  men,	  who	  had	  a	  separate	  cookhouse,	  did	  almost	  better.’376	  Cpl	  Flello	  and	  
his	  colleagues	  were	  not	  in	  agreement	  with	  this	  comparison.	  
By	  December	  of	  1942	  Flello	  was	  on	  the	  Railway	  at	  Tarsao	  and	  registering	  the	  disappointment	  
of	  the	  men,	  when	  the	  promised	  egg	  and	  sweet	  potato	  for	  Christmas	  dinner	  failed	  to	  appear.	  
He	  was	  in	  no	  doubt	  as	  to	  where	  the	  responsibility	  for	  this	  lay:	  ‘It	  really	  makes	  one	  very	  bitter	  
against	  the	  Army	  and	  those	  in	  charge.’377	  Meanwhile	  over	  on	  Borneo	  Lt	  Hobbs	  related	  how	  the	  
separation	  of	  officers	  from	  the	  men	  had	  led	  to	  a	  profound	  improvement	  in	  his	  conditions.	  
Whilst	  he	  describes	  how	  the	  men	  were	  now	  dying	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  two	  or	  three	  a	  day,	  and	  that	  
sixty	  had	  already	  died	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  medical	  facilities,	  in	  the	  next	  paragraph	  of	  his	  account	  he	  
goes	  on	  to	  recall	  the	  more	  amenable	  situation	  at	  the	  officers’	  camp.	  
Xmas	  day	  42	  …	  we	  were	  lucky	  to	  have	  a	  first	  class	  cook	  in	  the	  officers’	  camp	  and	  he	  
cooked	  us	  a	  real	  Xmas	  dinner.	  We	  bought	  30	  chickens	  and	  some	  beef	  and	  lots	  of	  other	  
food.	  The	  Jap	  commander	  lent	  us	  100	  dollars	  which	  was	  good	  of	  him.	  In	  the	  evening	  
we	  had	  party	  games	  and	  a	  concert.	  The	  mess	  was	  very	  well	  decorated,	  it	  was	  hard	  to	  
believe	  we	  were	  inside	  a	  prison	  camp.	  When	  we	  were	  separated	  from	  the	  men,	  the	  
officers	  stopped	  going	  on	  working	  parties,	  so	  we	  had	  a	  life	  of	  leisure,	  reading	  and	  
playing	  cards.378	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not	  impressed	  by	  the	  response	  of	  the	  officers	  and	  sergeants,	  who	  refused	  to	  discuss	  the	  complaints,	  and	  
who	  in	  his	  eyes	  had	  kept	  the	  good	  rice	  for	  themselves.	  
375	  IWM:	  Steeds;	  p139.	  
376	  IWM:	  Inglefield,	  G.	  (Docs	  1478)	  p28.	  
377	  IWM:	  Flello;	  25/12/42.	  
378	  IWM:	  Hobbs;	  pp34-­‐35.	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By	  December	  of	  1942	  the	  Japanese	  had	  started	  paying	  the	  officers	  although	  they	  weren’t	  
usually	  required	  to	  work,	  and	  this	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  the	  most	  persistent	  source	  of	  a	  pecuniary	  
advantage	  that	  they	  enjoyed	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.	  The	  other	  ranks	  had	  received	  pay	  from	  
June	  of	  that	  year,	  when	  they	  worked.	  The	  rates	  of	  pay	  as	  of	  February	  1943	  are	  displayed	  in	  
Table	  5.	  
Table	  5:	  Pay	  scales	  by	  rank:	  February	  1943.379	  
Rank	   Day	  rate	   Per	  month380	  
Lieutenant	  Colonel	   	   $220	  
Lieutenant	   	   $85	  
Warrant	  Officers	   40	  cents	   $11	  
NCOs	   30	  cents	   $8.25	  
Privates	   25	  cents	   $6.88	  
	  
These	  basic	  figures	  do	  not	  reflect	  what	  the	  officers	  actually	  got,	  as	  the	  Japanese	  made	  large	  
deductions,	  for	  accommodation	  and	  food,	  and	  also	  for	  a	  savings	  scheme,	  the	  funds	  of	  which	  
would	  supposedly	  be	  held	  until	  their	  release.381	  In	  many	  locations	  (although	  by	  no	  means	  all)	  
the	  officers	  also	  made	  a	  further	  deduction	  for	  hospital	  funds	  to	  enable	  the	  purchase	  of	  extra	  
food	  and,	  where	  available,	  medicines.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379	  From:	  Flower,	  “Captors	  and	  Captives.”	  In;	  Moore	  and	  Fedorowich,	  Prisoners	  of	  War,	  p243.	  
380	  Figures	  are	  Straits	  dollars	  equivalent.	  For	  daily	  paid	  labour	  I	  have	  calculated	  the	  monthly	  figure	  by	  
multiplying	  the	  day	  rate	  by	  27.5,	  which	  assumes	  about	  three	  yasumi	  days	  (rest	  days)	  per	  month.	  During	  
the	  speedo	  period	  such	  days	  would	  have	  been	  less	  frequent,	  if	  they	  occurred	  at	  all.	  
381	  The	  “savings”	  were	  never	  seen	  again.	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There	  were	  also	  local	  variations	  in	  rates,	  deductions	  and	  pay	  received.	  Dr	  Robert	  Hardie,	  at	  
Kanchanaburi	  in	  November	  1942,	  noted	  in	  his	  diary	  that	  the	  officers	  all	  got	  70	  ticals	  per	  month	  
regardless	  of	  rank.	  Of	  this	  45	  ticals	  were	  deducted	  for	  board	  and	  lodgings,	  a	  further	  15	  ticals	  
went	  into	  the	  savings	  account,	  and	  2	  ticals	  were	  deducted	  to	  buy	  extra	  food	  for	  the	  men,	  
leaving	  only	  about	  eight	  ticals	  a	  month	  (or	  25	  cents	  a	  day)	  in	  his	  hand.382	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  
that	  at	  this	  time	  the	  daily	  rate	  for	  privates	  was	  only	  10	  cents,	  and	  thus	  Hardie	  was	  in	  receipt	  of	  
substantially	  more	  than	  them,	  even	  after	  the	  various	  deductions.	  	  By	  the	  time	  the	  privates	  had	  
their	  pay	  increase	  in	  1943,	  the	  account	  of	  another	  MO	  demonstrates	  the	  continued	  
differentials	  on	  the	  Railway.	  At	  Chungkai	  he	  recalled	  that	  the	  officers	  got	  30	  baht,	  the	  NCOs	  
received	  20	  baht	  and	  the	  privates	  10	  baht	  per	  month.383	  Even	  after	  10	  baht	  was	  deducted	  from	  
the	  officers	  for	  the	  hospital	  fund	  (a	  larger	  amount	  than	  that	  “taxed”	  from	  the	  NCOs	  and	  
privates)	  they	  still	  had	  considerably	  greater	  purchasing	  power.	  	  	  
To	  give	  these	  numbers	  some	  meaning	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  camp	  economy,	  at	  Kanchanaburi	  in	  
November	  1942	  an	  egg	  cost	  7.5	  cents,	  and	  a	  bunch	  of	  bananas	  was	  15	  cents.384	  	  	  At	  Tonchan	  
South	  Camp	  in	  June	  1943	  25	  cents	  was	  usually	  enough	  to	  buy	  one	  egg	  and	  four	  cigarettes.385	  
The	  price	  and	  availability	  of	  items	  would	  fluctuate	  with	  location	  and	  time,	  often	  placing	  them	  
out	  of	  the	  reach	  of	  those	  on	  the	  lower	  rungs	  of	  the	  financial	  hierarchy,	  which,	  with	  the	  
exception	  of	  a	  few	  men	  involved	  in	  trading	  operations,	  meant	  the	  other	  ranks	  generally,	  and	  
the	  privates	  in	  particular.	  One	  private	  summarised	  this	  situation	  when	  he	  stated	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382	  Hardie,	  Robert.	  (1983)	  Burma-­‐Siam	  Railway:	  The	  secret	  diary	  of	  Dr	  Robert	  Hardie	  1942-­‐45.Imperial	  
War	  Museum.	  London.	  p50.	  The	  term	  tical	  was	  an	  anglicized	  version	  of	  the	  unit	  of	  Thai	  currency,	  the	  
baht.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Japanese	  attack	  1	  tical	  =	  1s.10d.	  (The	  Times;	  23/4/43,	  p9.)	  In	  January	  1942	  the	  
Straits	  dollar	  was	  worth	  2s.4d.	  (The	  Times;	  10/1/42,	  p7.)	  
383	  IWM:	  de	  Cayley,	  p16.	  The	  officers	  donated	  10	  baht	  to	  the	  hospital	  fund	  at	  this	  camp.	  
384	  Hardie,	  Burma-­‐Siam	  Railway,	  p50.	  Eggs,	  and	  duck	  eggs	  in	  particular,	  were	  a	  key	  source	  of	  extra	  
nutrition	  on	  the	  Railway.	  In	  an	  indication	  of	  how	  inflation	  was	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  camp	  economy,	  by	  
1945	  at	  the	  Kanchanaburi	  Officers	  Camp,	  an	  egg	  cost	  30	  to	  40	  ticals.	  Summers,	  Julie.	  (2005)	  The	  Colonel	  
of	  Tamarkan:	  Philip	  Toosey	  and	  The	  Bridge	  on	  the	  River	  Kwai.	  Pocket	  Books,	  London.	  p263.	  
385	  Flower,	  “Captors	  and	  Captives”,	  p243.	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There	  was	  considerable	  dissatisfaction	  because	  the	  officers,	  who	  had	  more	  money,	  
were	  able	  to	  buy	  six	  times	  as	  much	  as	  the	  men.	  Some	  of	  the	  officers	  did,	  in	  fact,	  
complain	  to	  the	  British	  commandant	  that	  the	  system	  was	  unfair.386	  	  	  
	  
By	  paying	  the	  officers	  more	  than	  the	  men	  the	  Japanese	  were	  complying	  in	  part	  with	  the	  
Geneva	  Convention	  of	  1929,	  drafted	  by	  the	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  (ICRC).387	  
Article	  4	  contained	  the	  foundation	  for	  differential	  conditions	  found	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
document.	  It	  stated	  that:	  ‘Differences	  of	  treatment	  between	  prisoners	  are	  permissible	  only	  if	  
such	  differences	  are	  based	  on	  the	  military	  rank,	  the	  state	  of	  physical	  or	  mental	  health,	  the	  
professional	  abilities,	  or	  the	  sex	  of	  those	  who	  benefit	  from	  them.’388	  Article	  23	  confirms	  the	  
position	  regarding	  officers’	  pay,	  when	  it	  stipulates	  that	  ‘officers	  and	  persons	  of	  equivalent	  
status	  who	  are	  prisoners	  of	  war	  shall	  receive	  from	  the	  detaining	  Power	  the	  same	  pay	  as	  
officers	  of	  corresponding	  rank	  in	  the	  armed	  forces	  of	  that	  Power…	  .’389	  	  
For	  most	  of	  the	  other	  ranks	  the	  fact	  of	  this	  selective	  employment	  of	  international	  agreements	  
was	  rarely	  recognised,	  although	  the	  effects	  of	  such	  implementations	  were,	  as	  has	  been	  
described,	  the	  source	  of	  considerable	  tensions.	  Ignorance	  of	  this	  partial	  application	  would	  
continue	  to	  persist	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  account	  of	  one	  ex-­‐prisoner,	  
recalling	  his	  time	  at	  Bandoeng	  Camp	  on	  Java.	  ‘Our	  Japanese	  masters,	  their	  hands	  as	  yet	  untied	  
by	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Convention,	  threw	  together	  in	  this	  gathering	  of	  allied	  
prisoners	  of	  war	  men	  of	  all	  races	  and	  ranks…’390	  
A	  more	  immediately	  recognisable	  dimension	  of	  the	  ICRC	  was	  the	  source	  of	  further	  food	  based	  
tensions	  in	  the	  camps,	  as	  Red	  Cross	  parcels	  started	  arriving	  during	  1943.	  Amongst	  some	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386	  IWM:	  Dawson;	  pp191-­‐192.	  
387	  Whilst	  the	  Japanese	  government	  had	  been	  a	  party	  to	  the	  Convention,	  the	  Diet	  had	  not	  ratified	  it,	  
allowing	  for	  a	  selective	  implementation	  of	  those	  parts	  that	  were	  considered	  expedient.	  
388	  https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/305	  	  Article	  4.	  
389	  https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/305	  	  Article	  23.	  
390	  IWM:	  Gregory;	  p26.	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  Convention	  had	  specified	  that:	  ‘Belligerents	  shall	  as	  far	  as	  
possible	  avoid	  bringing	  together	  in	  the	  same	  camp	  prisoners	  of	  different	  races	  or	  nationalities.’	  For	  a	  
detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  this	  clause,	  see:	  Schroer,	  Timothy	  L.	  (2013)	  “The	  Emergence	  and	  Early	  
Demise	  of	  Codified	  Racial	  Segregation	  of	  Prisoners	  of	  War	  under	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions	  of	  1929	  and	  
1949.”	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  International	  Law.	  Vol	  15,	  pp53-­‐76.	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BORs	  there	  was	  a	  perception	  that	  they	  were	  being	  inequitably	  distributed.	  Whilst	  encamped	  in	  
Japan	  Sgt	  Rose	  (RAF)	  noted	  that	  there	  was	  ‘Much	  bitter	  feeling	  amongst	  lads.	  Officers	  now	  
have	  Red	  Cross	  foodstuffs	  in	  their	  billet.’391	  He	  would	  later	  reflect	  in	  a	  published	  version	  of	  his	  
diary:	  ‘Perhaps	  that	  was	  why	  they	  weren’t	  arguing	  for	  better	  rations	  for	  the	  men.’392	  	  The	  bitter	  
feeling	  spilt	  over	  into	  formal	  protest	  at	  Jinsen	  in	  Korea,	  during	  the	  ‘Great	  Bully	  Controversy’,	  as	  
noted	  in	  the	  diary	  of	  L.	  Bombardier	  Toze:	  
First	  it	  was	  discovered	  that	  the	  officers	  were	  being	  issued	  with	  2ozs,	  Red	  Cross	  bulk	  
bully	  per	  man	  per	  day.	  Indignation,	  why	  not	  men?	  A	  formal	  written	  protest	  made	  by	  
squad	  leaders	  to	  Japs	  regarding	  unfairness.	  Japs	  very	  annoyed	  by	  letter,	  say	  that	  
officers	  have	  lost	  most	  weight	  as	  they	  have	  sloppy	  rice	  (at	  own	  request!)	  so	  get	  bully.	  
…	  Good	  scathing	  speech	  by	  Major	  Watkins	  of	  Loyals	  to	  Loyals	  NCOs	  telling	  ‘em	  they	  
were	  a	  rotten	  shower	  etc.	  Present	  state	  of	  affairs	  no	  bully	  stew	  to	  date	  only,	  no	  rice	  
balls	  and	  no	  more	  Red	  Cross	  issue	  until	  dispute	  settled.	  The	  whole	  affair	  stinks.393	  	  
	  
The	  same	  NCOs	  who	  got	  bawled	  out	  included	  some	  who	  in	  the	  preceding	  few	  months	  had	  
been	  carrying	  out	  officially	  sanctioned	  punishment	  beatings	  on	  men	  for	  stealing	  food	  from	  
Japanese	  stores.	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  command	  structure	  was	  being	  tested	  
to	  its	  limits	  by	  the	  inequitable	  distribution	  of	  food.	  In	  both	  cases	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  whether	  
the	  Japanese	  had	  issued	  Red	  Cross	  items	  specifically	  to	  the	  officers,	  or	  whether	  they	  had	  
passed	  them	  on	  for	  general	  distribution	  and	  the	  officers	  had	  themselves	  been	  slow	  or	  selective	  
in	  their	  distribution.	  Whilst	  the	  ‘bully	  controversy’	  episode	  suggests	  that	  the	  Japanese	  had	  
selectively	  issued	  the	  bully,	  the	  officers	  had	  accepted	  this	  offering	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  assented	  to	  	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391	  IWM:	  Rose;	  18-­‐20/9/1943.	  
392	  Rose,	  You	  Shook	  My	  Hand,	  p65.	  
393	  IWM:	  Toze;	  7/3/1943.	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4.3.3.	  Work.	  	  
The	  requirement	  for	  the	  other	  ranks	  to	  work	  was	  the	  other	  crucial	  factor	  in	  determining	  the	  
general	  health	  and	  survival	  chances	  of	  the	  POWs.	  Whilst	  across	  the	  globe	  captured	  other	  ranks	  
were	  usually	  required	  to	  work	  during	  the	  war,	  for	  those	  in	  Japanese	  hands	  it	  was	  usually	  under	  
much	  harsher	  conditions	  than	  those	  experienced	  by	  axis	  prisoners	  in	  western	  captivity.394	  For	  
the	  BORs	  in	  Asia,	  existing	  on	  subsistence	  rations	  at	  best,	  the	  energy	  expenditure	  involved	  in	  
the	  frequently	  heavy	  labour	  would	  push	  their	  calorific	  account	  into	  the	  negative,	  with	  serious	  
and	  often	  fatal	  implications	  for	  their	  overall	  health.	  	  Frequently	  they	  were	  made	  to	  work	  whilst	  
ill,	  even	  if	  they	  were	  in	  one	  of	  the	  makeshift	  hospitals.	  
	  In	  very	  visible	  contrast	  the	  officers	  were	  not	  normally	  expected	  to	  work	  alongside	  the	  men.	  
Again	  this	  was	  an	  example	  of	  selective	  implementation	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Convention.	  Article	  27	  
stated	  that:	  ‘Belligerents	  may	  employ	  as	  workmen	  prisoners	  of	  war	  who	  are	  physically	  fit,	  
other	  than	  officers	  and	  persons	  of	  equivalent	  status,	  according	  to	  their	  rink	  [sic]	  and	  their	  
ability.’395	  The	  Japanese	  did	  not	  follow	  this	  paragraph	  to	  the	  letter	  by	  any	  means,	  and	  on	  
occasion	  officers	  were	  made	  to	  work,	  but	  such	  lapses	  were	  far	  less	  frequent	  than	  the	  repeated	  
occasions	  when	  sick	  and	  unfit	  members	  of	  the	  other	  ranks	  were	  forced	  out	  to	  work.	  Cpl.	  
Henderson	  (along	  with	  Dawson)	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  men	  who	  recognised	  that	  certain	  aspects	  
of	  the	  Convention	  were	  being	  applied,	  and	  saw	  such	  implementation,	  and	  indeed	  the	  treaty	  as	  
a	  whole,	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  class	  based	  solidarities	  that	  transgressed	  international	  
boundaries.	  	  
This	  was	  in	  my	  opinion	  just	  another	  aspect	  of	  the	  class	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  officers	  
of	  opposing	  nations	  tacitly	  admitted	  that	  they	  had	  more	  in	  common	  with	  each	  other	  
than	  they	  had	  with	  the	  common	  privates	  of	  their	  own	  country.396	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394	  Notable	  exceptions	  to	  this	  were	  German	  and	  Russian	  POWs	  captured	  on	  the	  Eastern	  Front	  in	  Europe,	  
whose	  mortality	  rates	  far	  exceeded	  those	  of	  the	  allied	  prisoners	  in	  Asia.	  As	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  2	  allied	  
treatment	  of	  Japanese	  surrendered	  personnel	  after	  the	  war	  could	  on	  occasions	  be	  rough.	  
395	  https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/305	  	  Article	  27.	  
396	  IWM:	  Henderson;	  pp419-­‐420.	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Whilst	  there	  were	  rare	  occasions	  when	  the	  officers	  had	  to	  perform	  heavy	  labour,	  in	  times	  of	  
intense	  activity	  like	  the	  speedo	  period	  on	  the	  Railway	  or	  as	  a	  punishment,	  they	  were	  usually	  
camp	  based,	  attending	  to	  administrative	  duties	  or	  camp	  upkeep	  and	  gardening.397	  There	  were	  
also	  those	  who	  chose	  not	  to	  involve	  themselves	  in	  any	  such	  activities,	  and	  the	  diaries	  of	  the	  
overworked	  MOs	  are	  not	  surprisingly	  critical	  of	  such	  types.	  Robert	  Hardie	  noted	  on	  the	  Railway	  	  
that	  there	  	  ‘are	  quite	  a	  number	  of	  good	  officers	  among	  the	  British	  troops	  from	  home,	  but	  also	  
a	  surprising	  number	  who	  do	  not	  show	  much	  sense	  of	  responsibility,	  and	  unless	  forced	  to	  do	  
some	  job	  simply	  lie	  back	  and	  contribute	  nothing	  to	  the	  general	  welfare.’398	  There	  were	  similar	  
problems	  in	  getting	  some	  officers	  to	  contribute	  to	  welfare	  funds.	  Sybilla	  Flower	  cites	  the	  
example	  of	  a	  senior	  Regular	  Army	  officer	  at	  Tarsao	  who	  refused	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  hospital	  
fund,	  although	  she	  suggests	  that	  such	  attitudes	  were	  much	  rarer	  amongst	  the	  TA	  officers,	  
where	  there	  were	  closer	  links	  in	  civilian	  life	  to	  the	  men	  under	  them.399	  At	  Bandoeng	  Camp	  on	  
Java	  the	  British	  officers	  got	  a	  better	  press	  from	  “Weary”	  Dunlop,	  who	  noted	  that	  ‘some	  English	  
officers	  think	  they	  should	  give	  more	  than	  suggested’	  	  towards	  the	  Regimental	  Fund,	  whilst	  
being	  ‘disgusted	  at	  the	  light	  in	  which	  Australian	  officers	  had	  been	  shown.’400	  A	  group	  of	  the	  
Australian	  officers	  under	  his	  command	  were	  pleading	  poverty	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  maintain	  their	  
advantageous	  position.	  
The	  subject	  of	  work	  was	  perhaps	  that	  part	  of	  their	  privileged	  position	  that	  the	  officers	  could	  be	  
most	  defensive	  about.	  Here	  again	  some	  of	  the	  officers’	  own	  accounts	  draw	  on	  a	  narrative	  of	  
equivalence	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  selflessness	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  justify,	  mitigate	  and	  explain	  their	  
easier	  circumstances.	  One	  officer	  attempted	  to	  conflate	  the	  relative	  working	  conditions	  of	  
officers	  and	  men	  at	  Motoyama	  camp	  in	  Japan.	  He	  states	  that	  the	  men	  working	  in	  the	  mine	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397	  Despite	  his	  criticisms	  of	  the	  officer	  corps	  as	  a	  whole,	  Henderson	  did	  express	  	  concern	  for	  the	  older	  
officers	  who	  were	  made	  to	  work;	  some	  of	  the	  Battalion	  officers	  ‘tended	  to	  be	  men	  well	  past	  the	  first	  
bloom	  of	  youth.’	  p420.	  
398	  Hardie,	  Burma-­‐Siam	  Railway,	  p50.	  
399	  Flower,	  “Captors	  and	  Captives”,	  in	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn,	  Forgotten	  Captives.	  p	  244.	  
400	  Dunlop,	  Sir	  Edward	  E.(1986;	  2009	  edn)	  The	  War	  Diaries	  of	  Weary	  Dunlop:	  Japan	  and	  the	  Burma-­‐
Thailand	  Railway,	  1942-­‐1945.	  Penguin,	  London.pp116,117.	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‘were	  away	  from	  the	  camp	  at	  least	  twelve	  hours,	  and	  sometimes	  for	  as	  much	  as	  sixteen!’	  Not	  
to	  be	  outdone,	  the	  officers	  would	  regularly	  put	  in	  three	  hours	  in	  the	  camp	  garden.	  ‘It	  was	  
extremely	  hot	  on	  that	  exposed	  piece	  of	  land,	  and	  the	  three	  hours	  sometimes	  seemed	  very	  long	  
indeed.’401	  	  
In	  another	  example,	  Lt	  Hines,	  recalling	  his	  time	  on	  the	  Railway,	  provided	  a	  multi-­‐layered	  
exposition	  which	  employed	  most	  of	  the	  methodologies	  of	  mitigation	  and	  conflation	  in	  an	  
attempt	  to	  vindicate	  his	  situation:	  
At	  first	  the	  Japanese	  put	  great	  pressure	  on	  both	  men	  and	  officers	  to	  put	  roads	  through	  
the	  jungle.	  This	  was	  when	  most	  of	  the	  “savage”	  treatment	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  press	  was	  
inflicted.	  As	  the	  work	  got	  under	  way	  the	  officers	  ceased	  work	  much	  to	  the	  relief	  of	  the	  
other	  ranks	  who	  did	  not	  like	  to	  see	  them	  under	  the	  discipline	  of	  the	  Japanese	  guards.	  
Some	  stayed	  in	  the	  jungle	  to	  look	  after	  the	  men,	  including	  a	  number	  of	  RAMC	  officers,	  
others	  were	  moved	  to	  the	  rest	  camps.	  Conditions	  began	  to	  be	  much	  improved.	  When	  
the	  men	  left	  Thailand	  No	  4	  Camp	  was	  near	  to	  Bangpong	  and	  conditions	  were	  very	  
satisfactory.402	  
	  
He	  starts	  by	  suggesting	  that	  not	  only	  were	  all	  ranks	  in	  it	  together,	  but	  that	  this	  was	  also	  the	  
time	  when	  ‘great	  pressure’	  and	  ‘most	  of	  the	  ‘savage”	  treatment’	  were	  (jointly)	  suffered.	  Not	  
only	  does	  he	  imply	  that	  things	  got	  easier	  for	  the	  men	  as	  the	  officers	  stopped	  work	  (just	  as	  the	  
work	  was	  actually	  beginning)	  but	  also	  that	  the	  men	  were	  grateful	  when	  this	  happened.	  Of	  
course	  they	  did	  not	  all	  depart	  and	  leave	  the	  men	  to	  it,	  ‘some’	  stayed	  to	  ‘look	  after’	  the	  men,	  
whilst	  ‘others’	  went	  to	  the	  rest	  camps.	  It	  might	  be	  more	  accurate	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  few	  very	  
overworked	  MOs	  and	  administrative	  staff	  stayed	  with	  the	  men,	  whilst	  most	  of	  the	  officers	  
departed	  for	  the	  rest	  camps.	  The	  key	  part	  of	  the	  statement	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  last	  sentence,	  in	  
that	  once	  the	  officers	  were	  away	  from	  the	  men	  life	  became	  ‘very	  satisfactory’.	  
One	  group	  of	  BORs	  who	  would	  remain	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  their	  officers	  were	  their	  batmen,	  
soldiers	  who	  worked	  as	  their	  servants.	  This	  was	  another	  example	  of	  Japanese	  hierarchical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401	  IWM:	  Steeds;	  p217.	  
402	  IWM:	  Hines,	  Report	  on	  conditions	  in	  No4	  POW	  Camp	  in	  Thailand.	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partiality	  in	  their	  treatment	  of	  the	  officers,	  and	  even	  on	  the	  Railway	  such	  duties	  were	  
enshrined	  in	  the	  regulations	  laid	  down	  by	  their	  captors.	  Some	  prisoners	  were	  required	  ‘to	  
serve	  the	  commissioned	  officers	  …	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  one	  for	  4	  officers.’403	  One	  officer	  recalled	  that	  
near	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  at	  Kanchanaburi	  Officers	  Camp,	  this	  ratio	  had	  fallen	  considerably.	  
There	  were	  only	  three	  men	  to	  look	  after	  each	  hut	  of	  200	  officers,	  ‘so	  they	  barely	  managed	  to	  
wash	  more	  than	  a	  couple	  of	  bits	  of	  clothing	  for	  us	  a	  week.’404	  	  	  
For	  the	  batmen	  themselves,	  particularly	  those	  who	  were	  not	  professional	  servants,	  such	  
employment	  may	  not	  have	  been	  what	  they	  signed	  up	  for.	  This	  may	  have	  been	  the	  case	  when,	  
much	  to	  his	  dismay	  and	  bemusement,	  Lt	  Steeds’	  batman	  resigned	  just	  before	  the	  capitulation.	  
At	  this	  inopportune	  moment	  my	  batman,	  Taylor,	  decided	  to	  pack	  the	  job	  up;	  at	  such	  a	  
stage	  volunteers	  were	  scarce	  and	  I	  had	  to	  take	  on	  one	  Gunner	  Harris,	  a	  harum-­‐scarum	  
youth	  with	  a	  tremendous	  stutter;	  he	  proved	  to	  be	  of	  very	  little	  use,	  and	  I	  only	  had	  him	  
for	  a	  couple	  of	  weeks.	  I	  was	  sorry	  to	  lose	  Taylor	  who	  was	  a	  likeable	  man	  of	  sturdy	  
character,	  and	  I	  never	  could	  find	  out	  exactly	  why	  he	  chucked	  his	  hand	  in.405	  	  
	  
Taylor	  at	  least	  had	  the	  chance	  to	  jump.	  The	  batman	  who	  did	  for	  Captain	  Barratt	  was	  pushed	  
after	  he	  didn’t	  bring	  his	  officer’s	  kit	  with	  him	  when	  the	  Japanese	  ordered	  them	  to	  leave	  their	  
accommodation.406	  Lt	  Steeds	  had	  to	  look	  after	  himself	  for	  a	  while	  in	  Japan,	  but	  normal	  military	  
service	  of	  a	  sort	  was	  resumed	  in	  1944	  when	  the	  Japanese	  announced	  that	  the	  officers	  were	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403	  Kratoska,	  Paul	  H.	  (2006)	  The	  Thailand-­‐Burma	  Railway,	  1942-­‐1946:	  Documents	  and	  Selected	  Writings.	  
Volume	  III:	  POW	  Labour:	  Allied	  Prisoners	  of	  War	  on	  the	  Railway.	  Routledge,	  London.,	  p11.	  
404	  Coast,	  Railroad,	  p232.	  Similarly	  at	  Changi	  there	  had	  been	  concern	  at	  the	  decline	  in	  the	  pool	  of	  
suitable	  candidates	  as	  the	  net	  for	  ORs	  to	  go	  up-­‐country	  was	  widened,	  including	  some	  of	  their	  batmen,	  
and	  the	  proportion	  of	  officers	  to	  men	  increased;	  in:	  Havers,	  Re-­‐appraising,	  p85.	  
405	  IWM:	  Steeds;	  p136.	  
406	  IWM:	  Barratt,	  J.A.L.	  (Docs	  1771)	  p11.	  Whilst	  there	  were	  no	  doubt	  some	  tensions	  involved	  in	  these	  
relationships,	  they	  never	  fell	  to	  the	  point	  reached	  at	  Colditz	  where	  the	  other	  ranks	  went	  on	  strike	  in	  
1941.	  One	  orderly,	  Alec	  Ross,	  was	  even	  precluded	  by	  his	  officer,	  Douglas	  Bader,	  from	  returning	  home	  as	  
part	  of	  a	  prisoner	  exchange.	  On	  being	  told	  by	  the	  German	  commandant	  that	  he	  would	  be	  going	  home,	  
Bader	  intervened:	  ‘“No	  he's	  bloody	  not.	  He	  came	  here	  as	  my	  lackey	  and	  he'll	  stay	  as	  my	  lackey.”’	  
MacKenzie,	  S.P.	  (2006;	  online	  edn	  2011)	  The	  Colditz	  Myth:	  British	  and	  Commonwealth	  Prisoners	  of	  War	  
in	  Nazi	  Germany.	  OUP.	  pp145-­‐146.	  
154	  
	  
have	  one	  man	  as	  a	  servant.	  Their	  first	  incumbent	  had	  injured	  his	  wrist	  in	  a	  mining	  accident.	  
‘While	  he	  recuperated	  he	  looked	  after	  us.’407	  	  	  
As	  in	  normal	  military	  life,	  in	  captivity	  the	  batmen	  occupied	  an	  ill-­‐defined	  space,	  somewhere	  
between	  the	  officers’	  mess	  and	  the	  normal	  life	  of	  the	  other	  ranks,	  to	  whom	  they	  were	  largely	  
peripheral.	  They	  appear	  only	  fleetingly	  in	  the	  accounts	  of	  the	  men,	  at	  the	  margins	  of	  OR	  
identity.	  Grafton	  and	  Oakley	  were	  in	  rare	  agreement	  in	  their	  representation	  of	  batmen	  as	  an	  
integral	  part	  of	  the	  privileged	  conditions	  of	  the	  Dutch	  officers	  when	  they	  entered	  captivity	  in	  
the	  NEI,	  although	  their	  concerns	  were	  more	  influenced	  by	  national	  antagonism	  than	  by	  issues	  
of	  class.408	  In	  the	  British	  context	  attempts	  to	  improve	  the	  diet	  of	  their	  officers	  were	  a	  source	  of	  
some	  tensions,	  Henderson	  recalling	  with	  disapproval	  that	  he	  had	  heard	  an	  officer	  instruct	  his	  
man	  to	  go	  to	  the	  other	  ranks	  cookhouse	  to	  see	  if	  he	  could	  find	  some	  butter.409	  Toze	  recalled	  
the	  ‘uproar’	  in	  his	  camp	  in	  Korea	  when	  a	  batman	  who	  was	  caught	  trying	  to	  steal	  Red	  Cross	  
supplies,	  was	  given	  only	  a	  light	  punishment.410	  
On	  occasion	  batmen	  could	  be	  perceived	  as	  occupying	  a	  rare	  feminine	  place	  in	  the	  wider	  more	  
masculine	  landscape	  that	  the	  prisoners	  were	  attempting	  to	  reconstruct	  from	  the	  ashes	  of	  
defeat,	  surrender	  and	  imprisonment,	  as	  evoked	  by	  Pte	  Dixon	  on	  a	  march	  between	  camps	  on	  
the	  Railway.411	  
My	  heart	  went	  out	  to	  one	  of	  the	  officer’s	  batman,	  named	  by	  us	  as	  Clare.	  A	  nicer	  fellow	  
you	  could	  not	  ask	  for	  and	  who	  I	  knew	  so	  well.	  He	  was	  devastated	  and	  cried	  like	  a	  baby	  
as	  I	  beckoned	  him	  on.	  He	  was	  gay	  and	  I	  knew	  his	  chance	  of	  survival	  was	  nil,	  which	  I	  
learnt	  later	  was	  the	  case.412	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407	  IWM:	  Steeds;	  p198.	  
408	  IWM:	  Grafton;	  p42;	  IWM:	  Oakley;	  p30.	  
409	  IWM:	  Henderson;	  p282.	  
410	  IWM:	  Toze;	  18/2/1943.	  
411	  The	  position	  of	  medical	  orderlies,	  assisting	  the	  doctors	  and	  caring	  for	  their	  patients,	  might	  be	  an	  area	  
for	  further	  research	  with	  regard	  to	  constructions	  of	  masculinity	  on	  the	  Railway.	  
412	  IWM:	  Dixon;	  p91.	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Whilst	  the	  language	  used	  by	  Dixon	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  man’s	  sexuality	  has	  obviously	  evolved	  
somewhat	  from	  the	  then	  contemporary	  terminology,	  the	  underlying	  assumptions	  attached	  to	  
it	  have	  not,	  and	  it	  is	  implicit	  in	  this	  statement	  that	  because	  he	  was	  gay	  (or	  feminine)	  he	  was	  
not	  man	  enough	  to	  survive.	  This	  is	  rare	  example	  of	  a	  batman	  being	  seen	  in	  a	  sympathetic	  light,	  
more	  commonly	  they	  were	  perceived	  as	  vicariously	  enjoying	  some	  of	  the	  same	  privileges	  of	  
the	  officers	  they	  were	  serving.	  
Whilst	  this	  section	  has	  painted	  a	  fairly	  negative	  picture	  of	  the	  outlooks	  of	  the	  men	  with	  regard	  
to	  the	  officers	  in	  general,	  there	  were	  notable	  exceptions	  to	  such	  perceptions.	  Of	  particular	  
note	  in	  this	  regard	  were	  those	  officers	  who	  stayed	  with	  the	  men,	  some	  of	  whom	  were	  greatly	  
respected	  for	  the	  work	  they	  did	  in	  maintaining	  health	  as	  best	  as	  was	  possible	  under	  such	  
difficult	  circumstances.	  Medical	  officers	  (and	  their	  orderlies)	  were	  the	  subject	  of	  universal	  
praise	  as	  they	  struggled	  both	  physically	  and	  psychologically	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  what	  were	  
for	  most	  new	  clinical	  horizons	  with	  extremely	  limited	  resources,	  frequently	  having	  to	  use	  their	  
ingenuity	  and	  not	  a	  little	  courage	  in	  fighting	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  men	  in	  their	  care	  and	  keep	  
them	  off	  working	  parties.	  	  
Pte	  Dawson,	  who	  otherwise	  had	  nothing	  of	  positive	  note	  to	  say	  about	  officers,	  selected	  them	  
for	  specific	  praise,	  recalling	  that	  the	  hospitals	  on	  the	  Railway	  were	  ‘a	  tribute	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  
medical	  officers	  –	  British,	  Dutch	  and	  Australian.’413	  In	  addition	  some	  of	  the	  officers	  who	  went	  
with	  the	  men	  were	  equally	  well	  regarded	  for	  their	  work	  in	  attempting	  to	  look	  after	  those	  in	  
their	  charge,	  putting	  themselves	  in	  the	  front	  line	  of	  the	  battle	  for	  survival,	  a	  more	  detailed	  
survey	  of	  whom	  is	  contained	  in	  an	  ensuing	  section.	  It	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  such	  praise	  fell	  on	  the	  
few	  that	  were	  most	  clearly	  visible	  to	  the	  other	  ranks	  and	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  putting	  themselves	  
out	  for	  them;	  conversely	  the	  rarely	  seen	  majority,	  and	  those	  in	  clear	  view	  who	  were	  less	  
supportive,	  became	  the	  target	  of	  considerable	  resentment.	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  IWM:	  Dawson;	  pp70-­‐71.	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4.3.4.	  Differential	  mortality	  rates	  within	  the	  British	  other	  ranks.	  
Thus	  far	  the	  binary	  relationship	  between	  the	  BORs	  and	  their	  officers	  has	  been	  considered.	  
Whilst	  there	  is	  considerable	  merit	  in	  such	  a	  basic	  comparative	  model,	  particularly	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  this	  thesis,	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  offer	  a	  more	  detailed	  
structural	  analysis,	  which	  segments	  the	  BORs	  into	  the	  two	  categories	  of	  NCOs	  (sergeants,	  lance	  
sergeants,	  bombardiers	  and	  lance	  bombardiers)414	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  privates	  on	  the	  
other.	  The	  records	  of	  the	  125th	  A-­‐T	  Regt	  reveal	  a	  difference	  between	  these	  groups	  in	  terms	  of	  
mortality,	  the	  senior	  NCOs	  at	  27%	  and	  the	  lowest	  ranks	  at	  33%,	  corroborating	  the	  earlier	  
results	  from	  Joan	  Beaumont’s	  research	  on	  the	  Australians	  in	  Gull	  Force.415	  Further	  evidence	  of	  
such	  stratification	  has	  been	  suggested	  by	  Roland	  and	  Shannon,	  who	  examined	  the	  weight	  
changes	  of	  American	  POWs	  at	  Oeyama	  Camp	  in	  Japan	  in	  the	  last	  year	  of	  the	  war,	  a	  time	  when	  
ration	  scales	  were	  at	  their	  lowest.	  They	  found	  that	  NCOs	  ‘(corporals,	  sergeants,	  etc)	  suffered	  
less	  weight	  loss	  than	  did	  privates.’416	  
Whilst	  the	  differences	  in	  mortality	  within	  the	  other	  ranks	  are	  not	  as	  clear	  cut	  as	  those	  with	  the	  
officers,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  same	  factors	  of	  food,	  work	  and	  money	  were	  
responsible.	  The	  NCOs	  held	  an	  economic	  advantage	  over	  the	  privates	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  25%	  to	  
100%	  at	  varying	  locations,	  giving	  them	  greater	  purchasing	  power	  in	  the	  market	  for	  extra	  food	  
and	  thus	  greater	  access	  to	  nutritional	  supplements.	  
What	  Joan	  Beaumont	  has	  described	  as	  ‘a	  somewhat	  ambivalent	  respect	  for	  rank’	  by	  the	  
Japanese	  could	  be	  reproduced	  in	  the	  other	  ranks	  of	  the	  POWs,	  with	  NCOs	  being	  allocated	  less	  
strenuous	  supervisory	  roles.417	  When	  Henderson	  was	  working	  at	  the	  Singapore	  docks	  shortly	  
after	  the	  surrender,	  he	  recalled	  being	  told	  by	  a	  guard	  that,	  as	  he	  was	  a	  corporal,	  his	  role	  was	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414	  Bombardier	  is	  the	  Royal	  Artillery	  equivalent	  of	  a	  corporal.	  
415	  The	  figure	  for	  NCOs,	  without	  the	  lowest	  ranking	  lance	  bombardiers	  (who	  had	  a	  higher	  mortality	  than	  
the	  other	  NCOs),	  is	  25%.	  
416	  Roland	  and	  Shannon,	  “Patterns	  of	  Disease”,	  p76.	  	  
417	  Beaumont,	  Joan.	  (1983)	  “Rank,	  Privilege	  and	  Prisoners	  of	  War.”	  War	  and	  Society,	  Vol	  1,	  p78.	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supervise	  the	  work	  of	  the	  privates.	  With	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  officers	  from	  the	  men	  in	  the	  last	  
year	  of	  captivity,	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  administrative	  work	  would	  have	  fallen	  on	  the	  
shoulders	  of	  the	  senior	  NCOs,	  again	  taking	  them	  off	  the	  factory	  floor	  at	  a	  time	  when	  nutritional	  
deficiencies	  were	  at	  their	  greatest.	  Lighter	  work	  could	  also	  act	  to	  reduce	  illness,	  as	  well	  as	  
making	  it	  easier	  to	  work	  when	  sick,	  an	  important	  factor	  when	  wages	  were	  only	  paid	  to,	  and	  
rations	  issued	  for,	  the	  other	  ranks	  if	  they	  worked.	  
The	  cookhouse	  was	  for	  obvious	  reasons	  a	  highly	  desirable	  location	  of	  employment.	  The	  work	  
was	  generally	  less	  strenuous	  than	  heavy	  labouring,	  and	  the	  proximity	  of	  the	  cookhouse	  
precluded	  the	  often	  lengthy	  marches	  to	  the	  workplace.	  Of	  course	  the	  main	  advantage	  was	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  climb	  a	  little	  higher	  on	  the	  camp	  pecking	  order.	  It	  was	  not	  uncommon	  that	  rank	  
would	  play	  a	  part	  in	  who	  worked	  in	  the	  cookhouses,	  as	  Cpl	  Henderson	  recalled	  when	  he	  had	  
been	  lucky	  enough	  to	  get	  work	  in	  a	  Japanese	  kitchen,	  where	  ‘	  sometimes	  the	  working	  part	  of	  
the	  group	  was	  made	  up	  entirely	  of	  sergeants,	  ordinary	  “squaddies”	  not	  standing	  much	  chance	  
of	  getting	  on	  it.’418	  
There	  was	  a	  common	  belief	  that	  the	  catering	  staff	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunities	  that	  
were	  not	  available	  to	  less	  fortunately	  employed	  workers.	  There	  was	  a	  common	  joke	  that	  you	  
knew	  when	  rations	  were	  getting	  really	  short	  when	  even	  the	  cooks	  had	  beriberi.	  Pte	  Dawson	  
typified	  this	  attitude	  when	  he	  recalled:	  ‘We	  always	  took	  it	  for	  granted	  that	  that	  the	  cooks	  and	  
the	  officers	  were	  getting	  more	  than	  their	  fair	  share	  –	  suspicions	  which	  were	  often	  well	  
founded.’419	  Confirmation	  of	  such	  misgivings	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  diary	  of	  Cpl	  Flello,	  who	  had	  
the	  good	  fortune	  to	  find	  himself	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  coffee	  stall	  in	  the	  canteen	  at	  Tamarkan,	  
following	  ‘somewhat	  of	  a	  scandal	  regarding	  funds’	  involving	  his	  predecessor.	  Here	  he	  had	  ‘a	  
very	  enjoyable	  stay	  in	  the	  canteen	  and	  formed	  many	  valuable	  friends.	  …	  Began	  to	  get	  quite	  fat	  
with	  all	  the	  good	  living	  I	  was	  enjoying	  and	  also	  because	  I	  was	  not	  having	  as	  much	  exercise	  as	  I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418	  IWM:	  Henderson;	  p378.	  
419	  IWM:	  Dawson;	  p106.	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had	  been.’420	  Flello,	  despite	  his	  previous	  complaints,	  now	  found	  himself	  in	  a	  more	  privileged	  
position	  and	  he	  benefitted	  on	  both	  the	  income	  and	  expenditure	  sides	  of	  the	  nutritional	  
balance	  sheet,	  even	  without	  resorting	  to	  the	  creative	  accounting	  of	  the	  previous	  incumbent.	  
Thus	  whilst	  there	  large	  inequities	  in	  the	  camp	  economy,	  as	  defined	  by	  food,	  money	  and	  work,	  	  
between	  the	  officers	  and	  the	  BORs,	  it	  was	  at	  their	  respective	  extremes,	  the	  senior	  officers	  and	  
the	  privates,	  that	  the	  relative	  gaps	  were	  largest	  	  in	  what	  was	  a	  continuous	  rank	  based	  
hierarchy,	  that	  also	  operated	  within	  the	  other	  ranks.	  
	  
4.4.	  Other	  Sources	  of	  BOR	  Antipathy.	  
4.4.1.	  Discipline.	  
One	  of	  the	  earliest	  points	  of	  friction	  was	  the	  continuation	  of	  military	  discipline	  in	  captivity.	  At	  
the	  capitulation	  of	  Singapore	  its	  erstwhile	  defenders	  were	  marched	  off	  to	  Changi,	  where	  the	  
Japanese	  left	  the	  prisoners	  to	  get	  on	  with	  organising	  themselves.	  General	  Percival	  ‘s	  Malaya	  
Command	  structure	  was	  thus	  superimposed	  onto	  its	  new	  location,	  where	  it	  would	  be	  largely	  
free	  from	  Japanese	  interference	  for	  most	  of	  the	  war.	  Here	  the	  King’s	  Regulations	  were	  strictly	  
enforced,	  and	  indeed	  sometimes	  exceeded.	  
British	  Officers	  later	  maintained	  that	  they	  were	  free,	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  discipline,	  to	  
go	  beyond	  those	  regulations	  when	  they	  believed	  them	  to	  be	  too	  lenient	  for	  Prisoner	  of	  
War	  life.	  Perhaps	  it	  was	  for	  our	  own	  good.	  But	  we	  could	  be	  forgiven	  at	  times	  for	  
forgetting	  that	  we	  were	  prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese.421	  
	  
This	  regimented	  structure	  came	  as	  something	  of	  a	  culture	  shock	  for	  the	  POWs	  arriving	  from	  
Java,	  the	  “Java	  rabble”	  as	  some	  of	  the	  Changi	  officers	  referred	  to	  them,	  where	  conditions	  had	  
not	  been	  so	  organised.	  	  This	  was	  keenly	  observed	  by	  some	  American	  artillery	  men	  who	  had	  
been	  transferred	  to	  Changi.	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The	  Americans	  were	  not	  amused	  at	  the	  British	  officers.	  They	  acted	  as	  if	  they	  had	  not	  
lost	  the	  war.	  They	  went	  strutting	  around	  with	  swagger	  sticks,	  demanding	  military	  
courtesy	  and	  formal	  salutes.	  They	  even	  had	  their	  own	  men	  doing	  pack	  drill	  for	  
punishment.	  In	  a	  Japanese	  prison	  camp.	  The	  Americans	  could	  not	  believe	  it.	  The	  British	  
officers	  treated	  their	  own	  enlisted	  men	  like	  dirt,	  and	  in	  their	  loftiness	  they	  assumed	  
they	  could	  treat	  the	  Americans	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  …	  At	  Changi	  everyone	  was	  a	  double	  
prisoner,	  of	  the	  British	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Japanese.422	  	  
	  
Some	  officers	  were	  also	  moved	  to	  comment	  upon	  this	  situation,	  Captain	  Merrett	  (RAOC)	  
noting	  in	  his	  diary	  in	  September	  1942	  that	  ‘We	  arrived	  in	  poorish	  order	  at	  Changi	  to	  find	  British	  
Army	  comic	  opera	  still	  functioning	  &	  so	  called	  “staff”	  still	  messing	  things	  up.’423	  	  The	  imposition	  
of	  military	  discipline	  was	  not	  without	  its	  risks,	  particularly	  to	  some	  of	  its	  enforcers	  at	  the	  
interface	  between	  the	  officers	  and	  the	  men.	  One	  warrant	  officer	  who	  was	  considered	  by	  his	  
men	  to	  be	  adhering	  over	  zealously	  to	  the	  “bull	  and	  blanco”	  of	  normal	  army	  life	  had	  his	  kit	  sunk	  
in	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  latrine	  trench	  with	  the	  desired	  result:	  ‘Without	  his	  Sam	  Browne	  he	  was	  
completely	  lost	  and	  he	  got	  the	  message.’	  He	  was	  perhaps	  more	  fortunate	  than	  the	  Sergeant-­‐
Major	  in	  the	  same	  unit	  who	  it	  is	  claimed	  was	  the	  victim	  of	  an	  assassination	  attempt.	  A	  large	  
block	  of	  concrete	  was	  dropped	  on	  his	  bed,	  but	  fortunately	  for	  him	  he	  was	  sleeping	  the	  wrong	  
way	  round	  underneath	  the	  mosquito	  net,	  and	  after	  returning	  from	  the	  Medical	  Officer	  ‘he	  
hobbled	  into	  our	  barrack-­‐room	  on	  two	  pieces	  of	  stick	  saying,	  “allright	  lads,	  the	  war	  is	  over	  for	  
us	  we	  are	  now	  all	  in	  the	  same	  boat	  so	  let’s	  call	  it	  a	  day.”	  With	  loud	  jeers	  from	  all	  he	  made	  a	  
hasty	  exit.’424	  
Whilst	  at	  Changi	  discipline	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  resentment,	  at	  other	  locations	  it	  can	  be	  
argued	  that	  it	  was	  a	  positive	  factor.	  Julie	  Summers,	  in	  an	  objective	  and	  convincing	  study	  of	  her	  
grandfather,	  Lt	  Col	  Philip	  Toosey,	  has	  suggested	  that	  for	  ‘those	  prisoners	  who	  ended	  up	  in	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  Daws,	  Prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese,	  p175.	  Mackenzie	  has	  suggested	  in	  the	  European	  context	  that	  the	  
attempts	  to	  maintain	  military	  discipline	  in	  POW	  camps	  may	  have	  been	  motivated	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  
inadequacy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  officers	  at	  their	  having	  surrendered.	  Such	  feelings	  would	  have	  been	  
stronger	  after	  Singapore,	  having	  been	  defeated	  by	  an	  Asian	  enemy	  in	  full	  view	  of	  the	  local	  population.	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  Colditz	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  p140.	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camps	  where	  their	  senior	  officers	  were	  prepared	  to	  take	  charge	  and	  organise	  the	  camps	  
efficiently	  this	  was	  a	  great	  benefit.’425	  	  The	  Railway	  camp	  at	  Tamarkan	  was	  commanded	  by	  
Toosey,	  who	  maintained	  tight	  control	  over	  the	  men	  in	  his	  charge	  through	  a	  committee	  of	  
selected	  officers.	  Corporal	  punishments	  were	  imposed	  for	  more	  extreme	  breaches	  of	  his	  camp	  
discipline,	  and	  whilst	  the	  level	  of	  “spit	  and	  polish”	  was	  not	  to	  everyone’s	  satisfaction,	  such	  
factors,	  including	  rigorous	  hygiene	  regulations,	  were	  balanced	  and	  even	  respected	  in	  the	  eyes	  
of	  the	  men	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  positive	  benefits	  that	  accrued	  from	  the	  regime.	  One	  MO	  described	  
Tamarkan	  as	  ‘a	  paradise	  to	  men	  who	  had	  known	  the	  filth,	  slush	  and	  disease	  of	  the	  jungle	  line	  
camps.’426	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  single	  factor	  at	  Tamarkan	  was	  Toosey’s	  insistence	  that	  
officers	  should	  sleep	  in	  the	  same	  quarters	  as	  the	  men,	  and	  eat	  the	  same	  food	  in	  the	  same	  
canteen	  as	  the	  men.427	  	  
The	  importance	  of	  this	  integrative	  approach	  was	  made	  clear	  by	  Gunner	  Jack	  Chalker,	  who	  
recalled	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  party	  of	  officers	  who	  held	  a	  more	  detached	  outlook	  during	  his	  time	  on	  
the	  Railway.	  
Relations	  with	  our	  own	  officers	  were	  mixed.	  In	  November	  1942,	  a	  large	  body	  of	  
officers,	  including	  some	  of	  high	  rank,	  arrived	  by	  barge	  at	  Kanyu,	  bringing	  a	  vast	  amount	  
of	  personal	  kit.	  They	  segregated	  themselves	  carefully	  in	  a	  camp	  nearby,	  apprehensive	  
of	  our	  diseased	  and	  unhappy	  condition.	  They	  had	  no	  idea	  of	  our	  problems,	  nor	  any	  
desire	  to	  comprehend	  them.	  In	  our	  camp	  there	  were	  six	  or	  seven	  officers,	  two	  of	  
whom	  were	  from	  my	  own	  regiment,	  all	  of	  whom	  had	  been	  with	  us	  since	  Singapore.	  On	  
the	  arrival	  of	  the	  newcomers	  they	  were	  ordered	  summarily	  to	  move	  into	  the	  officers’	  
camp.	  Our	  officers	  refused	  to	  leave	  us	  and	  I	  understand	  that	  they	  were	  then	  
threatened	  with	  court-­‐martials	  and	  other	  ludicrous	  punishments.	  Later,	  much	  to	  our	  
delight,	  our	  Japanese	  Commandant	  ordered	  a	  party	  of	  officers	  from	  the	  neighbouring	  
camp	  to	  work	  on	  the	  railway.	  The	  squabbling	  and	  use	  of	  rank	  to	  avoid	  working	  was	  
particularly	  nauseating	  and	  drew	  appropriate	  comments	  from	  our	  guards.	  We	  
honoured	  those	  few	  gallant	  men	  who	  continued	  to	  stand	  by	  us.428	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This	  passage	  highlights	  the	  respect	  in	  which	  the	  men	  could	  hold	  those	  officers	  who	  were	  
directly	  attached	  to	  them	  and	  who	  shared	  to	  some	  extent	  their	  difficult	  living	  conditions.	  In	  
contrast	  the	  disdain	  with	  which	  they	  viewed	  the	  new	  influx,	  reciprocated	  by	  the	  officers’	  party	  
in	  their	  turn,	  is	  clearly	  drawn.	  Their	  arrival	  by	  barge	  with	  an	  abundance	  of	  gear,	  when	  the	  men	  
would	  have	  had	  to	  slog	  it	  by	  foot	  and	  the	  attempts	  to	  discipline	  those	  officers	  already	  on	  site	  
with	  the	  men,	  were	  seen	  in	  an	  equally	  dim	  light.	  So	  much	  so	  that	  when	  they	  were	  made	  to	  
work,	  contrary	  to	  the	  views	  espoused	  by	  Lt	  Hines,	  it	  was	  the	  cause	  of	  celebration	  in	  the	  other	  
ranks.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  Chalker’s	  views	  on	  the	  new	  arrivals	  at	  Kanyu,	  Toosey’s	  respect	  was	  such	  that	  he	  
was	  also	  able	  to	  impose	  a	  tax	  on	  external	  “trading”,	  along	  with	  a	  levy	  of	  the	  officers	  pay	  that	  
would	  rise	  from	  30%	  to	  60%,	  which	  went	  to	  the	  hospital	  fund.429	  	  Whilst	  it	  might	  be	  expected	  
that	  the	  author	  would	  seek	  to	  show	  affairs	  at	  Tamarkan	  in	  a	  favourable	  light,	  the	  very	  low	  
mortality	  rate	  at	  this	  location	  does	  suggest	  that	  such	  organisation	  was	  a	  major	  positive	  factor	  
for	  the	  men.	  A	  similarly	  redemptive	  approach	  is	  followed	  by	  Sybilla	  Jane	  Flower,	  who	  suggests	  
that,	  alongside	  a	  greater	  adaptability	  of	  TA	  soldiers,	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  command	  
structure	  in	  Lt	  Col	  Flower’s	  	  9th	  Royal	  Northumberland	  Fusiliers	  was	  a	  key	  reason	  why	  the	  unit	  
suffered	  less	  deaths	  than	  the	  regular	  unit,	  the	  1st	  Manchester	  Regiment.430	  	  
The	  ability	  to	  impose	  some	  control	  in	  the	  camps	  would	  also	  be	  of	  importance	  later	  in	  the	  war,	  
particularly	  as	  more	  British	  POWs	  were	  moved	  to	  camps	  shared	  with	  US	  servicemen	  in	  Japan,	  
some	  of	  whom	  were	  particularly	  ardent	  in	  their	  application	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  free	  enterprise.	  	  
In	  some	  of	  these	  camps	  the	  local	  economy	  had	  become	  sophisticated	  enough	  to	  have	  a	  futures	  
market,	  primarily	  for	  rice	  and	  cigarettes.	  An	  extra	  portion	  of	  rice	  at	  supper	  could	  be	  traded	  in	  
return	  for	  two	  portions	  to	  be	  repaid	  in	  the	  near	  future,	  a	  commerce	  that	  put	  some	  already	  
desperate	  POWs	  that	  much	  closer	  to	  outright	  starvation.	  One	  enterprising	  rice	  trader,	  who	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arrived	  at	  a	  camp	  in	  northern	  Honshu	  with	  a	  draft	  of	  Americans,	  sought	  to	  globalise	  his	  
business	  into	  the	  British	  lines,	  but	  he	  received	  short	  shrift	  from	  the	  senior	  British	  officer	  
present.431	  
There	  were	  rare	  occasions	  when	  a	  soldier	  might	  incorrectly	  ascribe	  his	  unhappy	  condition	  to	  
the	  ‘British	  Army	  comic	  opera’,	  when	  in	  fact	  it	  was	  a	  result	  of	  a	  Japanese	  initiative.	  An	  example	  
of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  at	  the	  start	  of	  1944	  when	  Cpl	  Flello	  complained	  that	  he	  and	  his	  comrades	  
were	  being	  split	  up	  and	  transferred	  back	  into	  their	  original	  units	  and	  regiments:	  	  
The	  red	  tape	  in	  our	  Btn	  is	  increasing	  to	  such	  a	  pitch	  now	  that	  it	  is	  becoming	  almost	  
unbearable.	  We	  are	  divided	  into	  sections	  and	  I	  have	  even	  had	  to	  move	  my	  bed	  from	  
among	  my	  friends	  so	  as	  to	  sleep	  with	  my	  section	  –	  much	  to	  my	  disgust	  as	  can	  be	  
imagined.432	  
	  
What	  Flello,	  from	  his	  restricted	  vantage-­‐point,	  was	  unaware	  of	  was	  that	  this	  was	  part	  of	  a	  
theatre	  wide	  reorganization	  that	  had	  been	  initiated	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  Japanese	  authorities.	  	  
Sometimes	  the	  machinery	  of	  camp	  discipline	  would	  shoot	  itself	  in	  the	  foot,	  to	  the	  amusement	  
of	  the	  lower	  ranks.	  One	  such	  event	  was	  recalled	  by	  Cpl	  Henderson	  at	  a	  camp	  on	  the	  Railway,	  
where	  he	  and	  some	  of	  his	  Communist	  Party	  comrades	  had	  been	  upsetting	  elements	  of	  the	  
administration	  by	  ignoring	  an	  order	  to	  stop	  holding	  their	  ‘subversive	  meetings’.	  Sgt	  Major	  
Goodwin	  and	  his	  squad	  of	  camp	  police	  duly	  swooped	  on	  what	  they	  thought	  was	  a	  proscribed	  
gathering	  of	  left	  wing	  radicals,	  only	  to	  get	  ‘a	  right	  bollocking’	  from	  two	  colonels	  who	  were	  
present	  at	  the	  meeting	  of	  the	  camp’s	  Literary	  Society	  which	  they	  had	  in	  fact	  burst	  into.433	  	  
The	  response	  of	  the	  men	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  discipline	  was	  mixed,	  and	  following	  Crang’s	  	  
classification	  cited	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  chapter	  ,	  it	  could	  be	  supportive	  where	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  
necessity,	  as	  at	  Tamarkan,	  and	  less	  so	  when	  it	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  unjustifiable	  “bull	  and	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blanco”,	  as	  at	  Changi.	  Even	  at	  Tamarkan	  however,	  it	  remains	  questionable	  as	  to	  how	  much	  of	  
the	  success	  that	  Toosey’s	  regime	  achieved	  was	  due	  to	  “spit	  and	  polish”,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  
likely	  more	  inspiring	  effect	  of	  equitably	  shared	  facilities	  and	  conditions.434	  
4.4.2.	  Standing	  up	  for	  the	  men.	  
A	  major	  contributory	  factor	  to	  the	  esteem	  in	  which	  some	  officers	  could	  be	  held	  was	  their	  
representation	  of	  the	  men	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Japanese	  intransigence	  by	  “standing	  up”	  for	  them.	  	  A	  
typical	  assessment	  in	  this	  respect	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  account	  of	  one	  private,	  describing	  a	  major	  
at	  one	  of	  the	  camps	  on	  the	  railway:	  ‘He	  was	  a	  very	  good	  officer	  and	  stood	  up	  against	  the	  
Japanese,	  not	  being	  the	  case	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  officers	  as	  self-­‐preservation	  seemed	  to	  be	  their	  
order	  of	  the	  day.’435	  In	  his	  eyes	  this	  officer	  was	  exceptional	  in	  selflessly	  representing	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  BORs,	  and	  stood	  out	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  peers	  as	  being	  something	  of	  a	  rarity.	  
Whilst	  it	  might	  be	  suggested	  that	  as	  this	  major	  was	  leading	  from	  the	  front,	  his	  junior	  officers	  
would	  naturally	  play	  a	  lesser	  role	  in	  such	  matters	  at	  this	  specific	  location,	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  
such	  favourable	  comments	  from	  the	  other	  camps	  at	  which	  Dixon	  was	  based	  points	  to	  this	  
major	  as	  being	  atypical	  of	  his	  peer	  group.	  
Even	  when	  they	  did	  stand	  up	  to	  the	  Japanese	  such	  actions	  could	  be	  re-­‐interpreted	  and	  seen	  
from	  a	  less	  than	  charitable	  perspective.	  Dawson	  recalled	  how	  some	  officers	  had	  complained	  
about	  the	  men	  having	  to	  carry	  rations	  with	  them	  on	  a	  march,	  for	  which	  a	  Japanese	  guard	  had	  
hit	  them	  on	  the	  head	  with	  the	  flat	  of	  a	  sword.	  	  
The	  officers	  were	  not	  hurt,	  except	  in	  their	  dignity,	  and	  they	  made	  the	  complaint,	  which	  
they	  made	  many	  times	  afterwards,	  that	  they	  could	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  maintain	  
discipline	  if	  they	  were	  to	  be	  reprimanded	  in	  this	  way	  in	  front	  of	  the	  men	  of	  whom	  they	  
were	  in	  charge.’436	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  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  relative	  merits	  of	  social	  privilege	  and	  leading	  by	  example	  in	  maintaining	  
discipline	  see:	  Beaumont,	  “Rank,	  Privilege	  and	  Prisoners”,	  p85.	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Whilst	  Dawson	  dismissed	  the	  physical	  aspect	  of	  such	  an	  act	  and	  ignored	  the	  considerable	  
psychological	  harm	  that	  no	  doubt	  accrued	  when	  a	  Japanese	  soldier	  approaches	  one’s	  head	  
with	  the	  sword	  he	  is	  holding,	  he	  used	  the	  passage	  to	  elaborate	  on	  a	  wider	  context,	  that	  of	  
officers	  seeking	  to	  mitigate	  personal	  attacks	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  Japanese	  sense	  of	  hierarchy.	  
Sometimes	  diplomacy	  was	  seen	  by	  those	  in	  command	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  improve	  the	  lot	  of	  
their	  men	  and	  such	  frequently	  unseen	  actions	  could	  be	  liable	  to	  misinterpretation	  by	  the	  men	  
when	  genuine,	  whilst	  also	  being	  misrepresented	  by	  officers	  when	  used	  for	  less	  altruistic	  
motives.	  Such	  actions,	  whether	  positive	  or	  negative	  in	  origin,	  could	  frequently	  gain	  momentum	  
on	  the	  camp	  grapevine,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  diary	  entries	  of	  two	  other	  ranks	  at	  Tarsao	  
during	  Christmas	  and	  New	  Year’s	  Eve	  of	  1942.	  Private	  Parry	  noted	  that	  ‘Mackellar	  [an	  officer]	  
was	  drinking	  with	  Tiger	  [a	  Japanese	  guard]	  all	  night,	  and	  never	  even	  wished	  us	  well.’437	  A	  week	  
later	  Pitfield	  noted:	  ‘Heard	  some	  of	  our	  officers	  actually	  spent	  New	  Year	  with	  the	  Japs	  drinking	  
the	  rats.’438	  Whilst	  these	  may	  be	  two	  separate	  examples	  of	  officer(s)	  socialising	  with	  the	  
guards,	  benignly	  or	  otherwise,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  specifics	  as	  noted	  by	  Parry	  had	  done	  the	  
rounds	  of	  the	  camp	  and	  been	  amplified	  by	  the	  time	  the	  story	  reached	  Pitfield	  the	  following	  
week.	  
These	  examples,	  whilst	  open	  to	  interpretation,	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  other	  ranks	  reproduced	  
them	  in	  a	  negative	  context.	  Of	  more	  direct	  significance	  were	  the	  interventions,	  or	  lack	  of	  them,	  
that	  could	  occur	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  work	  parties.	  Dawson	  recalled	  an	  occasion	  when	  the	  
Japanese	  engineers	  were	  short	  of	  labour	  for	  that	  day’s	  work	  detail,	  and	  men	  from	  the	  sick	  bay	  
were	  enlisted	  from	  their	  beds.	  He	  expressed	  the	  view	  of	  the	  other	  ranks	  that	  the	  officers	  
should	  have	  put	  up	  more	  of	  an	  argument,	  and	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  such	  was	  a	  source	  of	  friction	  
between	  them.439	  Henderson	  recorded	  a	  similar	  perception	  when	  the	  cooks	  had	  overslept	  one	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morning,	  meaning	  that	  the	  work	  party	  was	  expected	  to	  go	  out	  without	  breakfast.	  He	  led	  the	  
men	  in	  making	  a	  stand	  against	  going	  out	  until	  they	  had	  been	  fed,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  strong	  
opposition	  from	  the	  officers	  and	  sergeants	  who	  were	  urging	  them	  out	  in	  the	  fear	  that	  the	  
Japanese	  would	  ‘cut	  up	  rough.’	  The	  men	  stood	  their	  ground,	  and	  when	  the	  Japanese	  turned	  up	  
they	  agreed	  that	  the	  men	  should	  be	  fed.	  Henderson	  wrote	  that	  ‘this	  confirmed	  me	  in	  my	  long-­‐
held	  belief	  that	  in	  general	  we	  did	  not	  stand	  up	  to	  the	  Japanese	  sufficiently.’440	  
All	  of	  these	  incidents	  are	  capable	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  subjective	  interpretations,	  depending	  on	  
which	  side	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  one	  stood.	  There	  were	  no	  doubt	  officers	  who	  had	  to	  do	  things	  they	  
did	  not	  like	  with	  the	  best	  of	  intentions.	  Conversely	  some	  of	  them	  had	  ulterior	  motives.	  In	  the	  
eyes	  of	  many	  of	  the	  men	  it	  was	  usually	  those	  in	  the	  latter	  category	  who	  were	  in	  the	  
ascendancy,	  with	  less	  honourable	  aims	  and	  motivations.	  
	  
4.5.	  Conclusions.	  
Little	  has	  been	  written	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  British	  officers	  and	  the	  BORs	  in	  the	  POW	  
camps	  of	  Asia	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  and	  nothing	  at	  all	  about	  the	  wide	  disparities	  in	  their	  
mortality	  rates.	  This	  is	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  literature	  of	  captivity	  in	  other	  allied	  nations,	  
particularly	  Australia,	  but	  also	  in	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  has	  examined	  such	  
relations	  and	  quantified	  the	  rank	  based	  effects	  of	  differing	  conditions.	  Analysis	  of	  existing	  
sources	  at	  both	  the	  population	  and	  the	  regimental	  levels	  shows	  that	  the	  British	  other	  ranks,	  
like	  their	  Australian,	  American	  and	  Canadian	  allies,	  were	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  die	  in	  captivity	  than	  
were	  their	  officers.	  In	  the	  areas	  of	  food,	  work	  and	  finance	  the	  other	  ranks	  were	  three	  time	  
losers	  in	  the	  camp	  economy,	  with	  profound	  implications	  for	  their	  morbidity	  and	  mortality.	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This	  was	  primarily	  the	  result	  of	  a	  Japanese	  partiality	  towards	  the	  officers,	  usually	  expressed	  
through	  the	  selective	  application	  of	  those	  articles	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Convention	  that	  prescribed	  
differential	  treatment	  for	  those	  holding	  a	  commissioned	  rank.	  Such	  hierarchical	  advantages	  
were	  not	  however	  the	  sole	  purview	  of	  the	  officers,	  and	  they	  operated	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  
military	  hierarchy,	  decreasing	  in	  benefit	  as	  the	  ranks	  descended.	  Thus,	  even	  some	  of	  the	  most	  
vociferous	  complainants	  of	  officer	  privilege,	  such	  as	  Cpls	  Henderson	  and	  Flello,	  could	  find	  
themselves	  in	  advantageous	  positions,	  despite	  their	  lowly	  rank.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  trinity	  of	  health	  factors,	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  maintenance	  of	  military	  
discipline	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  men	  were	  the	  source	  of	  frequently	  cited	  tensions,	  and	  
although	  in	  both	  areas	  there	  were	  some	  very	  positive	  responses	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  some	  
officers,	  on	  the	  whole	  the	  view	  of	  the	  men	  was	  largely	  a	  negative	  one.	  The	  chain	  of	  command	  
also	  involved	  the	  senior	  NCOs,	  who	  were	  the	  source	  of	  some	  unfavourable	  comments,	  but	  who	  
were,	  like	  the	  Korean	  guards	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  captors,	  seen	  as	  less	  culpable	  than	  their	  
superiors	  in	  the	  overall	  scheme	  of	  things.	  
The	  issue	  of	  class	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  this	  subject,	  the	  British	  officers	  at	  this	  time	  having	  been	  
primarily	  drawn	  from	  the	  public	  school	  cohort,	  changes	  in	  the	  thinking	  behind	  official	  
recruitment	  policies	  not	  having	  taken	  effect	  by	  the	  time	  the	  men	  went	  into	  captivity.	  There	  are	  
however	  some	  caveats	  to	  drawing	  class	  based	  conclusions	  on	  the	  specific	  events	  in	  the	  camps	  
in	  Asia.	  For	  one	  the	  other	  ranks	  were	  not	  as	  homogenous	  a	  working	  class	  cohort	  as	  could	  be	  
found	  in	  the	  Regular	  Army.	  Many	  of	  the	  prisoners,	  and	  particularly	  the	  men	  of	  the	  18th	  
Division,	  who	  formed	  the	  core	  of	  this	  study,	  were	  in	  Territorial	  units	  recently	  recruited	  from	  a	  
variety	  of	  backgrounds	  to	  fight	  the	  war.	  
It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  mortality	  figures	  for	  the	  other	  allied	  nations	  displayed	  similar	  
rank	  based	  variations,	  despite	  claims	  of	  their	  having	  a	  much	  more	  informal	  and	  less	  class-­‐
based	  attitude	  in	  their	  services.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  mortality	  was	  a	  
167	  
	  
reflection	  of	  military	  hierarchy	  and	  the	  Japanese	  tolerance	  and	  encouragement	  of	  it	  amongst	  
the	  POWs.	  
Having	  said	  that,	  it	  was	  the	  class	  system	  in	  Britain	  which	  defined	  who	  would	  go	  in	  to	  such	  
privileged	  positions,	  and	  as	  the	  accounts	  of	  many	  of	  the	  officers	  surveyed	  suggest,	  they	  
expected	  such	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  to	  continue	  in	  captivity.	  Australian	  historian	  Hank	  Nelson	  has	  
written	  that:	  	  
As	  prisoners	  the	  officers	  had	  choices	  denied	  to	  the	  other	  ranks,	  and	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  
these	  choices	  they	  had	  acted	  in	  ways	  which	  made	  them	  the	  most	  praised	  and	  the	  most	  
abused	  prisoners.	  441	  	  
	  
In	  the	  eyes	  of	  many	  of	  the	  BORs	  in	  Asian	  captivity,	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  British	  officers	  
made	  the	  wrong	  choices.	  Unlike	  the	  camps	  in	  Europe,	  where	  there	  was	  a	  strict	  separation	  of	  
the	  military	  castes,	  in	  Asia,	  no	  matter	  how	  hard	  many	  of	  them	  tried,	  the	  officers	  were	  usually	  
in	  some	  sort	  of	  sight	  of	  the	  other	  ranks,	  who	  could	  plainly	  see	  the	  differing	  conditions	  under	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  Nelson,	  POW,	  p61.	  
442	  IWM:	  Dawson;	  p46.	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Chapter	  5.	  Fear	  of	  the	  unknown.	  
	  
5.1.	  Introduction.	  
Preceding	  chapters	  have	  described	  how	  the	  responses	  of	  the	  other	  ranks	  towards	  local	  
populations,	  both	  in	  the	  civilian	  and	  military	  context,	  could	  be	  conditioned	  by	  pre-­‐existing	  
colonially	  and	  racially	  informed	  influences.	  In	  this	  chapter	  the	  prevalence	  of	  such	  outlooks,	  and	  
their	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  actions,	  perspectives	  and	  recollections	  of	  the	  men,	  will	  be	  
examined	  in	  two	  specific	  contexts	  in	  regard	  to	  civilian	  populations.	  The	  perceived	  hostility	  of	  
local	  civilians	  (and	  the	  landscape	  they	  inhabited)	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  one	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  
precluded	  escape	  attempts,	  and	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  assess	  the	  validity	  of	  such	  
assumptions,	  making	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  situation	  of	  those	  Britons	  in	  captivity	  in	  Europe.	  
The	  second	  section	  will	  focus	  more	  specifically	  on	  attitudes	  to	  the	  Tamil	  labourers,	  their	  
assumed	  role	  in	  the	  cholera	  epidemic	  that	  spread	  down	  the	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway	  in	  1943,	  
and	  how	  established	  colonial	  mores	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  racial	  distance	  could	  impact	  on	  the	  way	  
they	  were	  viewed.	  
	  
5.2.	  Escaping	  from	  Captivity.	  
There	  are	  two	  major	  topics	  which	  contrast	  the	  popular	  memory	  of	  British	  POW	  experiences	  in	  
Asia	  and	  Europe	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  issues	  of	  mortality	  and	  escape.	  The	  
increased	  risk	  of	  mortality	  in	  Asia,	  specifically	  for	  the	  other	  ranks,	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  in	  
the	  previous	  chapter.	  In	  this	  section	  the	  apparent	  difference	  in	  the	  situations	  regarding	  escape	  
from	  captivity	  is	  examined,	  with	  specific	  focus	  on	  the	  purported	  causes	  of	  such	  variations.	  The	  
reasons	  for	  the	  relative	  dearth	  of	  escape	  attempts	  by	  the	  prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese	  are	  
examined,	  with	  particular	  reference	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  study	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  difference	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attached	  to	  the	  local	  populations	  and	  the	  landscape.	  Comparisons	  are	  drawn	  with	  the	  situation	  
in	  Europe	  which	  suggest	  that	  there	  were	  as	  many	  similarities	  as	  differences.	  
In	  the	  popular	  discourse,	  whilst	  the	  prisoners	  in	  Europe	  seemingly	  dedicated	  their	  lives	  to	  
completing	  a	  successful	  “home	  run”	  back	  to	  Britain,	  those	  in	  Asia,	  so	  far	  from	  home,	  were	  too	  
busy	  trying	  just	  to	  survive	  to	  have	  time	  for	  such	  missions.	  Both	  of	  these	  standpoints	  were	  
strongly	  reinforced	  in	  the	  public’s	  perceptions	  by	  the	  cinematic	  representations	  of	  the	  
respective	  theatres.443	  Such	  sweeping	  generalisations	  however	  do	  not	  accurately	  portray	  the	  
reality	  of	  the	  situations	  and	  ignore	  some	  striking	  similarities	  between	  them.	  Recent	  scholarship	  
has	  started	  to	  question	  such	  simplistic	  perspectives,	  particularly	  in	  the	  European	  context,	  and	  
writing	  about	  the	  situation	  in	  Germany	  Mackenzie	  has	  asserted	  that:	  ‘One	  of	  the	  great	  myths	  
surrounding	  British	  POWs	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  is	  that	  planning	  and	  carrying	  out	  daring	  
escapes	  dominated	  every	  waking	  hour.’444	  	  	  
The	  figures	  for	  successful	  escapes	  by	  POWs	  back	  to	  allied	  lines	  make	  interesting	  reading.	  
Mackenzie	  has	  suggested	  that	  around	  180	  prisoners	  made	  successful	  home	  runs	  from	  
Germany,445	  whilst	  Aiden	  Crawley	  states	  that	  only	  30	  RAF	  and	  Commonwealth	  aircrew	  took	  the	  
same	  route	  during	  the	  war.446	  Charles	  Rollings	  indicates	  that	  in	  Italy	  in	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  
armistice,	  out	  of	  602	  escapees,	  only	  two	  made	  it	  to	  the	  Alps,	  Switzerland	  and	  safety.447	  Whilst	  
there	  has	  been	  no	  systematic	  survey	  of	  British	  servicemen	  escaping	  from	  Japanese	  camps,	  
there	  are	  two	  published	  sources	  that	  confirm	  at	  least	  27	  successful	  attempts	  in	  the	  early	  days	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443	  For	  representations	  of	  the	  European	  experience	  see;	  The	  Wooden	  Horse	  (1950),	  The	  Colditz	  Story	  
(1955),	  The	  Great	  Escape	  (1963)	  and	  Von	  Ryan’s	  Express	  (1965).	  For	  Asia	  see;	  The	  Bridge	  on	  the	  River	  
Kwai	  (1957),	  King	  Rat	  (1965),	  	  To	  End	  all	  Wars	  (2001)	  and	  The	  Railway	  Man	  (2013).	  
444	  MacKenzie,	  S.P.	  (2006;	  online	  edn	  2011)	  The	  Colditz	  Myth:	  British	  and	  Commonwealth	  Prisoners	  of	  
War	  in	  Nazi	  Germany.	  OUP.p319.	  
445	  MacKenzie,	  The	  Colditz	  Myth,	  p	  345.	  Mackenzie	  states	  that	  around	  60	  home	  runs	  from	  the	  Greater	  
Reich	  utilised	  passenger	  trains,	  and	  that	  these	  accounted	  for	  roughly	  a	  third	  of	  the	  overall	  total,	  
suggesting	  a	  figure	  of	  about	  180.	  
446	  Crawley,	  Aidan.	  (1956:	  1957	  edn)	  Escape	  From	  Germany.	  Popular	  Book	  Club,	  London.	  p	  20.	  This	  figure	  
includes	  the	  three	  successful	  members	  of	  the	  Great	  Escape,	  two	  Norwegians	  and	  a	  Dutchman,	  who	  were	  
serving	  in	  the	  RAF.	  	  
447Rollings,	  Charles.	  (2008)	  Prisoner	  of	  War:	  Voices	  from	  Behind	  the	  Wire	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Ebury	  
Press,	  London.	  p273.	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of	  captivity;	  24	  of	  these	  were	  from	  Hong	  Kong,	  through	  occupied	  China	  and	  into	  allied	  
territory.448	  The	  remarkable	  account	  of	  Charles	  McCormac,	  detailing	  a	  mass	  breakout	  by	  17	  
prisoners	  from	  Pasir	  Panjiang	  Camp	  on	  Singapore	  Island,	  provides	  the	  other	  three	  completions,	  
including	  two	  who	  made	  it	  all	  the	  way	  to	  Australia,	  and	  a	  third	  man	  who	  got	  no	  further	  than	  
the	  southern	  end	  of	  Sumatra,	  where	  he	  married	  a	  local	  girl	  and	  assimilated	  into	  a	  small	  fishing	  
community.449	  Furthermore	  there	  were	  at	  least	  three	  successful	  escapes	  from	  camps	  on	  the	  
Railway	  in	  late	  1944,	  as	  prisoners	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  confusion	  created	  by	  allied	  bombing	  
raids	  to	  make	  their	  getaway.450	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  escapes	  from	  the	  camps	  there	  were	  also	  several	  men	  who	  successfully	  
evaded	  the	  Japanese	  after	  the	  sinking	  of	  the	  transport	  ship	  the	  Lisbon	  Maru,	  in	  October	  1942,	  
again	  through	  China,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  successful	  evasions	  by	  British	  air	  crews	  in	  Burma	  and	  
Sumatra.451	  Furthermore	  there	  were	  at	  least	  two	  successful	  civilian	  escapes	  from	  Lunghwe	  
Internment	  Camp	  near	  Shanghai,	  in	  1943	  and	  1944,	  the	  latter	  involving	  five	  people	  who	  made	  
a	  six	  week	  journey	  overland	  to	  the	  allied	  lines.452	  Whilst	  this	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  comprehensive	  
survey,	  it	  does	  suggest	  that	  successful	  escape	  was	  not	  impossible	  in	  the	  Asian	  theatre,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  early	  days	  and	  through	  China,	  but	  also	  at	  other	  times	  and	  locations.	  The	  
numbers	  in	  Asia	  require	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  analysis,	  but	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  suggest	  that	  
the	  biggest	  difference	  pro	  rata	  between	  the	  theatres	  was	  in	  the	  number	  of	  escapes	  attempted,	  
with	  far	  more	  occurring	  in	  Europe.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448	  Ride,	  Edwin.	  (1981)	  BAAG:	  Hong	  Kong	  Resistance,	  1942-­‐1945.	  	  OUP.	  p328.	  
449	  McCormac,	  Charles.	  (1954;	  2005	  edn)	  You’ll	  Die	  in	  Singapore.	  	  Monsoon	  Books,	  Singapore.	  Two	  men	  
were	  killed	  in	  the	  camp	  breakout,	  another	  seven	  in	  a	  skirmish	  with	  a	  Japanese	  patrol	  the	  following	  day,	  
and	  a	  further	  four	  after	  an	  attack	  on	  their	  boat	  in	  the	  Straits	  of	  Malacca.	  The	  remaining	  four	  men	  
traversed	  the	  length	  of	  Sumatra,	  before	  one	  died	  of	  dysentery	  on	  the	  southern	  shore	  opposite	  Java.	  
450	  UKNA:	  H1/62.	  Siamese	  contacts;	  Jedburghs;	  Siamese	  air	  force;	  D	  Division;	  operation	  ROBERT;	  E	  
Group;	  prisoners	  of	  war;	  interviews	  with	  Balankura.	  
451	  For	  the	  Lisbon	  Maru	  survivors	  see	  Ride,	  BAAG,	  p	  101.	  For	  an	  example	  from	  Burma,	  see	  Lyman,	  
Robert.	  (2011)	  Japan’s	  Last	  Bid	  For	  Victory:	  The	  invasion	  of	  India	  1944.	  The	  Praetorian	  Press,	  Barnsley.	  
pp	  160-­‐162.	  For	  Sumatra;	  see	  McCormac,	  You’ll	  Die,	  p	  180.	  
452	  IWM:	  Scott	  R.F.	  (Docs	  1049)	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There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  that	  have	  been	  suggested	  as	  contributing	  to	  this	  difference	  in	  
Asia,	  including	  the	  fear	  of	  retribution	  and	  execution,	  and	  physical	  and	  mental	  fitness.	  	  Most	  
relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  relations	  with	  the	  local	  populations	  were	  perceptions	  of	  hostility	  in	  
both	  the	  human	  and	  the	  physical	  landscapes,	  and	  the	  profound	  sense	  of	  difference	  from	  and	  
unfamiliarity	  with	  them.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  such	  factors	  were	  absent	  in	  Europe;	  as	  will	  
be	  demonstrated	  there	  were	  remarkable	  similarities	  as	  well	  as	  differences,	  but	  they	  were	  
usually	  taken	  as	  having	  had	  considerably	  more	  impact	  on	  the	  prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese.	  
	  
5.2.1.	  Execution	  and	  retribution.	  
There	  were	  several	  early	  attempts	  at	  escape	  in	  Singapore	  and	  these	  were	  dealt	  with	  by	  
executions,	  carried	  out	  by	  Sikh	  firing	  squads	  whose	  inability	  to	  dispose	  of	  their	  victims	  
efficiently	  became	  something	  of	  a	  legend.	  	  The	  three	  gunners	  who	  were	  shot	  in	  March,	  after	  
being	  caught	  in	  town	  wearing	  civilian	  clothes,	  may	  have	  just	  been	  unfortunate	  in	  being	  caught	  
whilst	  conducting	  business	  (or	  pleasure).	  The	  four	  other	  ranks	  shot	  on	  the	  2nd	  September	  1942	  
had	  been	  trying	  to	  escape,	  and	  met	  their	  end	  on	  the	  beach	  at	  Changi,	  in	  another	  bungled	  
execution.453	  The	  news	  of	  this	  event	  spread	  rapidly	  through	  the	  POWs,	  who	  were	  at	  the	  time	  
crowded	  onto	  the	  parade	  ground	  at	  Selarang	  Barracks	  whilst	  their	  commanders	  held	  out	  
against	  Japanese	  demands	  that	  the	  men	  sign	  a	  no	  escape	  clause.454	  	  
The	  “Selarang	  Incident”	  ended	  a	  few	  days	  later,	  as	  with	  disease	  spreading	  through	  the	  
crowded	  lines	  and	  threatening	  to	  reach	  epidemic	  proportions,	  Lt	  Col.	  Holmes	  ordered	  the	  
POWs	  to	  sign	  under	  duress	  and	  on	  his	  responsibility.	  The	  lack	  of	  an	  immediate	  preventative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453	  MacArthur,	  Surviving	  the	  Sword,	  pp29,	  48.	  
454	  Among	  the	  many	  POWs	  who	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  botched	  execution	  were	  Gunner	  Notley	  (IWM:	  
Sound:	  16670;	  Reel	  2)	  and	  Private	  Pitfield	  (IWM:	  Pitfield;	  p3-­‐4.)	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  no	  escape	  clause	  
to	  the	  Japanese	  (and	  to	  the	  men	  who	  had	  to	  sign	  it)	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  an	  official	  document	  regarding	  POW	  
regulations:	  ‘In	  the	  case	  of	  war	  prisoners	  who	  have	  submitted	  such	  declaration	  and	  try	  to	  escape,	  they	  
will	  be	  punished	  strictly	  under	  the	  Military	  Law	  and	  if	  necessary	  they	  will	  be	  shot	  dead	  on	  the	  spot.’	  	  
(House	  Rules	  for	  War	  Prisoners:	  No	  3	  Branch	  Office	  of	  Thai	  War	  Prisoners’	  Camp	  at	  Thanbyuzyat.,	  Article	  
5.)	  In:	  Kratoska,	  Paul	  H.	  (2006)	  The	  Thailand-­‐Burma	  Railway,	  1942-­‐1946:	  Documents	  and	  Selected	  
Writings.	  Volume	  III:	  POW	  Labour:	  Allied	  Prisoners	  of	  War	  on	  the	  Railway.	  Routledge,	  London.	  p9.	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effect	  of	  the	  no	  escape	  clause	  on	  the	  POWs	  can	  be	  measured	  by	  his	  needing	  to	  respond	  to	  
‘anxious	  enquiries	  from	  the	  men	  .	  .	  .	  that	  they	  would	  not	  lose	  pay,	  pensions	  or	  allowances.’455	  
Of	  far	  more	  impact	  was	  the	  associated	  threat	  of	  execution.	  Such	  acts	  were	  not	  unknown	  in	  the	  
European	  theatre,	  the	  most	  famous	  of	  which,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  the	  only,	  was	  the	  killing	  of	  50	  
officers	  who	  had	  been	  recaptured	  after	  the	  “Great	  Escape”,	  which	  had	  a	  similar	  ‘salutary	  effect	  
on	  potential	  escapers.’456	  A	  rare	  stay	  of	  execution	  was	  granted	  to	  the	  four	  survivors	  of	  a	  failed	  
attempt	  to	  traverse	  the	  50	  miles	  from	  Songkurai	  on	  the	  Burma-­‐Thai	  Railway	  to	  Ye	  on	  the	  
Burmese	  coast,	  in	  recognition	  of	  their	  courage	  and	  after	  considerable	  and	  skilled	  advocacy	  
from	  the	  senior	  British	  officer	  in	  the	  camp.457	  	  
For	  some	  escapers	  it	  was	  the	  fear	  of	  death	  itself,	  through	  execution	  or	  otherwise,	  that	  pushed	  
them	  into	  making	  their	  escapes	  attempts.	  Charles	  McCormac,	  in	  a	  camp	  with	  an	  ever	  
decreasing	  number	  of	  inmates	  who	  had	  been	  identified	  by	  the	  Japanese	  as	  being	  ‘specially	  
dangerous’,	  knew	  that	  it	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  before	  his	  turn	  would	  come.	  This	  drove	  him	  on	  
in	  his	  plans:	  ‘Logic	  was	  reduced	  to	  very	  simple	  terms.	  …	  It	  was	  escape	  or	  die.’458	  Conditions	  on	  
the	  Railway	  would	  motivate	  a	  number	  of	  attempts,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  noted	  by	  Private	  Ablett	  (5th	  
Bed/Herts)	  at	  Leinkhan	  Camp,	  where	  an	  Australian	  prisoner	  had	  been	  caught	  stealing.	  ‘The	  
torture	  and	  beatings	  was	  [sic]	  too	  great	  for	  him.	  So	  he	  escaped.’459	  Whether	  he	  was	  successful	  
is	  not	  clear,	  although	  there	  is	  no	  record	  of	  him	  being	  brought	  back	  to	  the	  camp	  prior	  to	  
execution,	  which	  was	  a	  common	  method	  of	  deterrence	  used	  by	  the	  Japanese.	  In	  another	  
example,	  an	  RAF	  pilot	  was	  shot	  down	  in	  his	  Hurricane	  over	  Burma	  in	  1943,	  and	  captured	  by	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
455	  MacArthur,	  Surviving	  the	  Sword,	  p50.	  
456	  Gilbert,	  Adrian.	  (2006;	  2007	  edn)	  	  POW:	  Allied	  Prisoners	  in	  Europe,	  1939-­‐1945.	  John	  Murray,	  London.	  
p272.	  
457	  MacArthur,	  Surviving	  the	  Sword,	  p136-­‐137.	  MacArthur	  suggests	  that	  these	  were	  the	  only	  POWs	  to	  
survive	  an	  escape	  attempt	  in	  Thailand	  during	  the	  war;	  several	  other	  such	  cases	  will	  be	  detailed	  in	  this	  
section.	  
458	  McCormac,	  You’ll	  Die,	  pp	  64,	  65.	  
459	  UKNA:	  WO	  344/361/1	  	  Aaron-­‐Alesbrook;	  Ablett,	  R.J.	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Japanese.	  The	  threat	  of	  execution	  whilst	  being	  interrogated	  focussed	  his	  mind	  considerably,	  
and	  despite	  a	  bullet	  wound	  incurred	  when	  his	  plane	  was	  shot	  down	  he	  successfully	  escaped.460	  	  
There	  is	  little	  evidence	  of	  large	  scale	  specific	  retribution	  being	  taken	  on	  prisoners	  still	  in	  the	  
camps	  after	  escapes,	  although	  given	  their	  rarity	  this	  is	  perhaps	  not	  a	  surprise.	  When	  such	  
reprisals	  did	  occur	  they	  were	  usually	  associated	  with	  external	  events,	  such	  as	  the	  uncovering	  
of	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  spy	  ring	  or	  the	  commando	  raid	  on	  Japanese	  shipping	  in	  Singapore	  harbour.	  
The	  fear	  of	  execution	  was	  however	  a	  considerable	  deterrent,	  particularly	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  
captivity	  when	  some	  men	  were	  fit	  enough	  to	  have	  harboured	  thoughts	  of	  escape.	  
5.2.2.	  Malnutrition	  and	  morale.	  
In	  many	  respects	  the	  Japanese	  approach	  to	  escape	  was	  that	  prevention	  was	  better	  than	  cure.	  
The	  ration	  scales	  that	  they	  set	  for	  the	  POWs,	  even	  on	  the	  rare	  occasions	  that	  they	  met	  them,	  
were	  certainly	  debilitating,	  particularly	  for	  the	  other	  ranks	  who	  frequently	  had	  to	  carry	  out	  
hard	  labour.	  Whilst	  the	  unexpectedly	  large	  number	  of	  mouths	  that	  they	  had	  to	  feed	  in	  the	  
early	  days,	  and	  the	  increasingly	  less	  reliable	  supply	  networks	  during	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  war,	  
contributed	  to	  the	  Japanese	  difficulty	  in	  maintaining	  provisions	  to	  the	  camps,	  malnutrition,	  
and	  the	  resultant	  poor	  physical	  health,	  were	  seen	  as	  key	  tools	  in	  physically	  controlling	  the	  
prisoners	  in	  the	  camps	  and	  limiting	  their	  horizons	  outside	  of	  them.461	  It	  was	  health	  factors	  that	  
finally	  led	  to	  Cpl	  Henderson	  giving	  up	  on	  any	  hopes	  of	  escaping.	  He	  had	  kept	  hold	  of	  a	  W.D.	  oil	  
compass	  at	  the	  surrender,	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  escaping	  when	  a	  suitable	  opportunity	  
presented	  itself.	  Two	  years	  later	  it	  was	  ‘evident	  that	  continued	  sickness	  made	  me	  ineligible	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460	  Brown,	  G.A.	  (1983)	  Those	  who	  dared:	  A	  comprehensive	  list	  of	  World	  War	  II	  Allied	  Escapers.	  Battleline	  
Books,	  Langley,	  BC.	  p	  60.	  
461	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  factor	  in	  lowering	  morale	  and	  the	  will	  to	  escape	  was	  noted	  in	  an	  official	  guide	  
produced	  by	  South	  East	  Asia	  Command	  and	  given	  to	  combat	  personnel	  involved	  in	  the	  retaking	  of	  
Burma	  in	  July	  1944,	  on	  what	  to	  do	  if	  captured.	  This	  stated	  that:	  ‘It	  is	  therefore	  up	  to	  you	  to	  make	  an	  
EARLY	  attempt	  to	  escape.’	  IWM:	  K98/173:	  Stone	  walls	  do	  not	  a	  prison	  make,	  nor	  iron	  bars	  a	  cage.	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such	  a	  venture’,	  and	  he	  passed	  the	  compass	  on	  to	  a	  group	  thinking	  of	  an	  attempt	  from	  
Chungkai.462	  
Further	  evidence	  of	  the	  health	  effects	  on	  the	  POWs	  is	  contained	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  British	  Army	  
Aid	  Group	  (BAAG)	  in	  December	  1942.	  Captain	  Ford	  at	  Sham	  Shui	  Po,	  the	  other	  ranks	  camp	  in	  
Hong	  Kong,	  assessed	  the	  fitness	  of	  his	  men	  with	  regard	  to	  possible	  escape.	  Of	  around	  3,300	  
prisoners	  just	  over	  a	  third	  were	  considered	  fit	  enough	  to	  walk	  40	  miles,	  and	  only	  20%	  of	  these	  
were	  in	  his	  view	  capable	  of	  making	  any	  real	  effort.	  ‘Rest	  assured	  that	  the	  spirit	  here	  is	  willing	  
and	  the	  morale	  is	  high	  but	  the	  troops	  are	  in	  a	  shocking	  condition.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  
believed.	  Total	  deaths	  to	  date,	  196.’463	  
Whilst	  Ford’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  men’s	  physical	  state	  pulled	  no	  punches,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  
question	  that	  of	  their	  mental	  condition.	  Morale	  and	  spirit	  in	  this	  context	  have	  subtly	  different	  
connotations;	  even	  if	  morale	  had	  been	  reasonably	  strong,	  it	  did	  not	  necessarily	  follow	  that	  the	  
spirit	  to	  escape	  would	  have	  been	  willing.	  Aidan	  Crawley	  recalled	  from	  his	  time	  in	  German	  
camps	  that	  more	  often	  than	  not	  what	  precluded	  escape	  attempts	  was	  not	  fear,	  but	  a	  sense	  of	  
inertia.464	  A	  prime	  example	  of	  such	  inertia	  was	  seen	  at	  the	  Sulmono	  Camp	  in	  Italy	  shortly	  after	  
the	  armistice	  in	  September	  1943.	  Confusion	  reigned	  during	  the	  period	  between	  the	  Italian	  
surrender	  and	  the	  German	  re-­‐occupation,	  not	  least	  in	  MI9,	  whose	  London	  office	  had	  issued	  a	  
“stay	  put”	  order,	  whilst	  their	  Mediterranean	  Command	  had	  set	  up	  “A	  Force”,	  a	  unit	  to	  assist	  in	  
escapes.	  	  
Captain	  McKee	  of	  A	  Force	  arrived	  at	  the	  camp	  to	  find	  about	  a	  thousand	  POWs	  milling	  around	  
aimlessly,	  and	  despite	  threatening	  them	  with	  his	  revolver,	  only	  23	  men	  accompanied	  him	  on	  
the	  short	  but	  ephemeral	  route	  back	  to	  allied	  lines,	  before	  the	  window	  of	  opportunity	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
462	  UKNA:	  WO	  344/381/2.	  	  Henderson	  was	  the	  only	  member	  of	  the	  cohort	  studied	  who	  indicated	  any	  
thought	  of	  escaping	  on	  the	  exit	  questionnaires	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.	  
463	  Ride,	  BAAG,	  p149.	  
464	  Crawley,	  Escape,	  p16.	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closed	  by	  the	  influx	  of	  German	  forces.	  Similar	  lethargy	  was	  found	  at	  camps	  in	  Chieti	  and	  
Modena,	  and	  Gilbert	  suggests	  that	  whilst	  the	  stay	  put	  order	  played	  a	  role	  in	  such	  inaction,	  ‘at	  
the	  same	  time	  the	  force	  of	  inertia	  also	  seemed	  to	  hold	  them	  as	  firmly	  in	  place	  as	  the	  barbed	  
wire	  and	  the	  Italian	  guards.’465	  After	  the	  drama,	  shock	  and	  emotion	  of	  the	  initial	  months	  of	  the	  
war	  in	  Asia	  and	  the	  adaptation	  to	  defeat	  and	  captivity,	  it	  appears	  probable	  that	  there	  would	  be	  
an	  element	  of	  such	  inertia,	  particularly	  once	  a	  routine	  had	  been	  established	  in	  the	  better	  
organised	  camps	  such	  as	  Changi.	  In	  this	  context	  it	  seems	  fair	  to	  suggest	  that	  Captain	  Ford	  was	  
putting	  something	  of	  a	  brave	  face	  on	  the	  situation	  and	  seeking	  to	  maintain	  his	  own	  morale	  as	  
much	  as	  reporting	  on	  that	  of	  the	  men.	  
5.2.3.	  ‘Foreign	  landscapes,	  foreign	  faces.	  It’s	  all	  as	  alien	  as	  a	  different	  planet.’466	  
Deterrence	  and	  health	  were	  considerable	  restraints	  on	  potential	  escapees.	  Of	  no	  less	  reality	  in	  
the	  minds	  of	  the	  FEPOWs	  were	  the	  self-­‐perceptions	  of	  difference,	  and	  the	  presumed	  hostility	  
of	  both	  the	  local	  inhabitants	  and	  the	  physical	  environment,	  as	  encapsulated	  by	  a	  BOR	  who	  
successfully	  escaped	  from	  Hong	  Kong.	  	  
Many	  men	  considering	  escape	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  captivity	  had	  hesitated	  because	  they	  
feared	  the	  unknown	  beyond	  the	  wire,	  the	  endless	  miles	  of	  toil	  through	  vast	  Chinese	  
wastelands,	  and	  the	  possible	  anti-­‐British	  attitude	  of	  the	  local	  people.467	  	  
	  
Such	  perceptions	  have	  been	  reproduced	  and	  amplified	  in	  the	  literature.	  In	  the	  following	  
passage	  Clifford	  Kinvig	  has	  summarised	  most	  of	  the	  features	  of	  this	  narrative	  of	  perceived	  
hostility,	  and	  his	  comprehensive	  exposition	  makes	  it	  worth	  including	  at	  length.	  
There	  was	  a	  world	  of	  difference	  from	  making	  an	  escape	  attempt	  in	  the	  European	  
theatre	  where,	  uniforms	  apart,	  a	  soldier	  from	  one	  of	  the	  Allied	  armies	  could	  look	  much	  
like	  a	  man	  from	  the	  other	  side.	  In	  South	  East	  Asia	  a	  European	  was	  immediately	  
recognisable	  and	  had	  little	  chance	  of	  passing	  himself	  off	  as	  one	  of	  the	  locals.	  In	  
addition	  the	  Thai	  and	  Burmese	  populations	  were	  generally	  disinclined	  to	  help	  
European	  fugitives.	  However	  ill-­‐treated	  they	  themselves	  were	  by	  the	  Japanese,	  the	  
impoverished	  [sic]	  and	  social	  disorganisation	  they	  were	  suffering	  were	  as	  much	  the	  
consequence	  of	  the	  Allies’	  failure	  to	  defend	  their	  territories	  in	  the	  region	  as	  the	  result	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  Gilbert,	  POW,	  pp282-­‐287.	  
466	  Orwell,	  George.	  (1934;	  2009	  edn)	  Burmese	  Days.	  Penguin	  Classics,	  London.	  p	  186.	  
467	  Whitehead	  and	  Bennett,	  Escape	  to	  Fight	  on,	  p	  108.	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of	  Japanese	  actions.	  Certainly	  this	  is	  what	  the	  occupiers’	  propaganda	  claimed;	  the	  
Japanese	  were	  after	  all,	  freeing	  the	  locals	  from	  European	  domination.	  What	  was	  more,	  
there	  was	  generally	  a	  cash	  reward	  for	  the	  capture	  of	  allied	  POWs,	  and	  with	  inflation	  
and	  shortages	  gripping	  most	  of	  the	  occupied	  territories,	  the	  price	  on	  the	  head	  of	  a	  
prisoner	  was	  always	  worth	  receiving.468	  
	  
Whilst	  there	  is	  obvious	  merit	  in	  Kinvig’s	  observation	  that	  European	  prisoners	  would	  be	  
conspicuous	  amongst	  Asian	  populations,	  it	  does	  not	  tell	  the	  whole	  story,	  either	  in	  Asia	  or	  in	  
Europe.	  	  
5.1.3	  (a)	  Standing	  out.	  
There	  are	  numerous	  accounts	  of	  how	  exposure	  to	  the	  tropical	  sun,	  in	  partnership	  with	  other	  
factors,	  could	  provide	  some	  level	  of	  cover	  within	  the	  local	  populations.	  Australian	  nurse	  Betty	  
Jeffrey,	  a	  survivor	  of	  flight	  from	  Singapore,	  was	  astonished	  as	  she	  entered	  captivity	  and	  walked	  
past	  a	  Malay	  woman	  who	  said	  to	  her:	  “A	  bit	  haughty	  today,	  aren’t	  you	  old	  thing.”469	  The	  
“Malay”	  woman	  was	  one	  of	  her	  former	  colleagues,	  now	  well-­‐tanned	  and	  dressed	  in	  a	  local	  
fashion.	  Bernice	  Archer	  has	  written	  of	  how	  such	  transformative	  effects	  could	  prove	  
problematic	  for	  the	  psychology	  of	  male	  civilian	  internees,	  and	  suggests	  that	  ‘as	  they	  shrank,	  
shuffled	  and	  changed	  colour	  with	  the	  sun	  and	  illness,	  perhaps	  they	  feared	  that	  they,	  too,	  were	  
becoming	  inferior,	  little	  yellow	  men.’470	  
For	  some	  servicemen	  such	  transformations	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  pass	  muster	  as	  locals	  in	  the	  
eyes	  of	  the	  Japanese.	  Charles	  McCormac	  actually	  signed	  on	  for	  a	  Japanese	  working	  party	  in	  
Sumatra,	  claiming	  to	  be	  Eurasian,	  in	  order	  to	  raise	  funds	  for	  his	  ongoing	  escape	  bid.	  He	  told	  the	  
Japanese	  soldier	  in	  charge	  that	  his	  blue	  eyes	  were	  an	  inheritance	  from	  his	  German	  father,	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  Kinvig,	  River	  Kwai	  Railway,	  p142.	  For	  a	  similar	  synopsis	  including	  white	  conspicuousness,	  unfriendly	  
natives	  and	  impenetrable	  jungle	  see	  Rollings,	  Prisoner	  of	  War,	  p281.	  
469	  Jeffrey,	  Betty.	  (1954:	  1960	  edn)	  White	  Coolies.	  Hamilton	  and	  Co,	  London.	  p22.	  	  
470	  Archer,	  The	  Internment,	  p76.	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whilst	  his	  now	  ‘mahogany	  brown’	  complexion	  and	  his	  ability	  to	  speak	  Malay	  lent	  credence	  to	  
his	  claimed	  maternal	  Malay	  ancestry.471	  	  
Spencer	  Chapman,	  an	  officer	  who	  famously	  evaded	  the	  Japanese	  whilst	  fighting	  as	  a	  guerrilla	  
in	  Malaya	  for	  most	  of	  the	  war,	  demonstrates	  the	  persistence	  of	  self-­‐perceptions	  of	  
conspicuousness,	  despite	  the	  reality	  of	  his	  own	  experience.	  Early	  in	  his	  account	  he	  states	  that	  
‘whereas	  an	  Englishman	  or	  a	  Pole	  may	  hope	  to	  escape	  detection	  in	  any	  country	  from	  Norway	  
to	  the	  Balkans,	  no	  European	  can	  live	  for	  a	  day	  in	  an	  Asiatic	  country	  without	  being	  recognised	  as	  
a	  white	  man.’	  Despite	  such	  misgivings	  he	  would	  survive	  close	  contacts	  with	  the	  Japanese,	  
utilising	  a	  mixture	  of	  Tamil	  dress	  and	  a	  strong	  solution	  of	  potassium	  permanganate	  mixed	  with	  
coffee	  to	  darken	  his	  complexion.	  ‘I	  do	  not	  know	  what	  the	  genuine	  Tamils	  thought	  about	  it,	  but	  
I	  am	  convinced	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Malays,	  and	  certainly	  the	  Japs,	  were	  taken	  in	  by	  our	  
disguise.’472	  
One	  of	  the	  rare	  if	  only	  partially	  successful	  stories	  of	  escape	  from	  the	  Railway	  involved	  Cpl	  
R.A.S.	  (Ras)	  Pagani,	  the	  son	  of	  an	  English	  father	  of	  Italian	  descent	  and	  a	  French	  mother.	  A	  
member	  of	  the	  5th	  Loyals,	  he	  had	  been	  part	  of	  the	  island	  hop	  to	  Sumatra,	  where,	  unable	  to	  get	  
a	  passage	  away,	  he	  had	  been	  picked	  up	  by	  the	  Japanese.	  Sent	  to	  work	  on	  the	  northern	  end	  of	  
the	  Railway,	  he	  bided	  his	  time	  before	  making	  his	  escape	  near	  Thanbyuzayat,	  heading	  north	  
and	  deeper	  into	  Burma,	  wearing	  nothing	  but	  a	  loincloth,	  a	  good	  growth	  of	  beard	  and	  a	  pugri	  
around	  his	  head.	  His	  attempts	  to	  blend	  with	  the	  local	  population	  were	  not	  just	  restricted	  to	  his	  
clothing	  however:	  ‘During	  my	  stay	  in	  the	  East	  I	  found	  that	  a	  European	  could	  always	  be	  
detected,	  no	  matter	  how	  good	  his	  disguise,	  by	  his	  walk,	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  sway	  in	  his	  
posterior.’	  Whilst	  a	  POW	  he	  had	  perfected	  this	  sway,	  and	  by	  wearing	  no	  footwear	  his	  feet	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  McCormac,	  You’ll	  Die,	  p.	  171-­‐172.	  
472	  Chapman,	  F.	  Spencer.	  (1949)	  The	  Jungle	  is	  Neutral.	  Chatto	  and	  Windus,	  London.	  pp.	  10,	  72-­‐75.	  
Chapman	  was	  himself	  an	  escapee,	  having	  been	  captured	  for	  a	  brief	  time;	  when	  unaware	  of	  a	  nearby	  
Japanese	  soldier	  he	  identified	  himself	  to	  local	  tribesmen.	  He	  escaped	  the	  following	  day.	  pp	  289-­‐294.	  An	  
officer	  who	  was	  parachuted	  in	  to	  join	  his	  group	  later	  in	  the	  war	  thought	  Chapman	  was	  Chinese,	  due	  to	  
his	  yellow	  skin.	  p	  367.	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became	  suitably	  hardened	  for	  the	  journey	  ahead.	  The	  final	  element	  in	  his	  cultural	  
transformation	  would	  come	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  an	  even	  more	  basic	  custom	  when	  he	  saw	  a	  
party	  of	  four	  Japanese	  guards	  in	  a	  town	  one	  day.	  In	  their	  sight	  he	  went	  through	  a	  gateway	  and	  
proceeded	  to	  squat	  in	  the	  hedge	  as	  if	  ‘spending	  a	  penny’.	  After	  they	  passed	  he	  got	  up	  and	  
swayed	  away	  on	  a	  journey	  that	  would	  take	  him	  across	  Burma.473	  	  
A	  similar	  adoption	  of	  local	  mannerisms	  helped	  Rohan	  Rivett	  and	  his	  party	  negotiate	  their	  local	  
fishing	  boat	  through	  a	  large	  Japanese	  convoy	  in	  the	  Sunda	  Strait,	  during	  the	  invasion	  of	  Java	  in	  
1942.	  The	  two	  most	  sunburnt	  men	  took	  the	  oars,	  whilst	  another,	  ‘who	  by	  this	  time	  looked	  like	  
a	  Malay’,	  took	  the	  tiller.	  With	  ‘the	  oarsmen	  rowing	  native-­‐fashion	  and	  pushing	  the	  oar	  against	  
the	  rollock	  instead	  of	  pulling	  it	  towards	  them’,	  the	  Japanese	  Navy	  thought	  they	  were	  just	  
fishermen	  returning	  home	  and	  ignored	  them.474	  
These	  accounts	  demonstrate	  that	  with	  some	  careful	  thought	  and	  an	  open	  mind,	  it	  was	  possible	  
to	  mitigate	  obvious	  physiological	  differences	  in	  Asia.	  	  Furthermore	  such	  physical	  and	  cultural	  
challenges	  were	  not	  unknown	  in	  Europe,	  where	  escape	  attempts	  would	  have	  gained	  from	  
Pagani’s	  attention	  to	  detail	  and	  willingness	  to	  adapt.	  	  
An	  officer	  on	  the	  run	  in	  Italy	  was	  bemused	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  locals	  knew	  straight	  away	  that	  
he	  was	  British.	  It	  was	  explained	  to	  him	  that	  ‘his	  hair	  was	  parted	  in	  the	  wrong	  way,	  that	  he	  
walked	  and	  sat	  in	  the	  wrong	  way,	  and	  that	  “anyone	  as	  scruffy	  as	  you	  wouldn’t	  have	  glasses	  in	  
Italy.”’	  As	  Gilbert	  observed	  in	  the	  European	  context,	  ‘the	  British	  officer	  class	  did	  not	  make	  
good	  social	  chameleons.’475	  It	  was	  not	  just	  appearances	  that	  could	  give	  the	  game	  away.	  
Cultural	  ignorance	  did	  for	  a	  couple	  of	  prisoners	  in	  Germany,	  who	  had	  succeeded	  in	  putting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473	  Morrison,	  Ian.	  (1947)	  Grandfather	  Longlegs:	  The	  Life	  and	  Gallant	  Death	  of	  Major	  H.P.	  Seagrim.	  G.C.,	  
D.S.O.,	  M.B.E.	  Faber	  and	  Faber,	  London.	  pp204-­‐205.	  	  	  For	  a	  similar	  episode	  involving	  the	  adoption	  of	  
regional	  cultural	  practices	  with	  regard	  to	  urination	  see:	  Nichol,	  John	  and	  Rennell,	  Tony.	  (2007)	  Home	  
Run:	  Escape	  from	  Nazi	  Europe.	  Viking,	  London.	  pp230-­‐231.	  In	  this	  example	  an	  American	  airman	  has	  to	  
forgo	  his	  usual	  modesty	  and	  relieve	  himself	  openly	  in	  public,	  as	  per	  the	  French	  custom.	  
474	  Rivett,	  Behind	  Bamboo,	  p	  72.	  
475	  Gilbert,	  POW,	  p274,	  p280.	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some	  mileage	  behind	  them	  before	  they	  were	  picked	  up	  for	  walking	  down	  the	  central	  
reservation	  on	  the	  autobahn.	  The	  Britain	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  find	  their	  way	  back	  to	  had	  no	  
such	  motorways	  and	  they	  were	  thus	  unaware	  of	  such	  restrictions.476	  	  	  
5.2.3	  (b)	  Foreign	  faces.	  
If	  Kinvig’s	  views	  on	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  Europeans	  had	  some	  foundation,	  his	  analysis,	  
repeating	  the	  now	  established	  narrative,	  of	  the	  unfavourable	  attitudes	  of	  the	  Thai	  and	  
Burmese	  populations	  is	  more	  questionable	  on	  a	  number	  of	  grounds.	  The	  generalised	  assertion	  
that	  the	  respective	  populations	  were	  reluctant	  to	  aid	  escapers	  is	  a	  simplistic	  one	  that	  fails	  to	  
recognise	  significant	  differences	  both	  between	  and	  within	  them.	  Burma	  was	  a	  patchwork	  
collection	  of	  different	  ethnic	  groups,	  including	  the	  hill	  tribes	  of	  Nagas,	  Karens,	  Shans,	  Chins	  and	  
Kachins	  as	  well	  as	  the	  plains	  dwelling	  Burman	  people	  themselves,	  all	  leavened	  with	  a	  large	  
imperial	  diaspora	  from	  India.477	  The	  Burmans	  had	  little	  inclination	  to	  assist	  their	  erstwhile	  
colonial	  masters,	  and	  indeed,	  far	  from	  blaming	  the	  British	  for	  their	  new	  situation,	  the	  Burma	  
Independence	  Army	  (BIA)	  was	  not	  only	  alongside	  the	  Japanese	  invaders,	  but	  was	  seeking	  to	  
get	  ahead	  of	  them	  in	  the	  race	  to	  “liberate”	  Burma.	  The	  minority	  communities,	  who	  supplied	  
most	  of	  the	  recruits	  to	  the	  British	  colonial	  defence	  force	  the	  Burma	  Rifles,	  were	  less	  keen	  to	  
see	  the	  Japanese	  arrive,	  fearing	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  new	  Burman	  hegemony.	  	  
It	  was	  these	  communities	  that	  assisted	  Pagani	  in	  his	  escape,	  as	  first	  several	  Indians	  and	  then	  a	  
Kachin	  guided	  him	  to	  Karen	  country,	  where	  ‘all	  the	  villagers	  were	  friendly	  and	  willing	  to	  help’.	  
Here	  he	  joined	  a	  group	  of	  Karen	  guerrillas	  led	  by	  a	  British	  Major	  and	  some	  Indian	  Army	  NCOs,	  
and	  spent	  some	  months	  fighting	  with	  them	  against	  the	  Japanese	  and	  Burmese	  armies.	  
Eventually,	  together	  with	  one	  of	  the	  Indian	  NCOs,	  he	  attempted	  to	  traverse	  Burma	  to	  reach	  
the	  British	  lines,	  and	  assisted	  by	  a	  Buddhist	  priest	  he	  nearly	  made	  it,	  but	  was	  captured	  by	  a	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  Crawley,	  Escape,	  p44.	  




group	  of	  Burmans,	  probably	  inspired	  as	  much	  by	  nationalism	  and	  colonial	  antipathy	  as	  by	  the	  
promise	  of	  money,	  whilst	  trying	  to	  cross	  the	  Irrawaddy	  River.	  	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  likely	  
execution,	  he	  at	  this	  point	  reached	  into	  his	  diverse	  repertoire	  of	  ethnic	  characters	  and	  
surfaced	  as	  a	  downed	  American	  pilot,	  and	  spent	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Rangoon	  prison	  with	  his	  
“fellow”	  US	  airmen.478	  	  
The	  distinction	  between	  the	  Burmans	  and	  the	  hill	  tribes	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  Private	  Dixon,	  who	  had	  
been	  tipped	  off	  by	  a	  friendly	  Japanese	  guard	  that	  an	  officer	  of	  the	  Sherwood	  Foresters	  had	  
been	  spotted	  using	  binoculars,	  in	  preparation	  for	  an	  escape.	  He	  duly	  passed	  on	  the	  warning	  
and	  noted	  that	  ‘the	  [Burman]	  plainsmen	  had	  no	  love	  for	  the	  British	  at	  that	  time	  and	  to	  be	  
caught	  meant	  certain	  death.’479	  Less	  sensitive	  to	  the	  nuances	  of	  the	  ethnic	  demographics	  of	  
Burma	  was	  Private	  Carpenter,	  in	  a	  passage	  where	  his	  distrust	  of	  all	  Burmese	  was	  broadened	  
out	  into	  a	  more	  holistic	  antipathy	  to	  Asians	  in	  general.	  ‘During	  the	  Japanese	  occupation	  of	  
these	  various	  Far	  Eastern	  countries,	  with	  one	  or	  two	  genuine	  exceptions,	  most	  of	  these	  people	  
would	  have	  sold	  us	  down	  the	  country	  if	  anyone	  had	  tried	  to	  escape.	  It	  would	  have	  been	  worse	  
to	  be	  taken	  by	  them	  than	  by	  the	  Japs	  themselves.’	  He	  continued	  to	  say	  that	  ‘We	  could	  not	  
trust	  these	  bastards	  and	  even	  to	  this	  very	  day	  I	  would	  not	  trust	  them.	  They	  would	  shake	  your	  
hand	  and	  smile	  then	  stab	  you	  in	  the	  back,	  still	  smiling.’480	  Given	  that	  Carpenter,	  like	  the	  
majority	  of	  British	  prisoners	  including	  Dixon,	  did	  no	  time	  on	  the	  Burmese	  side	  of	  the	  border,	  it	  
would	  seem	  that	  such	  antipathy	  had	  a	  more	  historical	  basis,	  perhaps	  rooted	  in	  his	  service	  in	  
India	  as	  a	  regular	  soldier,	  and	  in	  the	  colonial	  outlooks	  he	  would	  have	  picked	  up.481	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478	  Morrison,	  Grandfather,	  pp205-­‐211.	  For	  his	  former	  camp-­‐mates,	  unaware	  of	  his	  recapture,	  this	  was	  
seen	  as	  a	  successful	  attempt;	  as	  one	  of	  them	  noted	  on	  his	  post-­‐war	  exit	  questionnaire:	  ‘Cpl	  Pegarny	  [sic]	  
of	  Recce	  Corps	  18th	  Divn	  left	  18	  Kilo	  Camp	  Dec	  1942	  and	  was	  never	  heard	  of.	  Was	  said	  to	  have	  got	  
through.’	  UKNA:	  WO	  344/361/1	  	  Aaron-­‐Alesbrook;	  Adamson	  J.T.	  
479	  IWM;	  Dixon;	  pp124-­‐125.	  
480	  IWM:	  Carpenter;	  p67.	  Financial	  inducements	  could	  work	  both	  ways,	  as	  Captain	  Carmichael,	  the	  
aforementioned	  Hurricane	  pilot	  shot	  down	  over	  Burma,	  found	  to	  his	  salvation.	  On	  offering	  a	  reward	  a	  
local	  villager	  looked	  after	  him	  and	  guided	  him	  to	  safety.	  In	  Brown,	  Those	  who	  dared,	  p	  60.	  
481	  UKNA:	  WO	  345/9:	  Carpenter,	  C.W.	  and	  WO	  344/368/1:	  Carpenter,	  C.W.;	  WO345/9:	  	  Dixon,	  H.	  and	  
WO	  344/368/1:	  Dixon,	  H.	  The	  post	  captivity	  RAPWI	  interviews	  contained	  a	  record	  of	  the	  camps	  and	  their	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The	  argument	  that	  the	  Thais	  were	  equally	  disinclined	  to	  help	  potential	  British	  fugitives	  has	  
even	  more	  shortcomings	  to	  it,	  not	  least	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  overtly	  colonial	  past.	  Whilst	  there	  
had	  been	  some	  European	  (and	  Chinese)	  economic	  intrusions,	  Thailand,	  uniquely	  in	  South	  East	  
Asia,	  had	  enjoyed	  a	  singularly	  long	  history	  of	  independence	  from	  foreign	  rule	  and	  western	  
occupation.	  	  The	  colonial	  factor	  that	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Burman	  antipathy	  to	  the	  British	  was	  
thus	  largely	  absent,	  save	  among	  a	  few	  pan-­‐Asian	  intellectuals.	  	  
There	  are	  frequent	  mentions	  in	  the	  POW	  accounts	  of	  the	  gifts	  made	  by	  Thais	  to	  those	  
desperate	  soldiers	  without	  the	  wherewithal	  to	  trade,	  as	  they	  passed	  through	  their	  districts.	  
Such	  actions	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  represent	  a	  popular	  antipathy	  to	  the	  British,	  or	  an	  impoverished	  
population	  so	  gripped	  by	  shortages	  that	  were	  always	  going	  to	  turn	  an	  escaper	  in.	  Indeed,	  by	  
the	  end	  of	  1944	  the	  Thai	  population,	  in	  both	  individual	  and	  official	  capacities	  were	  providing	  
widespread	  assistance	  to	  the	  three	  privates	  who	  escaped	  the	  Railway	  during	  the	  bombing	  
raids.	  Such	  was	  the	  generosity	  of	  the	  local	  population	  that	  they	  started	  to	  avoid	  the	  villages	  
because	  of	  the	  overwhelming	  hospitality	  on	  offer	  and	  the	  delays	  caused	  by	  accepting	  it.	  For	  
several	  months	  they	  enjoyed	  the	  goodwill	  and	  support	  of	  the	  many	  Thais	  they	  met,	  some	  
Javanese	  and	  even	  a	  seminary	  of	  Italians	  in	  Bangkok.	  On	  their	  escape	  route	  they	  were	  assisted	  
by	  train	  guards,	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  Thai	  police	  from	  Constables	  to	  a	  General,	  and	  finally	  a	  flight	  of	  
Thai	  Air	  Force	  bombers.482	  Whilst	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  direction	  the	  war	  was	  taking	  might	  
have	  moderated	  the	  views	  of	  some	  officials,	  particularly	  those	  further	  up	  the	  hierarchy,	  and	  
that	  by	  this	  stage	  the	  resistance	  network	  had	  grown	  considerably	  from	  its	  very	  modest	  
beginnings,	  these	  factors	  do	  not	  detract	  from	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  largely	  supportive	  response	  
from	  the	  Thai	  people	  to	  the	  POWs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
British	  COs	  at	  which	  the	  POWs	  had	  been	  kept.	  The	  nearest	  Carpenter	  got	  to	  Burma	  was	  Takunun	  camp,	  
some	  80kms	  south	  of	  the	  border,	  whilst	  Dixon	  got	  a	  little	  closer	  when	  he	  was	  at	  Taimonta	  camp	  some	  
25	  kms	  from	  Burma.	  
482	  UKNA:	  H1/62.	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In	  some	  cases	  local	  communities	  would	  not	  only	  support	  the	  prisoners,	  they	  would	  also	  adopt	  
them.	  Private	  Dawson	  recalled	  one	  colleague	  who	  whilst	  driving	  a	  lorry	  had	  made	  contact	  with	  
local	  Thais,	  who	  encouraged	  him	  to	  abscond	  and	  join	  them.	  One	  day	  he	  mingled	  with	  his	  new	  
friends	  as	  his	  Japanese	  guard	  returned	  to	  the	  main	  convoy,	  and	  he	  ‘threw	  in	  his	  lot	  with	  the	  
Thais	  completely	  and	  never	  returned	  and	  after	  capitulation	  when	  official	  returns	  were	  made	  
he	  was	  listed	  as	  “missing”’.483	  Whilst	  those	  espousing	  a	  more	  paranoid	  perspective	  on	  the	  
hospitality	  of	  the	  local	  people	  might	  suggest	  that	  the	  POW	  was	  being	  lured	  away	  precisely	  to	  
cash	  him	  in	  with	  the	  Japanese,	  and	  this	  indeed	  may	  have	  been	  possible,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  foregoing	  analysis.	  Certainly	  to	  Dawson	  it	  seemed	  clear	  that	  the	  driver	  had	  
made	  a	  successful	  home	  run,	  although	  his	  new	  domicile	  was	  a	  lot	  closer	  to	  home	  than	  his	  old	  
one.	  	  
Such	  immersions	  into	  a	  sympathetic	  local	  community	  were	  not	  unknown	  in	  Europe,	  and	  were	  
thought	  to	  be	  the	  destination	  of	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  the	  2,000	  POWs	  in	  Italy	  who	  
remained	  unaccounted	  for	  after	  the	  war.484	  However	  despite	  such	  hospitality,	  and	  
notwithstanding	  the	  issue	  of	  conspicuity,	  the	  human	  landscape	  through	  which	  an	  escapee	  had	  
to	  travel	  in	  Europe	  was	  in	  actuality	  frequently	  more	  hostile	  than	  that	  which	  had	  to	  be	  
negotiated	  by	  fugitives	  in	  Asia.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  camps	  were	  in	  enemy	  as	  opposed	  to	  
occupied	  territory,	  and	  as	  Gilbert	  states,	  ‘the	  prime	  obstacle	  facing	  escapers	  was	  the	  transit	  of	  
a	  hostile	  and	  very	  alert	  Germany.’485	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  a	  population	  at	  large	  that	  was	  every	  bit	  as	  unfriendly	  as	  that	  on	  the	  worst	  parts	  
of	  the	  plains	  of	  Burma,	  the	  escaper	  had	  a	  much	  more	  powerful	  array	  of	  state	  security	  branches	  
to	  evade.	  Everyone	  from	  the	  Gestapo	  to	  the	  Hitler	  Youth,	  including	  the	  considerable	  civilian	  
and	  military	  police	  forces,	  the	  armed	  services	  and	  the	  Volksturm	  home	  guard	  units,	  could	  be	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  IWM:	  Dawson;	  p98.	  
484	  Gilbert:	  POW;	  p288.	  
485	  Gilbert:	  POW;	  p273.	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mobilised	  to	  track	  down	  escaped	  prisoners,	  a	  mission	  in	  which	  they	  were	  usually	  successful.	  	  
To	  get	  beyond	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  Reich	  was	  no	  guarantee	  of	  success	  either,	  as	  there	  was	  no	  
way	  of	  knowing	  who	  would	  be	  sympathetic	  and	  who	  would	  turn	  you	  in.	  One	  runaway	  made	  it	  
all	  the	  way	  to	  a	  farmhouse	  in	  Normandy	  before	  he	  was	  given	  up	  by	  the	  owner,	  and	  the	  
skippers	  of	  Swedish	  ships	  had	  been	  known	  to	  return	  to	  port	  in	  Germany	  if	  a	  prisoner	  was	  
found	  stowing	  away	  whilst	  at	  sea.486	  	  
5.2.3	  (c)	  Foreign	  landscapes.	  
The	  physical	  locations	  in	  which	  these	  foreign	  faces	  lived	  were	  equally	  different	  to	  many	  British	  
eyes.	  The	  jungle	  in	  particular	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  site	  of	  fear,	  incomprehension	  and	  assumed	  
hostility	  for	  the	  POWs.	  Like	  the	  ex-­‐pats	  in	  Forster’s	  A	  Passage	  to	  India,	  ‘they	  realised	  that	  they	  
were	  thousands	  of	  miles	  from	  any	  scenery	  that	  they	  understood.’487	  Spencer	  Chapman	  
summarised	  his	  view	  of	  the	  private	  soldier’s	  outlook	  thus:	  ‘To	  them	  the	  jungle	  seemed	  
predominantly	  hostile,	  being	  full	  of	  man-­‐eating	  tigers,	  deadly	  fevers,	  venomous	  snakes	  and	  
scorpions,	  natives	  with	  poisoned	  darts,	  and	  a	  host	  of	  half-­‐imagined	  nameless	  terrors.’	  Having	  
spent	  over	  three	  years	  living	  in	  and	  around	  it,	  he	  concluded	  that	  ‘the	  truth	  is	  that	  the	  jungle	  is	  
neutral.’488	  
Such	  neutrality	  was	  not	  widely	  perceived	  in	  British	  eyes	  however,	  as	  fed	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  
racialized	  suppositions	  and	  the	  search	  for	  explanations	  for	  the	  series	  of	  resounding	  defeats	  in	  
the	  early	  months	  of	  hostilities,	  it	  was	  commonly	  assumed	  that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  in	  their	  
natural	  element	  when	  fighting	  in	  the	  jungle.489	  These	  assumptions	  were	  prevalent	  at	  the	  
highest	  levels,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  Churchill’s	  advice	  to	  the	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  that	  ‘Going	  into	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  MacKenzie,	  The	  Colditz	  Myth,	  p342.	  
487	  Forster,	  E.M.	  (1924;	  1984	  edn)	  A	  Passage	  to	  India.	  Harcourt	  Brace	  Jovanavich,	  New	  York.	  p200.	  
488	  Chapman,	  The	  Jungle	  is	  Neutral,	  p	  125.	  
489	  This	  was	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Home	  Islands	  of	  Japan	  were	  in	  a	  temperate	  climatic	  zone,	  and	  that	  




swampy	  jungles	  to	  fight	  the	  Japanese	  is	  like	  going	  into	  the	  water	  to	  fight	  a	  shark.’490	  These	  
views	  were	  not	  specifically	  British,	  but	  were	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  occidental	  narrative,	  as	  
exemplified	  in	  the	  words	  of	  an	  American	  reporter	  embedded	  with	  the	  US	  Marines	  on	  
Guadalcanal,	  who	  described	  a	  jungle	  patrol:	  
On	  the	  way	  up	  to	  the	  front,	  we	  had	  come	  through	  patches	  of	  jungle,	  and	  it	  had	  
seemed	  alien,	  almost	  poisonous.	  …	  Each	  time	  we	  came	  out	  into	  the	  light	  of	  the	  grassy	  
knolls,	  we	  breathed	  deeply	  and	  more	  easily.	  These	  open	  spaces	  were	  our	  natural	  
terrain.	  They	  were	  American;	  the	  jungle	  was	  Jap.491	  
	  
The	  physical	  environment	  in	  Europe,	  whilst	  familiar,	  may	  also	  have	  been	  no	  less	  intimidating,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  winter.	  The	  Pyrenees	  and	  the	  Alps,	  two	  of	  the	  most	  favoured	  routes	  to	  
freedom,	  would	  have	  been	  challenging	  to	  weary	  escapees	  with	  guides	  in	  the	  summer,	  and	  
more	  so	  for	  those	  who	  tried	  unaided	  to	  traverse	  the	  peaks	  through	  the	  snow	  that	  enveloped	  
them	  for	  much	  of	  the	  year.	  Yet	  the	  jungles	  of	  Asia	  have	  retained	  a	  special	  place	  as	  a	  hostile	  
location	  that	  is	  purported	  to	  have	  precluded	  even	  the	  thought	  of	  escape.	  As	  one	  former	  POW	  
recalled,	  ‘it	  was	  folly	  –	  you	  can’t	  escape	  from	  a	  jungle.’492	  An	  officer	  at	  Takelin	  Camp	  on	  the	  
Railway	  had	  tried	  to	  dissuade	  a	  group	  of	  BORs	  from	  attempting	  an	  escape,	  citing	  the	  dangers	  
of	  going	  ‘hundreds	  of	  miles	  into	  unknown	  jungle.’	  They	  were	  recaptured	  and	  were	  believed	  to	  
have	  been	  shot,	  although	  they	  had	  survived	  for	  about	  a	  month.493	  Similarly	  in	  the	  literature	  
Clifford	  Kinvig	  refers	  to	  ‘malarial	  jungles’	  and	  ‘mighty	  rivers’	  as	  being	  ‘a	  prospect	  to	  daunt	  even	  
the	  most	  reckless	  and	  desperate	  potential	  escaper’,494	  	  whilst	  Rollings	  describes	  the	  landscape	  
of	  the	  Far	  East	  as	  ‘vast	  and	  often	  thick	  with	  impenetrable	  jungle.’495	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  Gilbert,	  Martin.	  (1986)	  Road	  to	  Victory:	  Winston	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  Churchill	  1941-­‐1945.	  William	  Heinemann	  Ltd,	  
London.	  p	  399.	  
491	  Hersey,	  John.	  (1943)	  Into	  the	  Valley.	  Hodder	  and	  Stoughton,	  London.	  p	  34-­‐35.	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  IWM:	  Wade,	  J.D.	  (Sound	  9957)	  
493	  TNA:	  WO	  344/361/1	  	  Aaron-­‐Alesbrook:	  Addy,	  K.C.	  
494	  Kinvig,	  River	  Kwai	  Railway,	  p143.	  
495	  Rollings,	  Prisoner	  of	  War,	  p281.	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Such	  words	  might	  have	  been	  taken	  from	  the	  erroneous	  assessments	  made	  of	  the	  terrain	  by	  
the	  British	  Command,	  prior	  to	  the	  disastrous	  Malayan	  campaign,	  in	  which	  the	  Japanese	  forces	  
had	  had	  no	  problems	  in	  feeding	  not	  just	  battalions	  of	  infantry	  but	  also	  columns	  of	  tanks	  
through	  the	  ‘impenetrable	  jungle’.496	  Whilst	  much	  of	  Malaya	  was	  plantation	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  
more	  virgin	  jungle	  that	  could	  be	  found	  on	  the	  remoter	  reaches	  of	  the	  Railway,	  there	  was	  a	  
British	  naiveté	  in	  matters	  of	  tropical	  ecology	  that	  would	  travel	  with	  the	  prisoners	  on	  the	  
journey	  “up-­‐country”.	  In	  the	  mentality	  of	  the	  prisoners	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  imagine	  this	  new	  and	  
unknown	  environment,	  along	  with	  the	  novel	  experience	  of	  captivity	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  racial	  and	  
colonial	  inversion,	  playing	  its	  part	  in	  contributing	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  profound	  displacement	  and	  
disorientation.	  	  
There	  are	  however	  factors	  which	  can	  be	  suggested	  that	  mitigate	  the	  thesis	  of	  the	  
impenetrability	  of	  the	  natural	  surroundings.	  Even	  in	  the	  tropical	  regions	  that	  have	  become	  the	  
focus	  of	  this	  narrative,	  there	  were	  a	  variety	  of	  landscapes,	  some	  less	  forbidding	  than	  others,	  
particularly	  where	  the	  hand	  of	  man	  had	  been	  involved.	  There	  were	  also	  the	  instances	  where	  
the	  landscape	  had	  been	  successfully	  negotiated.	  As	  already	  discussed,	  Ras	  Pagani	  had	  
effectively	  avoided	  much	  of	  the	  jungle	  by	  utilising	  roads	  and	  paths	  that	  ran	  through	  it.	  Perhaps	  
the	  most	  remarkable	  tale	  of	  traversing	  hostile	  terrain	  occurred	  during	  the	  early	  days	  of	  
hostilities,	  when	  a	  group	  of	  24	  British	  civilians	  fled	  Bangkok	  as	  the	  Japanese	  army	  occupied	  
Thailand.	  The	  group	  contained	  an	  assortment	  of	  businessmen	  and	  bankers,	  along	  with	  two	  
women	  and	  a	  sixty	  year	  old	  man.	  They	  followed	  what	  would	  become	  a	  very	  familiar	  route	  
several	  years	  later	  for	  the	  POWs	  working	  on	  the	  Railway,	  although	  this	  party	  travelled	  in	  boats	  
crewed	  by	  friendly	  Thais.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496	  As	  late	  as	  1944	  the	  British	  Army	  could	  still	  be	  myopic	  in	  this	  regard.	  Lt	  Gen	  Scoones	  considered	  the	  
jungle	  to	  the	  north	  east	  of	  Imphal	  to	  be	  impenetrable,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  own	  engineers	  had	  just	  
constructed	  a	  jeep	  track	  through	  part	  of	  it.	  It	  came	  as	  a	  considerable	  surprise	  when	  Lt	  Gen	  Mutaguchi	  
sent	  a	  large	  force	  through	  from	  this	  direction,	  utilising	  the	  newly	  constructed	  track.	  Lyman,	  Robert.	  
(2011)	  Japan’s	  Last	  Bid	  For	  Victory:	  The	  invasion	  of	  India	  1944.	  The	  Praetorian	  Press,	  Barnsley.	  p	  51.	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They	  travelled	  from	  Ban	  Pong	  to	  Kanburi	  and	  thence	  to	  Three	  Pagodas	  Pass,	  all	  the	  while	  
staying	  one	  step	  ahead	  of	  the	  pursuing	  Japanese	  army,	  which	  had	  been	  alerted	  to	  their	  
movements.	  By	  Three	  Pagodas	  Pass	  the	  Japanese	  had	  headed	  them	  off	  and	  it	  was	  decided	  to	  
cut	  across	  country	  to	  get	  to	  Tavoy	  in	  the	  still	  British	  controlled	  Burma.	  This	  was	  a	  route	  that	  
even	  the	  friendly	  police	  in	  Kanchanaburi	  had	  thought	  was	  mad,	  and	  would	  result	  in	  their	  
imminent	  mortality.	  It	  was	  decided	  to	  send	  an	  advance	  guard	  travelling	  light	  to	  cut	  through	  to	  
the	  coast	  and	  then	  send	  back	  a	  relief	  party	  to	  collect	  the	  others	  who	  were	  behind	  them.	  With	  
no	  guide	  for	  all	  but	  the	  first	  day,	  they	  reached	  Tavoy	  In	  six	  days,	  their	  route	  having	  taken	  them	  
through	  a	  variety	  of	  landscapes.	  They	  had	  spent	  two	  days	  cutting	  a	  path	  through	  thick	  bamboo	  
jungle,	  two	  days	  walking	  along	  stream	  beds	  and	  then	  traversed	  two	  4/5,000	  foot	  mountains	  
before	  reaching	  their	  destination.	  A	  rescue	  party	  was	  sent	  back	  to	  bring	  out	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
group,	  who	  duly	  appeared	  several	  days	  later,	  ‘battered,	  but	  all	  fit	  and	  well.’	  It	  had	  been	  a	  
tough,	  but	  not	  insurmountable	  challenge,	  a	  point	  reinforced	  by	  one	  of	  the	  advance	  party	  who	  
said	  that	  ‘after	  10	  years	  luxurious	  living	  in	  Bangkok	  this	  was	  really	  hard	  going.’497	  On	  a	  much	  
larger	  scale	  a	  contemporary	  assessment	  of	  the	  Burma	  evacuation	  had	  made	  a	  similar	  point:	  
‘The	  trek	  of	  thousands	  of	  men,	  women	  and	  children	  from	  Burma	  to	  India	  is	  sufficient	  evidence	  
that	  the	  intervening	  mountains	  are	  not	  impenetrable.’498	  	  
	  
5.2.4.	  Summary.	  
Despite	  the	  widely	  diverging	  popular	  narratives	  of	  escape	  involving	  the	  POWs	  in	  Asia	  and	  
Europe,	  this	  analysis	  has	  suggested	  that	  there	  was	  a	  considerable	  convergence	  in	  many	  aspects	  
of	  their	  experiences.	  The	  key	  difference	  was	  one	  of	  degree.	  The	  factors	  of	  fear	  of	  retribution,	  
poor	  health	  and	  hostile	  environments	  were	  found	  to	  apply	  in	  both	  theatres,	  but	  were	  more	  
persistent	  and	  pervasive	  for	  the	  prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese.	  Whilst	  the	  number	  of	  successful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
497	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  Secret:	  Being	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escapes	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  surprisingly	  comparable	  once	  a	  systematic	  analysis	  of	  the	  Asian	  
theatre	  has	  been	  conducted,	  the	  wide	  variance	  in	  the	  frequency	  of	  attempts	  remains	  
irrefutable.	  
For	  the	  other	  ranks	  in	  captivity	  in	  Asia,	  any	  thoughts	  of	  escape	  would	  usually	  be	  subsumed	  in	  
the	  fight	  for	  survival.	  The	  fear	  of	  execution	  and	  their	  physical	  debilitation	  acted	  as	  considerable	  
constraints	  in	  any	  such	  attempts.	  In	  some	  cases	  these	  factors	  were	  supplemented	  by	  their	  
racially	  and	  colonially	  informed	  fear	  of	  the	  unknown	  environment,	  both	  human	  and	  physical,	  
that	  they	  found	  themselves	  in.	  It	  is	  however	  possible	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  perils	  of	  these	  
environmental	  factors,	  informed	  by	  pre-­‐existing	  and	  persistent	  notions	  of	  difference,	  have	  
been	  overstated.	  With	  ingenuity,	  opportunity	  and	  considerable	  bravery,	  a	  number	  of	  men	  
surmounted	  these	  perceived	  obstacles	  and	  gained	  their	  freedom.	  
	  
5.3.	  Tamil	  Labourers	  and	  the	  Cholera	  Epidemic	  of	  1943.	  
For	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  imprisoned	  other	  ranks	  their	  most	  frequent	  contacts	  with	  civilians	  
would	  be	  through	  work.	  There	  were	  many	  locations	  at	  which	  such	  associations	  existed,	  from	  
the	  mines	  and	  furnaces	  of	  Japan,	  Korea	  and	  Formosa,	  to	  the	  construction	  projects	  in	  the	  
Netherlands	  East	  Indies	  and	  the	  Pacific	  islands.	  Such	  experiences	  served	  to	  reinforce	  their	  
impression	  that	  they	  were	  now	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  new,	  and	  for	  them	  inverted,	  colonial	  
order.	  In	  one	  location,	  however,	  despite	  their	  own	  desperate	  condition,	  the	  prisoners	  would	  
clearly	  see	  that	  they	  were	  not	  at	  the	  base	  of	  the	  Japanese	  imperial	  hierarchy,	  during	  their	  time	  
on	  the	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway.	  Here	  in	  their	  perceptions	  they	  were	  replaced	  at	  the	  bottom	  by	  
the	  Tamil	  labourers,	  whose	  misfortune	  it	  was	  to	  occupy	  the	  lowest	  steps	  on	  the	  ladders	  of	  race	  
and	  class	  in	  that	  part	  of	  South	  East	  Asia,	  regardless	  of	  who	  occupied	  the	  top	  rung.	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On	  the	  Railway	  the	  Tamils,	  already	  struggling	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  food,	  basic	  facilities	  and	  medical	  
support,	  would	  suffer	  a	  new	  nadir,	  as	  a	  wave	  of	  cholera	  swept	  down	  river	  through	  their	  
encampments,	  carrying	  large	  numbers	  of	  the	  labourers	  and	  their	  families	  to	  their	  deaths.	  
Whilst	  such	  pitiful	  circumstances	  generated	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  sympathy	  from	  many	  of	  the	  
prisoners,	  it	  was	  frequently	  tinged	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  culpability	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Tamils.	  One	  
POW	  wrote:	  ‘They	  had	  no	  conception	  of	  elementary	  hygiene	  and	  it	  was	  very	  likely	  true,	  as	  we	  
all	  believed,	  that	  they	  had	  done	  much,	  despite	  our	  precautions,	  to	  contaminate	  water	  supplies.	  
But	  they	  suffered	  more	  than	  we.’499	  Their	  poor	  sanitation	  and	  lack	  of	  organisation	  are	  
frequently	  cited	  in	  both	  the	  first-­‐hand	  accounts	  and	  the	  subsequent	  literature	  as	  contributing	  
to	  the	  desperate	  conditions	  in	  which	  they	  found	  themselves.	  In	  this	  section,	  following	  some	  
background	  on	  both	  the	  Tamils	  and	  the	  cholera	  that	  awaited	  them,	  the	  prevalence	  of	  such	  
views	  will	  be	  examined,	  and	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  common	  assumptions	  regarding	  sanitation	  will	  
be	  assessed.	  
	  
5.3.1.	  The	  Tamil	  labourers.	  
The	  Tamils	  were	  a	  relatively	  small	  part	  of	  the	  civilian	  labour	  force	  of	  millions	  of	  romusha	  whom	  
the	  Japanese	  recruited	  through	  a	  mixture	  of	  inducement,	  requisition	  and	  abduction,	  to	  work	  
across	  its	  Asian	  territories.500	  Hundreds	  of	  thousands	  never	  returned	  home,	  many	  of	  whom	  
died	  at	  their	  workplaces	  throughout	  the	  Greater	  East	  Asia	  Co-­‐Prosperity	  Sphere.	  Paul	  Kratoska	  
has	  written:	  ‘Theirs	  is	  a	  story	  of	  death	  and	  dislocation	  of	  holocaust	  proportions,	  and	  
remarkably	  it	  is	  a	  story	  that	  has	  received	  little	  attention	  from	  historians.’	  501	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  IWM:	  Dawson:	  p	  22.	  
500	  Romusha	  is	  a	  collective	  name	  given	  to	  the	  Asian	  labour	  force,	  sometimes	  more	  specifically	  applied	  to	  
those	  conscripted	  from	  the	  Netherlands	  East	  Indies.	  
501	  Kratoska,	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  (2005)	  Asian	  Labor	  in	  the	  Wartime	  Japanese	  Empire:	  Unknown	  Histories.	  




Whilst	  the	  historical	  silence	  of	  these	  workers	  is	  frequently	  attributed	  to	  issues	  of	  literacy	  and	  
publishing	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  silence	  of	  historians	  in	  the	  developed	  
world),	  there	  remains	  sufficient	  source	  material	  from	  which	  to	  attempt	  to	  recreate	  their	  
situation	  on	  the	  Railway.	  Official	  reports	  commissioned	  by	  the	  British	  Government	  
immediately	  after	  the	  war	  frequently	  contain	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  labourers,	  even	  if	  the	  records	  of	  
the	  interviews	  themselves	  have	  disappeared.	  Asian	  historians	  have	  in	  a	  number	  of	  areas	  put	  
together	  local	  wartime	  histories,	  a	  trend	  enhanced	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Railway	  by	  local	  and	  
Japanese	  studies	  that	  have	  sought	  out	  survivors	  of	  the	  episode	  and	  recorded	  their	  oral	  
histories.	  Finally,	  and	  no	  less	  important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  study,	  are	  the	  accounts	  and	  
responses	  of	  the	  POWs	  themselves.	  
At	  its	  commencement	  the	  railway	  construction	  project	  had	  initially	  utilised	  Burmese	  and	  Thai	  
labourers	  on	  their	  respective	  sides	  of	  the	  border,	  supplemented	  in	  stages	  with	  around	  60,000	  
POWs.	  However	  the	  proximity	  of	  this	  local	  labour	  force	  to	  their	  homes	  led	  to	  increasingly	  large	  
desertions	  from	  these	  cohorts,	  as	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  line	  worsened.	  As	  word	  spread	  of	  the	  
appalling	  conditions,	  recruitment	  locally	  became	  problematic.	  These	  factors,	  coupled	  with	  the	  
Japanese	  need	  to	  maintain	  some	  sort	  of	  cordial	  relations	  with	  their	  titular	  allies	  in	  Burma	  and	  
Thailand,	  and	  a	  newly	  foreshortened	  construction	  period,	  meant	  that	  a	  new	  source	  of	  labour	  
was	  required,	  particularly	  for	  the	  remoter	  central	  sections	  of	  the	  line.	  502	  	  	  	  
The	  Tamil	  plantation	  workers	  in	  Malaya,	  underemployed	  since	  the	  economic	  dislocation	  of	  the	  
Japanese	  occupation,	  seemed	  like	  an	  ideal	  solution.	  Pre-­‐war	  conditions	  in	  Malaya	  had	  been	  
mixed	  with	  respect	  to	  health,	  welfare	  and	  wages,	  and	  a	  repatriation	  law	  that	  has	  been	  
described	  as	  treating	  ‘the	  plantation	  workforce	  as	  dispensable	  livestock	  to	  be	  herded	  back	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502	  An	  attempt	  to	  offset	  the	  bad	  reputation	  that	  the	  Railway	  was	  getting	  in	  Burma	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  
Japanese	  orders	  for	  new	  recruitment	  in	  March	  1943.	  As	  well	  as	  a	  doctor	  for	  every	  1,000	  workers,	  the	  
document	  specified	  that:	  ‘1.	  Corps	  members	  shall	  not	  be	  treated	  as	  common	  laborers,	  as	  in	  the	  past.	  
The	  term	  coolie	  shall	  be	  strictly	  prohibited.’	  In;	  Trager,	  Frank	  N.	  (ed)	  (1971)	  Burma:	  Japanese	  Military	  




forth	  as	  required’.503	  Despite	  such	  shortcomings,	  plantation	  life	  was	  in	  some	  ways	  better	  than	  
where	  they	  had	  come	  from,	  and	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  considerably	  healthier	  than	  where	  they	  
were	  going.	  
Whilst	  there	  were	  lesser	  numbers	  of	  Chinese	  and	  ethnic	  Malays	  sent	  up	  country,	  it	  was	  from	  
the	  Tamil	  population	  of	  Malaya	  that	  the	  main	  body	  of	  men	  (and	  some	  women	  and	  children)	  
were	  enlisted	  and	  conscripted.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  Sook	  Ching	  episode,	  exact	  numbers	  are	  
chimeric	  and	  even	  approximations	  prove	  problematic.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  surrender	  in	  1945	  
some	  Japanese	  officials	  would	  claim	  that	  records	  were	  not	  required	  to	  be	  kept	  of	  civilian	  
workers,	  others	  that	  they	  had	  been	  burnt	  prior	  to	  the	  surrender.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  
difficulties	  that	  the	  latter	  factors	  may	  have	  caused	  in	  the	  extrapolation	  of	  such	  numbers,	  War	  
Crimes	  Investigation	  Team	  (WCIT)	  No	  10	  was	  given	  Japanese	  figures	  that	  78,204	  Malayans	  
(largely	  Tamils,	  but	  including	  some	  Telegus,	  indigenous	  Malays	  and	  Chinese)	  had	  been	  
employed,	  of	  whom	  29,634	  had	  died,	  and	  24,620	  had	  deserted.	  The	  WCIT	  estimated	  that	  many	  
of	  the	  so-­‐called	  deserters	  had	  in	  fact	  died,	  and	  whilst	  still	  using	  the	  Japanese	  figure	  for	  those	  
employed,	  arrived	  at	  a	  total	  of	  more	  than	  40,000	  deaths,	  over	  50%	  of	  the	  cohort.	  504	  This	  figure	  
was	  considerably	  higher	  than	  that	  suffered	  by	  the	  POWs	  working	  on	  the	  line,	  of	  whom	  around	  
20%	  died	  in	  its	  construction.505	  	  	  
Also	  of	  note	  in	  the	  WCIT	  document	  is	  the	  Japanese	  acknowledgement	  that	  a	  large	  proportion	  
of	  the	  Tamil	  deaths	  took	  place	  after	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  Railway,	  a	  period	  which	  for	  those	  
POWs	  who	  remained	  on	  the	  line	  would	  be	  considerably	  easier	  and	  one	  of	  recovery,	  and	  had	  a	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  Thomas,	  Martin.	  (2012)	  Violence	  and	  Colonial	  Order:	  Police,	  Workers,	  and	  Protest	  in	  the	  European	  
Colonial	  Empires,	  1918-­‐40.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  p302.	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  UKNA:	  WO	  325/56:	  Report	  on	  Coolie	  Camp	  Conditions	  on	  the	  Burma-­‐Siam	  Railway	  During	  the	  Period	  
November	  1943-­‐	  August	  1945.	  p75.	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  Kinvig,	  River	  Kwai	  Railway,	  p198.	  A	  total	  of	  61,806	  POWs	  were	  sent	  to	  the	  Railway,	  and	  12,399	  died	  




much	  lower	  mortality	  associated	  with	  it.	  506	  This	  post	  completion	  contrast	  is	  made	  sharper	  by	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  healthiest	  POWs	  had	  been	  selected	  for	  transport	  on	  work	  parties	  to	  Japan,	  
leaving	  behind	  those	  who	  were,	  in	  the	  less	  than	  sympathetic	  medical	  eyes	  of	  the	  Japanese,	  
considered	  to	  be	  too	  ill	  to	  make	  the	  journey.	  
Whilst	  many	  post-­‐war	  historians	  have	  based	  their	  assessments	  of	  Tamil	  mortality	  on	  the	  WCIT	  
figures,	  David	  Boggett	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  numbers	  employed	  and	  dying	  on	  the	  Railway	  
may	  have	  been	  considerably	  higher.	  507	  He	  cites	  a	  report	  sent	  to	  the	  Colonial	  Office,	  shortly	  
after	  the	  war	  had	  ended,	  by	  Major	  Crawford,	  the	  former	  CO	  of	  the	  POW	  medical	  unit	  known	  as	  
“K”	  force.508	  	  This	  contained	  anecdotal	  accounts	  suggesting	  that	  as	  many	  as	  250,000	  
“Malayans”	  had	  been	  employed	  in	  Thailand,	  with	  100,000	  or	  more	  dying	  on	  the	  Railway.509	  
Further	  support	  for	  this	  higher	  mortality	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  change	  in	  population	  figures	  for	  
Malaya	  between	  1941	  and	  1947.	  Whilst	  the	  (ethnic)	  Malay	  population	  increased	  during	  this	  
period	  by	  11.5%,	  and	  that	  of	  the	  Chinese	  by	  10%,	  the	  Indian	  figure	  fell	  by	  nearly	  20%,	  from	  
744,202	  to	  599,616.510	  	  
There	  were	  a	  number	  of	  causes	  of	  this	  mortality,	  including	  debilitating	  diseases	  and	  conditions	  
such	  as	  dysentery,	  malaria,	  beriberi,	  pneumonia,	  ulcers,	  all	  fed	  by	  the	  effects	  of	  poor	  diet	  and	  
overwork.	  Such	  afflictions	  would	  usually	  take	  some	  time	  before	  the	  victim	  finally	  succumbed.	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  WO	  325/56:	  The	  figures	  contained	  in	  this	  respect	  indicate	  Japanese	  officers	  seeking	  to	  mitigate	  their	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  deaths.	  Colonel	  Watanabe,	  in	  charge	  during	  the	  building	  of	  the	  railway,	  suggested	  
that	  10,000	  died	  during	  construction	  and	  20,000	  after,	  whilst	  Major	  General	  Adachi,	  the	  commander	  
after	  the	  line	  had	  been	  completed,	  claimed	  22,000	  died	  during	  construction	  and	  11,000	  after.	  These	  
figures	  no	  doubt	  reflect	  their	  relative	  responsibilities	  at	  the	  times	  concerned,	  and	  the	  impending	  War	  
Crimes	  Trials.	  Major	  Tsuneshi	  was	  careful	  not	  to	  fall	  out	  with	  either	  of	  his	  more	  senior	  colleagues,	  and	  
only	  gave	  a	  combined	  figure,	  of	  30,000,	  for	  both	  periods.	  
507Boggett,	  David.	  (2003)	  “Notes	  on	  the	  Thai-­‐Burma	  Railway:	  Part	  VI:	  The	  Background	  to	  Indian	  Labour	  in	  
Southeast	  Asia.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Kyoto	  Seika	  University,	  No	  24,	  pp26-­‐27.	  
508	  “K”	  Force	  was	  a	  team	  of	  30	  medical	  officers	  and	  200	  orderlies	  sent	  from	  Changi	  to	  the	  Railway	  in	  late	  
June	  1943,	  raised	  by	  the	  Japanese	  in	  response	  to	  the	  cholera	  epidemic,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  rectify	  the	  total	  
lack	  of	  medical	  care	  available	  to	  the	  civilian	  labourers.	  “L”	  Force,	  comprised	  of	  15	  medical	  officers	  and	  
100	  orderlies	  followed	  them	  in	  late	  August	  1943.	  Kratoska,	  Paul	  H.	  (2006)	  The	  Thailand-­‐Burma	  Railway,	  
1942-­‐1946:	  Documents	  and	  Selected	  Writings.	  Volume	  IV:	  Asian	  Labour.	  Routledge,	  London.	  pp	  90,118.	  	  
509	  UKNA:	  CO	  273/678/1	  	  Report	  on	  Malayan	  Labour	  on	  Bangkok-­‐Moulmein	  Railway.	  
510	  Paul	  H.	  Kratoska.	  (1998)	  The	  Japanese	  Occupation	  of	  Malaya:	  A	  Social	  and	  Economic	  History.	  Hurst	  
and	  Company,	  London.	  p	  317.	  
192	  
	  
Accidents	  and	  suicides	  also	  made	  a	  more	  immediate	  contribution	  to	  the	  death	  toll,	  but	  it	  was	  
the	  sudden	  onset	  of	  cholera	  that	  would	  generate	  the	  greatest	  medical	  fear	  on	  the	  Railway.	  
5.3.2.	  Cholera.	  
The	  1943	  cholera	  epidemic	  coincided	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  both	  the	  Tamil	  and	  POW	  labour	  forces	  
in	  the	  middle	  reaches	  of	  the	  Railway,	  and	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  monsoon.	  This	  remote	  region	  had	  
little	  or	  no	  infrastructure	  to	  support	  the	  workforce,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  communications	  networks	  
to	  travel	  to	  and	  supply	  the	  camps,	  and	  the	  basic,	  if	  any,	  facilities	  that	  greeted	  them	  when	  they	  
arrived.	  Furthermore	  the	  region	  was	  sparsely	  populated,	  reducing	  the	  possibility	  of	  trading	  for	  
food	  with	  the	  local	  population,	  a	  need	  that	  became	  more	  pressing	  as	  the	  arrival	  of	  supplies	  
became	  increasingly	  intermittent,	  due	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  monsoon	  on	  both	  river	  transport	  
and	  the	  jungle	  paths.	  	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  with	  the	  rain	  filled	  latrines,	  where	  they	  existed,	  
overflowing	  across	  the	  camps,	  the	  conditions	  were	  ideal	  for	  the	  spread	  of	  disease.	  
Cholera	  was	  endemic	  to	  this	  area,	  and	  the	  first	  report	  of	  an	  occurrence	  during	  the	  construction	  
period	  was	  upriver	  in	  Burma	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1942.511	  The	  Japanese	  Southern	  Army	  disease	  
prevention	  unit	  had	  notified	  its	  members	  that	  a	  further	  outbreak	  had	  started	  on	  the	  Burmese	  
side	  in	  March	  of	  1943,	  and	  was	  slowly	  working	  its	  way	  downriver.512	  As	  far	  south	  as	  Konyu	  
camp,	  only	  160	  kilometres	  from	  Bangkok,	  orders	  to	  take	  preventative	  measures	  were	  issued	  in	  
early	  March.513	  By	  the	  middle	  of	  May	  the	  disease	  had	  taken	  hold	  in	  the	  more	  northerly	  camps	  
on	  the	  Thai	  side	  of	  the	  border,	  including	  Songkurai	  and	  Nike,	  and	  a	  week	  later	  had	  reached	  
Takunan,	  some	  70	  kilometres	  to	  the	  south.514	  In	  mid-­‐June	  cholera	  cases	  were	  recorded	  in	  the	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  Cholera.,	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  Soldiers	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  Thailand	  1941-­‐47.	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  
Basingstoke.	  p119.	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  Dunlop,	  The	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  Burma-­‐Siam	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  p94.	  
193	  
	  
cluster	  of	  camps	  at	  Hintok,	  Konyu	  and	  Tarsao	  further	  south,	  although	  for	  the	  POWs	  beyond	  
this	  cluster,	  the	  outbreak	  diminished	  in	  potency	  at	  the	  southern	  end	  of	  the	  line.515	  
When	  cholera	  struck,	  the	  victim	  would	  rapidly	  decline,	  as	  bodily	  fluids	  were	  ejected	  by	  
vomiting	  and	  the	  characteristic	  “rice-­‐water”	  diarrhoea,	  accompanied	  by	  severe	  weight	  loss	  due	  
to	  dehydration	  and	  for	  most,	  a	  rapid	  death	  within	  a	  day	  or	  so	  if	  untreated.	  The	  bacteria	  were	  
usually	  transmitted	  through	  the	  faecal	  contamination	  of	  water	  supplies,	  often	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
poor	  sanitary	  conditions,	  aided	  by	  the	  favourable	  alkaline	  geology	  through	  which	  the	  Kwae	  Noi	  
River	  flowed.	  Prevention	  through	  improved	  sanitation,	  and	  cure,	  by	  means	  of	  rehydration	  
therapies,	  were	  under	  normal	  circumstances	  very	  effective	  in	  controlling	  the	  disease.	  For	  the	  
POWs,	  who	  had	  some	  limited	  clinical	  support,	  such	  measures	  could,	  through	  the	  ingenuity	  and	  
dedication	  of	  their	  medical	  teams,	  prove	  helpful;	  for	  the	  Tamil	  labourers,	  totally	  lacking	  in	  such	  
support,	  they	  would	  be	  impossible,	  with	  fatal	  consequences.	  	  
	  Japanese	  sources	  suggest	  that	  between	  6,800	  and	  10,000	  Tamils	  perished	  in	  the	  outbreak,	  
although	  given	  the	  caveats	  outlined	  previously,	  such	  figures	  may	  represent	  a	  considerable	  
underestimate.516	  The	  mortality	  rate	  for	  Tamils	  who	  caught	  the	  disease	  was	  90%,	  as	  compared	  
to	  that	  for	  the	  POWs,	  who	  had	  some	  rudimentary	  health	  care,	  of	  50%.517	  Within	  the	  prisoner	  
statistics	  there	  were	  significant	  rank	  based	  and	  geographical	  variations.	  In	  one	  camp	  in	  the	  
cholera	  zone,	  at	  205	  kilometres,	  only	  one	  of	  two	  hundred	  officers	  was	  admitted	  to	  the	  
“hospital”.	  In	  comparison	  the	  other	  ranks	  were	  25	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  catch	  the	  disease,	  with	  
a	  total	  of	  172	  out	  of	  1,400	  falling	  victim.	  The	  mortality	  rate	  was	  58%.518	  The	  greater	  impact	  of	  
cholera	  in	  the	  middle	  section	  of	  the	  line	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  POW	  death	  tolls.	  Of	  the	  7,000	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  (1993)	  “Asian	  Laborers	  Along	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  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railroad.”	  Waseda	  Journal	  of	  
Asian	  Studies.	  Vol	  15,	  p97.	  The	  figure	  of	  10,000	  comes	  from	  a	  Japanese	  history	  of	  the	  Railway,	  whilst	  
6,800	  was	  the	  figure	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  by	  Japanese	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  Captain	  H.E.	  de	  Wardener,	  RAMC.	  (1946)	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  among	  prisoners-­‐of-­‐war	  in	  Siam.”	  The	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unfortunate	  men	  of	  “F”	  Force,	  sent	  to	  the	  Songkurai	  area	  in	  May	  1943,	  around	  3,100	  died,	  
nearly	  half	  their	  number.	  In	  comparison	  with	  other	  diseases,	  cholera	  was	  the	  ‘worst	  killer’,	  
accounting	  for	  750	  deaths.519	  At	  Chungkai	  hospital,	  near	  the	  Thai	  terminus	  of	  the	  railroad	  and	  
further	  away	  from	  the	  remote	  epicentre	  of	  the	  epidemic,	  cholera	  had	  a	  lesser	  impact	  on	  
overall	  mortality.	  Here	  dysentery	  was	  the	  cause	  of	  most	  deaths,	  although	  the	  40%	  mortality	  
rate	  of	  the	  relatively	  fewer	  cholera	  cases	  still	  fed	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  disease	  and	  contributed	  to	  its	  
fearsome	  reputation.520	  
Cholera	  came	  with	  its	  own	  longstanding	  mythology	  and	  racialized	  assumptions.	  	  Indian	  
standards	  of	  hygiene	  and	  ignorance	  of	  disease	  were	  already	  the	  source	  of	  widespread	  disdain	  
at	  all	  levels	  of	  white	  colonial	  society	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.521	  The	  origin	  of	  the	  
disease	  in	  north	  east	  India	  made	  it	  ‘a	  convenient	  symbol	  for	  much	  that	  the	  west	  despised	  
about	  a	  society	  so	  different	  from	  its	  own.’522	  Such	  tropes	  fed	  into	  and	  nourished	  some	  already	  
well-­‐established	  narratives	  among	  the	  western	  prisoners	  regarding	  the	  sanitary	  habits	  and	  
disorganisation	  of	  their	  Tamil	  co-­‐workers.	  	  
At	  the	  extreme	  end	  of	  this	  spectrum	  was	  a	  belief	  that	  the	  Tamils	  were	  the	  source	  of	  cholera	  
and	  had	  brought	  the	  disease	  with	  them.	  One	  officer	  hinted	  at	  this	  when	  he	  recalled	  that	  the	  
camps	  upcountry	  ‘had	  cholera	  and	  all	  other	  things	  when	  they	  brought	  up	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  Tamils’.523	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein	  historian	  Gavan	  Daws	  claims	  ‘it	  was	  the	  romusha	  who	  brought	  cholera	  to	  the	  
railroad’,	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  any	  planned	  programme	  of	  inoculation	  by	  the	  Japanese.524	  The	  point	  
was	  made	  more	  explicitly	  post-­‐war	  by	  WCIT	  10,	  in	  their	  investigation	  into	  an	  outbreak	  at	  Ikeda	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  Daws,	  Prisoners,	  p209.	  The	  lack	  of	  inoculation	  would	  have	  made	  the	  romusha	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  
cholera	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  arrival	  in	  Thailand,	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  implication	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  brought	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  with	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195	  
	  
Han	  camp	  in	  Thailand	  during	  1945,	  which	  according	  to	  the	  Japanese	  CO	  killed	  fifteen	  of	  the	  
thirty	  Tamil	  victims	  (the	  Tamil	  claim	  of	  150	  deaths	  was	  discounted	  as	  an	  exaggeration	  by	  the	  
author	  of	  the	  report).	  The	  Japanese	  attributed	  the	  cause	  as	  being	  either	  one	  of	  their	  units	  that	  
had	  recently	  passed	  through	  the	  camp,	  or	  a	  nearby	  Thai	  village.	  The	  WCIT	  however	  gave	  more	  
weight	  to	  another	  source:	  ‘One	  intelligent	  witness	  (who	  was	  not	  however,	  in	  the	  camp)	  states	  
that	  the	  disease	  began	  after	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  trainload	  of	  coolies	  from	  Malaya.’	  The	  mystery	  
informant	  claimed	  that	  the	  starving	  Tamils	  had	  gorged	  themselves	  on	  rice,	  leading	  to	  an	  
outbreak	  of	  diarrhoea	  that	  then	  fouled	  the	  camp.	  He	  also	  claimed	  that	  150	  of	  them	  had	  died,	  
although	  this	  carried	  less	  weight	  with	  the	  pre-­‐set	  minds	  of	  the	  WCIT.525	  	  	  
In	  most	  accounts	  it	  was	  however	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  disease	  that	  was	  widely	  attributed	  to	  the	  
Indian	  labour	  force,	  due	  to	  their	  still	  inherent	  characteristics	  of	  poor	  sanitation	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  
organisation.	  As	  one	  POW	  recalled,	  it	  was	  ‘the	  Tamils	  who	  may	  have	  been	  largely	  responsible	  
for	  the	  spread	  of	  cholera.’526	  	  
5.3.3.	  Sanitation.	  
There	  was	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  and	  widespread	  opinion	  among	  the	  troops	  that	  Asians	  were	  
unhygienic,	  and	  as	  has	  already	  been	  demonstrated	  this	  conception	  was	  both	  reinforced,	  and	  in	  
some	  cases	  mitigated,	  by	  close	  contacts	  before	  captivity.	  In	  the	  cholera	  ridden	  and	  monsoon	  
sodden	  quagmire	  of	  the	  jungle	  camps	  on	  the	  Railway	  such	  perceptions	  became	  legion,	  and	  
have	  been	  reproduced	  in	  most	  of	  the	  subsequent	  literature.	  	  	  
One	  of	  the	  first	  locations	  where	  such	  allegations	  appeared	  was	  at	  the	  Ban	  Pong	  camp,	  the	  
initial	  transit	  depot	  in	  Thailand	  for	  those	  being	  transported	  from	  Singapore	  and	  Malaya	  to	  
work	  on	  the	  Railway.	  Clifford	  Kinvig	  describes	  the	  arrival	  of	  “F”	  Force	  in	  April	  of	  1943,	  when	  the	  
camp	  ‘was	  now	  a	  squalid	  mess	  from	  overuse,	  poor	  sanitation	  facilities	  and	  previous	  occupancy	  
by	  native	  labour	  gangs	  from	  Malaya.’	  The	  following	  month	  he	  cites	  the	  ‘blunt’	  reaction	  of	  an	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  UKNA:	  WO	  325/56,	  p61.	  
526	  IWM:	  Dawson;	  p22.	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Australian	  POW	  who	  arrived	  at	  Ban	  Pong	  with	  “H”	  Force,	  who	  described	  it	  as	  ‘littered	  with	  
excrement,	  seething	  with	  flies	  and	  in	  that	  condition	  of	  unspeakable	  filth	  which	  only	  Asiatics	  
can	  attain.’527	  Regardless	  of	  the	  recent	  occupation	  by	  “F”	  Force,	  the	  POW	  automatically	  
blamed	  the	  Asian	  labourers,	  and	  such	  assumptions	  would	  be	  replicated	  all	  along	  the	  Railway.	  
Despite	  the	  blame	  falling	  on	  the	  Tamil	  cohorts,	  who	  had	  only	  started	  transiting	  through	  Ban	  
Pong	  in	  April	  1943,	  the	  insanitary	  conditions	  at	  the	  camp	  had	  a	  longer	  history	  which	  indicates	  
that	  more	  architectural	  and	  meteorological	  causes	  were	  responsible.	  The	  first	  wave	  of	  POWs	  
had	  passed	  through	  from	  Singapore	  at	  the	  end	  of	  June	  1942,	  and	  by	  the	  following	  month	  the	  
conditions	  at	  the	  camp	  were	  described	  by	  Dr	  Robert	  Hardie,	  of	  the	  Malayan	  Volunteer	  Field	  
Ambulance	  Service,	  as	  a	  scene	  of	  ‘squalid	  huts	  knee-­‐deep	  in	  mud	  and	  floodwater	  and	  
sewage.’528	  He	  identified	  the	  cause	  as	  the	  totally	  insufficient	  provision	  of	  latrines,	  both	  in	  
number	  and	  capacity,	  their	  unhygienic	  construction,	  and	  their	  location	  adjacent	  to	  the	  flimsy	  
huts	  where	  the	  men	  slept.	  Even	  before	  the	  rains	  came	  and	  flooded	  the	  defective	  toilets,	  he	  
noted	  that	  ‘the	  bottom	  ends	  of	  the	  huts	  are	  nearly	  uninhabitable	  owing	  to	  the	  stench	  and	  the	  
clouds	  of	  flies	  and	  bluebottles.	  But	  the	  huts	  are	  so	  crowded	  that	  the	  bottom	  ends	  cannot	  be	  
evacuated.’529	  Requests	  for	  materials	  to	  resolve	  this	  problem	  were	  ignored	  by	  the	  Japanese,	  
and	  thus,	  as	  a	  POW	  in	  the	  second	  major	  wave	  sent	  upcountry	  from	  Changi	  in	  November	  1942	  
recalled,	  in	  the	  rainy	  season	  the	  water	  came	  up	  to	  their	  beds,	  carrying	  with	  it	  an	  armada	  of	  the	  
insanitary	  contents	  flushed	  from	  the	  inadequate	  latrines.530	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
527	  Kinvig,	  River	  Kwai	  Railway,	  p122,	  p125.	  The	  Australian	  POW	  was	  Russell	  Braddon;	  see	  The	  Naked	  
Island,	  p	  170.	  “F”	  and	  “H”	  Forces	  were	  sent	  from	  Changi,	  along	  with	  the	  Tamils,	  	  to	  construct	  the	  remote	  
middle	  sections	  of	  the	  Railway.	  	  
528	  Hardie,	  The	  Burma-­‐Siam	  Railway,	  p	  92.	  
529	  Hardie,	  The	  Burma-­‐Siam	  Railway,	  p29.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  allegations	  that	  the	  Tamils	  carried	  
cholera	  with	  them	  into	  Thailand,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  Hardie	  suggests	  that	  POWs	  brought	  
malaria	  with	  them	  to	  Ban	  Pong,	  an	  area	  previously	  untroubled	  by	  the	  disease	  (p30).	  
530	  IWM:	  Dawson;	  p75.	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Such	  unhygienic	  scenarios	  were	  replicated	  at	  many	  locations	  on	  the	  Railway,	  and	  were	  the	  
subject	  of	  numerous	  complaints	  from	  the	  civilian	  labour	  force	  themselves,	  as	  the	  WCIT	  10	  
noted:	  
Coolie	  statements	  are	  full	  of	  complaints	  as	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  latrines	  which	  in	  most	  
cases	  are	  open	  trenches	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  the	  huts,	  without	  roofs	  and	  with	  no	  
provision	  for	  privacy!	  In	  wet	  weather	  these	  overflowed	  all	  over	  the	  camp	  site.	  …	  No	  
wonder	  that	  in	  such	  conditions	  infectious	  diseases	  like	  cholera	  and	  dysentery	  spread	  
like	  wild	  fire.531	  
	  
This	  statement,	  in	  a	  report	  that	  frequently	  adopts	  an	  unsympathetic	  attitude	  to	  the	  Tamil	  
labourers,	  provides	  clear	  evidence	  that	  contradicts	  the	  assertion	  that	  they	  were	  intrinsically	  
unhygienic,	  and	  their	  complaints	  mirror	  those	  made	  by	  Dr	  Hardie.532	  Attending	  to	  daily	  bodily	  
functions	  in	  a	  sanitary	  fashion	  would	  become	  impossible	  in	  such	  situations.	  	  
These	  conditions,	  and	  the	  unsanitary	  situations	  that	  they	  generated,	  were	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  
civilian	  camps,	  as	  one	  MO	  recorded	  shortly	  after	  the	  war.	  He	  had	  noted	  that	  ‘the	  camps,	  
immediately	  after	  the	  coolies	  had	  passed	  through	  were	  filthy’,	  but	  then	  went	  on	  to	  describe	  
similar	  circumstances,	  for	  the	  same	  reasons,	  at	  the	  POW	  camp	  at	  205	  kilometres.	  
Latrines	  (shallow	  trench)	  were	  totally	  inadequate,	  and	  fouling	  of	  the	  ground	  all	  over	  
the	  camp	  was	  very	  prevalent	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  epidemic.	  It	  was	  
not	  until	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  epidemic	  that	  the	  Japanese	  would	  permit	  any	  men	  to	  dig	  




In	  another	  camp	  at	  Hintok	  in	  April	  1943,	  before	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  epidemic,	  Australian	  doctor	  
“Weary”	  Dunlop	  had	  noted	  comparable	  concerns	  with	  regard	  to	  ‘the	  lethargy	  of	  troops,	  who	  
frequently	  offend	  by	  defecating	  in	  the	  bushes	  about	  the	  camp’.	  He	  added	  the	  caveat	  that	  ‘the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531	  UKNA:	  WO	  325/56,	  p40.	  	  
532	  The	  report	  by	  WCIT	  No	  10	  is	  liberally	  littered	  with	  statements	  of	  a	  derogatory	  and	  racist	  nature.	  
Rotation	  of	  the	  labour	  force	  on	  the	  Railway	  was	  hindered	  by,	  amongst	  other	  things,	  ‘the	  stubborn	  
unreasonableness	  of	  coolies.’	  (p16).	  	  Damned	  with	  the	  faintest	  of	  racially	  informed	  praise	  was	  one	  
Japanese	  formation:	  ‘In	  short,	  the	  10	  Spec.	  Rly.	  Trt.	  Unit	  is	  the	  “whitest”	  of	  all	  the	  units	  employing	  
coolies	  on	  the	  Burma-­‐Siam	  Railway.’	  (p21).	  In	  reference	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  levies	  from	  the	  rubber	  
estates	  it	  opines:	  ‘Naturally,	  human	  nature	  being	  what	  it	  is,	  they	  [the	  estates]	  contributed	  the	  worst	  
half,	  the	  unruly	  element	  who	  were	  always	  gambling,	  drinking	  and	  whoring.’	  (p13).	  	  
533	  De	  Wardener,	  “Epidemic”,	  p	  637.	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lack	  of	  personal	  cleanliness	  of	  hands	  and	  mess	  tins	  is	  perhaps	  comprehensible	  considering	  
their	  exhausted	  state.’	  534	  	  
Another	  Australian	  medical	  officer	  noted	  in	  an	  official	  report,	  on	  his	  return	  to	  Changi,	  that	  the	  
combination	  of	  exhaustion,	  poor	  facilities	  and	  living	  conditions	  meant	  that	  ‘personal	  
cleanliness	  and	  hygiene	  were	  insurmountable	  problems.’535	  In	  the	  same	  report	  he	  noted	  that	  
‘the	  wide	  prevalence	  of	  dysentery	  and	  diarrhoea	  led	  to	  constant	  and	  almost	  uncontrollable	  
fouling	  of	  approaches	  and	  environs.’536	  Dysentery,	  and	  subsequently	  cholera,	  would	  only	  add	  
to	  the	  problems	  of	  sanitation,	  both	  in	  the	  camps	  and	  at	  work.	  A	  Japanese	  railway	  officer	  
recalled	  the	  problem	  presented	  at	  his	  work	  site	  by	  the	  rapid	  bowel	  movements	  of	  the	  
prisoners,	  who	  would	  avail	  themselves	  of	  the	  nearest	  bush,	  unable	  to	  reach	  the	  toilets	  in	  time.	  
‘We	  made	  simple	  toilets	  …	  but	  we	  could	  not	  stop	  the	  scattering	  of	  loose	  faeces	  and	  the	  foul	  
odour,	  a	  miserable	  situation.’537	  
In	  many	  camps	  further	  up	  the	  line	  there	  were	  no	  latrines	  at	  all	  when	  the	  civilian	  labour	  force	  
(and	  the	  POWs)	  moved	  in,	  and	  no	  opportunity	  to	  construct	  them	  as	  everyone	  was	  driven	  out	  
to	  work	  each	  day.538	  Some	  of	  these	  camps	  had	  been	  fabricated	  by	  the	  POWs	  specifically	  for	  the	  
Tamils,	  one	  such	  featuring	  a	  row	  of	  sleeping	  shelves	  one	  foot	  off	  the	  ground,	  with	  another	  
above	  it	  at	  four	  feet.	  	  No	  latrines	  were	  constructed.539	  	  The	  implications	  of	  such	  an	  
arrangement	  for	  debilitated	  workers,	  particularly	  those	  on	  the	  lower	  shelf,	  with	  near	  endemic	  
dysentery	  afflicting	  many,	  are	  unpleasant	  to	  even	  imagine,	  much	  less	  endure.	  	  
Many	  of	  the	  problems	  derived	  from	  the	  pollution	  of	  water	  supplies.	  Whilst	  the	  Japanese	  
authorities	  would	  often	  delineate	  where	  water	  should	  be	  drawn	  from,	  with	  themselves	  
furthest	  upstream,	  and	  ‘Coolies	  and	  Prisoners	  of	  War’	  below,	  they	  sometimes	  allowed	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534	  Dunlop,	  War	  Diaries,	  p	  238.	  	  
535	  “H”	  Force	  in	  Thailand	  –	  medical	  report.	  	  in:	  Kratoska,	  Thailand-­‐Burma	  Railway,	  Vol	  IV,	  p	  278.	  
536	  “H”	  Force	  in	  Thailand	  –	  medical	  report.	  	  in:	  Kratoska,	  Thailand-­‐Burma	  Railway,	  Vol	  IV,	  p275.	  
537	  2nd	  Lt	  Juji	  Tarumoto.	  ‘Matoma,	  the	  hardest	  time	  of	  all’,	  in:	  Tamayama,	  Railwaymen,	  p140.	  
538	  Hardie,	  The	  Burma-­‐Siam	  Railway,	  p106.	  
539	  Coast,	  Railroad,	  pp129-­‐130.	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prisoners	  (or	  more	  precisely	  the	  officers)	  to	  impose	  their	  own	  hierarchy	  upon	  water	  resources.	  
Thus	  at	  Taimonta	  camp	  in	  northern	  Thailand	  the	  officers	  instituted	  a	  system	  whereby	  ‘the	  
higher	  portion	  was	  not	  to	  be	  used	  except	  for	  drawing	  water	  for	  the	  cook-­‐house,	  the	  middle	  
portion	  was	  to	  be	  used	  by	  	  British	  and	  Dutch	  troops	  and	  the	  lower	  portion	  by	  the	  Tamils.	  In	  
that	  way	  it	  was	  hoped	  to	  lessen	  the	  dangers	  of	  infection.’540	  This	  may	  possibly	  have	  reduced	  
the	  dangers	  of	  infection	  for	  the	  prisoners,	  but	  it	  now	  left	  the	  Tamils	  using	  water	  for	  all	  
purposes,	  including	  cooking	  and	  drinking,	  that	  had	  been	  used	  by	  the	  prisoners	  upstream	  as	  at	  
best	  both	  a	  bath	  and	  a	  laundry,	  and	  at	  worst	  a	  latrine.	  Such	  indifference	  to	  those	  lower	  down	  
the	  colonial	  ladder	  is	  encapsulated	  in	  another	  insanitary	  reproduction	  of	  western	  superiority,	  
as	  related	  by	  an	  officer	  imprisoned	  on	  Java.	  
We	  used	  a	  stream	  which	  flowed	  through	  the	  native	  hutments,	  and	  which	  they	  seemed	  
to	  use	  equally	  as	  a	  water	  supply	  and	  the	  main	  drain.	  We	  traced	  the	  stream	  up	  for	  a	  
couple	  of	  miles	  and	  found	  no	  other	  village	  contaminating	  the	  water	  which	  we	  used	  for	  
all	  purposes,	  still	  having	  a	  water	  cart	  for	  sterilization.	  We	  officers	  finally	  had	  a	  very	  
posh	  lavatory	  constructed	  over	  a	  fast	  moving	  little	  rivulet.	  Higher	  up	  we	  used	  the	  same	  




Race	  and	  class	  combine	  in	  this	  unconscious	  fluvial	  allegory	  for	  the	  British	  Empire	  in	  Asia.	  Such	  
arrangements	  were	  a	  continuation	  of	  long-­‐standing	  colonial	  practices,	  as	  highlighted	  by	  Vijay	  
Prashad	  in	  his	  study	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  sanitation	  arrangements	  in	  imperial	  Delhi,	  where	  ‘	  the	  
colonial	  regime	  built	  the	  unequal	  treatment	  of	  the	  native	  and	  colonial	  areas	  into	  the	  sanitation	  
system	  itself	  as	  spatial	  domination	  functioned	  as	  the	  everyday	  metaphor	  for	  colonial	  
domination.’542	  The	  continuation	  of	  such	  stratified	  arrangements,	  even	  in	  captivity,	  serves	  to	  
demonstrate	  the	  persistence	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  an	  inherent	  sense	  of	  racial	  superiority	  and	  
difference,	  as	  well	  as	  giving	  lie	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  POWs	  were	  now	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  
heap.	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  Dawson;	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  IWM:	  Steeds;	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Water	  could	  still	  prove	  problematic,	  even	  for	  those	  Tamils	  fortunate	  enough	  to	  have	  survived	  
the	  camps	  and	  the	  journey	  down	  the	  line	  to	  the	  base	  Hospital	  at	  Kanchanaburi.543	  At	  one	  
stage,	  due	  to	  problems	  with	  transport,	  water	  had	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  filter	  pump	  by	  the	  river	  
and	  carried	  by	  hand	  to	  the	  hospital	  by	  the	  medical	  staff,	  and	  the	  labourers’	  portion	  was	  only	  
sufficient	  for	  cooking	  purposes.	  This	  meant	  that	  ‘no	  drinking	  water	  was	  issued	  to	  the	  coolies.’	  
Col	  Benson,	  in	  charge	  of	  “L”	  Force,	  reported	  that	  initially	  those	  who	  could	  get	  down	  to	  the	  
river	  would	  illicitly	  slake	  their	  thirst	  and	  bring	  back	  bottles	  for	  those	  unable	  to	  make	  the	  
journey,	  receiving	  beatings	  from	  the	  Japanese	  if	  caught.	  Once	  the	  guards	  stopped	  even	  this	  
source	  thirst	  became	  a	  killer,	  and	  in	  desperation	  after	  rain	  storms	  the	  patients	  would	  ‘rush	  out	  
to	  the	  dirty	  rain	  pools	  in	  the	  camp	  and	  in	  the	  adjacent	  fields	  to	  obtain	  drinking	  water.’	  Another	  
medical	  officer	  in	  the	  same	  location	  noted	  that	  when	  the	  pumps	  broke	  down	  the	  labourers	  
could	  go	  four	  days	  without	  water,	  by	  which	  time	  ‘they	  were	  nearly	  mad	  with	  thirst.’	  544	  
Such	  desperation	  was	  not	  the	  sole	  purview	  of	  the	  Tamils,	  as	  a	  British	  officer	  noted	  in	  the	  diary	  
he	  kept	  during	  his	  captivity	  in	  a	  camp	  in	  Formosa.	  As	  survivors	  of	  the	  Railway	  started	  to	  transit	  
to	  Japan	  the	  story	  of	  the	  episode	  and	  the	  associated	  mortality	  spread	  with	  them,	  and	  Captain	  
Davies	  wrote:	  	  
It	  is	  of	  great	  interest	  to	  note	  the	  few	  officer	  casualties,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  all	  
endured	  precisely	  the	  same	  conditions.	  In	  my	  opinion	  this	  is	  due	  solely	  to	  the	  better	  
self-­‐discipline	  of	  the	  educated,	  in	  respect	  particularly	  of	  water-­‐holes,	  streams	  etc.	  How	  
well	  I	  know	  how	  impossible	  it	  is	  to	  stop	  men	  drinking	  when	  and	  where	  they	  
shouldn’t.545	  	  
	  
Whilst	  Davies	  was	  obviously	  misinformed	  regarding	  the	  equivalence	  of	  the	  conditions	  endured	  
by	  the	  men	  and	  their	  officers,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  education	  in	  conditioning	  their	  actions,	  he	  was	  
correct	  in	  identifying	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  men	  had	  to	  sometimes	  drink	  from	  unsuitable	  sources.	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  The	  patients	  were	  crammed	  65	  to	  a	  railroad	  truck	  for	  the	  journey	  down	  the	  line,	  more	  than	  twice	  the	  
density	  that	  the	  “fit”	  POWs	  had	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  their	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  up-­‐country	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  of	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  in,	  Kratoska,	  The	  Thailand-­‐Burma	  Railway,	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  History	  of	  “L”	  Force;	  in,	  Kratoska,	  The	  Thailand-­‐Burma	  Railway;	  Volume	  IV:	  pp142,	  154.	  
545	  IWM:	  Davies,	  G.P	  (Docs	  448)	  27/10/1944.	  
201	  
	  
BORs,	  Tamils,	  and	  even	  officers	  could	  be	  driven	  by	  severe	  dehydration	  to	  utilise	  otherwise	  un-­‐
potable	  water.	  In	  such	  circumstances	  desperation	  trumped	  self-­‐discipline	  and	  education.	  As	  Ira	  
Klein	  has	  suggested	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  similar	  story	  of	  cholera,	  transport	  links	  and	  polluted	  
water	  in	  19th	  century	  India,	  ‘banning	  contaminated	  sources	  was	  as	  effective	  as	  outlawing	  
human	  thirst.’546	  
Of	  particular	  significance	  in	  respect	  of	  sanitation	  was	  the	  perception	  of	  indiscipline	  in	  Tamil	  
toileting	  habits,	  and	  a	  common	  opinion	  that	  the	  ‘principle	  of	  “defaecating	  on	  the	  doorsteps”	  
was	  almost	  universal.’547	  	  Whilst	  it	  is	  still	  common	  today	  in	  many	  of	  the	  poorer	  parts	  of	  the	  
world,	  where	  toilets	  do	  not	  exist,	  to	  find	  open	  defecation	  practised,	  in	  such	  situations	  
“defecating	  on	  the	  doorstep”	  is	  seen	  as	  being	  the	  most	  unhygienic	  and	  least	  desirable	  
option.548	  Such	  assumptions	  as	  to	  the	  habits	  of	  the	  labourers	  also	  ignore	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  had	  
come	  from	  organised	  plantations	  in	  Malaya,	  where	  some	  sort	  of	  rudimentary	  toileting	  facilities	  
were	  provided.	  The	  Tamils	  had	  become	  accustomed	  to	  their	  use,	  as	  their	  numerous	  complaints	  
regarding	  the	  lack	  of	  such	  facilities	  in	  the	  camps	  demonstrated.	  	  
Poor	  hygiene	  practices	  were	  caused	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  facilities,	  the	  inability	  to	  
construct	  them	  due	  to	  the	  labour	  demands	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  consideration	  in	  these	  matters	  by	  
the	  Japanese,	  compounded	  by	  debilitation	  and	  inclement	  weather.	  	  In	  these	  respects	  the	  
POWs	  were	  frequently	  in	  much	  the	  same	  position,	  and	  suffered	  similarly,	  as	  noted	  by	  the	  same	  
prisoner	  cited	  previously	  who	  had	  suggested	  Tamil	  culpability.	  	  
We	  often	  passed	  the	  Tamil	  camp	  and	  commented	  on	  its	  filthy	  state.	  Our	  British	  
arrogance	  –	  a	  quality	  of	  which	  the	  Japanese	  were	  intensely	  aware	  and	  which	  they	  
resented	  more	  than	  anything	  else	  about	  us	  –	  often	  failed	  to	  appreciate	  that,	  through	  
no	  fault	  of	  ours,	  our	  own	  camp	  must	  often	  have	  been	  in	  little	  better	  state.	  The	  smell	  
from	  the	  Tamil	  camp	  offended	  us	  and	  yet	  there	  were	  tents	  in	  our	  camp	  housing	  men	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546	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  Ira.	  (1994)	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  Imperialism,	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  and	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  in	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who	  were	  too	  ill	  to	  wash	  themselves	  and	  which	  doubtless	  would	  have	  been	  just	  as	  
offensive	  to	  an	  unaccustomed	  nose.549	  
	  
	  
In	  one	  further	  respect	  the	  POWs	  had	  an	  advantage	  over	  the	  Tamils.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  
accounts	  of	  dying	  Tamils	  being	  buried	  or	  burned	  alive,	  including	  several	  in	  the	  cases	  under	  
study.	  One	  prisoner	  recalled	  having	  to	  work	  on	  such	  a	  burial	  detail.	  
	  
As	  I	  and	  others	  entered	  these	  quarters	  it	  was	  a	  pathetic	  sight	  to	  see	  them	  lying	  in	  the	  
mud,	  hands	  outstretched	  just	  begging	  for	  water.	  Their	  precautions	  were	  nil	  as	  they	  
writhed	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  agony	  with	  no	  help	  from	  anyone.	  What	  could	  we	  do?	  To	  
touch	  in	  any	  way	  would	  no	  doubt	  give	  you	  the	  disease	  so	  we	  started	  to	  dig	  a	  very	  large	  
square	  hole.	  After	  many	  hours	  of	  toiling	  we	  shoveled	  [sic]	  the	  dead	  onto	  sacks	  and	  put	  
them	  in	  the	  hole.	  Those	  that	  were	  dying	  I	  am	  sorry	  to	  say	  ended	  up	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  
We	  had	  no	  alternative.	  The	  stench	  was	  unbearable	  as	  we	  hastily	  filled	  in	  the	  hole	  with	  
the	  occasional	  hands	  appearing	  through	  the	  earth,	  but	  I	  suppose	  it	  was	  now	  life	  or	  
death	  for	  all	  of	  us	  as	  cholera	  spreads	  so	  rapidly.550	  
	  
Pity,	  helplessness	  and	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  Tamil’s	  lack	  of	  ‘precautions’	  are	  combined	  in	  this	  
dreadful	  situation,	  one	  which	  officers	  also	  took	  part	  in	  as	  the	  Japanese	  resorted	  to	  any	  means	  
necessary	  and	  all	  available	  labour	  to	  control	  the	  epidemic.	  Another	  prisoner	  told	  of	  how	  similar	  
prophylactic	  measures	  were	  carried	  out	  by	  an	  officer	  at	  a	  labourers’	  camp;	  if	  he	  did	  not	  think	  
they	  would	  last	  the	  day	  he	  would	  hit	  them	  on	  the	  head	  with	  a	  hammer,	  after	  which	  they	  were	  
buried	  or	  burnt.	  He	  prefaced	  this	  statement	  with	  a	  description	  of	  how	  the	  appalling	  conditions	  
were	  amplified	  by	  the	  poor	  sanitation	  and	  sense	  of	  resignation	  of	  the	  Tamils.551	  	  
As	  well	  as	  fellow	  labourers,	  Asian	  medical	  parties	  could	  also	  find	  themselves	  on	  the	  horns	  of	  a	  
terrible	  dilemma.	  Former	  medical	  student	  Tan	  Choon	  Keng	  had	  been	  recruited	  by	  the	  Japanese	  
to	  serve	  as	  an	  orderly	  on	  the	  Railway,	  and	  whilst	  he	  had	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  ill-­‐treatment	  of	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  Dixon;	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captives	  on	  the	  line,	  ‘it	  was	  beyond	  his	  wildest	  expectation	  that	  he	  himself	  would	  perpetrate	  
this	  insanity.’552He	  set	  fire	  to	  a	  hospital	  hut;	  no	  one	  had	  the	  strength	  to	  get	  out.	  
Not	  everyone	  complied	  with	  the	  Japanese	  orders;	  Dr	  Hardie	  noted	  in	  his	  diary	  that	  the	  guards	  
tried	  to	  get	  some	  British	  POWs	  to	  bury	  still	  extant	  Tamils.	  	  
On	  one	  occasion	  they	  forced	  them	  at	  the	  point	  of	  loaded	  rifles	  to	  lay	  them	  in	  shallow	  
graves;	  but	  the	  British	  (they	  were	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  other	  ranks,	  no	  officers)	  steadfastly	  
refused	  to	  do	  any	  more…	  the	  Japanese	  themselves	  	  covered	  the	  bodies.553	  
	  
On	  one	  occasion	  a	  POW	  was	  the	  intended	  victim.	  Edward	  Dunlop	  described	  this	  rare	  
occurrence,	  noting	  how	  a	  Japanese	  guard	  felled	  the	  soldier	  by	  hitting	  him	  with	  sticks	  and	  
shovels	  and	  then	  pushed	  him	  into	  a	  hole.	  ‘The	  soldiers	  with	  the	  party	  refused	  to	  comply	  with	  
the	  burial	  order	  and	  many	  were	  struck.	  Eventually	  the	  “corpse”	  was	  rescued.’554	  	  
Joanna	  Bourke,	  a	  historian	  who	  has	  spent	  some	  time	  examining	  the	  frequently	  overlooked	  less	  
pleasant	  aspects	  of	  what	  people	  have	  to	  do	  in	  the	  prosecution	  of	  a	  war,	  and	  the	  difficulties	  of	  
those	  returning	  to	  civilian	  life	  afterwards,	  has	  suggested	  that	  servicemen	  who	  have	  been	  
involved	  in	  such	  brutality	  need	  to	  find	  ‘a	  legitimate	  narrative	  that	  can	  “place”	  the	  self	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  is	  both	  coherent	  and	  convincing’.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  Tamil	  sanitation	  narrative	  has	  been	  
adopted	  as	  a	  part	  of	  this	  process,	  as	  those	  who	  witnessed	  their	  suffering	  tried	  to	  rationalise	  
the	  previously	  unimaginable	  horrors	  they	  had	  witnessed,	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  had	  to	  participate	  
in.555	  In	  this	  context	  pre-­‐existing	  colonial	  tropes	  could	  be	  adapted	  to	  the	  new	  situation	  caused	  
by	  the	  negligent	  attitude	  of	  the	  Japanese	  to	  their	  Asian	  labourers.	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The	  cholera	  epidemic	  of	  1943	  brought	  fear	  and	  death	  to	  many	  on	  the	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway,	  
but	  no	  community	  suffered	  as	  much	  as	  did	  the	  Tamil	  labourers.	  Whilst	  their	  condition	  
engendered	  widespread	  sympathy	  amongst	  the	  POWs,	  this	  was	  frequently	  accompanied	  by	  a	  
sense	  of	  culpability	  due	  to	  imputations	  of	  poor	  hygiene	  and	  organisation.	  Such	  conceptions	  
frequently	  had	  a	  prior	  colonial	  and	  racial	  provenance,	  and	  would	  persist	  into	  the	  post-­‐war	  
period.	  Despite	  their	  continued	  prevalence	  in	  most	  of	  the	  literature,	  this	  section	  has	  
questioned	  the	  applicability	  of	  such	  notions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  Railway.	  	  
The	  blame	  for	  conditions	  in	  the	  camps	  lay	  squarely	  with	  the	  Japanese.	  It	  was	  they	  who	  sent	  the	  
labourers	  up	  the	  line	  with	  little	  or	  no	  provision	  of	  basic	  facilities,	  food	  or	  medical	  care.	  It	  was	  
the	  Japanese	  who	  refused	  to	  stop	  movements	  on	  the	  line	  during	  the	  epidemic,	  thus	  facilitating	  
its	  spread,	  and	  it	  was	  they	  whose	  ‘only	  epidemic	  control	  was	  to	  throw	  the	  sick	  on	  the	  fire.’556	  
	  
5.4.	  Conclusions.	  
The	  two	  contexts	  considered	  in	  this	  chapter	  share	  a	  common	  thread	  with	  regard	  to	  how	  the	  
POWs’	  perceptions	  of	  their	  difference	  from	  the	  local	  populations	  could	  influence	  their	  
outlooks	  and	  actions.	  In	  both	  cases	  there	  is	  a	  persistent	  and	  pervasive	  post-­‐war	  narrative	  that	  
has	  represented	  the	  peoples	  of	  Asia	  as	  being	  a	  threat,	  whether	  through	  the	  perceived	  hostility	  
to	  escapees	  or	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  cholera	  epidemic	  on	  the	  Railway.	  Whilst	  there	  is	  some	  
foundation	  for	  such	  assumptions	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  primary	  sources,	  the	  foregoing	  analysis	  
suggests	  that	  such	  views	  were	  by	  no	  means	  ubiquitous,	  or	  indeed	  were	  necessarily	  an	  accurate	  
representation.	  The	  realities	  of	  the	  situations	  were	  more	  complex	  and	  nuanced.	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The	  threat	  posed	  by	  local	  inhabitants	  (and	  the	  physical	  environment)	  to	  escaping	  prisoners	  
was	  not	  as	  clear	  as	  the	  literature	  suggests,	  and	  is	  indeed	  contradicted	  by	  many	  of	  the	  cases	  
examined.	  Similarly,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  blame	  apportioned	  to	  the	  Tamils	  for	  the	  cholera	  
epidemic	  has	  been	  overstated,	  and	  whilst	  the	  fear	  of	  their	  camps	  is	  entirely	  understandable,	  
the	  causes	  of	  the	  prevalent	  conditions	  at	  those	  locations	  are	  less	  easily	  ascribed	  to	  the	  
unfortunate	  occupants,	  if	  at	  all.	  Of	  course	  the	  realities	  of	  situations	  are	  frequently	  different	  to	  
how	  they	  are	  perceived,	  and	  these	  cases	  were	  no	  exception	  to	  this	  rule.	  The	  BORs	  adopted	  a	  
wide	  variety	  of	  responses	  across	  a	  spectrum	  that	  ranged	  from	  the	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  
antipathetic,	  sometimes,	  particularly	  in	  the	  cholera	  epidemic,	  displaying	  both	  at	  the	  same	  
time.	  
Pre-­‐existing	  notions	  of	  difference,	  informed	  by	  the	  colonial	  and	  racial	  conceptualisations	  of	  
white	  superiority,	  could	  find	  fertile	  ground	  in	  such	  alien	  surroundings	  and	  fraught	  situations.	  
These	  could	  in	  turn	  be	  fed	  by	  the	  views	  of	  some	  of	  the	  officers,	  whose	  words	  would	  continue	  
to	  have	  considerable	  traction	  and	  credence	  with	  a	  section	  of	  the	  men,	  despite	  their	  frequent	  
unpopularity	  and	  some	  of	  the	  previous	  inaccuracies	  that	  had	  contributed	  to	  the	  low	  esteem	  in	  
which	  they	  were	  often	  held.	  	  
These	  outlooks	  could	  provide	  an	  additional	  constraint	  to	  thoughts	  of	  escape,	  and	  influence	  
assertions	  of	  culpability,	  and	  more,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  cholera	  epidemic.	  Towards	  the	  other	  
end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  were	  those	  men	  who	  adopted	  or	  possessed	  a	  more	  open	  outlook,	  were	  
less	  intimidated	  by	  their	  new	  surroundings,	  and	  less	  swift	  to	  rush	  to	  judgements	  about	  the	  
people	  in	  whose	  midst	  they	  found	  themselves.	  Such	  prisoners	  could	  utilise	  this	  more	  positive	  
perspective	  to	  at	  least	  harbour	  some	  ambition	  to	  escape,	  and	  to	  display	  considerable	  empathy	  
for	  the	  suffering	  of	  those	  around	  them.	  As	  on	  any	  spectrum,	  there	  was	  a	  considerable	  amount	  
of	  space	  between	  these	  two	  positions,	  and	  a	  complexity	  that	  could	  be	  dictated	  by	  changing	  
circumstances.	  Escapes,	  particularly	  successful	  ones,	  usually	  required	  a	  strong	  mental	  attitude,	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although	  in	  some	  instances	  they	  were	  driven	  by	  a	  less	  positive	  sense	  of	  desperation.	  Similarly,	  
even	  the	  most	  sympathetic	  of	  perspectives	  on	  Tamil	  suffering	  could	  be	  conditional	  on	  an	  
element	  of	  their	  culpability.	  
The	  local	  people	  themselves	  often	  endured	  worse	  conditions	  and	  less	  consideration	  under	  the	  
Japanese	  occupation	  than	  did	  the	  POWs,	  particularly	  when	  used	  in	  labour	  forces.	  Those	  who	  
avoided	  such	  horrors	  and	  struggled	  to	  continue	  their	  lives,	  despite	  the	  dislocation	  of	  the	  war,	  
were	  frequently	  supportive	  towards	  the	  prisoners,	  despite	  the	  appreciable	  risks	  involved	  if	  
caught	  doing	  so.	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  situation	  was	  different	  from	  that	  experienced	  by	  prisoners	  
in	  Europe,	  most	  of	  whom	  found	  themselves	  captive	  in	  enemy	  homelands	  as	  opposed	  to	  
occupied	  territories.	  Despite	  this	  factor,	  post-­‐war	  narratives	  have	  continued	  to	  stress	  the	  less	  
favourable	  nature	  of	  Asian	  captivity,	  and	  whilst	  there	  are	  valid	  reasons	  for	  so	  doing,	  the	  















Chapter	  6.	  The	  Journey	  West.	  
	  
6.1.	  Introduction.	  
If	  the	  popular	  memory	  of	  the	  FEPOWs’	  time	  in	  captivity	  has	  been	  one	  of	  a	  largely	  singular	  
nature,	  fed	  by	  mass	  media	  constructions	  that	  relied	  heavily	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  suffering	  on	  
the	  Burma-­‐Thailand	  Railway,	  such	  conditions	  were	  by	  no	  means	  ubiquitous.	  Furthermore,	  
whilst	  the	  persistence	  of	  the	  theme	  of	  continued	  antipathetic	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  Japanese,	  
encapsulated	  in	  the	  mantra	  of	  neither	  forgiving	  nor	  forgetting,	  was	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  this	  
storyline,	  close	  scrutiny	  of	  individual	  case	  studies	  reveals	  that	  many,	  although	  not	  all	  of	  the	  
POWs,	  would	  find	  some	  degree	  of	  reconciliation	  after	  the	  war.	  This	  would	  occur	  at	  differing	  
times	  and	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  but	  it	  represents	  a	  continuous	  thread	  that	  is	  all	  the	  more	  
remarkable	  given	  the	  internal	  battle	  of	  many	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  memory	  of	  what	  they	  
had	  been	  through,	  and	  their	  external	  fights,	  with	  the	  respective	  governments	  of	  Japan,	  over	  an	  
appropriate	  apology,	  and	  of	  Britain	  in	  the	  search	  for	  adequate	  compensation.	  
This	  chapter	  will	  seek	  to	  elucidate	  both	  the	  development	  of	  post	  war	  attitudes	  to	  the	  Japanese	  
and	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  often	  contradictory	  popular	  narrative	  of	  captivity	  in	  the	  Asian	  
theatre.	  	  The	  trajectory	  of	  individual	  reconciliation	  will	  be	  tracked	  through	  the	  accounts	  of	  the	  
former	  prisoners,	  primarily	  from	  the	  IWM	  holdings.	  The	  second	  section	  examines	  the	  selective	  
development	  of	  published	  (newspapers	  and	  books)	  and	  cinematic	  representations	  and	  their	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Around	  half	  of	  the	  documentary	  case	  studies	  allow	  for	  scrutiny	  of	  attitudes	  to	  the	  Japanese	  
since	  1945,	  mainly	  through	  post-­‐hoc	  memoirs	  but	  also	  including	  two	  contemporary	  diaries	  that	  
had	  some	  accompanying	  post-­‐war	  thoughts	  attached	  when	  they	  were	  deposited	  in	  the	  
collections.	  Of	  particular	  importance	  in	  ascertaining	  such	  post-­‐war	  views	  were	  the	  interviews	  
in	  the	  sound	  archive	  at	  the	  IWM,	  which	  were	  systematically	  surveyed	  for	  the	  standard	  
reference,	  usually	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  accompanying	  interview	  notes,	  to	  ‘attitudes	  to	  the	  
Japanese’.	  	  
There	  were	  a	  total	  of	  forty	  such	  oral	  records	  for	  the	  other	  ranks,	  which	  when	  combined	  with	  
the	  documentary	  sources	  reveal	  that	  around	  a	  third	  of	  the	  men	  still	  held	  unswerving	  and	  
strongly	  antagonistic	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  Japanese,	  unmediated	  by	  the	  passage	  of	  time.	  
Conversely	  about	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  veterans	  expressed	  varying	  degrees	  of	  reconciliation	  with	  
the	  Japanese	  as	  a	  people,	  with	  many	  finding	  some	  sense	  of	  conciliation	  with	  their	  former	  
captors,	  although	  not	  surprisingly	  the	  vast	  majority	  could	  not,	  and	  would	  not	  forget.	  These	  
accounts	  provide	  insights	  into	  both	  the	  mutability	  (and	  the	  persistence)	  of	  attitudes	  in	  the	  
post-­‐war	  period,	  revealing	  a	  range	  of	  factors	  which	  influenced	  the	  varying	  degrees	  of	  
rapprochement	  that	  were	  achieved,	  including	  belief	  systems,	  family	  and	  social	  contacts,	  and	  
the	  healing	  power	  of	  time	  itself.	  
For	  a	  few	  their	  core	  beliefs,	  including	  religion	  but	  also	  among	  those	  holding	  more	  radical	  
political	  outlooks,	  were	  the	  source	  of	  an	  early	  accommodation	  with	  the	  Japanese	  after	  
liberation.557	  Paul	  Addison’s	  factions	  of	  ‘Anglican	  Deep	  England’	  and	  ‘radical-­‐populist	  Britain’	  
had	  something	  in	  common	  perhaps.558	  For	  many	  in	  this	  category	  the	  war	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  
historically	  specific	  location	  of	  antipathy,	  which	  ended	  with	  its	  passing.	  Christian	  faith	  had	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  Such	  beliefs	  were	  often	  given	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  survival	  in	  the	  camps.	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  “Book	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  p1367.	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conditioned	  Lawrence	  Smith,	  formerly	  a	  private	  in	  the	  RAMC,	  to	  follow	  the	  road	  to	  
reconciliation,	  as	  he	  recalled	  when	  asked	  for	  his	  views	  on	  the	  Japanese	  some	  forty	  years	  later:	  
“I	  don’t	  feel	  any	  bitterness	  at	  all.	  It	  would	  have	  contradicted	  my	  Christian	  path,	  I	  would	  show	  
hospitality	  to	  any	  Japanese	  I	  met.”559	  	  
Ernie	  Henderson,	  a	  lifelong	  communist,	  demonstrated	  a	  parallel,	  although	  more	  politically	  
derived	  belief	  in	  the	  brotherhood	  of	  man.	  	  ‘I	  have	  to	  end	  with	  a	  word	  about	  the	  Japanese.	  I	  am	  
not	  anti-­‐Japanese	  although	  I	  condemn	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  Japanese	  as	  I	  experienced	  it	  in	  
those	  dark	  years	  of	  1942-­‐1945.’560	  	  Similarly,	  Arthur	  Mendelsohn	  said	  that	  he	  was	  “not	  
conscious	  of	  carrying	  the	  scars	  around	  with	  me”,	  when	  making	  an	  explicit	  link	  between	  his	  
tolerance	  and	  his	  “radical	  political	  opinions”.	  When	  asked	  if	  the	  experience	  had	  changed	  his	  
attitudes	  to	  the	  Japanese,	  he	  responded;	  “not	  really	  …	  I	  didn’t	  know	  any	  Japanese	  before	  the	  
war”,	  before	  commenting	  that	  he	  had	  met	  a	  lot	  of	  young	  Japanese,	  who	  were	  in	  his	  eyes	  “not	  
guilty	  for	  the	  crimes	  of	  their	  fathers”.	  Unsurprisingly	  he	  expressed	  “suspicions	  of	  some	  
Japanese	  of	  my	  generation”	  that	  he	  had	  met,	  wondering	  if	  they	  might	  have	  been	  guards	  in	  the	  
camps.561	  	  Although	  highly	  unlikely	  in	  reality,	  such	  caveats	  were	  not	  uncommon	  with	  regard	  to	  
their	  Japanese	  peer	  group,	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  persistence	  of	  bad	  memories	  even	  amongst	  the	  
most	  tolerant	  of	  the	  FEPOWs.	  
This	  feeling	  of	  generational	  misgiving	  was	  a	  feature	  of	  around	  a	  quarter	  of	  those	  interviewees	  
who	  had	  more	  positive	  things	  to	  say	  about	  the	  Japanese,	  frequently	  stated	  as	  a	  caveat	  to	  an	  
otherwise	  more	  amenable	  outlook.	  Such	  statements	  were	  also	  frequently	  made	  in	  parallel,	  as	  
above,	  with	  references	  to	  younger	  Japanese,	  the	  new	  generations	  coming	  through	  of	  whom	  
many	  knew	  nothing	  of	  what	  had	  occurred	  and	  thus	  couldn’t	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  actions	  
of	  their	  predecessors.	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  IWM:	  Smith,	  L	  (Sound	  9497)	  Reel4.	  
560	  IWM:	  Henderson;	  p544.	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  IWM:	  Mendelsohn,	  A.	  (Sound	  6801)	  Reel4.	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The	  sense	  of	  generational	  progress,	  enhanced	  by	  post-­‐war	  contacts,	  was	  echoed	  by	  Arthur	  
Morley,	  who	  stated	  during	  an	  interview	  that:	  “Now	  I	  have	  nothing	  to	  say	  against	  the	  Japanese,	  
today’s	  generation	  are	  innocent	  of	  the	  deeds	  of	  World	  War	  Two.”	  The	  evolution	  of	  Morley’s	  
perspectives	  was	  no	  doubt	  influenced	  by	  an	  intake	  of	  Japanese	  students	  at	  the	  college	  where	  
he	  worked	  in	  the	  1980s,	  one	  of	  whom,	  “a	  nice	  chap”,	  he	  got	  to	  know	  quite	  well.	  	  The	  student	  
was	  unaware	  of	  what	  had	  happened	  to	  the	  POWs	  during	  the	  war,	  and	  for	  this	  mistreatment	  he	  
“most	  humbly	  apologised”	  to	  Morley.562	  
The	  response	  of	  another	  interviewee,	  Clifford	  Bailey,	  when	  asked	  about	  his	  views	  on	  the	  
Japanese	  in	  1980,	  contained	  similar	  evidence	  of	  mediation	  through	  post-­‐war	  contacts,	  whilst	  
revealing	  the	  still	  extant	  seeds	  of	  suspicion	  for	  the	  wartime	  generation.	  
I’ve	  not	  any	  strong	  feelings	  at	  all.	  I	  haven’t	  any	  feelings	  of	  hatred	  –	  don’t	  think	  about	  
them	  much	  –	  I	  wouldn’t	  go	  out	  of	  my	  way	  to	  seek	  their	  company,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  
hand	  I	  would	  offer	  them	  no	  anything	  [sic]	  to	  offend	  them.	  I	  live	  quite	  near	  to	  a	  
Japanese	  family,	  I’ve	  sat	  next	  to	  the	  wife	  and	  the	  children	  on	  the	  bus	  and	  conversed	  
with	  them	  and	  I’ve	  felt	  no	  feelings	  of	  hatred	  against	  them,	  although	  the	  parents	  would	  
possibly	  have	  been	  school	  children	  in	  the	  war.563	  	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  aforementioned	  cases	  offer	  anecdotal	  evidence	  of	  how	  contacts	  had	  helped	  to	  
influence	  the	  attitudes	  of	  the	  POWs,	  for	  a	  couple	  of	  the	  cohort,	  who	  had	  held	  strongly	  
antipathetic	  views,	  a	  specific	  family	  event	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  the	  catalyst	  for	  changing	  
perceptions.	  	  William	  Rose	  was	  one	  of	  those	  who	  claimed	  that	  his	  core	  beliefs,	  in	  this	  case	  his	  
Christianity,	  had	  kept	  him	  going	  in	  the	  camps	  and	  influenced	  his	  outlook	  afterwards.	  In	  the	  
published	  edition	  of	  his	  wartime	  diaries	  he	  wrote	  that:	  
Being	  a	  PoW	  was	  a	  very	  testing	  time	  but	  I	  got	  through	  it	  with	  prayer	  and	  a	  resolve	  to	  
overcome.	  I	  have	  often	  been	  asked	  what	  I	  thought	  of	  the	  Japanese	  people.	  My	  reply	  
was	  always	  that	  not	  all	  of	  the	  Japanese	  people	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  atrocities.564	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  IWM:	  Morley,	  A.J.	  (Sound	  9767)	  Reel3.	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  IWM:	  Bailey;	  Reel11.	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  You	  Shook	  My	  Hand,	  pp3-­‐4	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This	  apparently	  tolerant	  perspective	  represents	  one	  of	  several	  developments	  from	  the	  content	  
of	  his	  original	  contemporary	  manuscript	  diaries,	  which	  were	  a	  litany	  of	  derogatory	  references	  
to	  both	  fellow	  POWs	  and	  their	  captors,	  and	  he	  was	  no	  doubt	  influenced	  by	  the	  marriage	  of	  his	  
son	  to	  a	  Japanese	  woman.	  Describing	  meeting	  his	  daughter	  in	  law	  Takako	  Rose	  for	  the	  first	  
time,	  he	  wrote	  that	  ‘I	  would	  never	  have	  thought	  such	  a	  thing	  would	  have	  brought	  us	  so	  much	  
happiness.	  …	  This	  was	  the	  first	  Japanese	  person	  I	  had	  met	  since	  the	  war.’	  Encouraged	  by	  his	  
Damascene	  road	  encounter	  with	  Takako,	  Rose	  and	  his	  wife	  visited	  Japan	  on	  a	  journey	  of	  
reconciliation.	  He	  would	  subsequently	  become	  an	  active	  member	  of	  the	  Burma	  Campaign	  
Society	  until	  his	  death	  in	  2011.	  This	  mainly	  officer	  based	  group,	  formed	  from	  the	  remnants	  of	  
the	  Burma	  Campaign	  Fellowship	  Group	  in	  2002,	  includes	  both	  veterans	  of	  the	  14th	  Army	  and	  
the	  prison	  camps,	  and	  seeks	  to	  develop	  reconciliation	  through	  providing	  ‘a	  bilateral	  forum	  ...	  
for	  non-­‐recriminatory	  discussion	  of	  war	  related	  issues’.565	  	  	  
The	  file	  of	  E.W.	  Parry	  offers	  a	  similar,	  though	  less	  explicit	  example	  of	  familial	  Japanese	  
contacts,	  with	  a	  post-­‐war	  attachment	  noting	  that	  both	  his	  daughter	  and	  son	  in	  law	  were	  fluent	  
in	  Japanese.	  Whilst	  this	  note	  does	  not	  clearly	  state	  that	  his	  son	  in	  law	  is	  Japanese,	  the	  fact	  that	  
he	  notes	  both	  were	  fluent	  in	  that	  language	  indicates	  regular	  contacts	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  and	  
may	  well	  have	  influenced	  the	  decision	  by	  Parry	  and	  his	  wife	  to	  visit	  the	  mine	  at	  Sendai	  in	  
Japan,	  where	  he	  worked	  for	  the	  last	  year	  of	  the	  war.	  	  On	  this	  trip	  he	  describes	  that	  an	  ‘elderly	  
taxi	  driver	  took	  them	  to	  the	  area	  of	  the	  mine	  …	  and	  he	  was	  somewhat	  embarrassed	  about	  the	  
affair.’566	  
Interviewed	  more	  than	  fifty	  years	  after	  his	  liberation,	  Eric	  Bouch	  reflected	  on	  how	  the	  passage	  
of	  time,	  and	  the	  generations,	  had	  mellowed	  his	  outlook	  in	  his	  later	  years:	  	  
After	  all	  this	  time	  you	  cannot	  hate	  the	  Japanese	  people	  of	  today,	  because	  they	  know	  
nothing	  about	  it	  …	  the	  only	  people	  that	  I	  really	  hate,	  if	  you	  use	  the	  word	  hate,	  are	  the	  
few	  Japanese	  I	  was	  with	  on	  the	  railway	  and	  then	  Japan	  itself,	  my	  generation	  –	  but	  the	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  http://www.perkins-­‐smart.com/burmacampaignsociety/aboutus/index.html	  
566	  IWM:	  Parry;	  Notes	  attached	  to	  manuscript	  diary.	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future	  generations	  from	  then,	  well	  you	  can’t	  hate	  them	  -­‐	  you’ll	  never	  forget	  what	  
happened,	  whatever	  you	  try	  and	  do	  and	  think,	  but	  hate	  cannot	  go	  on	  can	  it?	  Not	  after	  
all	  these	  years.567	  
	  
So	  powerful	  is	  the	  exposition	  of	  Bouch	  on	  this	  topic	  that	  the	  mask	  of	  impartiality	  slips	  from	  the	  
interviewer,	  the	  normally	  imperturbable	  Conrad	  Wood,	  and	  he	  reflexively	  responds	  to	  the	  
question	  posed	  at	  the	  end,	  with	  an	  assenting	  “no”.	  
In	  several	  interviews	  the	  subjects	  demonstrate	  the	  complexities	  inherent	  in	  the	  consideration	  
of	  their	  opinions.	  Jim	  Long	  reflected	  on	  the	  question	  of	  his	  perspectives	  on	  the	  Japanese:	  	  
I’ve	  hated	  them	  all,	  I	  hate	  anything	  Japanese,	  but	  now	  I’m	  getting	  older	  I	  sometimes	  sit	  
around	  and	  ask	  myself,	  do	  I	  really	  hate	  them	  or	  is	  it	  just	  prejudice?	  	  Is	  it	  not	  time	  to	  
forgive	  and	  forget?	  	  I	  usually	  come	  up	  with	  the	  answer,	  maybe	  forgive	  but	  I	  can	  never	  
forget,	  I	  generally	  don’t	  want	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  them.568	  
	  
In	  a	  similarly	  reflexive	  mood	  was	  Percy	  Mutimer,	  who	  had	  spent	  several	  years	  in	  hospital	  once	  
back	  in	  Britain,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  his	  experiences	  in	  captivity.	  His	  response	  encapsulates	  many	  of	  
the	  themes	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  discourse	  regarding	  the	  Japanese,	  as	  well	  as	  offering	  a	  vision	  of	  
more	  mundane,	  but	  no	  less	  painful	  reality	  of	  daily	  life	  in	  captivity.	  
It’s	  very	  strange,	  it’s	  taken	  a	  long	  time	  to	  wear	  off,	  but	  I’ve	  met	  Japanese	  since,	  several	  
times	  ….	  we	  had	  a	  crowd	  come	  round	  where	  I	  work	  and	  whether	  it	  was	  because	  I	  was	  
working	  at	  the	  time	  and	  they	  were	  a	  crowd	  talking,	  I	  suddenly	  felt	  as	  though	  I	  was	  a	  
prisoner	  again	  and	  I	  felt	  violent,	  and	  I	  was	  driving	  a	  fork	  lift	  truck	  and	  if	  one	  had	  got	  in	  
the	  way	  I	  could	  have	  killed	  him.	  That’s	  the	  only	  time.	  I	  was	  out	  with	  my	  brother	  one	  
day	  and	  we	  stopped	  to	  give	  a	  young	  girl	  a	  lift,	  a	  nice	  looking	  girl	  and	  she	  was	  Japanese.	  
I	  spoke	  to	  her	  in	  Japanese	  quite	  a	  lot	  …	  she	  asked	  me:	  	  “Where	  did	  you	  learn?”	  …	  I	  told	  
her	  …	  She	  said	  “Ah,	  I	  hope	  your	  feelings	  aren’t	  too	  bad	  for	  the	  Japanese	  because	  of	  
that.”	  I	  said	  I	  can’t	  take	  it	  out	  of	  a	  girl	  like	  you	  …	  it	  wasn’t	  you.	  …	  It	  was	  a	  long	  long	  time	  
of	  boredom,	  humiliation,	  filth,	  dirt	  and	  disease,	  a	  lot	  of	  sickness	  and	  illness,	  and	  
whether	  one	  should	  forgive	  and	  forget	  I	  don’t	  know,	  it’s	  impossible	  really	  to	  forget	  
it.569	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  IWM:	  Bouch,	  E.W.	  (Sound	  19102)	  Reel4.	  
568	  IWM:	  Long,	  J.	  (Sound	  15350)	  Reel16.	  
569	  IWM:	  Mutimer;	  Reel4.	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Both	  Mutimer	  and	  Long,	  in	  common	  with	  many	  of	  the	  interviewees,	  seem	  to	  be	  offering	  less	  
rehearsed	  and	  composed	  responses	  on	  this	  particular	  question,	  	  drifting	  from	  thought	  to	  
thought	  as	  they	  related	  their	  replies.	  Whilst	  there	  is	  still	  a	  considerable	  sense	  of	  antipathy	  
present,	  the	  distance	  of	  time	  has	  eroded	  the	  conviction	  with	  which	  it	  is	  held.	  
For	  a	  few	  of	  the	  IWM	  cohort	  there	  would	  be	  no	  sense	  of	  reconciliation	  or	  forgiveness,	  
although	  even	  the	  previously	  strident	  Stanley	  Dawson,	  writing	  in	  1946,	  would	  hint	  at	  the	  
power	  of	  time	  as	  an	  aid	  to	  numbing	  the	  memory,	  if	  not	  to	  entirely	  forgetting	  the	  past.	  ‘It	  
seems	  strange	  looking	  back	  to	  find	  that	  deep	  hatred	  of	  the	  Japanese	  has	  passed	  into	  a	  mere	  
lack	  of	  interest.	  …	  now	  one	  is	  little	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  Japanese	  than	  is	  the	  average	  
person.’570	  The	  process	  of	  editing	  his	  papers	  did	  however	  reignite	  a	  less	  tolerant	  perspective	  in	  
Dawson,	  as	  he	  concludes	  that:	  
One	  will	  always	  think	  of	  the	  Japanese	  as	  sadistic	  and	  heartless	  –	  in	  spite	  of	  having	  
known	  men	  like	  Watanabe	  and	  having	  been	  impressed	  by	  the	  writings	  of	  such	  a	  
Christian	  as	  Toyohiko	  Kagawa	  and	  being	  conscious	  that	  among	  millions	  of	  Japanese	  
one	  did	  not	  meet	  there	  must	  have	  been	  many	  more	  of	  high	  character.571	  
	  
More	  persistent	  antipathy	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  interviews	  of	  two	  former	  prisoners	  who	  
were	  both	  held	  in	  Saigon.	  Walter	  Cleveland	  continued	  to	  “hate	  every	  one	  of	  them”,	  and	  had	  
sworn	  at	  tourists	  outside	  Buckingham	  Palace.572	  James	  Gregory	  suggested	  that	  “it	  would	  need	  
a	  bigger	  Christian	  than	  me	  to	  forgive,	  and	  I	  will	  never	  forget.”	  He	  had	  been	  visited	  by	  Special	  
Branch	  detectives	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  a	  visit	  by	  Emperor	  Hirohito,	  and	  wrote	  several	  letters	  of	  
complaint	  to	  the	  Japanese	  Ambassador.573	  Interestingly	  both	  of	  these	  men	  expressed	  regret	  at	  
the	  fact	  that	  only	  two	  atom	  bombs	  had	  been	  dropped	  on	  Japan,	  the	  only	  such	  expressions	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  IWM:	  Dawson;	  p199.	  
571	  IWM:	  Dawson;	  p201.	  
572	  IWM:	  Cleveland,	  W.S.	  (Sound	  17348)	  Reel3.	  
573	  IWM:	  Gregory,	  J.R.	  (Sound	  6011)	  Reel4.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  Gregory’s	  actions,	  one	  former	  prisoner	  said	  
that	  he	  had	  written	  to	  the	  Emperor	  to	  apologise	  for	  the	  rude	  reception	  he	  had	  received	  in	  Britain.	  He	  
had	  described	  the	  Japanese	  as	  he	  saw	  them	  in	  the	  war	  as	  “quite	  likeable	  little	  fellows	  in	  some	  ways	  and	  
horrible	  little	  buggers	  in	  other	  ways.”	  Docketty,	  F.J.	  (Sound	  4822)	  Reel5.	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found	  in	  the	  interview	  survey,	  although	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  confirm	  that	  they	  had	  either	  
met	  in	  Saigon	  or,	  had	  they	  done	  so,	  if	  they	  had	  kept	  in	  touch	  afterwards.	  
Equally	  vituperative	  post-­‐war	  statements	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  memoir	  of	  Henry	  Dixon,	  
contained	  in	  a	  ‘Letter	  of	  Reflection’	  that	  had	  been	  printed	  in	  the	  London	  FEPOW	  newsletter,	  
shortly	  after	  the	  visit	  of	  Emperor	  Akihito,	  Hirohito’s	  son,	  in	  1998.	  He	  wrote	  that:	  
We	  are	  all	  now	  in	  our	  twilight	  days	  and	  for	  many	  still	  remain	  the	  horrific	  years	  which	  
we	  spent	  under	  the	  barbaric	  Japanese,	  as	  their	  prisoners-­‐of-­‐war.	  How	  can	  anyone	  
forget	  the	  starvation,	  brutality	  and	  depravity	  under	  their	  hands	  without	  thought	  for	  
the	  suffering	  they	  were	  inflicting?	  …	  For	  me,	  I’m	  afraid	  I	  could	  never	  bring	  myself	  to	  
seek	  reconciliation	  and	  make	  friends	  with	  an	  enemy	  who	  was	  so	  barbaric	  and	  will	  not	  
accept	  his	  brutal	  and	  cruel	  treatment	  of	  P.o.W.s	  under	  his	  jurisdiction	  with	  no	  
apology.574	  
	  
	  The	  reference	  to	  the	  apology	  resonates	  with	  the	  contemporary	  struggle	  by	  the	  ex-­‐prisoners	  in	  
the	  1990s	  to	  gain	  compensation,	  for	  which	  a	  suitable	  Japanese	  expression	  of	  contrition	  was	  
seen	  as	  an	  integral	  pre-­‐requisite.	  Dixon,	  in	  common	  with	  many	  of	  his	  colleagues,	  felt	  that	  a	  
number	  of	  such	  gestures	  made	  by	  individuals	  and	  official	  representatives	  of	  the	  government	  of	  
Japan	  were	  unsatisfactory,	  and	  he	  instead	  focused	  in	  his	  letter	  on	  the	  unsympathetic	  words	  of	  
a	  Japanese	  engineer	  who	  had	  served	  on	  the	  Railway,	  as	  reproduced	  in	  the	  Daily	  Mail,	  who	  had	  
accused	  the	  POWs	  of	  being	  lazy	  and	  responsible	  for	  their	  own	  situation.	  	  
Some	  of	  Dixon’s	  greatest	  antipathy	  was	  expressed	  against	  Keiko	  Holmes,	  and	  those	  FEPOWs	  
and	  relatives	  who	  had	  taken	  part	  in	  the	  group	  visits	  to	  Japan	  that	  she	  organized.	  Holmes	  was	  
the	  Japanese	  wife	  of	  a	  British	  businessman	  who	  had	  been	  inspired	  to	  set	  up	  an	  organization	  
called	  Agape,	  in	  order	  to	  reconcile	  the	  former	  prisoners	  and	  their	  Japanese	  captors.	  Her	  
interest	  had	  been	  stimulated	  following	  a	  visit	  to	  a	  POW	  grave	  site	  at	  the	  Iruka	  copper	  mine	  
which	  had	  been	  maintained	  by	  the	  local	  miners	  and	  their	  families.	  	  For	  this	  work	  she	  had	  been	  
awarded	  an	  O.B.E.	  by	  the	  Queen,	  just	  before	  Akihito’s	  visit	  in	  1998.	  It	  took	  some	  persuasion	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(and	  probably	  not	  a	  little	  personal	  courage)	  to	  attend	  her	  first	  FEPOW	  Association	  conference	  
in	  1991	  and	  start	  to	  deliver	  her	  message	  of	  conciliation.	  Given	  the	  post-­‐war	  power	  of	  direct	  
contacts	  with	  Japanese	  citizens	  to	  stimulate	  improved	  relations,	  Dixon	  was	  under	  no	  illusions	  
as	  to	  the	  threat	  such	  activities	  could	  pose	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  his	  antipathy	  and	  that	  of	  some	  of	  
his	  less	  resolute	  colleagues.	  
Now	  it	  seems	  for	  many	  a	  cheap	  holiday	  in	  Japan	  under	  Keiko	  Holmes	  is	  all	  that	  is	  
required	  to	  not	  only	  forget	  but	  also	  to	  forgive,	  coming	  back	  from	  these	  trips	  telling	  
everyone	  what	  wonderful	  people	  the	  Japanese	  are	  and	  so	  friendly.575	  
	  
Whilst	  those	  who	  travelled	  to	  Japan	  would	  have	  been	  a	  relatively	  small	  proportion	  of	  the	  POW	  
population,	  the	  effects	  of	  Holmes’	  project	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  archives.	  Jack	  Hughieson	  had	  
survived	  the	  sinking	  of	  the	  Japanese	  transport	  ship	  Lisbon	  Maru,	  three	  and	  a	  half	  years	  of	  
captivity,	  and	  the	  dropping	  of	  the	  bomb	  on	  Hiroshima.	  In	  1945	  he	  had	  hated	  the	  Japanese,	  a	  
feeling	  that	  would	  persist	  long	  after	  the	  war.576	  Many	  years	  later	  he	  was	  asked	  by	  some	  
Japanese	  tourists	  to	  take	  their	  photograph	  at	  Hampton	  Court,	  a	  request	  he	  refused	  until	  his	  
wife	  reminded	  him	  that	  as	  part	  of	  his	  treatment	  (for	  psychological	  problems	  stemming	  from	  
captivity)	  he	  should	  do	  so.	  After	  persistent	  contacts	  from	  Keiko	  Holmes	  (and	  out	  of	  a	  growing	  
respect	  for	  the	  courage	  she	  had	  displayed	  in	  attempting	  to	  spread	  her	  message	  of	  
reconciliation	  at	  FEPOW	  reunions)	  he	  finally	  agreed	  to	  go	  with	  a	  party	  of	  former	  prisoners	  to	  
Japan.	  
At	  Heathrow	  I	  was	  still	  undecided,	  and	  when	  I	  saw	  the	  Japanese	  writing	  on	  the	  plane	  I	  
didn’t	  want	  to	  go	  on	  board	  …	  once	  we	  arrived	  there	  was	  a	  crowd	  of	  children	  waving	  
Union	  Jacks	  …	  it	  was	  marvellous	  all	  the	  way	  ….	  they	  treated	  us	  very	  well	  …	  At	  the	  
leaving	  dinner	  I	  made	  a	  speech	  …	  It’s	  a	  completely	  different	  Japan	  from	  the	  one	  I	  left	  in	  
1945	  and	  thank	  you	  for	  seeing	  the	  other	  side	  of	  Japan.577	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  For	  one	  prisoner	  at	  Nagasaki	  witnessing	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  bomb	  and	  clearing	  up	  afterwards	  
alongside	  a	  Japanese	  soldier	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  cathartic	  experience	  of	  reconciliation.	  “I	  said	  to	  the	  
Japanese	  guard,	  what	  have	  we	  done	  to	  you?	  He	  replied,	  what	  have	  we	  done	  to	  each	  other?	  Everything	  
that	  had	  happened	  over	  the	  past	  tree	  and	  a	  half	  years	  was	  neutralised.”	  IWM:	  Lawrence,	  S.	  (Sound	  
9706)	  Reel4.	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Hughieson	  also	  spoke	  of	  how	  Holmes	  had	  been	  inspired	  by	  her	  mother,	  who	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
war	  had	  disinterred	  the	  bodies	  of	  600	  POWs	  from	  a	  mass	  grave	  at	  Iruka,	  reburying	  them	  in	  
individual	  graves,	  and	  sending	  their	  identification	  to	  the	  respective	  authorities	  in	  each	  country.	  
He	  told	  of	  how	  Holmes	  had	  since	  been	  dedicated	  to	  getting	  the	  government	  of	  Japan	  to	  
acknowledge	  what	  had	  happened	  to	  the	  prisoners	  during	  the	  war.	  
Bill	  Notley	  had	  a	  similarly	  transformational	  experience	  when	  he	  visited	  Iruka	  with	  Keiko	  
Holmes.	  Until	  that	  point	  his	  hatred	  of	  the	  Japanese	  had	  been	  un-­‐mitigated,	  but	  his	  contacts	  
with	  Keiko	  and	  the	  “very	  kind”	  Japanese	  that	  he	  met	  on	  his	  return	  led	  to	  a	  profound	  re-­‐
appraisal	  in	  his	  outlook.	  “I	  have	  forgiven,	  but	  I	  will	  never	  forget.”578	  
	  
The	  cases	  presented	  reveal	  a	  spectrum	  of	  reconciliation	  ranging	  from	  an	  immediate	  
rapprochement	  to	  a	  persistent	  and	  continuing	  antipathy.	  The	  majority	  of	  those	  studied	  
demonstrated	  some	  form	  of	  conciliation	  at	  different	  times	  and	  to	  varying	  degrees.	  Whilst	  this	  
was	  a	  comprehensive	  survey	  of	  the	  sound	  archives	  at	  the	  IWM,	  it	  should	  be	  reiterated	  that	  this	  
represented	  only	  a	  very	  small	  cohort	  of	  the	  total	  population	  of	  BORs	  in	  captivity,	  and	  thus	  the	  
conclusions	  provided	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  only	  indicative	  of	  the	  overall	  perspectives.	  
	  
6.3.	  Selective	  Representation	  of	  the	  FEPOW	  Experience.	  
The	  popular	  narrative	  of	  captivity	  in	  Asia	  has	  largely	  been	  created	  by	  the	  selective	  
reproduction	  of	  a	  narrow	  range	  of	  accounts	  that	  have	  dominated	  the	  representations	  provided	  
by	  the	  mass	  media	  of	  the	  newspaper,	  book	  publishing	  and	  film	  industries.	  Each	  will	  be	  
examined	  in	  turn,	  to	  outline	  the	  operation	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  filtering	  process	  on	  how	  the	  
FEPOW	  experience	  has	  been	  consumed	  by	  the	  public.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578	  IWM:	  Notley,	  W.R.	  (Sound	  16670)	  Reel7.	  
217	  
	  
6.3.1.	  The	  press.	  
Recollections	  of	  time	  spent	  on	  the	  Railway	  would	  resonate	  large	  in	  the	  sporadic	  coverage	  of	  
captivity	  in	  Asia	  in	  post	  war	  newspapers.	  In	  order	  to	  track	  the	  development	  of	  editorial	  
positions	  through	  the	  period	  I	  have	  focussed	  (although	  not	  exclusively)	  on	  the	  Daily	  Mirror	  and	  
the	  Daily	  Mail.	  The	  Mirror	  was	  selected	  to	  represent	  the	  red	  tops	  as	  it	  had	  claimed	  to	  
epitomise	  the	  views	  of	  the	  ordinary	  civilians	  and	  servicemen	  and	  women	  during	  the	  war,	  and	  
unlike	  some	  of	  its	  rivals	  it	  was	  a	  mass	  market	  publication	  from	  the	  war	  through	  to	  the	  present	  
day.	  In	  the	  middlebrow	  sector	  the	  Mail,	  providing	  a	  similarly	  persistent	  presence,	  was	  chosen	  
due	  to	  it	  having	  the	  largest	  circulation	  during	  most	  of	  the	  period	  under	  scrutiny.	  
Their	  coverage	  was	  largely	  associated	  with	  concurrent	  stories	  regarding	  the	  Japanese	  royal	  
family,	  and	  offers	  useful	  insights	  into	  the	  evolution	  of	  both	  the	  post	  war	  agenda	  of	  the	  former	  
prisoners	  and	  that	  of	  the	  popular	  narrative	  that	  grew	  around	  their	  story.	  The	  issues	  of	  
compensation	  and	  the	  associated	  demands	  for	  an	  apology	  from	  Japan	  would	  take	  some	  time	  
to	  develop	  and	  fully	  attract	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  papers,	  and	  royal	  visits	  were,	  if	  not	  catalysts,	  
certainly	  accelerants	  for	  such	  clusters	  of	  coverage.	  The	  state	  visits	  by	  Emperor	  Hirohito	  in	  1971	  
and	  his	  son,	  Emperor	  Akihito,	  in	  1998	  were	  two	  such	  occasions,	  separated	  by	  British	  royal	  
attendance	  at	  Hirohito’s	  funeral	  in	  1989	  and	  the	  coronation	  of	  Akihito	  in	  1990.	  	  
There	  are	  some	  consistent	  themes	  that	  recur	  around	  these	  moments,	  including	  the	  
involvement	  of	  members	  of	  the	  British	  Royal	  Family,	  protests	  against	  the	  Japanese	  monarchy,	  
and	  the	  expressions	  of	  editorial,	  public	  and	  FEPOW	  opinions	  in	  the	  newspapers.	  The	  tabloid	  
Daily	  Mirror	  adopted	  a	  dual	  editorial	  position	  at	  these	  times,	  unsure	  whether	  to	  move	  onwards	  
into	  a	  new	  era	  of	  post	  war	  international	  collaboration	  or	  to	  feed	  on	  (and	  into)	  the	  growing	  
public	  narrative	  of	  repugnance	  and	  abhorrence	  at	  the	  events	  in	  the	  camps.	  In	  the	  end	  it	  would	  
face	  both	  ways,	  as	  somewhat	  paradoxically	  its	  journalists	  and	  commentators	  wrote	  articles	  
that	  focussed	  on	  the	  horrors	  of	  captivity	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  recompense,	  whilst	  the	  majority	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of	  the	  POWs	  whose	  views	  it	  featured	  were	  finding	  some	  degree	  of	  reconciliation.	  The	  Daily	  
Mail,	  while	  making	  limited	  and	  largely	  forward	  looking	  comments	  in	  the	  early	  years,	  joined	  in	  
the	  compensation	  frenzy	  that	  occurred	  in	  1998.	  
Hirohito’s	  state	  visit	  in	  1971,	  to	  receive	  the	  Order	  of	  the	  Garter,	  was	  the	  first	  to	  the	  UK	  by	  a	  
reigning	  Japanese	  emperor.	  On	  the	  home	  front	  all	  seemed	  quiet,	  a	  tranquillity	  that	  was	  
reflected	  by	  the	  Special	  Branch,	  which	  was	  looking	  for	  threats	  from	  the	  east	  in	  their	  security	  
preparations:	  ‘All	  Orientals	  arriving	  in	  Britain	  are	  being	  carefully	  checked	  in	  case	  they	  are	  
Japanese	  extremists.’579	  While	  the	  Mirror	  had	  stirred	  up	  a	  response	  by	  printing	  a	  letter	  from	  
Yoko	  Ono	  outlining	  the	  Emperor’s	  pacific	  nature,580	  	  the	  Mail	  displayed	  a	  largely	  sympathetic,	  if	  
low	  key,	  outlook,	  only	  really	  showing	  any	  interest	  in	  the	  attempts	  by	  Lord	  Mountbatten	  to	  
avoid	  meetings	  with	  Hirohito.	  The	  only	  part	  of	  its	  coverage	  that	  strayed	  from	  this	  line	  was	  the	  
quote	  attributed	  to	  the	  former	  SEAC	  commander:	  ‘It	  is	  hard	  to	  express	  how	  much	  we,	  who	  had	  
fought	  the	  Japanese,	  came	  to	  loathe	  them.’581	  
Hirohito	  was	  largely	  greeted	  in	  silence	  by	  the	  thin	  crowd	  as	  he	  drove	  down	  The	  Mall	  on	  his	  way	  
to	  Buckingham	  Palace.	  One	  27	  year	  old	  man,	  who	  claimed	  to	  have	  a	  grievance	  against	  Hirohito,	  
threw	  his	  coat	  at	  the	  carriage	  carrying	  the	  royal	  party,	  and	  was	  promptly	  despatched	  to	  
hospital	  for	  a	  psychiatric	  report.582	  	  The	  following	  day	  there	  were	  several	  incidents	  involving	  
similarly	  young	  men;	  one	  who	  had	  shouted	  abuse	  at	  the	  Emperor	  outside	  Claridges	  claimed	  
that	  his	  father	  had	  been	  killed	  by	  the	  Japanese,	  whilst	  another	  had	  been	  questioned	  over	  the	  
felling	  of	  a	  tree	  that	  had	  been	  planted	  in	  a	  ceremony	  at	  Kew	  Gardens.	  Both	  were	  released	  
without	  charge.	  583	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Whilst	  the	  response	  in	  the	  UK	  had	  been	  fairly	  muted,	  the	  reception	  on	  the	  continent	  would	  
prove	  much	  livelier.	  A	  young	  Belgian	  student	  had	  been	  arrested	  for	  throwing	  an	  egg	  at	  the	  
Emperor’s	  car,584	  a	  tactic	  that	  would	  be	  repeated	  by	  a	  young	  man	  in	  The	  Hague,	  with	  a	  rock	  
that	  smashed	  the	  windscreen.585	  	  After	  a	  particularly	  widespread	  and	  hostile	  reaction	  in	  
Holland,	  he	  must	  have	  been	  pleasantly	  surprised	  to	  receive	  cheers	  from	  a	  crowd	  gathered	  at	  
Bonn	  Airport	  to	  welcome	  him	  to	  Germany.	  Away	  from	  the	  controlled	  environment	  of	  the	  
airport	  however	  his	  reception	  was	  different,	  and	  he	  was	  welcomed	  into	  the	  city	  by	  a	  crowd	  of	  
jeering	  and	  whistling	  students,	  and	  a	  banner	  that	  read	  ‘Out	  with	  the	  war	  criminal	  Hirohito.’586	  
In	  Europe,	  as	  in	  the	  UK,	  it	  was	  the	  younger	  generation	  that	  had	  gained	  much	  of	  the	  publicity	  
through	  their	  physical	  interventions,	  some	  motivated	  through	  family	  connections,	  others,	  
particularly	  on	  the	  continent,	  no	  doubt	  still	  in	  the	  anti-­‐fascist	  afterglow	  of	  the	  sixties	  student	  
movements.	  The	  war	  veterans	  themselves,	  particularly	  in	  the	  UK,	  had	  been	  more	  restrained	  in	  
their	  responses,	  perhaps	  exhibiting	  the	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  attached	  to	  their	  middle	  aged	  
time	  of	  life.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  Hirohito’s	  death	  some	  18	  years	  later	  this	  would	  change.	  
The	  former	  prisoners	  were	  by	  the	  start	  of	  1989	  starting	  to	  collect	  their	  pensions,	  but	  some	  of	  
them	  weren’t	  going	  to	  retire	  quietly.	  	  Hirohito’s	  state	  funeral	  in	  Japan	  was	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  
protesting	  FEPOWs,	  so	  they	  focussed	  their	  attention	  on	  the	  nearest	  target	  of	  opportunity,	  
which	  happened	  to	  be	  the	  British	  Royal	  Family	  and	  the	  unfortunate	  Prince	  Philip,	  who	  had	  
been	  designated	  to	  attend	  as	  the	  Queen’s	  representative.	  One	  veteran	  even	  went	  to	  the	  high	  
court	  in	  an	  unsuccessful	  attempt	  to	  get	  Philip	  charged	  with	  treason,	  but	  undeterred	  the	  
persistent	  litigant	  was	  reported	  to	  be	  trying	  to	  sell	  his	  Rover	  to	  pay	  for	  an	  appeal.	  587	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George	  Webber,	  a	  journalist	  on	  the	  Mirror,	  wrote	  a	  particularly	  strong	  piece	  for	  a	  page	  titled	  
‘WE	  POWS	  CAN	  NEVER	  FORGIVE	  NOR	  FORGET’.	  He	  recalled	  an	  Australian	  prisoner	  he	  had	  met	  
just	  after	  the	  war	  ended:	  
His	  hands	  were	  bandaged	  in	  splints	  held	  across	  his	  chest,	  yet	  he	  too	  wore	  a	  soft	  smile	  
of	  satisfaction.	  I	  was	  told	  that	  on	  the	  day	  his	  POW	  camp	  was	  liberated	  he	  sought	  out	  
the	  prison	  guard	  who	  had	  made	  his	  life	  a	  living	  hell.	  He	  then	  battered	  him	  to	  death	  
with	  his	  bare	  fists	  so	  violently	  that	  he	  broke	  many	  of	  the	  bones	  in	  his	  own	  hands.	  Ask	  
him	  if	  he	  will	  attend	  the	  funeral	  of	  Hirohito.588	  	  
	  
Whilst	  this	  article	  provides	  anecdotal	  evidence	  against	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  the	  oft	  cited	  
magnanimity	  displayed	  by	  the	  POWs	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  captivity,	  its	  inclusion	  in	  the	  Mirror	  at	  
this	  time	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  Japanaphobic	  	  side	  of	  the	  paper’s	  bi-­‐polar	  coverage.	  The	  
Mail	  was	  a	  little	  more	  restrained	  in	  the	  one	  article	  that	  strayed	  from	  its	  still	  establishment	  
attitude:	  ‘Alas,	  until	  Hirohito’s	  generation	  gracefully	  accept	  their	  own	  guilt,	  Britons	  of	  Prince	  
Philip’s	  generation	  can	  never,	  gracefully,	  forgive.’589	  
As	  was	  protocol	  at	  such	  events,	  Prince	  Philip	  was	  required	  to	  bow	  to	  the	  Emperors,	  old	  and	  
new.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  imagine	  that	  this	  was	  not	  an	  action	  that	  he	  relished,	  and	  this	  was	  reflected	  in	  
the	  fact	  that	  his	  bows	  were	  so	  restrained	  that	  they	  were	  described	  variously	  by	  the	  Mirror	  as	  ‘a	  
polite	  little	  nod’	  and	  a	  ‘brief	  nod’	  on	  successive	  pages	  of	  their	  three	  page	  spread	  on	  the	  
funeral.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  readily	  acknowledged	  diminutive	  nature	  of	  the	  respects	  paid,	  this	  
coverage	  was	  introduced	  on	  the	  front	  page	  with	  the	  large	  banner	  headline	  ‘FURY	  AS	  PHILIP	  
TAKES	  A	  BOW’.590	  The	  Mail’s	  correspondent	  respectfully	  noted:	  ‘NO	  he	  did	  NOT	  bow.	  He	  did	  
not	  even	  nod	  curtly.’591	  
Despite	  the	  attacks	  on	  Prince	  Philip,	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  antipathy	  in	  this	  episode,	  as	  for	  the	  
state	  visit	  in	  1971,	  had	  been	  Japan’s	  wartime	  leader	  Hirohito.	  There	  was	  some	  hope	  that	  with	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his	  passing	  there	  could	  be	  new	  era	  of	  relations	  that	  moved	  on	  from	  the	  past	  and	  looked	  to	  the	  
future,	  a	  view	  espoused	  both	  editorially	  and	  on	  the	  letters	  page	  of	  the	  Mirror.	  Ex-­‐prisoner	  and	  
author	  Geoffrey	  Adams	  had	  himself	  proposed	  such	  an	  approach,	  suggesting	  saving	  any	  royal	  
representation	  for	  the	  crowning	  of	  Akihito,	  ‘which	  would	  have	  signalled	  a	  new	  beginning.’592	  
Almost	  unnoticed,	  the	  last	  word	  on	  the	  subject	  in	  the	  Mirror	  went	  to	  Dame	  Vera	  Lynn,	  who	  
wrote	  a	  letter	  seeking	  donations	  for	  surviving	  prisoners	  and	  their	  families.	  In	  it	  she	  contrasted	  
the	  £76	  compensation	  that	  the	  POWs	  had	  received	  ‘for	  their	  years	  of	  barbarous	  treatment’	  
with	  the	  £46	  million	  cost	  of	  Hirohito’s	  funeral,	  the	  first	  time	  that	  the	  subject	  of	  compensation	  
had	  been	  broached	  for	  many	  years.593	  	  It	  was	  a	  seed	  that	  would	  take	  some	  time	  to	  germinate,	  
but	  when	  it	  did,	  it	  would	  grow	  rapidly.	  
Coverage	  of	  the	  coronation	  of	  Emperor	  Akihito	  the	  following	  year	  might	  appear	  to	  have	  
suggested	  that	  there	  had	  indeed	  been	  a	  ‘new	  beginning’.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  one	  small	  
letter	  of	  protest	  there	  was	  hardly	  any	  negative	  coverage	  of	  either	  the	  ceremony	  or	  of	  the	  
presence	  of	  the	  British	  Royal	  Family	  in	  the	  Mirror.	  The	  only	  reference	  to	  protests	  was	  to	  those	  
carried	  out	  by	  the	  significant	  number	  of	  Japanese	  who	  were	  opposed	  to	  the	  ceremony	  as	  
representing	  a	  throwback	  to	  Japan’s	  military	  past.	  These	  followed	  on	  from	  demonstrations	  by	  
progressives	  at	  Hirohito’s	  funeral,	  and	  despite	  their	  anti-­‐militarist	  beliefs,	  thousands	  of	  
demonstrators	  battled	  with	  over	  37,000	  police	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  Tokyo,	  sent	  two	  religious	  
shrines	  up	  in	  flames,	  and	  launched	  a	  rocket	  attack	  on	  the	  imperial	  palace,	  in	  front	  of	  which	  
‘one	  fanatic	  …	  tried	  to	  commit	  ritual	  suicide.’594	  	  	  
Given	  that	  the	  coronation	  took	  place	  in	  November,	  the	  day	  after	  Remembrance	  Day,	  it	  might	  
have	  been	  expected	  that	  there	  would	  be	  a	  flurry	  of	  complaints	  about	  the	  royal	  presence.	  
Instead,	  because	  the	  British	  Royal	  Family	  had	  deployed	  their	  marketing	  trump	  card,	  the	  next	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generation	  as	  represented	  by	  Charles	  and	  Diana,	  the	  Mirror’s	  coverage	  of	  the	  visit	  turned	  into	  
a	  week-­‐long	  fashion	  review.	  The	  royal	  couple	  visited	  a	  commonwealth	  war	  graves	  site	  at	  
Yokohama	  on	  the	  11th,	  where,	  in	  a	  break	  with	  the	  established	  protocol	  ‘Diana	  raised	  eyebrows	  
by	  wearing	  a	  French	  Chanel	  outfit	  for	  the	  ceremony.’595	  	  At	  the	  coronation	  the	  headline	  news	  
was	  that	  ‘DI’S	  £100	  HAT	  STEALS	  THE	  SHOW.’596	  	  The	  power	  of	  the	  Diana	  factor	  was	  so	  strong	  
that	  at	  a	  garden	  party	  later	  in	  the	  week	  she	  could	  wear	  a	  hat	  based	  on	  the	  Japanese	  national	  
flag,	  white	  with	  a	  red	  sun	  on	  it,	  generating	  only	  one	  comment	  in	  the	  Mirror,	  which	  described	  it	  
simply	  as	  ‘a	  topping	  new	  idea’.597	  The	  Mail	  was	  neither	  interested	  in	  the	  coronation	  nor	  
impressed	  by	  the	  fashion.	  It	  ran	  one	  story	  all	  week,	  in	  which	  it	  observed:	  ‘The	  Princess	  [Diana]	  
may	  have	  realised	  that	  her	  “interesting”	  hat	  –	  a	  puckered	  veil	  hanging	  from	  a	  headband,	  was,	  
on	  reflection,	  a	  mistake.’598	  
The	  state	  visit	  of	  Emperor	  Akihito	  in	  1998	  would	  see	  the	  largest	  protests,	  in	  terms	  of	  column	  
inches,	  of	  the	  post	  war	  period.	  The	  interlinked	  aims	  of	  an	  apology	  and	  compensation	  had	  been	  
stimulated	  by	  financial	  settlements	  in	  Canada,	  the	  USA	  and	  Hong	  Kong,	  and	  political	  and	  public	  
pressure	  was	  being	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  Tony	  Blair’s	  British	  government.	  This	  time	  the	  tabloid	  
press	  was	  joined	  by	  its	  more	  middle	  brow	  cousins	  in	  adopting	  a	  more	  lurid	  approach	  to	  
reporting	  the	  issues	  around	  the	  visit.	  
The	  Mirror	  exhibited	  a	  range	  of	  responses	  to	  the	  visit	  and	  to	  the	  wider	  issues	  involved.	  The	  
tone	  of	  the	  veterans	  that	  it	  used	  for	  sound-­‐bites	  was	  less	  vituperative	  than	  previously.	  Arthur	  
Titherington	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Labour	  Camps	  Survivors	  Association	  (JLCSA)	  was	  frequently	  cited	  
as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  POWs	  in	  both	  the	  Mirror	  and	  the	  Mail,	  and	  whilst	  he	  was	  ardent	  in	  
his	  pursuit	  of	  an	  apology	  and	  recompense	  (he	  had	  spat	  on	  the	  stairs	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Diet	  
following	  an	  unsuccessful	  court	  case	  in	  Tokyo),	  he	  was	  keen	  to	  stress	  that	  he	  held	  ‘no	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animosity	  towards	  the	  modern	  Japanese.	  He	  said:	  “This	  is	  not	  about	  revenge.	  There	  is	  no	  
hatred.”’599	  	  A	  similar	  spirit	  of	  reconciliation	  was	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Mirror’s	  serialisation	  of	  
excerpts	  from	  Eric	  Lomax’s	  account	  of	  captivity,	  The	  Railway	  Man,600	  albeit	  the	  reader	  had	  to	  
traverse	  through	  a	  litany	  of	  suffering	  and	  brutality	  to	  get	  to	  it.	  Much	  of	  the	  contemporary	  
criticism	  from	  the	  POWs	  was	  being	  levelled	  at	  the	  British	  Government	  over	  its	  soft	  pedal	  
approaches	  to	  the	  Japanese	  Government	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  apology,	  and	  its	  tardiness	  in	  
dealing	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  compensation.	  
In	  the	  Mirror	  it	  was	  the	  journalists	  who	  were	  reporting	  in	  a	  fashion	  that	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  at	  
least	  ten,	  if	  not	  twenty,	  years	  behind	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  narrative	  as	  espoused	  by	  the	  former	  
captives	  that	  were	  being	  featured	  in	  the	  paper.	  Brian	  Sewell	  drew	  a	  direct	  comparison	  
between	  the	  holocaust	  and	  the	  Japanese	  treatment	  of	  the	  men	  who;	  
…	  they	  starved	  and	  beat	  and	  worked	  to	  death	  as,	  in	  their	  oriental	  beastliness,	  callous	  
disregard	  for	  Western	  sensibilities	  and	  brutal	  scorn	  for	  the	  vanquished,	  they	  built	  the	  
Burma-­‐Siam	  Railway	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  120,000	  lives.601	  	  	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  over	  100,000	  of	  those	  deaths	  were	  suffered	  by	  Asian	  labourers	  apparently	  
offered	  no	  contradiction	  to	  Sewell’s	  highly	  orientalised	  view	  of	  events.	  A	  more	  reasoned	  piece	  
from	  Tony	  Parsons,	  which	  he	  presaged	  with	  the	  qualification	  that	  his	  wife	  was	  Japanese	  and	  
that	  he	  had	  always	  found	  Japanese	  people	  very	  warm	  and	  friendly,	  arrived	  at	  a	  similar	  
conclusion.	  ‘I	  would	  never	  ask	  the	  men	  who	  were	  POWs	  in	  the	  Japanese	  camps	  to	  forgive	  and	  
forget.	  How	  can	  they?	  Some	  things	  can	  never	  be	  forgiven.	  Some	  things	  can	  never	  be	  
forgotten.’602	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  his	  captivity	  at	  Kinkaseki	  Camp	  on	  
Formosa,	  had	  set	  up	  the	  JLSCA	  in	  response	  to	  a	  perceived	  privileging	  of	  the	  Railway	  in	  the	  FEPOW	  
discourse,	  and	  to	  apply	  further	  pressure	  on	  the	  claim	  for	  compensation	  and	  an	  apology.	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The	  mantra	  of	  ‘never	  forgive,	  never	  forget’	  had	  taken	  a	  strong	  hold	  on	  the	  public	  discourse	  at	  
this	  time.	  Tony	  Blair,	  who	  had	  misjudged	  public	  opinion	  with	  an	  ill-­‐advised	  call	  for	  Akihito	  to	  be	  
welcomed,	  found	  himself	  having	  to	  use	  the	  sandbags	  of	  such	  semantics	  to	  staunch	  the	  flood	  of	  
criticism	  that	  his	  statement	  had	  created.	  From	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  he	  asserted:	  
“We	  must	  never	  -­‐	  and	  will	  never	  -­‐	  forget,	  or	  indeed	  forgive,	  the	  suffering	  of	  those	  people.”603	  
The	  Mail,	  having	  awoken	  to	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  the	  story,	  showed	  significantly	  more	  interest	  
in	  this	  visit	  than	  it	  had	  done	  on	  previous	  occasions,	  and	  did	  so	  from	  a	  much	  more	  negative	  
editorial	  position.	  Even	  one	  of	  its	  more	  nuanced	  contributions,	  from	  Cambridge	  historian	  John	  
Casey,	  reiterated	  the	  unforgiving	  theme,	  whilst	  elaborating	  on	  the	  need	  for	  progress.	  
Certainly	  we	  should	  not	  forget	  the	  past,	  and	  those	  who	  grievously	  suffered	  should	  not	  
be	  expected	  to	  forgive.	  But	  in	  the	  end,	  it	  becomes	  morbid	  and	  irrational	  for	  a	  nation	  to	  
be	  frozen	  in	  the	  attitudes	  and	  memories	  of	  fifty	  years	  ago.604	  
	  
Casey’s	  article	  provided	  the	  standard	  press	  response	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  reconciliation,	  but	  it	  did	  
serve	  to	  highlight	  the	  unusually	  persistent	  and	  rigid	  interpretation	  of	  the	  FEPOW	  narrative.	  
Whereas	  Summerfield	  has	  written	  of	  the	  widespread	  contestation	  of	  differing	  memories	  of	  the	  
war,	  the	  story	  of	  the	  prisoners	  in	  Asia	  had	  remained	  frozen	  into	  one	  of	  unremitting	  horror	  and	  
unrelenting	  antipathy,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  reproductions	  of	  the	  media.605	  
A	  rare	  voice	  that	  questioned	  the	  mob	  mentality	  prevalent	  in	  the	  press	  at	  the	  time	  came	  in	  an	  
editorial	  in	  The	  Independent,	  which	  referred	  to	  the	  ‘raucous	  xenophobia	  of	  the	  tabloid	  press.’	  
Whilst	  taking	  aim	  at	  the	  Sun	  and	  the	  Mail,	  its	  primary	  target	  was	  the	  coverage	  in	  the	  Daily	  
Mirror.	  
Before	  the	  visit	  of	  Emperor	  Akihito	  of	  Japan,	  we	  characterised	  in	  these	  pages	  the	  
public	  mood	  which	  tends	  to	  be	  stoked	  by	  the	  tabloid	  press	  whenever	  past	  crimes	  are	  
raked	  over.	  So	  it	  came	  to	  pass.	  The	  Mirror	  devoted	  two	  pages	  to	  stories	  of	  Japanese	  
torture	  more	  than	  50	  years	  ago	  under	  the	  headline	  "What	  price	  our	  heroes	  Tony?"	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When	  the	  Emperor	  was	  awarded	  the	  Order	  of	  the	  Garter,	  it	  thundered:	  "Today	  we	  are	  
all	  being	  asked	  to	  put	  money	  before	  pride."	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  had	  insulted	  the	  
veterans	  by	  asking	  them	  to	  be	  nice	  to	  the	  Emperor	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  our	  yen	  earnings.	  
And	  the	  Emperor	  had	  delivered	  "A	  Final	  Kick	  in	  the	  Teeth"	  by	  brushing	  aside	  the	  
protests	  of	  Jack	  Caplan,	  83,	  quoted	  on	  the	  front	  page	  as	  saying:	  "I	  watched	  my	  friends	  
beheaded,	  their	  bodies	  squirming	  on	  the	  ground.	  I've	  come	  here	  for	  them."606	  
	  
In	  a	  lengthy	  and	  balanced	  treatment	  of	  the	  wider	  issues	  involved,	  which	  included	  a	  discussion	  
of	  the	  semantics	  of	  apology,	  the	  leader	  writer	  was	  critical	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  official	  
Japanese	  outlook,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  compensation	  and	  the	  teaching	  of	  history	  in	  
Japan.	  It	  was	  however	  far	  more	  critical	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  British	  press,	  and	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  
papers	  that	  questioned	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  the	  passions	  that	  were	  being	  reported	  (and	  stimulated)	  
by	  its	  fellow	  publications.	  
It	  is	  true	  that	  some	  of	  the	  former	  prisoners	  of	  war	  are	  properly	  indignant	  at	  their	  
government's	  failure	  to	  extract	  fuller	  apologies	  and	  reparations	  from	  Japan,	  and	  were	  
mortally	  offended	  by	  the	  pomp	  and	  courtesy	  with	  which	  the	  Emperor	  was	  received.	  
But	  the	  larger	  truth	  is	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  former	  prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese	  were	  
probably	  embarrassed	  by	  the	  displays	  of	  public	  rudeness	  and	  flag-­‐burning.607	  
	  
	  
As	  The	  Independent	  suggested,	  many	  of	  the	  former	  prisoners,	  and	  particularly	  those	  the	  Mirror	  
quoted,	  were	  now	  in	  a	  more	  forgiving	  mode,	  certainly	  as	  far	  as	  the	  present	  day	  Japanese	  
population	  was	  concerned.	  Most	  of	  their	  anger	  was	  by	  now	  focussed	  on	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  the	  
continued	  obfuscation	  of	  their	  own	  Government	  over	  the	  compensation	  issue,	  in	  which	  the	  UK	  
was	  now	  out	  of	  line	  with	  most	  of	  the	  former	  western	  allies.	  It	  would	  be	  several	  years	  before	  
the	  survivors	  would	  finally	  receive	  a	  £10,000	  settlement,	  with	  the	  Royal	  British	  Legion	  having	  
helped	  to	  box	  Prime	  Minister	  Tony	  Blair	  into	  a	  very	  public	  corner	  from	  which	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  
escape.	  	  After	  this	  time	  there	  would	  be	  minimal	  coverage	  in	  the	  tabloids	  of	  the	  POW	  story,	  as,	  
with	  compensation	  having	  been	  fought	  for	  and	  won,	  the	  semantics	  of	  the	  apology	  faded	  from	  
the	  agenda	  of	  most,	  although	  not	  all,	  of	  the	  surviving	  FEPOWs.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606	  The	  Independent:	  31/5/1998:	  p4.	  
607	  The	  Independent:	  31/5/1998:	  p4.	  
226	  
	  
6.3.2.	  Published	  books.	  
Whilst	  the	  press	  can	  have	  a	  significant	  immediate	  impact	  on	  public	  opinion	  and	  help	  to	  shape	  
longer	  term	  perspectives,	  an	  individual	  article	  or	  newspaper	  has	  only	  a	  limited	  lifespan	  before	  
it	  is	  reduced	  to	  an	  artefact	  that	  is	  only	  viewed	  by	  researchers.	  Books	  (and	  films)	  can	  have	  a	  
much	  longer	  shelf	  life	  and	  thus	  can	  provide	  a	  more	  persistent	  vector	  for	  the	  transmission	  and	  
construction	  of	  popular	  memory.	  
Philip	  Towle,	  one	  of	  the	  rare	  British	  academics	  in	  the	  FEPOW	  field,	  has	  perhaps	  somewhat	  
exuberantly	  likened	  the	  POW	  canon	  to	  the	  literature	  generated	  in	  the	  trenches	  of	  the	  First	  
World	  War,	  and	  claimed	  that	  it	  represents	  the	  largest	  extant	  record	  of	  ‘a	  slave	  experience	  ever	  
written	  by	  the	  slaves	  themselves.’	  	  	  Whilst	  such	  equivalences	  might	  be	  debatable,	  he	  is	  
certainly	  correct	  in	  identifying	  the	  unusually	  large	  number	  of	  memoirs	  written	  and	  compiled	  by	  
the	  ordinary	  servicemen	  and	  the	  reticence	  of	  publishers	  to	  get	  involved	  with	  scripts	  that	  
contain	  insufficient	  drama	  on	  their	  pages.	  608	  	  
In	  this	  section	  a	  limited	  selection	  of	  such	  publications	  is	  considered	  in	  order	  to	  illuminate	  the	  
publishing	  barriers	  that	  faced	  potential	  authors,	  and	  how	  these	  operated	  to	  reproduce	  a	  
selective	  representation	  of	  the	  FEPOW	  experience.	  This	  filtering	  process	  would	  often	  privilege	  
the	  accounts	  of	  those	  officers	  who	  had	  served	  on	  the	  Railway	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  few	  who	  
had	  roused	  the	  interest	  of	  publishers	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  experienced	  the	  sharper	  end	  of	  Anglo-­‐
Japanese	  relations	  in	  so	  doing.	  Educational	  background	  could	  also	  make	  them	  more	  likely	  to	  
have	  the	  required	  skill	  set	  and	  confidence	  to	  write,	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  networks	  that	  
facilitated	  such	  efforts.	  	  The	  effects	  of	  this	  filtration	  become	  even	  more	  apparent	  when	  the	  
limited	  canon	  of	  filmed	  representations	  is	  considered.	  In	  common	  with	  the	  preceding	  sections,	  
a	  trajectory	  of	  reconciliation	  can	  also	  be	  traced	  over	  time,	  albeit	  one	  tinged	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  
superiority	  and	  the	  ultimate	  victory	  of	  western	  values.	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Publishers,	  perhaps	  more	  so	  than	  newspaper	  proprietors,	  are	  in	  the	  business	  to	  make	  money.	  
This	  has	  obvious	  implications	  for	  what	  they	  put	  into	  print,	  in	  the	  hope	  and	  expectation	  that	  the	  
public	  will	  buy	  it.	  The	  mundane	  and	  the	  ordinary	  are	  not	  usually	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  bestseller	  
lists.	  Former	  POW	  Harry	  Berry	  discovered	  this	  as	  he	  tried	  to	  commit	  his	  collection	  of	  letters	  
home	  to	  his	  wife	  and	  the	  diaries	  he	  kept	  in	  captivity	  to	  print.	  His	  accurate	  portrayal	  of	  the	  
tedium	  of	  camp	  life	  as	  he	  experienced	  it	  proved	  too	  dull	  for	  the	  industry,	  as	  his	  daughter	  
explained	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  eventually	  self-­‐published	  edition.	  	  
He	  wanted	  to	  get	  it	  published	  but	  conventional	  publishers	  requested	  it	  to	  be	  edited:	  
the	  exciting,	  the	  dramatic	  and	  the	  brutal	  to	  be	  highlighted,	  the	  tedious	  to	  be	  cut	  out.	  
Harry	  said,	  “No,	  that’s	  how	  it	  was	  for	  me	  and	  is	  exactly	  what	  I	  wrote	  at	  the	  time.	  It’s	  all	  
or	  nothing.”609	  
	  
	  In	  fairness	  to	  the	  publishers,	  Berry’s	  account	  is	  hardly	  a	  page	  turner,	  and	  features	  a	  thrice	  daily	  
review	  of	  catering	  arrangements,	  both	  before	  and	  after	  he	  was	  captured.	  To	  the	  historian	  it	  is	  
however	  an	  accurate	  representation	  of	  the	  mundanity	  of	  much	  of	  camp	  life,	  and	  is	  closer	  to	  
the	  truth	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  lack	  of	  commercial	  modifications.	  	  
One	  author	  who	  did	  take	  the	  publisher’s	  shilling	  was	  Lord	  Russell	  of	  Liverpool,	  who	  had	  served	  
as	  a	  legal	  adviser	  to	  the	  war	  crimes	  trials	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.610	  	  His	  original	  intention	  had	  
been	  to	  produce	  a	  multi-­‐volume	  academic	  account	  of	  the	  Japanese	  trials,	  but	  this	  held	  little	  
appeal	  for	  his	  publisher,	  who	  wanted	  a	  punchy	  follow	  up	  to	  his	  previous	  best	  seller,	  The	  
Scourge	  of	  the	  Swastika:	  A	  Short	  History	  of	  Nazi	  War	  Crimes.611	  	  Cassell	  got	  their	  way,	  and	  the	  
single	  volume	  came	  out	  with	  a	  similarly	  snappy	  title,	  The	  Knights	  of	  Bushido:	  A	  Short	  History	  of	  
Japanese	  War	  Crimes.612	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It	  was	  not	  always	  such	  a	  one	  way	  process	  however,	  as	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  No	  Time	  for	  Geishas,	  
the	  account	  of	  Lt.	  Geoffrey	  “Pharaoh”	  Adams	  captivity.	  ‘I	  make	  no	  apology	  for	  recounting	  that	  
not	  all	  our	  Japanese	  captors	  were	  the	  devil	  incarnate,	  nor	  every	  Allied	  serviceman	  an	  angel’,	  he	  
writes	  early	  on	  in	  an	  unusually	  balanced	  and	  informative	  account,	  for	  which	  he	  took	  the	  highly	  
unusual	  step	  of	  actually	  seeking	  the	  assistance	  of	  some	  of	  his	  captors	  in	  the	  editorial	  
process.613	  He	  had	  a	  comparatively	  undemanding	  time	  at	  Sime	  Rd	  Camp,	  even	  by	  the	  generally	  
benign	  standards	  of	  Singapore,	  and	  enjoyed	  a	  relatively	  comfortable	  Railway	  where	  he	  was	  a	  
livestock	  drover	  for	  much	  of	  the	  time.	  His	  good	  run	  would	  end	  in	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  war,	  
when	  he	  was	  shipped	  to	  Japan	  to	  a	  camp	  where	  a	  particularly	  corrupt	  group	  of	  US	  POWs	  had	  
taken	  control,	  with	  the	  connivance	  of	  the	  commandant.	  	  
A	  book	  that	  also	  featured	  American	  criminality,	  but	  against	  a	  more	  feral	  background	  featuring	  
the	  widespread	  provenance	  of	  such	  behaviour,	  is	  	  James	  Clavell’s	  novel	  King	  Rat.614	  This	  
located	  sufficient	  suffering	  and	  misery	  at	  Changi	  to	  preclude	  the	  need	  to	  go	  up-­‐country	  to	  the	  
setting	  of	  the	  Railway.	  Clavell,	  who	  after	  arriving	  from	  Java	  spent	  most	  of	  his	  captivity	  at	  
Changi,	  paints	  a	  stark	  fictionalised	  picture	  of	  desperation	  and	  survival	  which	  bears	  little	  
resemblance	  to	  the	  relatively	  comfortable	  reality	  of	  the	  camp.	  Despite	  this	  he	  paints	  a	  picture	  
of	  camp	  life	  that	  has	  some	  resonance	  with	  actual	  accounts,	  albeit	  in	  different	  locations.	  His	  
cast	  of	  characters	  runs	  the	  gamut	  of	  some	  of	  the	  worst	  camp	  stereotypes,	  particularly	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  his	  fellow	  officers.	  British	  colonels	  are	  top	  slicing	  the	  rations	  by	  using	  tampered	  
weights,	  a	  padre	  trades	  his	  tobacco	  ration	  to	  hungry	  men	  for	  their	  food,	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  class	  
is	  never	  far	  from	  the	  surface,	  albeit	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  laissez-­‐faire	  Americans	  and	  
Australians	  with	  whom	  his	  main	  character	  associates.	  The	  inaccurate	  representation	  of	  Changi	  
was	  amplified	  by	  the	  cover	  material	  on	  a	  later	  edition,	  which	  stated	  that	  ‘only	  one	  man	  in	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fifteen	  had	  the	  strength,	  the	  luck,	  the	  cleverness	  to	  survive’.615	  	  In	  reality	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  those	  
who	  passed	  through	  Changi	  died	  there,	  a	  small	  proportion	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  much	  higher	  
average	  figure	  of	  25%	  across	  Asia,	  and	  considerably	  less	  even	  than	  the	  oft	  cited	  figure	  of	  
around	  5%	  for	  British	  POWs	  in	  Europe.	  This	  was	  presumably	  a	  sales	  pitch	  from	  the	  publisher,	  
as	  Clavell	  himself	  only	  refers	  to	  a	  few	  deaths	  occurring	  during	  the	  time	  period	  in	  question.	  	  
King	  Rat	  is	  unusual	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  it	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  some	  historiographical	  
discussion.	  Sybilla	  Jane	  Flower,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  widely	  published	  of	  the	  British	  historians	  of	  
FEPOW	  captivity	  commends	  Clavell,	  saying	  that	  he	  ‘wrote	  convincingly	  of	  the	  anarchic	  
conditions	  in	  Changi	  Jail	  in	  the	  last	  months	  of	  the	  war,	  after	  the	  Japanese	  had	  destroyed	  the	  
successful	  command	  structure	  put	  in	  place	  by	  the	  British	  and	  Australian	  generals	  in	  1942.’616	  	  In	  
her	  keenness	  to	  promulgate	  her	  primary	  thesis,	  that	  of	  the	  crucial	  importance	  of	  the	  command	  
structure	  and	  the	  consequent	  restoration	  in	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  officer	  corps,	  Flower	  has	  
perhaps	  not	  met	  her	  usually	  meticulous	  research	  thresholds.	  Not	  only	  were	  the	  most	  criminally	  
and	  morally	  reprehensible	  characters	  in	  the	  book	  senior	  British	  officers,	  but	  they	  had	  been	  
short	  changing	  the	  food	  supply	  for	  several	  years,	  not	  just	  the	  final	  months	  as	  she	  proposes.	  	  
The	  Australian	  historian	  Kevin	  Blackburn	  saw	  the	  book	  differently	  and	  suggested	  that	  Clavell	  
was	  trying	  to	  work	  through	  and	  mitigate	  his	  own	  sense	  of	  guilt	  at	  having	  escaped	  the	  horrors	  
of	  the	  Railway,	  by	  transposing	  them	  to	  Changi.617	  
	  In	  a	  more	  redemptive	  and	  reconciliatory	  approach,	  although	  still	  resonating	  with	  common	  
themes	  of	  extreme	  pain	  and	  suffering,	  Lt.	  Ernest	  Gordon	  recalled	  how	  his	  Christianity	  and	  the	  
support	  of	  friends	  helped	  him	  to	  recover	  from	  the	  cumulative	  effects	  of	  beri	  beri,	  malaria	  and	  
diphtheria,	  which	  nearly	  cost	  him	  his	  life	  at	  Chungkai	  Camp.	  His	  friends	  had	  created	  a	  small	  
private	  shed	  for	  him	  so	  that	  he	  could	  be	  moved	  out	  of	  the	  Death	  House,	  as	  the	  camp	  hospital	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  Clavell,	  James.	  (1962:	  1985	  edn)	  King	  Rat.	  Hodder	  and	  Stoughton,	  London.	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  Flower,	  “Memory”,	  in:	  Hack	  and	  Blackburn	  (eds)	  Forgotten	  Captives.	  p58.	  
617	  Blackburn,	  Kevin.(2000)	  “Commemorating	  and	  commodifying	  the	  prisoner	  of	  war	  experience	  in	  south	  
east	  Asia:	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Changi	  Prison	  Museum.”	  Journal	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  War	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  Issue	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230	  
	  
was	  known,	  which	  in	  effect	  was	  a	  waiting	  room	  for	  the	  morgue.	  His	  doctors	  had	  given	  him	  a	  
couple	  more	  days,	  but	  despite	  everything	  he	  pulled	  through	  and	  was	  able	  to	  witness	  the	  
parallel	  development	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  community	  spirit	  and	  healing	  in	  the	  camp,	  no	  doubt	  partly	  
stimulated	  by	  a	  period	  of	  more	  relaxed	  conditions	  after	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  Railway.618	  	  	  
Initially	  less	  forgiving	  was	  Lt.	  Eric	  Lomax,	  who	  had	  the	  misfortune	  to	  be	  the	  only	  signaller	  in	  the	  
hut	  at	  Kanchanaburi	  where	  a	  radio	  was	  found.	  His	  bad	  luck	  was	  compounded	  by	  the	  discovery	  
of	  a	  map	  of	  the	  Railway	  in	  his	  belongings,	  and	  no	  amount	  of	  pleading	  his	  genuine	  interest	  in	  
train-­‐spotting	  would	  mitigate	  his	  torture	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Japanese	  secret	  police,	  the	  
Kempetai.	  Although	  he	  survived	  this	  ordeal,	  it	  would	  scar	  him,	  both	  physically	  and	  
psychologically	  for	  many	  years	  afterwards.	  His	  hatred	  burned	  deepest	  for	  the	  diminutive	  NCO	  
who	  acted	  as	  interpreter	  for	  his	  torturers,	  and	  long	  after	  the	  war	  he	  still	  harboured	  a	  very	  
strong	  desire	  for	  revenge	  against	  him.	  By	  chance	  many	  years	  later,	  in	  1989,	  he	  came	  across	  an	  
article	  in	  the	  Japan	  Times	  about	  an	  interpreter,	  Nagase	  Takashi,	  who	  had	  assisted	  in	  the	  
location	  of	  graves	  on	  the	  Railway	  in	  the	  immediate	  post-­‐war	  period.	  Despite	  the	  passage	  of	  
over	  45	  years,	  Lomax	  recognised	  his	  interpreter	  and	  sought	  to	  locate	  him,	  initially	  intent	  on	  
revenge.	  A	  letter	  of	  profound	  apology	  from	  Nagase,	  and	  the	  realisation	  of	  the	  scale	  of	  his	  
penitence,	  would	  change	  everything	  however,	  and	  the	  pair	  eventually	  met	  and	  reconciled	  in	  
Thailand	  in	  1993.619	  
In	  a	  feedback	  loop	  characteristic	  of	  much	  of	  the	  FEPOW	  experience,	  Nagase	  Takashi	  would	  
come	  to	  feature	  in	  later	  editions	  of	  Gordon’s	  book,	  subsequently	  republished	  as	  To	  End	  All	  
Wars,	  to	  accompany	  the	  film	  of	  the	  same	  name	  that	  was	  released	  in	  2001.	  The	  only	  difference	  
from	  the	  original	  edition	  is	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  four	  page	  introduction,	  that	  contains	  a	  
description	  of	  a	  scene	  shot	  for	  the	  film	  (which	  required	  several	  takes)	  where	  Nagase	  and	  
Gordon	  meet	  in	  Kanchanaburi	  Cemetery,	  and	  a	  formal	  apology	  is	  made	  for	  the	  atrocities	  that	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  Gordon,	  Ernest.	  (1963)	  Miracle	  on	  the	  River	  Kwai.	  The	  Quality	  Book	  Club,	  London.	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  Lomax,	  Eric.	  (1995)	  The	  Railway	  Man.	  Jonathon	  Cape,	  London.	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the	  POWs	  suffered.	  Gordon’s	  choice	  of	  the	  words	  ‘I	  acknowledge	  his	  apology’	  instead	  of	  the	  
more	  obvious	  ‘accept’	  seems	  like	  a	  deliberate	  choice,	  although	  whether	  this	  reflects	  his	  still	  
unresolved	  acceptance,	  or	  that	  of	  his	  wider	  anticipated	  audience	  is	  unclear.620	  	  Whether	  the	  
film-­‐makers	  picked	  up	  on	  Nagase’s	  self-­‐appointed	  role	  as	  apologist	  for	  Japanese	  brutality	  
through	  Lomax’s	  book,	  or	  indeed	  through	  the	  two	  documentaries	  that	  followed	  it,	  is	  unclear.	  It	  
is	  a	  role	  that	  was	  reprised	  in	  the	  2013	  film	  version	  of	  The	  Railway	  Man,	  although	  not	  by	  Nagase	  
himself,	  as	  he	  passed	  away	  in	  2011.	  	  
The	  most	  recent	  addition	  to	  this	  canon	  of	  literature	  is	  a	  novel	  by	  Australian	  author	  Richard	  
Flanagan,	  The	  Narrow	  Road	  to	  the	  Deep	  North,	  winner	  of	  the	  Man	  Booker	  Prize	  2014.621	  The	  
character	  of	  surgeon	  Dorrigo	  Evans,	  a	  former	  POW	  who	  became	  a	  national	  hero	  in	  Australia	  
after	  the	  war	  has	  echoes	  of	  Edward	  “Weary”	  Dunlop	  about	  him,	  although	  it	  is	  probably	  safe	  to	  
say	  that	  Evans’	  sexual	  adventures	  were	  not	  informed	  from	  the	  same	  source.	  The	  scenes	  in	  
captivity	  again	  focus	  on	  the	  Railway	  and	  depict	  a	  standard	  portrayal	  of	  appalling	  conditions.	  A	  
not	  untypical	  passage	  describes	  the	  conditions:	  
As	  he	  came	  close	  to	  the	  ulcer	  hut,	  Dorrigo	  was	  enveloped	  by	  the	  stench.	  The	  stink	  of	  
foul	  meat	  was	  so	  bad	  that	  Jimmy	  Bigelow	  –	  who	  accompanied	  Evans	  on	  his	  rounds	  
outside	  of	  the	  cholera	  compound	  to	  help	  as	  an	  orderly	  nurse	  –	  would	  on	  occasion	  have	  
to	  leave,	  go	  outside	  and	  vomit.622	  
	  
The	  problem	  with	  such	  representations	  is	  not	  that	  they	  are	  inaccurate,	  there	  were	  many	  
scenes	  of	  an	  even	  worse	  nature,	  but	  that	  they	  are	  unrepresentative	  of	  the	  overall	  experience	  
of	  captivity.	  It	  was	  not	  always	  as	  bad	  as	  the	  way	  it	  is	  has	  been	  melodramatically	  portrayed.	  The	  
routine	  of	  boredom,	  illness,	  hunger	  and	  overwork	  was	  no	  less	  damaging	  to	  the	  health,	  but	  was	  
mostly	  considerably	  less	  dramatic	  than	  the	  portrayals	  in	  the	  media	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  worst	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  Gordon,	  Ernest	  (2002)	  To	  End	  All	  Wars.	  Zondervan,	  Grand	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  vi.	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  Flanagan,	  Richard.	  (2013;	  2014	  edn)	  The	  Narrow	  Road	  to	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  Chatto	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  Windus,	  London.	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  Flanagan,	  The	  Narrow	  Road,	  pp265-­‐266.	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aspects	  of	  prison	  life,	  giving	  consumers	  of	  such	  products	  a	  false	  impression	  that	  these	  
circumstances	  were	  the	  norm	  throughout	  captivity.	  
	  
The	  foregoing	  titles	  serve	  to	  highlight	  the	  selective	  nature	  of	  the	  publishing	  industry,	  which	  
sought	  to	  filter	  out	  any	  accounts	  which	  did	  not	  meet	  its	  demand	  for	  brutality	  and	  horror.	  This	  
meant	  that	  the	  public	  at	  large	  received	  a	  generally	  singular	  and	  narrow	  view	  of	  what	  life	  was	  
like	  in	  the	  camps,	  particularly	  for	  a	  small	  section	  of	  the	  officer	  corps,	  to	  the	  preclusion	  of	  the	  
many	  less	  dramatic	  accounts.	  This	  survey	  of	  POW	  literature	  has	  in	  itself	  been	  somewhat	  
selective	  in	  the	  publications	  considered,	  and	  has	  focussed	  primarily	  on	  a	  few	  accounts	  written	  
by	  such	  officers.	  Whilst	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  representative	  of	  the	  overall	  balance	  of	  
authorship,	  it	  is	  more	  so	  in	  terms	  of	  actual	  readership	  and	  exposure.	  	  These	  titles	  were	  
amongst	  the	  best-­‐selling	  accounts	  of	  captivity,	  and	  received	  a	  wider	  audience	  through	  the	  
other	  arms	  of	  the	  mass	  media,	  whether	  in	  the	  press,	  or	  as	  the	  next	  section	  will	  consider	  on	  
film.623	  None	  of	  the	  accounts	  by	  the	  other	  ranks	  have	  made	  it	  onto	  either	  the	  big	  or	  the	  small	  
screen.	  	  
6.3.3.	  Filmed	  representations.	  
The	  public	  reach	  of	  even	  a	  best-­‐seller	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  less	  than	  that	  which	  even	  a	  moderately	  
successful	  film	  might	  achieve	  (particularly	  when	  replayed	  on	  television),	  or	  indeed	  in	  a	  more	  
immediate	  sense	  the	  readership	  of	  a	  national	  newspaper.	  Making	  the	  jump	  into	  the	  20th	  (and	  
21st)	  century	  instruments	  of	  mass	  media	  consumption	  would	  be	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  most	  of	  
the	  books	  that	  were	  published.	  Only	  a	  select	  few	  would	  break	  through	  the	  celluloid	  ceiling,	  
which	  gave	  them	  a	  power	  to	  influence	  the	  post-­‐war	  narrative	  that	  went	  way	  beyond	  their	  
historical	  merits	  or	  the	  overall	  relevance	  of	  their	  representations.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
623	  Sales	  of	  The	  Railway	  Man	  would	  have	  received	  a	  boost	  from	  its	  serialisation	  in	  the	  Daily	  Mirror,	  and	  
were	  certainly	  lifted	  with	  the	  release	  of	  the	  film.	  Through	  January	  and	  February	  of	  2014	  more	  than	  100	  




The	  initial	  post-­‐war	  hiatus	  in	  cinematic	  representations	  was	  broken	  by	  two	  films	  that	  told	  the	  
story	  of	  women	  internees,	  whose	  stories	  of	  struggle	  and	  survival	  were	  perhaps	  more	  
acceptable	  to	  the	  film	  makers	  and	  the	  public	  at	  large	  than	  those	  of	  the	  conquered	  and	  
emasculated	  prisoners	  of	  war.	  Three	  Came	  Home	  (1950)624	  was	  based	  on	  the	  autobiographical	  
account	  of	  internment	  on	  Borneo	  by	  Agnes	  Keith,	  the	  American	  wife	  of	  a	  British	  colonial	  
official.625	  	  Keith’s	  nationality	  no	  doubt	  helped	  the	  book	  to	  make	  it	  onto	  the	  screen,	  and	  there	  
was	  a	  similarly	  international	  partnership	  in	  the	  1956	  film	  of	  Nevil	  Shute’s	  A	  Town	  Like	  Alice,626	  
where	  a	  British	  woman	  survives	  internment	  to	  meet	  an	  Australian	  she	  had	  met	  briefly	  in	  
captivity.627	  	  
The	  first	  releases	  that	  represented	  the	  POW	  experience	  directly	  were	  based	  on	  fictionalised	  
accounts	  constructed	  by	  authors	  who	  had	  been	  in	  the	  camps	  of	  Asia.	  Given	  the	  proximity	  of	  
these	  early	  releases	  to	  the	  events	  they	  described,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  novel	  was	  
the	  chosen	  source	  format,	  screening	  the	  identity	  (real	  or	  imagined)	  of	  the	  allied	  prisoners.	  	  The	  
Bridge	  on	  the	  River	  Kwai,	  (1957),628	  was	  based	  on	  a	  novel	  of	  life	  on	  the	  Railway	  by	  the	  French	  
author	  Pierre	  Boulle.	  He	  had	  spent	  a	  little	  time	  in	  the	  camps	  following	  his	  capture	  by	  Vichy	  
troops	  in	  French	  Indochina,	  and	  he	  used	  this	  experience,	  and	  his	  knowledge	  of	  several	  
collaborating	  French	  officers,	  to	  construct	  his	  best-­‐seller.	  Whilst	  both	  the	  book	  and	  the	  film	  
caused	  uproar	  amongst	  many	  veterans,	  particularly	  in	  Britain,	  for	  its	  portrayal	  of	  the	  
collaborating	  Colonel	  Nicholson	  character	  and	  of	  FEPOWs	  generally,	  it	  was	  also	  indicative	  of	  
some	  of	  the	  tensions	  of	  class	  and	  military	  structural	  relations	  that	  beleaguered	  the	  British	  
military	  in	  many	  locations,	  although	  again	  ironically	  enough,	  not	  this	  one.	  King	  Rat,	  released	  in	  
1965,	  offered	  a	  similarly	  brutalised	  and	  fictionalised	  account	  that	  whilst	  offering	  some	  insights	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
624	  Three	  Came	  Home	  (1950)	  Twentieth	  Century	  Fox	  Film	  Corporation.	  
625	  Keith,	  Agnes.	  (1947)	  Three	  Came	  Home.	  Little	  Brown	  and	  Company,	  Boston.	  
626	  A	  Town	  Like	  Alice.	  (1956)	  Rank	  Organisation/Vic	  Films	  Productions.	  
627	  Shute,	  Nevil	  (1950)	  A	  Town	  Like	  Alice.	  William	  Heinemann,	  London.	  
628	  The	  Bridge	  on	  the	  River	  Kwai.	  (1957)	  Columbia	  Pictures	  Corporation/Horizon	  Pictures	  (II)	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into	  the	  social	  dimensions	  of	  camp	  life,	  is	  open	  to	  particular	  accusations	  of	  inaccuracy	  at	  the	  
specific	  location	  it	  was	  situated	  in	  at	  Changi.629	  	  
The	  film	  portrayal	  of	  the	  American	  lead	  character,	  the	  King,	  was	  a	  sanitised	  and	  romanticised	  
representation	  considerably	  at	  odds	  not	  only	  with	  Clavell’s	  original,	  but	  also	  with	  that	  small	  
section	  of	  US	  prisoners	  that	  were	  encountered	  by	  the	  British,	  particularly	  later	  in	  the	  war	  in	  
Japan,	  who	  adopted	  a	  commercial	  approach	  to	  the	  business	  of	  survival	  that	  would	  have	  
impressed	  the	  most	  notorious	  of	  crime	  families.	  	  Such	  a	  disinfected	  depiction	  should	  not	  be	  
surprising	  given	  the	  source	  of	  funding	  and	  the	  potential	  markets	  for	  the	  film,	  and	  a	  similar	  
characterisation	  would	  recur	  in	  Empire	  of	  the	  Sun	  (1987)	  over	  twenty	  years	  later.630	  	  The	  
impact	  of	  these	  early	  films	  on	  the	  post	  war	  narrative	  was	  compounded	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  
further	  representations	  on	  screen	  until	  the	  early	  1980s.	  
It	  would	  be	  1981	  before	  the	  captivity	  story	  returned	  to	  the	  screen,	  with	  the	  television	  serial	  
Tenko,	  a	  dramatization	  over	  three	  seasons	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  women	  internees.631	  This	  was	  a	  
series	  that	  had	  to	  fight	  its	  own	  battles,	  not	  just	  through	  the	  celluloid	  ceiling,	  but	  also	  through	  
the	  glass	  ceiling	  of	  procurement	  at	  the	  male	  dominated	  BBC.	  As	  a	  television	  series,	  	  and	  thus	  
freed	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  immediacy	  required	  in	  a	  big	  screen	  production,	  the	  directors	  had	  
a	  much	  larger	  canvas	  of	  screen	  time	  upon	  which	  to	  paint	  a	  more	  realistic	  representation	  of	  the	  
pace	  of	  daily	  life	  in	  captivity.	  	  	  
After	  a	  further	  cinematic	  hiatus	  it	  would	  not	  be	  until	  the	  new	  millennium	  that	  films	  about	  the	  
FEPOW	  experience	  returned	  to	  the	  cinema,	  with	  the	  release	  of	  To	  End	  All	  Wars	  in	  2001,632	  a	  
film	  based	  on	  Ernest	  Gordon’s	  book,	  Miracle	  on	  the	  River	  Kwai,	  which	  provided	  the	  first	  
cinematic	  representation	  that	  focussed	  on	  the	  horrors	  of	  the	  Railway	  since	  the	  somewhat	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
629	  King	  Rat.	  (1965)	  Coleytown.	  
630	  Empire	  of	  the	  Sun.	  (1987)	  	  Amblin	  Entertainment/Warner	  Bros.	  
631	  Tenko.	  (1981-­‐1984)	  BBC/ABC.	  




glossy	  portrayal	  in	  The	  Bridge	  on	  the	  River	  Kwai,	  	  albeit	  leavened	  with	  a	  portion	  of	  western	  and	  
Christian	  redemption	  and	  reconciliation.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  the	  film	  of	  Eric	  Lomax’s	  The	  Railway	  
Man,	  released	  in	  2013,	  recounts	  the	  horrors	  of	  torture	  by	  the	  Japanese	  while	  he	  was	  on	  the	  
Railway,	  before	  concluding	  with	  an	  act	  of	  reconciliation	  and	  forgiveness	  with	  the	  Japanese	  
soldier,	  Nagase	  Takashi,	  who	  had	  acted	  as	  translator	  for	  his	  torturers.633	  	  
The	  screenwriter	  made	  numerous	  amendments	  to	  the	  original	  text,	  and	  there	  were	  two	  in	  
particular	  that	  diverge	  from	  the	  book	  and	  present	  the	  viewer	  with	  a	  somewhat	  different	  
picture	  from	  that	  it	  provided.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  director’s	  perceived	  need	  to	  compress	  
the	  story	  into	  an,	  if	  not	  in	  this	  context	  entertaining,	  at	  least	  a	  compelling	  narrative.	  In	  the	  film	  
the	  scenes	  during	  the	  war	  are	  condensed	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  torture	  that	  Lomax	  suffered.	  Whilst	  
this	  is	  typical	  of	  virtually	  any	  film,	  in	  this	  case	  it	  leaves	  the	  viewer	  with	  a	  very	  singular	  
impression	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  captivity.	  In	  the	  original	  account	  Lomax	  wrote	  that	  prior	  to	  
February	  1943	  he	  had	  ‘never	  seen	  any	  prisoner	  threatened	  with	  assault’.634	  His	  own	  
tribulations	  started	  at	  the	  end	  of	  September	  1943,	  the	  worst	  of	  which	  were	  the	  several	  weeks	  
of	  torture	  that	  followed.	  Around	  two	  months	  later	  he	  was	  sent	  down	  to	  Singapore’s	  Outram	  
Rd	  Jail,	  one	  of	  the	  more	  unpleasant	  sites	  operated	  by	  the	  Japanese	  and	  reserved	  for	  what	  they	  
considered	  to	  be	  problem	  prisoners.	  Here	  he	  would	  remain	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  times	  when	  
he	  was	  sent	  to	  Changi	  Hospital)	  until	  he	  returned	  to	  Changi	  five	  months	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
war.	  It	  should	  be	  stressed	  that	  the	  period	  of	  the	  torture	  that	  provided	  the	  most	  memorable	  
scenes	  in	  the	  film	  was	  untypical	  of	  most	  of	  even	  Lomax’s	  exceptional	  experience	  in	  captivity.	  
Yet	  that	  is	  what	  most	  people	  who	  see	  The	  Railway	  Man	  will	  take	  away	  from	  it,	  an	  
unrepresentative	  image	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  other	  insights	  creates	  the	  false	  impression	  
that	  conditions	  were	  always	  like	  that.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
633	  The	  Railway	  Man	  (2013)	  Archer	  Street	  Productions/Latitude	  Media/Lionsgate/Pictures	  in	  Paradise/	  
Silver	  Reel/	  Thai	  Occidental	  Productions.	  
634	  Lomax,	  The	  Railway	  Man,	  p94.	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The	  second	  rewrite	  that	  has	  implications	  for	  the	  overall	  meaning	  of	  the	  film	  involves	  how	  the	  
Japanese	  interpreter,	  Nagase	  Takashi,	  is	  portrayed,	  and	  how	  the	  meeting	  of	  reconciliation	  is	  
staged.	  The	  scene	  of	  reconciliation	  between	  Gordon	  and	  Nagase	  in	  To	  End	  All	  Wars	  is	  actually	  
much	  closer	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  Lomax	  meeting	  than	  the	  completely	  fictionalised	  dramatic	  
denouement	  in	  The	  Railway	  Man.	  John	  Nunnely	  suggested,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  then	  ongoing	  
discussions	  over	  suitable	  apologies	  and	  compensation,	  that	  there	  was	  a	  danger	  of	  
triumphalism	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  extraction	  of	  such	  an	  apology,	  that	  could	  preclude	  any	  
meaningful	  sense	  of	  reconciliation.635	  Such	  dramatized	  reconstructions	  of	  acts	  of	  conciliation	  
are	  in	  danger	  of	  spreading	  conceptions	  of	  triumphalism	  beyond	  the	  FEPOW	  community	  who	  
Nunnely	  was	  referring	  to	  and	  into	  the	  wider	  viewing	  public.	  
The	  distillation	  of	  the	  FEPOW	  experience,	  already	  filtered	  through	  the	  net	  of	  publishing,	  
becomes	  even	  clearer	  when	  the	  cinematic	  canon	  is	  considered,	  feeding	  largely	  from	  a	  select	  
few	  titles.	  Whilst	  reconciliation	  has	  come	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  some	  of	  the	  accounts	  that	  have	  
successfully	  quenched	  the	  thirst	  of	  publishers	  and	  filmmakers	  for	  harsh	  and	  exceptional	  





A	  dominant	  theme	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  outlooks	  of	  the	  FEPOWs	  towards	  the	  Japanese	  people	  has	  
been	  one	  of	  reconciliation.	  The	  paths	  to	  reconciliation	  have	  been	  varied	  and	  occurred	  
throughout	  the	  period,	  informed	  by	  political	  and	  religious	  beliefs,	  life	  events	  and	  contacts,	  
chance	  and	  time.	  Whilst	  very	  few	  could	  forget	  their	  experiences,	  many	  came	  to	  find	  a	  level	  of	  
conciliation	  that	  is	  a	  remarkable	  testament	  to	  the	  power	  of	  human	  nature	  to	  overcome	  such	  
bitter	  conditions	  as	  those	  that	  the	  prisoners	  endured.	  This	  finding	  is	  also	  somewhat	  at	  odds	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  Michael.	  (2004)	  “Prisoners	  of	  the	  Japanese	  and	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  Politics	  of	  Apology:	  A	  Battle	  over	  
History	  and	  Memory.”	  Journal	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  39(4),	  p563.	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with	  the	  persistent	  antipathetic	  popular	  memory	  of	  the	  episode,	  which	  has	  been	  informed	  by	  
the	  frequently	  commercial	  approach	  to	  mass	  media	  depictions.	  	  
Such	  accounts	  frequently	  resorted	  to	  and	  constructed	  a	  standard	  narrative	  which	  focussed	  on	  
the	  worst	  moments	  and	  elements	  of	  camp	  life,	  usually	  as	  seen	  through	  the	  eyes	  of	  those	  
officers	  who	  found	  themselves	  on	  the	  Railway.	  In	  such	  extreme	  circumstances	  these	  officers	  
were	  more	  likely	  to	  find	  themselves	  at	  the	  sharp	  end	  of	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  contacts,	  although	  for	  
most	  of	  their	  colleagues,	  either	  in	  Changi	  or	  at	  other	  camps	  where	  they	  were	  imprisoned,	  their	  
circumstances	  were	  usually	  considerably	  less	  taxing	  than	  those	  of	  the	  other	  ranks.	  The	  story	  of	  
most	  of	  the	  officers	  was	  probably	  as	  unattractive	  to	  the	  entertainment	  industry	  as	  it	  was	  
contradictory	  to	  the	  national	  imaginings	  of	  soldier-­‐heroes,	  but	  such	  factors	  should	  not	  
preclude	  their	  story	  being	  told,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  balanced	  overall	  representation.	  The	  more	  
mundane	  and	  less	  exciting	  stories	  of	  the	  BORs	  and	  their	  longer	  term,	  less	  immediate	  suffering	  
due	  to	  overwork,	  illness	  and	  hunger,	  would	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  reach	  a	  mass	  audience.	  Wulf	  
Kansteiner	  has	  written	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  marginalisation	  of	  those	  without	  access	  to	  the	  
means	  of	  communication:	  
Small	  groups	  whose	  members	  have	  directly	  experienced	  such	  traumatic	  events	  
(veterans’	  or	  survivors’	  groups)	  only	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  shape	  the	  national	  memory	  if	  
they	  command	  the	  means	  to	  express	  their	  visions,	  and	  if	  their	  visions	  meet	  with	  
compatible	  social	  or	  political	  objectives	  and	  inclinations	  among	  other	  important	  social	  
groups.636	  
	  
Despite	  the	  occasional	  congruence	  with	  the	  former	  prisoners,	  as	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
compensation	  issue,	  the	  vested	  interests	  of	  those	  ‘important	  social	  groups’	  who	  command	  the	  
vectors	  of	  mass	  communication	  have	  limited	  the	  opportunities	  for	  the	  former	  BORs	  to	  present	  
their	  experiences.	  This	  has	  led	  to	  an	  unbalanced	  representation	  of	  captivity	  in	  Asia	  that	  has	  
privileged	  the	  reproduction	  of	  a	  small	  and	  select	  group	  of	  those	  who	  were	  there.	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  in	  Memory:	  A	  Methodological	  Critique	  of	  Collective	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This	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  experiences	  of	  a	  section	  of	  the	  officer	  corps	  and	  the	  main	  body	  
of	  the	  other	  ranks,	  and	  the	  privileging	  of	  the	  former	  in	  the	  media,	  offers	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  
divergence	  of	  the	  popular	  narrative	  from	  the	  reconciliation	  experienced	  by	  many	  of	  the	  BORs.	  
Despite	  the	  widespread	  examples	  of	  conciliation,	  popular	  perceptions	  have	  been	  slow	  to	  
recognise	  them	  and	  media	  gatekeepers	  have	  remained	  reluctant	  to	  stray	  from	  their	  
established	  storyline.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  certain	  irony	  to	  this	  as	  the	  post-­‐war	  reconciliation	  achieved	  by	  many	  would	  seem	  to	  
be	  a	  textbook	  example	  of	  British	  self-­‐perceptions	  of	  tolerance	  and	  worthy	  of	  greater	  exposure.	  
There	  is	  a	  limited	  acknowledgment	  of	  this	  in	  some	  of	  the	  representations	  examined.	  However	  
such	  reconstructions	  are	  frequently	  reproduced	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  qualify	  this	  tolerance	  as	  
being	  conditional	  on	  the	  inevitable	  victory	  of	  superior	  western	  cultural	  values,	  a	  triumph	  over	  
the	  bestiality	  of	  those	  less	  civilised	  than	  ourselves.	  It	  doesn’t	  take	  too	  much	  digging	  at	  the	  IWM	  
to	  unearth	  evidence	  that	  contradicts	  such	  hegemonic	  assumptions,	  but	  such	  examples	  don’t	  sit	  
easily	  with	  either	  our	  own	  perceptions	  of	  self	  or	  with	  the	  identity	  that	  is	  constructed	  for	  us	  and	  
reproduced	  in	  the	  mass	  media.	  They	  don’t	  sell	  newspapers,	  books	  or	  cinema	  seats	  either.	  
One	  former	  prisoner	  of	  the	  Japanese	  asserted	  on	  the	  last	  page	  of	  his	  book	  that	  ‘remembering	  
is	  not	  enough,	  if	  it	  simply	  hardens	  the	  hate.’637	  Unfortunately	  the	  organisations	  and	  industries	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Few	  people	  will	  undergo	  the	  kaleidoscope	  of	  emotions	  that	  the	  servicemen	  sent	  out	  to	  Asia	  in	  
1941	  experienced	  within	  a	  few	  short	  months.	  After	  leaving	  war-­‐torn	  Britain,	  mostly	  for	  the	  first	  
time,	  they	  sampled	  the	  wildly	  contrasting	  locations	  of	  an	  empire	  that	  was	  unbeknown	  to	  them	  
nearing	  its	  end,	  a	  demise	  that	  they	  would	  soon	  play	  a	  role	  in.	  Welcomed	  to	  Singapore	  by	  the	  
now	  familiar	  sound	  of	  bombing,	  they	  experienced	  the	  tension	  of	  being	  in	  a	  combat	  zone	  
before,	  contrary	  to	  all	  they	  had	  believed	  possible,	  they	  suffered	  a	  humiliating	  defeat	  at	  the	  
hands	  an	  Asian	  enemy.	  After	  their	  shame	  had	  been	  publicly	  paraded	  for	  all	  the	  local	  
populations	  to	  see,	  they	  entered	  into	  another	  totally	  new	  experience,	  that	  of	  a	  captivity	  that	  
would	  occupy,	  for	  those	  who	  survived	  it,	  the	  next	  three	  and	  a	  half	  years	  of	  their	  lives.	  Here	  
they	  would	  remain	  near	  hermetically	  sealed	  off	  from	  home,	  and	  from	  the	  changes	  taking	  place	  
in	  the	  wider	  world.	  
Whilst	  some	  of	  their	  officers	  set	  about	  trying	  rebuild	  their	  ravaged	  self-­‐image,	  from	  the	  
shattered	  remains	  of	  the	  imagined	  soldier-­‐heroes	  they	  had	  left	  behind	  on	  the	  battlefields	  of	  
Hong	  Kong,	  Malaya	  and	  Singapore,	  the	  men,	  their	  sense	  of	  identity	  equally	  bruised,	  suffered	  
the	  further	  indignity	  of	  being	  made	  to	  work	  like	  “coolies”,	  with	  rations	  to	  match.	  For	  some,	  the	  
children	  of	  the	  inter-­‐war	  depression	  years,	  such	  hardship	  was	  not	  entirely	  new,	  food	  had	  been	  
poor,	  and	  work,	  if	  you	  could	  get	  it,	  was	  frequently	  tough.	  But	  even	  that	  upbringing	  could	  not	  
have	  prepared	  them	  for	  what	  was	  to	  come.	  
Divisions	  of	  class,	  which	  had	  been	  so	  visible	  on	  the	  convoys	  out,	  now	  became	  more	  clearly	  
drawn,	  as	  whilst	  conditions	  got	  worse	  for	  everyone,	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  poor	  nutrition,	  
work	  and	  illness	  fell	  heaviest	  on	  those	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  military	  ladder,	  as	  demonstrated	  
explicitly	  by	  the	  mortality	  figures	  presented.	  Whilst	  in	  Britain	  the	  whole	  of	  society	  was	  
supposedly	  pulling	  together,	  it	  seemed	  to	  many	  in	  the	  camps	  that	  the	  divisions	  were	  becoming	  
wider.	  As	  with	  any	  society,	  it	  was	  never	  quite	  as	  simple	  as	  an	  “us	  and	  them”	  situation,	  with	  the	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privileges	  of	  rank	  operating	  on	  every	  step	  of	  the	  ladder.	  This	  aspect	  of	  FEPOW	  experience	  has	  
largely	  been	  lost	  from	  view	  as	  the	  post-­‐war	  British	  establishment,	  recovering	  from	  the	  
exertions	  of	  a	  long	  and	  debilitating	  conflict,	  largely	  chose	  to	  forget	  about	  the	  hostilities	  in	  Asia,	  
the	  defeat	  in	  Singapore	  and	  those	  taken	  prisoner.	  	  
British	  attitudes	  to	  race	  could	  also	  be	  delineated	  in	  Asia,	  made	  all	  the	  clearer	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  
in	  the	  midst	  of	  so	  many	  new	  and	  different	  peoples.	  Whilst	  there	  was	  evidence	  of	  fairly	  
widespread	  racialized	  language,	  this	  rarely	  translated	  into	  outright	  bigotry.	  The	  closest	  contact	  
with	  men	  of	  another	  race	  was	  with	  the	  Eurasian	  Dutch,	  and	  given	  that	  the	  camp	  environment	  
was	  so	  conducive	  to	  the	  stimulation	  of	  tensions,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  a	  little	  surprising,	  given	  the	  oft	  
stated	  assumptions	  of	  a	  common	  British	  racism	  at	  that	  time,	  that	  only	  a	  minority	  of	  the	  BORs	  
felt	  any	  real	  sense	  of	  antipathy	  towards	  them.	  Just	  as	  many	  of	  the	  men	  had	  a	  positive	  opinion	  
of	  their	  Dutch	  colleagues.	  Less	  surprising	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  antagonism,	  where	  it	  existed,	  
was	  often	  hidden	  from	  plain	  sight.	  	  
In	  plainer	  sight	  has	  been	  the	  use	  of	  racialized	  assumptions	  with	  regard	  to	  post-­‐war	  narratives	  
that	  have	  grown	  around	  the	  themes	  of	  escape	  and	  the	  1943	  cholera	  epidemic.	  In	  both	  topics	  it	  
is	  possible	  to	  suggest	  that	  such	  assertions	  were	  not	  as	  clear	  cut	  as	  the	  subsequent	  expositions	  
would	  have	  us	  believe.	  In	  these	  cases	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  were	  other	  factors	  at	  
work,	  and	  that	  racial	  tropes	  have	  been	  employed	  to	  mitigate	  inaction	  in	  the	  matter	  of	  escape	  
and	  a	  sense	  of	  guilt	  regarding	  the	  Tamils	  on	  the	  Railway.	  	  
Views	  on	  the	  Japanese	  are	  harder	  to	  evaluate,	  because	  of	  the	  obvious	  distortions	  created	  by	  
the	  regime	  that	  the	  prisoners	  were	  subjected	  to.	  Yet	  despite	  what	  they	  went	  through,	  
remarkably	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  BORs	  could	  find	  some	  degree	  of	  reconciliation	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  
period.	  It	  would	  be	  interesting	  in	  this	  context	  to	  compare	  the	  outlooks	  of	  the	  FEPOWs,	  who	  
had	  to	  live	  with	  the	  Japanese	  as	  captors	  for	  three	  and	  a	  half	  years,	  with	  those	  of	  the	  men	  of	  
the	  14th	  Army	  who	  were	  conditioned	  to	  kill	  them,	  a	  task	  they	  carried	  out	  with	  great	  success	  in	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Burma	  during	  the	  latter	  years	  of	  the	  war.	  Unfortunately	  the	  14th	  Army	  has	  left	  far	  fewer	  
records	  at	  the	  IWM,	  particularly	  among	  the	  other	  ranks,	  and	  the	  distance	  of	  time	  probably	  
now	  precludes	  such	  an	  analysis.	  
The	  predominance	  of	  colonialism	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  British	  attitudes	  to	  race	  has	  been	  
questioned	  by	  Tony	  Kushner,	  who	  has	  suggested	  that	  popular	  culture	  was	  of	  particular	  
importance	  in	  how	  Britons	  viewed	  the	  black	  GIs.	  The	  evidence	  from	  this	  survey	  is	  mixed;	  
certainly	  film	  was	  a	  frequently	  cited	  source	  of	  how	  the	  men	  identified	  those	  they	  met,	  civilian	  
or	  military,	  although	  the	  reality	  was	  sometimes	  not	  surprisingly	  a	  little	  different.	  With	  regard	  
to	  the	  colonial	  influence	  the	  evidence	  is	  less	  clear.	  Certainly	  around	  half	  of	  the	  subjects	  used	  
“colonial”	  language	  in	  their	  diaries	  with	  regard	  to	  local	  civilians,	  but	  where	  this	  originated	  from	  
is	  debatable.	  It	  could	  have	  been	  prevalent	  at	  home	  and	  thus	  they	  brought	  it	  with	  them,	  or	  they	  
could	  have	  become	  rapidly	  acculturated	  to	  their	  new	  surroundings.	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  an	  
equal	  number	  of	  them	  chose	  not	  to	  use	  such	  epithets.	  	  
Kushner	  also	  points	  to	  a	  mutability	  in	  outlooks,	  which	  is	  largely	  absent	  among	  the	  diarists,	  
suggesting	  a	  greater	  rigidity	  in	  attitudes,	  although	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  is	  too	  small	  to	  make	  
any	  significant	  judgements.	  The	  interviews	  and	  memoirs	  that	  made	  up	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  cohort	  
are	  not	  much	  use	  in	  this	  context,	  as	  they	  provide	  only	  a	  snapshot	  of	  the	  views	  at	  the	  time	  they	  
were	  recorded,	  although	  several	  of	  the	  men	  recalled	  how	  first	  contacts	  could	  sometimes	  
change	  their	  preformed	  opinions.	  
British,	  imperial	  and	  western	  identities	  could	  often	  overlap,	  particularly	  when	  defined	  by	  the	  
parameter	  of	  race.	  For	  many	  of	  the	  other	  ranks	  “POW”	  was	  how	  they	  saw	  themselves,	  and	  
where	  unit	  discipline	  was	  less	  strict	  many	  small	  groups	  of	  assorted	  nationalities	  could	  coalesce,	  
and	  it	  could	  be	  a	  source	  of	  some	  irritation	  if	  they	  were	  ordered	  back	  into	  regimental	  and	  
national	  huts.	  Whilst	  some	  might	  suggest	  that	  there	  was	  a	  sense	  of	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  solidarity	  
against	  the	  Dutch,	  the	  evidence	  of	  this	  survey	  suggests	  that	  this	  took	  a	  wider	  European	  or	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western	  sense,	  encompassing	  the	  white	  and	  usually	  English-­‐speaking	  Dutch	  and	  was	  
constructed	  against	  the	  Dutch	  Eurasian	  other,	  although	  as	  discussed,	  such	  attitudes	  were	  far	  
from	  hegemonic.	  
In	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  the	  establishment	  has	  been	  accused	  of	  largely	  ignoring	  the	  FEPOW	  
community,	  be	  it	  through	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Official	  History	  to	  tell	  their	  story,	  the	  lack	  of	  much	  
needed	  support	  or	  the	  paltry	  compensation	  figure	  originally	  paid	  to	  them.	  The	  embarrassment	  
of	  the	  establishment	  at	  the	  failure	  in	  Singapore	  had	  in	  turn	  created	  similar	  failings	  closer	  to	  
home.	  Under	  such	  circumstances	  it	  is	  perhaps	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  narrative	  of	  captivity	  in	  
Asia	  has	  been	  frozen	  in	  time.	  This	  process	  has	  been	  enhanced	  by	  the	  continued	  narrow	  
representation	  of	  that	  experience	  by	  the	  media,	  in	  a	  way	  has	  privileged	  the	  voices	  of	  an	  
unrepresentative	  few	  in	  what	  has	  largely	  been	  a	  search	  for	  profits.	  With	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  war	  
generation	  their	  voices	  will	  become	  even	  more	  muted,	  but	  fortunately	  they	  can	  still	  be	  
recovered	  from	  records	  such	  as	  those	  held	  at	  the	  Imperial	  War	  Museum.	  
This	  thesis	  has	  adopted	  a	  social	  history	  methodological	  approach	  to	  sources	  that	  are	  more	  
commonly	  associated	  with	  military	  matters.	  In	  so	  doing	  it	  has	  revealed	  a	  rich	  seam	  of	  evidence	  
that	  can	  inform	  understandings	  of	  race,	  class	  and	  identity	  in	  a	  wider	  national	  context.	  The	  
archives	  of	  the	  Imperial	  War	  Museum	  contain	  the	  source	  material	  for	  many	  similar	  avenues	  of	  
research.	  Whilst	  a	  deeper	  examination	  of	  the	  14th	  Army	  in	  Burma	  may	  not	  have	  been	  possible,	  
there	  are	  many	  other	  plausible	  avenues	  of	  investigation.	  Comparisons	  on	  similar	  (or	  a	  variety	  
of	  other)	  topics	  as	  covered	  here	  could	  be	  made	  with	  troops	  stationed	  in	  India	  and	  elsewhere,	  
and	  through	  different	  time	  periods.	  The	  travelling	  researcher	  could	  make	  trans-­‐national	  
comparative	  studies	  utilising	  archival	  sources	  in	  Australia,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  
Netherlands.	  	  
The	  final	  word	  must	  go	  to	  the	  men	  who	  have	  been	  a	  major	  part	  of	  my	  life	  over	  the	  past	  few	  
years.	  They	  have	  frequently	  confounded	  my	  expectations,	  while	  confirming	  a	  few.	  Reading	  and	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listening	  to	  their	  accounts	  rarely	  fails	  to	  generate	  an	  emotional	  response,	  and	  yet	  despite	  the	  
grim	  nature	  of	  their	  experience	  I	  have	  also	  found	  myself	  laughing	  with	  them	  a	  surprising	  
number	  of	  times,	  an	  indication	  of	  their	  spirit	  in	  adversity.	  	  An	  overall	  picture	  has	  formed	  of	  a	  
group	  of	  ordinary	  men,	  with	  the	  virtues	  and	  faults	  that	  are	  common	  to	  the	  human	  condition,	  
who	  struggled	  to	  come	  to	  terms,	  not	  only	  with	  the	  extraordinary	  circumstances	  that	  fate	  
decreed	  upon	  them	  during	  the	  war,	  but	  also	  with	  their	  memories	  and	  the	  persistent	  























Sources:	  	  Imperial	  War	  Museum	  –	  Documents	  Archive	  
NAME	   	   	   IWM	  Cat.	  No.	   	   Rank	   	   	   Regiment	  
Caldwell,	  E.J.	   	   11092	  (ts	  diary)	  	   Pte	   	   	   RAOC	  
Carpenter,	  C.	   	   1484	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   Pte	   	   	   5th	  Norfolks	  
Coates,	  N.H.	   	   6651	  	  	  (ms	  diary)	   Sapper	   	   	   251	  Fd	  Park	  Coy,	  RE	  
Davies,	  E.W	   	   3656	  	  	  (ms	  diary)	   Sgt	   	   	   RCS	  
Dawson,	  S.	   	   3156	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   Pte	   	   	   RAOC	  
Dixon,	  H.	  	   	   13003	  (ts	  memoir)	   Pte	   	   	   RASC	  
Flello,	  F.E.L.	  	   	   3662	  	  	  (ms	  diary)	   Cpl	   	   	   5th	  Beds/Herts	  
Grafton,	  A.W.F.	  	   6466	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   L	  Bdr	   	   	   3rd	  HAA	  Regt,	  RA	  
Gregory,	  D.L.	   	   8105	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   Aircraftman	   	   RAF	  
Henderson,	  E.S.	  	   8225	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   Cpl	   	   	   5th	  Beds/Herts	  
Holden,	  E.	  	  	   	   2510	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   Pte	   	   	   RAOC	  
Houghton,	  J.R.	   	   2258	  	  	  (ms	  diary)	   Pte	   	   	   5th	  Loyals	  
Oakley,	  V.F.T.	   	   8278	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   Wireless	  Operator	   RAF	  
Parry,	  E.W.	   	   2729	  	  	  (ms	  diary)	   Bdr	   	   	   88	  Field	  Regt,	  RA	  
Pitfield,	  T.W.	   	   6398	  	  	  (ms	  diary)	   Gnr	   	   	   118	  Field	  Regt,	  RA	  
Rose,	  W.C.	   	   [05/58/1]	  (ms	  diary)	   Sgt	   	   	   RAF	  
Street,	  G.A.	   	   1683	  	  	  (ms	  diary)	   NCO	   	   	   2nd	  Cambs	  
Strong,	  G.	  	  	   	   6838	  	  	  (ms	  diary)	   Pte	   	   	   RAOC	  
Taylor,	  J.D.	   	   841	  	  	  	  	  	  (ts	  report,	  1943)	  Cpl	   	   	   Intelligence	  Corps	  
Toze,	  A.V.	   	   1133	  	  	  (ms	  diary)	   L	  Bdr	   	   	   122	  Field	  Regt,	  RA	  
	  
Barratt,	  J.A.L.	   	   1771	  	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   Cap	   	   	   4th	  Norfolks	  
Crawley,	  N.	   	   1132	  	  	  	  (cig	  packet)	   Lt	  Col	   	   	   118	  Field	  Regt,	  RA	  
Davies,	  G.P.	   	   448	  	  	  	  	  	  (ms	  diary)	   Cap	   	   	   2nd	  Loyals	  
De	  Cayley,	  F.E.	   	   7888	  	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   Cap	   	   	   5th	  Suffolks	  
Eva,	  O.V.	   	   2381	  	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   Lt	   	   	   9th	  Northd	  Fusiliers	  
Hines,	  D.V.E.	   	   463	  	  	  	  	  	  (ms	  diary)	  	   Lt	   	   	   3/17	  Dogras	  (IA)	  
Hobbs,	  T.W.	   	   845	  	  	  	  	  	  (ts/ms	  diary)	   Lt	   	   	   21	  LAA	  Regt,	  RA	  
Inglefield,	  G.	   	   1478	  	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   Cap	   	   	   1	  Sherwood	  Foresters	  
Merrett,	  F.M.	   	   1293	  	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   Cap	   	   	   RAOC	  
Steeds,	  A.J.	   	   8398	  	  	  	  (ts	  diary)	  	   Lt	   	   	   6	  HAA	  Regt,	  RA	  
Wylie,	  J.	   	   6872	  	  	  	  (assorted)	   Maj	   	   	   125th	  Anti-­‐Tank	  Regt	  
	  
Baker,	  C.H.	   	   1439	  	  	  	  (ts	  memoir)	   Liaison	  Officer	   	   ABDA	  Command	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Sources:	  	  Imperial	  War	  Museum	  –	  Sound	  Archive	  
	  
NAME	   	   	   IWM	  Cat.	  No.	   	   Rank	   	   	   Regiment	  
	  
Anckhorn,	  F.G	   	   22926	   	   	   Gnr	   	   	   118	  Field	  Regt,	  RA	  
Aspinall,	  J.	   	   10707	   	   	   Gnr	   	   	   5th	  Searchlight	  Regt	  
Bailey,	  C.	   	   4647	   	   	   NCO	   	   	   5th	  Loyals	  
Baynes,	  L.L.	   	   23226	   	   	   Sgt	   	   	   1st	  Cambs	  
Bennington,	  L.B.	   19092	   	   	   Pte	   	   	   2nd	  Cambs	  
Blackham,	  H.J.	   	   10980	   	   	   NCO	   	   	   RCS	  
Bouch,	  E.W.	   	   19102	   `	   	   Pte	   	   	   2nd	  Cambs	  
Cleveland,	  W.S.	  	   17348	   	   	   Pte	   	   	   1st	  Suffolks	  
Docketty,	  F.J.	   	   4822	   	   	   Gnr	   	   	   30th	  Searchlight	  Regt	  
Flegehen,	  R.	   	   32218	   	   	   Pte	   	   	   RAMC	  
Frasier,	  D.M.	   	   8302	   	   	   Spr	   	   	   36th	  Fortress	  Regt	  
Furbear,	  P.	   	   29063	   	   	   NCO	   	   	   135	  Field	  Regt,	  RA	  
Goulding,	  H.B.	   	   4808	   	   	   NCO	   	   	   35	  LAA	  Regt,	  RA	  
Gregory,	  J.R.	   	   6011	   	   	   NCO	   	   	   6th	  Norfolks	  
Griffiths,	  W.	   	   4749	   	   	   Aircraftman	   	   RAF	  
Gwillam,	  R.	   	   10789	   	   	   Gnr	   	   	   155	  Field	  Regt,	  RA	  
Harrison,	  G.W.	   	   10750	   	   	   Gnr	   	   	   5	  Field	  Regt,	  RA	  
Hawkins,	  R.A.	   	   18480	   	   	   Pte	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   5th	  Suffolks	  
Hughieson,	  J.	   	   28639	   	   	   Seaman	  	   	   Royal	  Navy	  
Jones,	  T.J.	   	   4890	   	   	   Gnr	   	   	   77	  HAA	  Regt,	  RA	  
Kirkwood,	  J.	   	   4793	   	   	   Aircraftman	   	   RAF	  
Lane,	  A.	  	   	   10295	   	   	   Drummer	   	   2nd	  Mancs	  
Larkin,	  C.J.	   	   6126	   	   	   NCO	   	   	   RCS	  
Lawrence,	  S.	   	   9706	   	   	   Aircraftman	   	   RAF	  
Long,	  J.	  	   	   15350	   	   	   Pte	   	   	   RASC	  
Marchant,	  G.E.	   	   10308	   	   	   Spr	   	   	   287	  Field	  Coy,	  RE	  
McGuire,	  F.	   	   6374	   	   	   NCO	   	   	   RCS	  
Mendelsohn,	  A.	  	   6801	   	   	   Pte	   	   	   5th	  Beds/Herts	  
Morley,	  A.J.	   	   9767	   	   	   NCO	   	   	   1st	  Cambs	  
Mutimer,	  P.J.	   	   4801	   	   	   NCO	   	   	   5th	  Searchlight	  Regt	  
Notley,	  W.R.	   	   16670	   	   	   Gnr	   	   	   155	  Field	  Regt,	  RA	  
Payne,	  H.	   	   4748	   	   	   Gnr	   	   	   137	  Field	  Regt,	  RA	  
Roberts,	  B.	   	   4796	   	   	   Signalman	   	   RCS	  
Roberts,	  J.	   	   6058	   	   	   NCO	   	   	   RAMC	  
Smith,	  J.	   	   10705	   	   	   Pte	   	   	   5th	  Loyals	  
Smith,	  L.	   	   9497	   	   	   Pte	   	   	   RAMC	  
Wade,	  J.D.	   	   9957	   	   	   Pte	   	   	   2nd	  Suffolks.	  
Wills,	  G.	   	   9498	   	   	   Gnr	   	   	   5th	  Searchlight	  Regt	  
Woodhouse,	  T.F.	   6184	   	   	   NCO	   	   	   RCS	  
Wyatt,	  J.A.	   	   4814	   	   	   NCO	   	   	   2nd	  East	  Surreys	  
Yerbury,	  F.	   	   18290	   	   	   Pte	   	   	   RAMC	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  Archive	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